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1. Julie Fallon stands to be sentenced today after being found guilty by a jury of the offence of culpable driving causing death contrary to s 29(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

2. The sentencing task is governed by the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). Section 7 of that Act specifies the purposes of sentencing. They include ensuring that the offender is adequately punished in a way that is just and appropriate; preventing crime by deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences; protecting the community from the offender; promoting their rehabilitation; making them accountable for their actions; denouncing their conduct and recognising the harm done to the victim and the community. The appropriate weight to be given to each purpose in any particular sentencing exercise is an assessment that must be made according to the circumstances of the individual case.

3. The offence of culpable driving causing death carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 14 years. Section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides that, in sentencing an offender for an offence punishable by imprisonment, the Court may impose a sentence of imprisonment only if satisfied, having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate. Mr Williamson SC, who appears for Ms Fallon, accepted that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate in the present case. That concession was appropriately made. While the maximum penalty of 14 years 1 is reserved for the worst case, which this case is not, the fact that the offence necessarily involves the taking of a human life means that a sentence of imprisonment is ordinarily considered necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing specified in the Act.

4. However, even where imprisonment is the only appropriate penalty, it remains necessary to decide how that sentence is to be served. A sentence of imprisonment must be served by full-time detention at a correctional centre unless the Court orders otherwise: s 10(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. The other orders the Court can make include suspending all or part of the sentence and placing the offender on a good behaviour order: s 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. While it may sound counter-intuitive, the Court can also order that a sentence of imprisonment be served in the community, for example under an intensive correction order or a drug and alcohol treatment order: ss 11 and 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act.

1 Cf DPP v Adams (No 6) [2025] ACTSC 554.

5. Mr Williamson accepted that the present offence is inherently serious because it involved the taking of a human life. However, he submitted that Ms Fallon could appropriately be sentenced to a term of imprisonment to be served by intensive correction in the community, for two reasons. First, he submitted that the objective seriousness of Ms Fallon’s manner of driving is relatively low. That submission raises a factual dispute which I must determine. Secondly, he submitted that an intensive correction order would be appropriate in the circumstances of this case because of the impact a sentence of full-time detention would have on Ms Fallon’s two young children, to whom she is in effect the sole parent, their father having moved back to Ireland. I will return to both issues.

6. Section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides a non-exhaustive list of mandatory sentencing considerations. The balancing of those factors in deciding how an offender should be sentenced is “a matter of instinctive synthesis”, which requires the sentencing judge “to take account of all of the relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all” (emphasis in original): DPP v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 at [5], citing Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64 at [75]; (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 611. The High Court noted in Dalgliesh at [7] that, as the extent to which each factor bears upon the case is inevitably a matter for judgment, the process of instinctive synthesis allows a measure of discretion to the sentencing judge.

Nature and circumstances of the offence

7. The first mandatory consideration specified in s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act is the nature and circumstances of the offence.

8. Ms Fallon’s offence was committed at around 7:30am on the morning of 23 May 2024, while she was driving her children to school. The weather was clear, but it was cold. As Ms Fallon drove along Atkins Street towards the intersection of Athllon Drive, her windscreen began to fog up on the inside. She did not pull over. Instead, she tried to clear the fog by turning on the “de-mister” and winding down both front windows. The evidence does not establish when she wound down the passenger window. That must also have taken her attention away from her driving to some extent, but I have put that consideration aside as it was not relied on in the prosecution case.

9. Ms Fallon turned left into Athllon Drive, where she was facing directly into the early morning sun. Athllon Drive is a two-way single lane road. It is sealed and in good condition. The speed limit was 80 km/h. At a point about 240 metres from the point where Ms Fallon turned onto that road, it curves to the left. Ms Fallon failed to navigate the curve, instead continuing straight ahead onto the wrong side of the road. At the point where Ms Fallon crossed onto the wrong side of the road, the first vehicle coming the other way was a Ford Ranger. The victim, Simon Smith, was riding a Triumph Daytona motorcycle directly behind the Ford Ranger. The driver of the Ford Ranger gave evidence at the trial that he saw Ms Fallon’s car encroach on his lane and that he swerved left to avoid a head-on collision. Mr Smith remained in the centre of his lane and collided with the front corner of Ms Fallon’s car. Her car ended up completely on the wrong side of the dividing line. Mr Smith was thrown some distance and suffered very severe injuries. He died in hospital two days later.

10. The allegation of culpable driving was based on two aspects of Ms Fallon’s driving: that she continued to drive when her view was obscured by fog on the inside of the windscreen and that she took her eyes off the road and looked to the left immediately before the collision. The prosecution alleged that Ms Fallon’s failure to navigate the left curve in the road was due to the combination of those two aspects of her driving.

11. Ms Fallon accepts that she turned her head to the left (taking her eyes off the road) immediately before the collision. That can be seen in dashcam footage tendered at the trial. However, there was a factual dispute as to whether her visibility was obscured by fog on her windscreen at that point. Mr Williamson submitted that, contrary to admissions made by Ms Fallon in the aftermath of the collision, the objective evidence shows that the view through her windscreen was not obscured by fog at that point.

12. Ms Fallon made admissions on that issue to a witness and to a police officer who interviewed her at the scene of the collision. She told the witness that her window “fogged up”. She told the police officer that she had “one or two out of 100” visibility.

13. However, the defence case at trial was that those admissions were wrong and overstated the extent to which Ms Fallon’s visibility was impaired. That submission was maintained at the sentence hearing. It was said to be supported by dashcam footage taken from the rear of the car travelling in front of Ms Fallon. Mr Williamson invited the Court to find that the dashcam footage shows that Ms Fallon’s windscreen had begun to clear immediately before the collision. It is that footage that shows Ms Fallon turning to her left immediately before the collision. Mr Williamson submitted that, as the viewer of the footage can see into her car, it follows that Ms Fallon must have been able to see out at that point.

14. I do not accept that submission, for two reasons. First, it is apparent from the footage that the camera is positioned higher than Ms Fallon’s line of sight (as it is angled down towards her from above). It is also apparent that the camera is facing in the opposite direction to the direction in which Ms Fallon was driving. Importantly, that means the camera was facing away from the sun, not directly into the sun, as Ms Fallon was. I accept that the footage shows Ms Fallon inside the car. The prosecution relied on that aspect of the footage because it shows her turning her eyes away from the road at the critical point. I also accept that the footage shows that the fog was not covering the whole of Ms Fallon’s windscreen at that point. The upper area of the windscreen was relatively clear. However, the lower part of the windscreen was fogged. The extent to which that obscured Ms Fallon’s view of the road cannot be judged by looking from the outside in, from a position higher than Ms Fallon’s line of sight and facing away from instead of into the sun. The two perspectives are simply not comparable. From Ms Fallon’s perspective, there was fog on the windscreen, and she was facing directly towards the sun.

15. The second reason I do not accept Mr Williamson’s submission is that there is no reason not to accept Ms Fallon’s admissions, both to a witness at the scene and to police. Mr Williamson submitted that the admissions are unreliable because Ms Fallon was in an extremely distressed state when she made them. That does not explain why she would exaggerate the extent to which her vision was obscured in the moments leading up to the collision. It might be thought that, if anything, a person distressed by their responsibility for a traumatic event would be more likely to deny or downplay their involvement than to overstate it. In any event, I found her admissions persuasive. Being admissions against interest when the events in question were very fresh in her mind, they provide an inherently plausible explanation as to why Ms Fallon collided head on with a motorcycle in broad daylight.

16. The conclusion that Ms Fallon could not see in front of her in the moments leading up to the collision is also supported by evidence at the trial concerning her manner of driving at that time. One witness gave evidence that her car was “swervy”. I note that other drivers can be seen in the dashcam footage driving in a steady path and not swerving. The only reasonable inference is that, in the moments leading up to the collision and before she turned her head to the left, Ms Fallon’s view through the windscreen was substantially obscured by fog on the inside of the windscreen.

17. Still, Ms Fallon did not pull over. She said that was for fear of hitting a pole. She did not stop for fear of being rear-ended. It may be noted that the fact that she had those thoughts provides another reason for rejecting the submission that her admissions were wrong and she could actually see the road ahead.

18. Why Ms Fallon turned her head to her left immediately before the collision is unexplained. Mr Williamson submitted that it was because the sun was in her eyes but there is no evidence that this was why she turned. Ms Fallon told Constable Rule that the window was completely fogged up and that when she came around the corner the sun was so low it “completely blinded” her. However she did not explain why she turned her head to the left. The expected reaction to having sun shining directly in a driver’s eyes would be to squint or shade the eyes rather than to turn to look away from the road while continuing to drive straight ahead.

19. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, due to a combination of fog on the inside of her windscreen and the sunlight shining directly in her eyes, Ms Fallon could not see the road ahead on Athllon Drive for a considerable distance. She compounded the danger of continuing to drive in those circumstances by turning her head to the left for a reason that remains unexplained. The importance of a driver always keeping their eyes on the road ahead while moving forward is obvious. In the result, instead of navigating the curve to the left, Ms Fallon continued straight ahead and so crossed onto the wrong side of the road, where she collided head-on with Mr Smith’s motorcycle, causing his death.

Objective seriousness of the offence

20. It is necessary to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence. The offence consists of causing the death of a person by the offender’s failure, unjustifiably and to a gross degree, to observe the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in all the circumstances of the case: s 29(7) of the Crimes Act. The maximum penalty of imprisonment for 14 years indicates that, while less serious than the offence of manslaughter (which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 20 years), it is nonetheless an offence of considerable gravity involving, as it does, the taking of a human life. That said, it may be accepted that, within the range of driving that might constitute the offence, there are degrees of seriousness.

21. In light of my finding concerning the extent and duration of impaired visibility through which Ms Fallon continued to drive I accept, as submitted by the prosecution, that her culpability is not confined to “a momentary lapse” when she turned her head to the left. The term “momentary lapse” must be taken in this context to refer to a second or seconds. In the circumstances in which Ms Fallon was driving that morning, on a single lane two-way road in morning traffic, and having had impaired visibility for a considerable distance, it is doubtful whether it was reasonable for her to take her eyes off the road at all. As already noted, the distance between the point where she turned onto Athllon Drive and the point of the collision was 240 metres. The evidence was that she was travelling at about 33 km/h at the time of the collision. It follows that she was driving along Athllon Drive for about 25 seconds before the collision. Over that entire time and distance, she failed to perceive the point ahead where the road curved to the left. In those circumstances, this case cannot be said to be at lowest end of the range of seriousness.

22. Conversely, I accept, as acknowledged by the prosecution, that Ms Fallon’s degree of culpability falls short of amounting to a complete abandonment of responsibility. Her manner of driving involved a substantial risk of a catastrophic outcome, but I do not think it can be concluded that Ms Fallon knowingly or deliberately took that risk. In my assessment, the proper characterisation of her manner of driving is that she was unduly preoccupied with the task of getting her children to school and that she wholly failed to heed or comprehend the danger caused by the fog on the windscreen or the very significant risk she was taking by continuing to drive with such limited visibility.

23. Ms Fallon must bear full responsibility for the offence (cf s 33(1)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act). However, I must bear in mind that there is a very broad range of culpable driving that can constitute this offence, from momentary inattention to street racing in traffic at high speed. I would assess the objective seriousness of Ms Fallon’s manner of driving as being towards the lower end of the range of objective seriousness but not at the lowest end of the range.

Any injury, loss or damage

24. Section 33(1)(e) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires me to consider any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence. The most significant factor is that the offence involved the taking of a human life but that is an element of the offence and is reflected in the sternness of the maximum penalty. As a matter of legal principle, it is not a factor that aggravates the seriousness of the offence. Mr Smith’s motorcycle was destroyed but there is no evidence as to who bore that loss. While that remains a relevant factor, it is of lesser significance than other factors in the present sentencing exercise.

The effect of the offence on victims

25. Six victim impact statements were read at the sentence hearing. Section 53(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides that, in deciding how the offender should be sentenced for the offence, the Court must consider those statements. That is not so say that victims are expected to shoulder the burden of determining the appropriate punishment for an offence. Punishment is quintessentially an exercise of judicial power; it is judges who must take that heavy responsibility. However, the Legislative Assembly clearly intended that victims should have a voice in the sentencing process and that the impact of an offence on them should not be overlooked by the sentencing judge, but should instead be considered along with other relevant factors.

26. The victim impact statements in the present case painted so vivid and joyful a picture of Simon Smith that few people could have heard those statements without wishing they had known him in his lifetime. He experienced both great hardship and great happiness. As a result of his biological family’s intolerance of his homosexuality, he was estranged from them. He experienced the best and worst of the gay scene in Sydney in the 1980s. People of my generation understand the inexcusable discrimination experienced by gay men and women in those times; sometimes overt, sometimes subtle, always vicious in its impact. In later years, Mr Smith worked hard, physically and emotionally, to overcome the enduring hardships of those times. He went on to become a dedicated public servant, a powerful advocate for the vulnerable and the disadvantaged and, most importantly, a treasured friend to many.

27. Apart from their painting of this joyful, resilient man, the victim impact statements also made many thoughtful points. Not all are legally relevant to the sentencing task. However, as I have explained, the legislation contemplates that victims will have a voice at the sentence hearing. Three of the points that emerge from the statements warrant specific acknowledgment.

28. First, Mr Smith’s very close friend, Jeffrey Street, described how his grief was exacerbated by the challenges of navigating a system that is geared towards conventional families rather than single people whose closest relationships elude easy categorisation. This point was echoed by another close friend of Mr Smith, James Collier. Mr Street describes his relationship with Mr Smith with the words, “kindred spirit, chosen brother, confidant and companion”. None of those labels gave him access to the emergency department at the hospital where Simon Smith lay dying, or to other services ordinarily available to conventional family members. I acknowledge that those experiences must have been extremely distressing for Mr Street and Mr Collier. Addressing such difficulties is beyond the scope of my role. However, with Mr Street’s permission, I have forwarded his victim impact statement to the head of the Justice and Community Safety Directorate, who has agreed to raise it with the appropriate health authorities. I hope Mr Street’s voice will be heard on this issue.

29. Secondly, some of the victims struggled with the fact that Ms Fallon pleaded not guilty, suggesting that she did not appreciate the gravity of her conduct. It is important to record that every person accused of a criminal offence is entitled to plead not guilty. That is a central, immutable pillar of our criminal justice system and I make no further comment about it. What can be said is that the jury’s verdict, with which I respectfully agree, recognised that culpable driving is not the reserve of young people racing stolen cars. Every time we get behind the wheel of a car, we take possession of a lethal weapon. Being in a rush, being preoccupied, paying scant attention to the risks of everyday driving, looking away from the road to do something else; these are all vices that can cause another person’s death in an instant. This is another issue on which I express my hope that the voices of Ms Fallon’s victims will be heard.

30. The third point is that, conversely, in all their grief and notwithstanding their anguish at how easily Simon Smith’s death might have been avoided, a number of the victims were at pains to extend their compassion to Ms Fallon. Mr Street said that he learned from the Canberra Times about Ms Fallon being charged and that his heart “broke again”. He acknowledged her family’s grief and said that Mr Smith “wouldn’t want his death to manifest in despair.” The Lamb family wrote that Simon “was a lover, not a hater” and that he would want those grieving his death to “get on with life.” They extended their compassion to Ms Fallon and her family. Mr Collier acknowledged that punishment is one purpose of sentencing but expressed his belief that “the greatest punishment is to have to live with the consequences of our actions.” He hopes that Ms Fallon will strive to “do better” by improving her driving skills. He speculated that the Court might be able to direct her to share her experience with other potential offenders by way of warning and deterrent. While I do not have power to make a direction in those terms, I will return to consider how Ms Fallon might be encouraged to honour the legacy of Simon Smith.

Any assistance by the defence in the administration of justice

31. As already noted, Ms Fallon pleaded not guilty. Accordingly, she is not entitled to any reduction in the sentence under s 35 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. However, it is appropriate to acknowledge that the trial was conducted with commendable efficiency on her behalf. Mr Williamson opened to the jury on the basis that the only issue in dispute was whether Ms Fallon’s departure from the standard of care was merely negligent, or gross and unjustified. In that way, the defence assisted in the administration of justice, which authorises the Court “to impose a lesser penalty on the offender than it would otherwise have imposed”: s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. I will return to explain how I have taken that consideration into account.

Remorse

32. One of the mandatory considerations specified in s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act is whether the offender has demonstrated remorse. That is a difficult consideration in the present case. Ms Fallon’s apparent failure to accept full responsibility for the gravity of her conduct caused increased angst to some of the victims. She did not write a letter to the victims or the Court or otherwise expressly articulate any remorse. Nor did she listen to the victim impact statements as they were read. At her request, she was permitted to withdraw to the remote witness room during that part of the hearing. As the statements were read, she turned away, cried, patted her face repeatedly and rocked back and forth in her seat.

33. It is regrettable that Ms Fallon was unable to participate in that important part of the hearing. I have no doubt that her conduct exacerbated the grief of the friends of Simon Smith who attended the hearing. However, I do not think her conduct was due to an absence of remorse. On the contrary, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that she is so wracked with guilt and remorse that she was barely able to function during the hearing. That conclusion finds support in the character references she has provided to the Court, which speak with one voice as to the extreme distress she has suffered as a result of these events. One character referee states that she has observed Ms Fallon carry “an immense burden of remorse and sadness” and that she understands the gravity of her offence. Indeed, her conduct at the hearing was consistent with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

34. Unfortunately, as a result of the state Ms Fallon was in at the hearing, she missed the opportunity to hear the gracious sentiments extended to her by the authors of the victim impact statements to which I have referred.

35. It is understandable, but unfortunate, that Ms Fallon was not ready at the time of the hearing to convey her remorse directly to Mr Smith’s loved ones. In light of her presentation at the hearing, I decided against a course I had contemplated, which was to refer the offence for restorative justice under the Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT). In case there is any prospect that she may in time recover from her current symptoms and be able to engage more constructively with others on the subject of her offence, I will include in the orders I make today a direction that the Director-General, Corrections consider making a post-sentence referral for restorative justice, as allowed under s 28A of the Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act. Mr Street at least would appear to be a “victim” for the purposes of that Act (which adopts the definition of a victim under the Victims of Crimes Act 1994 (ACT)), as it is apparent from his victim impact statement that he was psychologically dependent on Mr Smith and that he endured “emotional suffering (including grief)” as a result of Mr Smith’s death. There is no obligation on him to participate in any referral, but it is appropriate at least to pave the way for that to occur. In that way, there may be an opportunity for a negotiated outcome of the kind imagined by Mr Collier, which could, for example, see Ms Fallon share her experience with young people as a cautionary tale for future drivers. Circumstances of the offender

36. Ms Fallon was 54 years old at the time of the offence. Her children were 12 and 9 years old (meaning they would now be 14 and 11 years old). She has no prior convictions. Since the events giving rise to these proceedings, her marriage has failed for other reasons. While she receives some child support from the children’s father, she relies on Centrelink single parent payments by way of income.

37. The material before me included a pre-sentence report and an intensive correction assessment report. Those reports record that Ms Fallon had a traumatic upbringing. [Redacted]. Ms Fallon and her husband separated about two years ago as a result of his dependence on alcohol. Following the events giving rise to these proceedings, Ms Fallon herself developed a dependence on alcohol [redacted]. Her cousin has provided a letter of support for these proceedings in which she speaks of the progress Ms Fallon has made since that time. She states that Ms Fallon has worked tirelessly under the weight of her impending sentence and her husband’s absence to maintain stability and a sense of normalcy for her children.

38. Returning to the two reports from Corrective Services, Ms Fallon has been assessed as suitable for a community service work condition and suitable for an intensive correction order.

39. Ms Fallon also tendered a report from a mental health clinician at CatholicCare who reported that Ms Fallon has experienced significant excessive worry, heightened distress and persistent concerns about the impact of her offence on her children. The author of the report notes Ms Fallon’s use of alcohol as a coping mechanism before she engaged in therapy through CatholicCare. To her credit, Ms Fallon stopped using alcohol before starting psychological treatment, attending weekly sessions of intensive cognitive behavioural therapy. There is, however, a suggestion in the evidence that she has not remained completely abstinent since then.

40. Ms Fallon also tendered a statement prepared by her children. They describe her as a caring mother who spends many hours looking after them, cooking for them and spending what little money she has doing fun things with them. She makes every moment “special”. The letter makes explicit reference to Ms Fallon’s regret for the offence and states that, even when Ms Fallon was stressed about that, she would still put her children first.

41. Ms Fallon also tendered three character references which attest both to the hardship she has seen in her life and to her dedication as a mother. One friend who has known Ms Fallon since they were both three years old describes her as an honest, considerate, gentle and deeply caring person who, despite significant personal hardship, has worked hard to build a stable and loving home for her family. The letter refers to Ms Fallon’s husband’s longstanding alcohol dependence which ultimately resulted in their separating and his returning to Ireland, leaving Ms Fallon solely responsible for raising their two children.

The probable effect imprisonment would have on the offender’s children

42. Section 33(1)(o) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires me to consider, in deciding how Ms Fallon should be sentenced, the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on her dependants.

43. As will be apparent from the forgoing summary, there is ample material before me to establish that a sentence of full-time detention would have a devastating impact on Ms Fallon’s children, who have already suffered the departure of their father from their daily lives due to his alcoholism [redacted]. The impact on children of parental alcoholism and parental incarceration is well understood. There is information on both topics in the Bugmy Bar Book, but I do not consider it necessary to resort to that material to support my finding that the imposition of a full-time custodial sentence on Ms Fallon would likely be catastrophic for her children. That is the view of two of Ms Fallon’s character referees, including her cousin. I accept their assessment.

Current sentencing practice

44. As is customary, the prosecution provided comparable decisions to assist the Court. They included three decisions of this Court and five decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. While it is permissible to have regard to New South Wales decisions, the requirement of s 33(1)(za) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act to consider “current sentencing practice” must be taken to refer to current sentencing decisions in the Territory: s 122 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT). I have confined my attention to the Territory decisions.

45. The first was DPP v Barrett [2023] ACTSC 260 (Loukas-Karlsson J). The offender in that case was a truck driver who went through a red light. The truck collided with a Ford Falcon at a speed of almost 80 km/h, pushing it into a Land Cruiser. The driver of the Ford Falcon died. The driver of the Land Cruiser sustained serious injuries. The offender was charged with culpable driving causing death and culpable driving causing grievous bodily harm. The reason for the collision was that, as the offender approached the lights, an alarm sounded in the truck. He looked down to see what it was. He told police the light must have turned orange as he looked down. When he looked back at the road, the cars in front of him had stopped at the red light. The sentencing judge recorded at [31] that the offender was “eyes down” without his eyes on the road for a period of between 8 and 11 seconds. He was found to have cannabis in his system, but it was common ground that that had not contributed to the accident and her Honour did not treat it as an aggravating factor: at [64].

46. Justice Loukas-Karlsson found that the offence involved more than momentary inattention but did not involve a complete abandonment of responsibility: at [72]. Her Honour assessed the objective seriousness of the offence to be “below the midrange”. The judgment includes a helpful summary at [183]-[192] of other Territory decisions sentencing offenders for culpable driving causing death. I have considered that summary.

47. Unwinding a combined reduction of 20% allowed for the offender’s pleas of guilty and assistance to authorities, Loukas-Karlsson J imposed a sentence for the offence of culpable driving causing death with a starting point of approximately 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment.

48. The other decisions identified by the prosecution were my decision in R v Laidlaw [2022] ACTSC 215 and the decision of Murrell CJ in R v Richardson [2016] ACTSC 133. Each of those decisions is included in the summary provided by Loukas-Karlsson J in Barrett.

Conclusion

49. In all the circumstances and having regard to the decisions to which I have referred, I consider the appropriate sentence to be a term of imprisonment for three years. Although I have found that Ms Fallon’s conduct of the trial assisted in the administration of justice, I have not reduced the term of the sentence on that account. The reason for that will become obvious from what I am about to say.

50. But for one consideration, I would have felt compelled to require Ms Fallon to serve a significant portion of her sentence by full-time detention. However, in my assessment, the interests of her two children, and indeed the interest of the community in supporting the well-being and moral development of all children, overwhelm those purposes of sentencing that would otherwise require Ms Fallon to spend time in gaol. For that single reason, I have decided to order Ms Fallon to serve her sentence of imprisonment by intensive correction in the community, as allowed by s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. I am satisfied that to take Ms Fallon away from her children at this vulnerable stage of their lives would be catastrophic for them.

51. I have not reached this conclusion lightly. I recognise that permitting Ms Fallon to serve her sentence of imprisonment by intensive correction in the community reflects a measure of leniency. I hope that it will not be perceived as a failure to recognise the value of the life taken from Simon Smith, by all accounts a truly kind, decent and honourable man who meant everything to his close friends. As I have endeavoured to explain, the exercise of the Court’s power to punish must always be informed by the circumstances of the individual case. It is trite that the relevant circumstances often pull in opposite directions. In the circumstances of this case, to require Ms Fallon to serve her sentence by full-time detention would have the effect of piling trauma upon trauma and would not best protect the community.

52. Notwithstanding the very serious nature of any offence that involves taking the life of another person, I do not think the interests of justice would be well served by a decision that is likely to have such a deleterious effect on two children. I propose instead to frame orders calculated to support Ms Fallon to work on her rehabilitation and her mental health and to be the best parent she can be to her two children.

53. In all the circumstances, I consider that the purposes of sentencing can adequately be met by making an intensive correction order with a community service condition requiring Ms Fallon to perform 300 hours of community service. In accordance with s 80E(2)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I will impose a requirement that Ms Fallon complete her community service within 3 years. As she has previously resorted to alcohol to cope with her distress about this offence, [redacted], I consider it appropriate also to include a condition that she not consume alcohol for that period.

Licence disqualification

54. Ms Fallon’s licence is automatically disqualified for 12 months from today: s 62 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT). Section 65(2) of that Act authorises the Court to extend that period by disqualifying the person from holding or obtaining a driver licence from the end of the compulsory disqualification period until the disqualification is set aside under subsection (3) if satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest to do so after considering the matters specified in s 65(7). One of the matters specified in s 65(7) is the risk to the safety of other road users. Although Ms Fallon is not in the category of driver who habitually abandons responsibility for their manner of driving, the evidence at the trial has persuaded me that she did not have any real appreciation at the time of the collision of the risk posed by the decisions she made, and failed to make, that day. There is no evidence that she has taken any steps since being charged to improve her understanding of risk on the road.

55. For that reason, I am satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest to disqualify her from holding or obtaining a driver licence from the end of the compulsory disqualification period until the disqualification is set aside. Without wanting to constrain the discretion of the judicial officer who considers any application to have the disqualification set aside, I record that I do not have in mind that the disqualification should continue for any lengthy period beyond 12 months; only that, failing having addressed the issue at the proceedings on sentence, Ms Fallon should be required to demonstrate that she has taken steps to learn from the events of the collision and improve her appreciation of risk on the road, for example, by undertaking a Safer Driver course.

Orders

56. Julie Fallon, please stand: (1) For the offence of culpable driving causing death, you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for three years commencing on 27 July 2026 and expiring on 26 July 2029. (2) I order that the sentence be served by intensive correction in the community on the core conditions stated in s 42 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) as well as the following conditions: (a) That you perform 300 hours of community service work within 3 years, that is, by 27 July 2029. (b) That you abstain from drinking alcohol during that period. (3) You are to report to the ACT Community Corrections office at Level 1, 249 London Circuit within 48 hours. (4) I note that your licence is automatically disqualified for 12 months from 27 July 2026 until 26 July 2027. (5) I disqualify you from holding or obtaining a driver licence from the end of that period until the disqualification is set aside under s 65(3) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT). (6) I direct the Director-General, Corrections, being a post-sentence referring agency within the meaning of the Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT), to consider whether to refer the offence for restorative justice in accordance with s 28A of the Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act. I certify that the preceding fifty-six [56] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum. Associate: Date: