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1. Shakira Adams is to be sentenced today for an offence of culpable driving causing death, punishable by imprisonment for 14 years: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 29(2). The victim of that offence was a young man named Matthew McLuckie. The offence was committed on the evening of Thursday, 19 May 2022. Ms Adams was then 19. Mr McLuckie was 20. Ms Adams has never held a driver’s licence and was driving a stolen car. She has long been a user of the stimulant drug, methylamphetamine. She had consumed that drug, and cannabis, before she drove that night. At the time of the collision that killed Mr McLuckie, she was driving along Hindmarsh Drive, on the wrong side of the road, at a speed of no less than 177 km/hr. Mr McLuckie, sober and licensed, was driving home from work in the opposite direction towards Ms Adams. At the speed at which Ms Adams was travelling, there was no opportunity for either driver to swerve when they came face to face. They collided head-on with what must have been massive force. Mr McLuckie died from his injuries early the following morning, Friday, 20 May 2022.

2. Ms Adams suffered multiple physical injuries. She also suffered traumatic brain injuries which have caused permanent impairment and significant mood disturbance and disinhibition. She requires a high level of disability support. She evidently remains addicted to, or at least prone to use methylamphetamine and used that drug while on bail for the present offences.

3. Matthew McLuckie’s family has been absolutely shattered by his death. Their grief has been intensified by the drawn-out process that has attended the legal requirement to determine whether, as a result of Ms Adams’ self-inflicted brain injuries, she was unfit to stand trial. It is important to record that it was the duty of Ms Adams’ lawyers to address that issue, but also to acknowledge that the process of its determination has proved almost unbearable for Matthew McLuckie’s family.

4. It will be apparent from this introduction that the task of sentencing Ms Adams is complex and fraught. The ultimate task of a sentencing judge is to determine a just sentence, but the factors relevant to that determination are incommensurable and, in many respects, inconsistent: Elias v The Queen; Issa v The Queen [2013] HCA 31; 248 CLR 483 at [27]; DPP v Dalgliesh [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 at [4] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). The inconsistencies are stark in the present case, where an offender who is to be punished for, in the words of the prosecutor, “an atrocious abandonment of responsibility” with “a horrific outcome” has by her own criminal conduct rendered herself permanently disabled and cognitively impaired.

5. Because the determination of a just punishment is so fraught in this case, I endeavour in this judgment to explain as fully as I can the process by which I have determined the sentence to be imposed on Ms Adams. The judgment will be made available on the Court’s website. Most sentencing decisions of this Court are published on that website. I encourage any person interested in understanding any sentencing decision in the Territory to read the whole of the sentencing decision in question.

6. The proper approach to sentencing requires the sentencing judge to identify all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discuss their significance and then make a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case. Only at the end of that process does the judge determine the sentence: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [51] (McHugh J).

7. The requirement to determine a just sentence after considering all the factors that are relevant in the individual case at hand (“individualised justice”) is “acknowledged to involve the exercise of a wide sentencing discretion”: Elias at [27] and the authorities cited in footnote 54.

8. However, the existence of that discretion does not authorise the judge to act at whim. The sentencing task is governed by numerous statutory and common law principles. Broadly speaking, such principles are directed to two topics: the objective circumstances of the offence and the personal circumstances of the offender. The factors a sentencing judge is required to take into account will frequently pull in different directions: Elias at [27] and the authorities cited in footnote 53. As the High Court explained in that case, “[i]t is the duty of the judge to balance often incommensurable factors and to arrive at a sentence that is just in all of the circumstances. The administration of the criminal law involves individualised justice, the attainment of which is acknowledged to involve the exercise of a wide sentencing discretion”.

9. As to the objective circumstances of the offence, there are two central questions: (i) How serious, within the calendar of criminal offences, is the offence for which the offender is to be sentenced? (ii) How serious is this particular instance of that offence?

10. The answer to the first question is determined by reference to the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence for which the person is to be sentenced. Ms Adams was initially charged with manslaughter, which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 20 years: Crimes Act s 15(2). However, the prosecution accepted her plea of guilty to the lesser charge of culpable driving causing death, which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 14 years: s 29(2). The maximum penalty is a legislative guidepost which serves as an indication of the relative seriousness of the offence charged: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] CA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27] and [31]. The offence for which Ms Adams is to be sentenced, by reference to the maximum penalty, is a less serious offence than the offence of manslaughter.

11. The answer to the second question (how serious is this instance of that offence?) is to be assessed “wholly by reference to the nature of the offending”, without reference to matters personal to the offender: Muldrock at [27]. However, that assessment can include aspects of the mental state of the offender at the time of the offence. The assessment of objective seriousness establishes the outer parameters of the appropriate sentence, which must be proportionate to the offence. In other words, the ultimate sentence imposed must not be disproportionately high or disproportionately low having regard to the sentencing judge’s assessment of its objective seriousness.

12. Factors personal to the offender must be weighed in that context. Such factors might point to the need for a sterner sentence within the parameters indicated by the objective seriousness of the offence, such as in the case of an offender who poses a danger to the public, or to the need for a more lenient sentence within those parameters, such as where an offender’s moral culpability for the offence is low, even if the offence is objectively serious.

13. Sentencing in the Territory is also governed by the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), which prescribes a list of mandatory considerations. Some of those considerations are concerned with the objective seriousness of the offence while others are concerned with the subjective circumstances of the offender. The Crimes (Sentencing Act) is available on the ACT Legislation Register.

14. Ms Adams entered her pleas of guilty on 27 August 2025, the day on which her trial for manslaughter was due to begin. In addition to the offence of culpable driving causing death, Ms Adams pleaded guilty to an offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). That offence carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for five years. She is also to be dealt with for a charge that has been transferred from the Magistrates Court of driving as an unlicensed driver as a first offender, contrary to s 31(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT).

15. Upon the entry of those pleas of guilty, I revoked bail: DPP v Adams (No 4) [2025] ACTSC 384. Ms Adams has been in custody since that date. Section 35 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act confers power on the Court to impose a lesser penalty (including a shorter non-parole period) on an offender who has pleaded guilty than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offence. However, the exercise of that discretion is governed by other principles stated within the section. The guilty pleas entered by Ms Adams raise additional questions, to which I will return.

Circumstances of the offences

16. The objective circumstances of the offences are to be determined primarily by reference to an agreed statement of facts tendered as part of the prosecution tender bundle. By reference to that statement, the facts may be summarised as follows.

17. At the time she committed the offence, Ms Adams was driving a stolen car, a Volkswagen Golf sedan. After that car was stolen it was fitted with stolen registration plates. There was no suggestion that Ms Adams was involved in the theft of the vehicle but she knew it had been stolen. She told a doctor that she bought it for a ball of ice.

18. On the evening of 19 May 2022, Ms Adams met up with a friend, Mr Martinho. She told him that a man by the name of Chatfield was “stressing her out”. After eating together, they drove off in separate cars intending to drive to the home of Mr Chatfield’s mother.

19. As they were driving along Canberra Avenue towards Manuka, a Volkswagen Tiguan began tailgating Mr Martinho. The Tiguan was also a stolen vehicle. The Tiguan aggressively overtook Mr Martinho and pulled in behind the Golf being driven by Ms Adams. Mr Martinho moved into the right lane and accelerated, gesturing to Ms Adams to drive away. She sped off towards Manuka.

20. At the Hume Circle roundabout, Mr Martinho and the Tiguan pulled up alongside each other. Both rolled down their windows and Mr Martinho made a hand gesture as if to say “what’s going on?”. The occupants of the Tiguan shone torches at him. He saw three Caucasian men he says were unknown to him. The Tiguan then accelerated in the direction of Ms Adams. Mr Martinho saw Ms Adams make a U-turn in a nearby street and drove down Canberra Avenue back towards Queanbeyan. Mr Martinho saw the Tiguan turn and follow her.

21. To explain what happened next, it is helpful to provide a map of the route taken by the two cars. I appreciate that this will not be visible to persons listening to this judgment read aloud but it will be included in the published judgment.

22. The green line on the map shows the path Ms Adams took, followed by the Tiguan, when she first sped off down Canberra Avenue towards Queanbeyan. At the sentence hearing, the prosecution played dashcam footage obtained from a bus that was stopped at a red light on the intersection of Canberra Avenue and Newcastle Street, indicated by the bus icon on the map. That was at approximately 10:48 pm. The dashcam footage shows Ms Adams driving through the intersection at high speed and through a red light. There were about four or five cars at or near that intersection. The Tiguan slowed briefly for the light to turn green before continuing to follow Ms Adams a few seconds later.

23. The two cars continued speeding towards Queanbeyan, overtaking two cars that were travelling at the posted speed limit of 80km/hr. A witness from one of those cars said they did not see Ms Adams or the Tiguan indicate or brake at any point. That witness was shaken by the extraordinary speed of the two cars driving past.

24. At some point, the offender and the Tiguan made a U-turn and began travelling back along Canberra Avenue towards Fyshwick, as indicated by the yellow line on the map. They overtook another car, a witness from which said the two cars were going “incredibly fast”. That witness saw the car being driven by Ms Adams thrown into a “fishtail” and the Tiguan lightly press their brakes. The two cars then overtook another car in a merging lane. Ms Adams overtook that car as the merging lane was ending, forcing it to move a little way across the road. The Tiguan followed to overtake the car as the merging lane ended, driving through the gravel on the edge of the road and forcing the car to move into the middle of the road.

25. Ms Adams then overtook another car on the left side of the road through the dirt edge. A witness from that car saw the car being driven by Ms Adams “get a bit wobbly” as it hit the dirt. The witness thought Ms Adams was going to tip over before she pulled erratically back into the lane and continued on.

26. As the two stolen cars approached the intersection of Canberra Avenue and Newcastle Street for the second time, Ms Adams turned left onto Hindmarsh Drive at extreme speed without breaking. A witness at the traffic lights saw the back left tyre of Ms Adams’ car lift off the road. They thought it was going to flip but Ms Adams regained control.

27. The two cars continued along Hindmarsh Drive towards Woden. They moved in and out of traffic, avoiding cars at high speed. Some witnesses described them as racing. Between approximately 10:52:07pm and 10:53:03pm, they passed through the average speed point-to-point cameras on Hindmarsh Drive, indicated by the two camera flash icons on the map. The average speed between the two cameras was calculated to be 175km/hr.

28. After driving past the camera at the intersection of Hindmarsh Drive and Tyagarah Street, both cars did a U-turn and drove back along Hindmarsh Drive towards Fyshwick, as indicated by the red line on the map. The offender drove past the camera at the intersection of Hindmarsh Drive and Tyagarah Street at 10:53:22 pm. The Tiguan followed one second later. Footage was shown of the cars overtaking a witness that showed the Tiguan with its high beam on and flashing its lights at Ms Adams.

29. At some point, the offender crossed the grass median strip and began driving on the wrong side of the road along Hindmarsh Drive towards Fyshwick, as indicated by the black line on the map. As Ms Adams crested the rise on Hindmarsh Drive near Mount Mugga Mugga, she narrowly missed a car driving in the opposite direction in the correct lane towards Woden.

30. A moment later, the offender collided head-on with the car being driven by Matthew McLuckie. That point is indicated by the black place marker on the map. Mr McLuckie was driving home from work as a baggage handler at the Canberra Airport. As a result of the collision, both Mr McLuckie and Ms Adams were rendered unconscious. Civilians and first responders attended. Both drivers were transported to Canberra Hospital by ambulance.

31. Matthew McLuckie was pronounced dead at the Canberra Hospital at 12:13 am on 20 May 2022. He had suffered multiple fatal injuries typical of a high-velocity motor vehicle collision, including cranial cavity bleeding, cutaneous and skeletal trauma, lung injury and extensive blood loss. The complete list of his injuries need not be recited today.

32. Ms Adams also sustained serious injuries including spinal and other bone fractures. As already indicated, she also sustained several traumatic brain injuries including a subarachnoid haemorrhage, subdural haemorrhage, intraparenchymal haemorrhages and diffuse axonal injury. Samples of her blood were taken at about 1:33 am. Her blood was found to contain 0.45g/L of methylamphetamine, 5μg/L of cannabis and 0.08mg/L of amphetamine.

33. It was not possible from those readings for police to calculate the concentration of those drugs at the time of the collision with any degree of certainty. However, it may safely be concluded (and I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt) that the combination of those drugs and Ms Adams’ state of fatigue at that time impaired her driving capacity considerably.

34. Methylamphetamine is a stimulant. In the expert opinion of Dr Vanita Parekh, part of whose report was tendered at the sentence hearing, the use of stimulant drugs is inconsistent with safe driving, causing increased recklessness, aggression and risk-taking, as well as disinhibition. Other evidence established that the offender had not slept for a couple of days. Dr Parekh stated that extreme fatigue can cause confusion, exhaustion, depression, drug-craving and suicidal behaviour.

35. The site of the collision was examined by the ACT Policing Major Collision Team at 12:40 am on 20 May 2022. They noted that the area in which the collision occurred was not lit by street lights and was subject to an 80km/hr speed limit. The road was dry and in good repair. Senior Constable Nathan Smorhun, an expert in motor vehicle collisions, concluded that, immediately before the collision, the Golf being driven by Ms Adams was travelling at least 177km/hr, and possibly as fast as 186km/hr. Senior Constable Nathan Smorhun also concluded that, in the circumstances of the collision, neither driver had time to swerve, rendering a head-on collision unavoidable.

Impact on Victims

36. I have already referred to the impact of the offence on Matthew McLuckie’s family and loved ones. Thirteen victim impact statements were read to the Court at the sentencing hearing. They form part of the record of these proceedings; I will not do them the disservice of attempting to summarise them today, save to say this. The public reading of so many beautifully written expressions of grief from the people who knew and loved Matthew McLuckie and continue to mourn his death provided a vivid picture of this remarkable, bright, joyful young redheaded man that will not be forgotten.

Objective Seriousness

37. As I have explained, I am required to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of this particular instance of the offence of culpable driving causing death. The reason for that requirement is that, as explained by the High Court in Markarian v The Queen at 372 [31], a sentencing judge must compare the case at hand with the notional most serious case so as to give proper effect to the maximum penalty prescribed by the legislature.

38. The present offence involved numerous aggravating factors. The prosecution relied in this context on the list of aggravating factors provided in the guideline judgment of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 at 231, which was revisited in R v Whyte [2002] NSWCCA 343; 55 NSWLR 252 and adopted by the ACT Court of Appeal in Monfries v R [2014] ACTCA 46. I did not understand it to be suggested that this Court should be guided by the guidelines provided in the guideline judgment of another jurisdiction. If that was the suggestion, I reject it. It is however useful in providing a checklist of potential aggravating factors.

39. Almost every aggravating factor identified in Jurisic is present in this case. In each case, the relevant factor is serious, in some instances extremely serious. The first factor is the extent and nature of the injuries inflicted. It is important in this context to explain a legal principle by which I am bound. The fact that Ms Adams caused Matthew McLuckie’s death is an element of the offence. There is a legal principle that any matter that is an element of the offence cannot also be taken into account as an aggravating factor, because it is part of the offence. However, in my view, the extent and severity of the injuries inflicted on both Matthew McLuckie and Ms Adams do serve as an aggravating factor. Furthermore, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the extent of injuries inflicted on Matthew McLuckie as a result of the sheer force of the collision exacerbated the trauma suffered by his family.

40. The next aggravating factor is the number of people put at risk by Ms Adams’ driving that night. The prosecution conceded that it is not possible to determine precisely how many people were put at risk. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was not an insignificant number. There were at least four or five cars at the intersection at which Ms Adams went through a red light and the two cars she overtook. 25 cars passed through the point-to-point cameras on Hindmarsh Drive in the five-minute period before the collision. There was the car which narrowly avoided a head-on collision with Ms Adams before she collided with the car being driven by Matthew McLuckie.

41. The next aggravating factor is the degree of speed. Ms Adams was driving at over twice the speed limit. It was an extremely dangerous speed even for an experienced, trained driver, which Ms Adams was not.

42. The next aggravating factor is the degree of intoxication or substance abuse. Ms Adams had consumed methylamphetamine and cannabis before driving that night. Her blood sample also showed amphetamine. As that is known to be a metabolite of methylamphetamine, I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that she had consumed both drugs. However, as explained by Dr Parekh, methylamphetamine at any concentration is likely to produce symptoms inconsistent with safe driving. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Adams’ capacity to drive was substantially impaired.

43. The next aggravating factor is any erratic or aggressive driving. Ms Adams drove extremely erratically and aggressively. She overtook other vehicles at high speed. She drove on the shoulder of the road at high speed. She took a corner at high speed. She drove on the wrong side of the road with no visibility of oncoming traffic. Her manner of driving could hardly have been more dangerous, erratic or aggressive.

44. The next aggravating factor is any competitive driving or showing off. There was a factual dispute on this issue. The prosecution case is that Ms Adams was either racing or being chased by the Tiguan. It was submitted on behalf of Ms Adams that she was not racing. The submission assumes a particular meaning of the word “racing”, the acceptance of which is not helpful in determining the seriousness of the offence. Whether Ms Adams sought to compete with the Tiguan or to get away from it, her manner of driving was extremely culpable.

45. The next aggravating factor is the length of the journey during which others were exposed to risk. The total distance travelled was 19.5 km, which she covered in about seven minutes. Having regard to the speed at which Ms Adams was driving, it may readily be concluded that almost every second exposed others to risk. Although the period of driving is measured in minutes and not hours, I consider the length of the journey to be a significant aggravating factor in the circumstances of this case.

46. The next aggravating factor listed in Jurisic is the ignoring of warnings. There is no evidence of that in the present case.

47. The next aggravating factor is escaping police pursuit. The prosecution noted that, in a phone call made by Ms Adams while she was driving, she told a friend that someone was chasing her. She was confused and thought she was being chased by police. The prosecution submitted that I should infer that Ms Adams drove as she did to avoid apprehension by police and relied on that as an aggravating factor. The submission raises difficult legal issues which I do not propose to determine in this case. I am inclined to think that the point of the aggravating factor of escaping police pursuit is the actual evasion of law enforcement authorities. I am not persuaded that an offender’s subjective belief is relevant in this context. However, and in any event, whether Ms Adams thought she was escaping police or racing or being chased by an unknown person in another car, the level of her culpability remains extreme.

48. The next aggravating factor is the degree of sleep deprivation. Police were told by a friend of Ms Adams that she had been awake for “a couple of days” before the offence. Dr Parekh offered her opinion partly on that basis. However, as Ms Adams herself has no recollection of that period, that is not an agreed fact. One of the common law principles by which I am bound is that any aggravating factor must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of clear evidence on this issue, I do not think I can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Adams had not slept for two days. I remain of the view that her capacity to drive remained severely impaired.

49. The final aggravating factor listed in the decision in Jurisic is failure to stop. The prosecution did not rely on that factor.

50. In summary, most of the common aggravating factors are present to a significant degree in the present case. The prosecution submitted that Ms Adams’ culpability was extremely high and that the objective seriousness of the offence is close to if not the most serious type of offence of this kind. I agree. I consider the present offence to be one of the utmost seriousness.

Circumstances of the offender

51. That brings me to a task that warrants careful explanation. I am required to have regard to the cultural background, character, antecedents, age and physical or mental condition of the offender. That is an explicit requirement of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, s 33(1)(m) but also a reflection of long-standing common law principles. The Court has from time to time been informed, through formal feedback and otherwise, that it can be re-traumatising to victims of crime to hear the Court recite and pay heed to the personal circumstances of an offender when they, the victims, feel their interests are being overlooked. I hope it will be clear from what I have already said that the impact of these offences on the victims will not be overlooked. I accept that, in a case such as the present, the requirement also to consider the personal circumstances of the offender may incite strong feeling. I acknowledge those feelings and seek only to ensure that the importance of this next part of the sentencing task will at least be understood, if not embraced.

52. The punishment of a person by the imposition of a term of imprisonment is an exercise of judicial power that must be undertaken judicially, that is to say, impartially, according to law. The recitation of the circumstances of the offender should not be taken to derogate from the seriousness of the impact of the offence on the victims. It is a necessary task undertaken as an aspect of the lawful exercise of the sentencing discretion.

53. Ms Adams’ personal circumstances were addressed in two psychological reports tendered at the sentence hearing, one from Professor David Greenberg dated 18 October 2023 and one from Ms Vanessa Edwige dated 31 October 2025. There was also a report from an occupational therapist, Ms Laura Bodycoat, dated 12 November 2025.

54. Professor Greenberg’s report was prepared for the purpose of the hearing to determine whether Ms Adams was fit to plead. He expressed the opinion that Ms Adams was unfit to plead and I have rejected his opinion on that issue in an earlier judgment in this case. His report nonetheless has some ongoing relevance to the sentencing task. In particular, while much of his report addressed the impact of the traumatic brain injuries Ms Adams acquired as a result of the collision, he did also include a summary of material addressing her mental state before that time. That material includes numerous reports of presentations at various hospitals and health services at times when Ms Adams was suicidal and exhibiting emotional dysregulation and presentations with thought disorder and perceptual disturbance indicating drug induced psychosis. In one assessment, Ms Adams reported that she was removed from her mother’s care at 12 months of age due to domestic violence from her father towards her mother. She was placed in numerous foster care homes. She reported that she had been subjected to physical and emotional abuse from her foster family at that time. Her biological mother had attempted suicide on multiple occasions. She had a best friend who had committed suicide in 2018, reportedly jumping off a building while on the phone to Ms Adams. She stated that she herself had attempted suicide in 2017.

55. The report of Ms Edwidge provided further information about Ms Adams’s childhood. Ms Edwidge is an experienced psychologist with recognised expertise particularly in the treatment and assessment of First Nations people suffering from mental illness. Ms Adams identifies as Ngunnawal. Her assessment was based on a review of a large amount of material as well as an interview with Ms Adams in late October 2025. Ms Edwidge provided a detailed account of Ms Adams’ psychosocial history. Her report in some respects contradicts the negative experience of foster care reported by Ms Adams in the material reviewed by Dr Greenberg. At the same time, the report provides a solid basis for concluding that Ms Adams had an upbringing of considerable disadvantage. It was reported by Ms Adams that, on one occasion when she self-placed back with her mother at the age of 13, her mother gave her an ice pipe and that she “got addicted straight away”. Ms Edwidge noted that Ms Adams has a history of drug use, self-harming and risk-taking behaviours. Unsurprisingly, she has always had problems with learning, “finding everything hard”.

56. Ms Edwidge noted a diagnosis at some point (not stated) of reactive attachment disorder. Ms Edwidge explained in her evidence at the sentence proceedings that this is a disorder where children who have had instability develop inappropriate attachments. There was also a diagnosis of oppositional defiance disorder, which Ms Edwidge explained is a diagnosis often given where in fact what is being seen is the impact of complex trauma. Ms Edwidge noted that behavioural disorders are often given as a label and are quite stigmatising. In particular, complex post-traumatic stress disorder, instead of being recognised as such, is often instead interpreted in a negative way as a behavioural disorder. Ms Edwidge summarised the material she reviewed as describing “a childhood and adolescence that was marred by early exposure to substance abuse, domestic violence, child maltreatment, out-of-home care, child sexual abuse and interrupted schooling”. Her report provided details of each of those disadvantages. Her ultimate diagnosis was that Ms Adams is a 23-year-old woman who presents with significant developmental disadvantage, having been exposed to multiple adverse childhood, adolescence and early adulthood experiences that have had a significant impact on her social and emotional well-being. Ms Edwidge expressed the opinion that Ms Adams meets the diagnosis criteria in ICD 11 for complex post-traumatic stress disorder. She further expressed her agreement with Prof Greenberg’s opinion that Ms Adams meets the criteria in DSM 5 for substance use disorder and major neurocognitive disorder. She concluded by expressing her clinical opinion that those mental health impairments were clinically significant at the time of the offences.

57. Ms Edwidge further stated that, in her opinion, full-time imprisonment will have a significant impact on Ms Adams’ mental health and social and emotional well-being. Ms Edwidge considers Ms Adams to be an extremely vulnerable young woman. She said: Ms Adams has experienced a severe traumatic brain injury that has resulted in severe global cognitive deficits. Reports indicate that she is disinhibited, impulsive and has poor frustration tolerance. There are concerns regarding Ms Adams vulnerability within a custodial environment. She is likely to be at risk of exploitation by other inmates, and her disinhibited behaviour may contribute to interpersonal difficulties or conflicts within the custodial setting.

58. Ms Edwidge also referred to Ms Adams requirement for consistent access to therapy to meet her disability needs. She noted the risk of exacerbation of Ms Adams’ existing difficulties without adequate support.

59. Ms Adams’ need for support was addressed in further detail in the report of the occupational therapist, Ms Bodycoat. She described at length the needs of a person suffering from traumatic brain injury and the particular needs of Ms Adams. Ms Bodycoat expressed her opinion that: due to her disabilities, Ms Adams cannot be safely accommodated within the general population of AMC. She lacks the capacity to independently perform the basic activities of daily living required in this environment such as cooking, laundry and working alongside others. Her cognitive and behavioural impairments significantly increase her vulnerability to verbal and physical abuse, as well as exploitation. While she remains highly vulnerable herself, impaired communication and emotional regulation may also cause distress or conflict with other detainees.

60. I have given anxious consideration to those opinions. There can be no doubt that the matters addressed at length in Ms Edwidge’s report and Ms Bodycoat’s report establish that Ms Adams’ moral culpability for the offences is reduced. She cannot be said to have the same level of responsibility for her actions as a person of sound mind raised not with an ice pipe but in a loving family. On the other hand, every aspect of that history has served to compound the risk Ms Adams poses to society. She has a history of driving offences, a history of drug use and a history of disinhibition or dysregulation. In light of her traumatic brain injuries and the uncertain path of those injuries, it is impossible to make any reliable assessment of Ms Adams’ prospects of rehabilitation.

61. I have determined that, because of the danger she poses to society, factors that would otherwise be mitigating in this sentencing exercise of Ms Adams’ youth and reduced moral culpability cannot be reflected in the head sentence. I propose to reflect those considerations only in the fixing of the non-parole period.

Comparative Cases

62. I am required to have regard to the current sentencing practices in the Territory: Crimes (Sentencing) Act s 33(1)(za). The prosecution provided a table of cases put forward as comparative which included cases from the Territory as well as interstate cases.

63. The first was the decision of this court in R v Livas (No 2) [2020] ACTSC 116 concerning a truck driver who drove into the rear of a family vehicle, inflicting fatal head injuries on a four-year-old child. The offender suffered from sleep apnoea and had systematically failed to investigate or mitigate the potential risks of such a diagnosis in his work as a truckdriver. There is a vast difference between the offender’s culpability in that case and the present case. The decision is unhelpful for that reason

64. Of more assistance is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Monfries to which I have already referred. The offender in that case drove a stolen vehicle erratically through various parts of Canberra at speeds of at least 118km/hr. He was chased by police until he sped through a red light and hit two pedestrians on a pedestrian crossing. One died instantly, another sustained serious injuries. The sentencing judge assessed the objective seriousness of the culpable driving offence to be high. The seriousness of the offence was aggravated by the presence of drugs in the offender’s system, the speed and manner of driving, and the fact that the offender was on conditional liberty at the time. The offender had mental health issues and a deprived background that moderated the emphasis on general deterrence and punishment, but his poor rehabilitative prospects, lack of remorse and history of recidivism suggested a strong need for specific deterrence. After allowing a reduction of 10% for a guilty plea, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment for 10 years and 9 months for the offence of culpable driving causing death. That sentence was upheld by majority on appeal.

65. None of the other decisions provided by the prosecution is of any great assistance as none involves offending of the extreme seriousness involved here. As submitted by the prosecution, I must also have regard to the decision of the ACT Legislature in 2011 to double the maximum penalty for the offence of culpable driving causing death from 7 to 14 years imprisonment. As stated by the High Court in Muldrock at [31], “an increase in the maximum penalty for an offence is an indication that sentences for that offence should be increased”. Furthermore, I note that due to the nature of the offender’s driving, this case is more serious than Monfries.

Guilty Plea

66. I am required to have regard to the fact that Ms Adams pleaded guilty. The Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides that I must consider the fact that she pleaded guilty; when she pleaded guilty or indicated an intention to plead guilty; whether the guilty plea was related to negotiations between the prosecution and defence about the charge to which she pleaded guilty; the seriousness of the offence and the effect of the offence on the victims. However, I am prohibited from making a significant reduction where the Crown case was particularly overwhelming: Crimes (Sentencing) Act s 35(4).

67. The offender pleaded guilty at the outset of what was to be her trial. Her counsel submitted that this could nonetheless be regarded as a plea entered at the earliest opportunity because it was entered on a basis not previously available, Ms Adams having up until that point faced trial on an indictment for manslaughter. He further submitted that, notwithstanding the strength of the prosecution case, the plea had significant utilitarian value as it spared the family of the deceased the ordeal of a trial. The trial was listed for a period of some 6 weeks to accommodate Ms Adams’ physical and psychological injuries, which meant she would require significant breaks and would be unable to participate in the trial for more than a few hours a day, a few days a week.

68. The prosecution accepted that there was some utilitarian value in the plea but disputed that it was entered at the earliest opportunity. The prosecutor noted that the reduction of the charge from manslaughter to culpable driving causing death was the result of negotiations between the Crown and the offender’s legal representatives, a matter specifically referred to in the Crimes (Sentencing) Act (see s 35(2)(c)), and that the negotiations were conducted under the shadow of an overwhelming Crown case.

69. There can be no doubt that the Crown case was overwhelming. Conversely, there can be no doubt that the plea of guilty spared the victim’s family even further trauma than what they have already endured in their experience of this awful process. It is appropriate to give the offender some recognition for the value of that. At the same time, the Crimes (Sentencing) Act gives clear guidance to sentencing judges that, in the case of a serious offence that has had a significant impact on victims, the sentence should not be reduced on account of a plea of guilty to an extent that disregards either that impact or the seriousness of the offence.

70. The Crimes (Sentencing) Act permits the Court to reflect any reduction in sentence in either the head sentence or the non-parole period. As I will explain, I propose to allow a moderate reduction in the non-parole period only.

Purposes of Sentencing

71. The prosecution submitted that a significant sentence of full-time imprisonment is required in the present case to meet the sentencing purposes of general deterrence, adequate punishment, denunciation and recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community. I accept that submission but would add that, in my assessment, the protection of the community from the offender must be given very significant if not paramount weight in the present case.

Orders

72. I will explain the structure of the sentences to be imposed on Ms Adams. In sentencing an offender for more than one offence, the Court is required to consider whether the sentences should be served cumulatively, that is, one after the other, or whether there should be complete or partial concurrency or overlap. I am to sentence Ms Adams for an offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent of the owner in addition to the offence of culpable driving causing death. The offence of driving the stolen motor vehicle is undoubtedly a serious offence in its own right. However, in the circumstances of the present case, its seriousness is overwhelmed by and reflected in the sentence I propose to impose for the offence of culpable driving causing death. For that reason, the sentence for the offence of driving without consent will be entirely concurrent with the sentence for the culpable driving offence.

73. I am required to fix a non-parole period for the sentences. It should be understood that the non-parole period denotes the earliest possible date on which a prisoner can apply for parole. There is no guarantee that a prisoner will be granted parole on their first application or at all. Applications for parole are determined by the Sentence Administration Board. The obvious benefit of that process is that, while the Court must fix the sentence that seems just based on the evidence available now, the Sentence Administration Board has the benefit, at the time any application for parole is considered, of updated evidence concerning the conduct of the prisoner and their health, including any addiction to prohibited substances.

74. I propose to reflect the extreme seriousness of the offence in the total term to be imposed. I consider the offence to be of such gravity, objectively, as to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. To the extent that factors personal to the offender mitigate the sentence to be imposed, I propose to reflect those factors by fixing a shorter non-parole period than would otherwise be indicated by the length of the head sentence.

75. I have decided to structure the sentence in that way for several reasons. First, I accept the submission put on behalf of the offender that, if she is granted parole, she will require a significant amount of supervision and support to assist her rehabilitation and reintegration into society. I have also had regard, in fixing the non-parole period, to the compelling evidence of Ms Edwidge and Ms Bodycoat as to the increased hardship Ms Adams is likely to experience in prison by reason of her physical and cognitive disabilities.

76. However, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Adams currently poses a significant danger to society. That was already the case before she committed the present offences. Possibly the most troubling piece of information I have heard during the protracted course of these proceedings was the evidence I received not long before the pleas were entered that Ms Adams had again been consuming methylamphetamine. This appears to have been associated with socialising with other drug users, notwithstanding the substantial level of disability support Ms Adams receives.

77. The combination of Ms Adams’ continued use of that most dangerous of drugs with the impact of her traumatic brain injuries, including mood disturbance and disinhibition, have unfortunately rendered her more dangerous than she was before she committed these offences. It was submitted on her behalf that she does not pose a risk of committing further driving offences at the moment because she cannot drive in her current physical condition. I do not accept that submission. I cannot be confident that Ms Adams would not attempt to drive if she were at liberty in the community. That is a risk that cannot be taken, and will not be taken through me, at this point.

78. The risk Ms Adams poses to the community in the future is best assessed by the Sentence Administration Board. When the occasion comes to consider any application for parole, that authority will have to give careful consideration to Ms Adams’ physical and mental impairments, the status of any drug addiction and her capacity for self-regulation.

79. There is one further minor matter to be addressed before I pass sentence. In addition to the two offences on the indictment, I am asked to deal with a summary offence that has been transferred by the Magistrates Court of driving unlicensed never having held a license (as a first offender), contrary to s 31(2) of the Road Transport (Drivers Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT). Ms Adams is treated as a first offender under the statute, notwithstanding her prior offences. The maximum penalty for that offence is a fine. Ms Adams has no capacity to pay a fine and there would be no point in imposing one in the present case. However, pursuant to s 62(1) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), as a result of being convicted of the offence of culpable driving causing death, the Court has authority to disqualify Ms Adams from obtaining a driver’s license. In the circumstances of the present case, Ms Adams should not be entitled to obtain a driver’s licence within any fixed period. The appropriate order in that circumstance, pursuant to s 62 of the Road Transport (General) Act, is that Ms Adams be disqualified until further order of the Court.

80. Shakira Adams, please stand: (1) I convict you of the offence of driving unlicensed never having held a license as a first offender (CAN2022/12261). (2) I order that you be disqualified from obtaining a driver’s licence until further order of the Court. (3) I convict you of the offence of culpable driving causing death (CC2022/12255). For that offence, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for 14 years commencing on 27 August 2025 and expiring on 26 August 2039. (4) I convict you of the offence of driving a motor vehicle without consent (CC2022/12284). For that offence, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for one year commencing on 27 August 2025 and expiring on 26 August 2026. (5) I fix a non-parole period of nine years commencing on 27 August 2025 and expiring on 26 August 2034. I certify that the preceding eighty [80] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum. Associate: Date: