austlii:cth/ARTA/2025/597
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2025-05-13
Original judgment source is linked above.
A criterion for a protection visa is that the Applicant is not a person whom the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds:
(a) is a danger to Australia's security, or
(b) having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the Australian community.
A non-citizen is taken not to satisfy the criterion mentioned in paragraph (2)(aa) if
(b) the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds, that
(i) the non-citizen is a danger to Australia's security, or
(ii) the non-citizen, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime (including a crime that consists of the commission of a serious Australian offence or serious foreign offence), is a danger to the Australian community
For the purpose of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, paragraph 36(1C)(b) has effect as if reference in that paragraph to a particularly serious crime includes a reference to a crime that consists of the commission of
(a) a serious Australian offence; or
(b) a serious foreign offence.
(a) the offence:
(i) involves violence against a person; or
(ii) is a serious drug offence; or
(iii) involves serious damage to property; or
(iv) is an offence against section 197A or 197B (offences relating to immigration detention); and
(b) the offence is punishable by:
(i) imprisonment for life; or
(ii) imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than 3 years; or
(iii) imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than 3 years.
HAS THE APPLICANT BEEN CONVICTED BY A FINAL JUDGMENT OF A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME?
(a) Robbery while armed with dangerous weapon > > (b) Use unauthorised pistol > > (c) Fire firearm in or near public place
The question whether a person constitutes a danger to the Australian community is one of fact and degree. It is not necessary to paraphrase a language of Article 33(2) of the Refugees Convention because the words are plain and simple English. In deciding the question, regard must be had to all the circumstances of each individual case.
The risk of re-offending and recidivism and the likelihood of relapsing into crime is a primary consideration. The criminal record must be looked at as a whole and prospects of rehabilitation achieved. The assessment to be made goes to the future conduct of the person and this involves a consideration of character and the possibility or probability of any threat, which could be posed to a member or members of the Australian community.
(1) the seriousness and nature of the crimes committed, the length of the sentence imposed, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances;
(2) the criminal record in totality - including the extent and nature of any prior convictions and the period over which they took place;
(3) the risk of re-offending and recidivism and the likelihood of re-lapsing into crime; and
(4) any prospects of rehabilitation.
Section 36(1C) will not be engaged by any risk to Australia whatsoever. It requires a "danger" to Australia - a term suggestive of a high level of risk. In the view reached by Logan J in DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63; (2019) 269 FCR 636, the word "danger" in s 36(1C) means "present and serious risk" (see at [83]).
Conceptually (at least for present purposes), "danger" is a function of probability and consequence. A person will pose a 'danger' insofar as there is sufficient likelihood that he or she will engage in conduct that visits upon others a sufficient degree of harm. Both of those constituent concepts may be measured along spectra. Future conduct might be inconceivable, highly improbable, likely or certain (or any degree in between). The harm that it might visit might range from minor to severe. At issue presently is what combinations of probability and consequence should suffice to qualify as danger in the sense contemplated by s 36(1C)(b) of the Act...
Qualitatively, it is clear enough that the reference in s 36(1C)(b) of the Act to "danger" was intended to denote a prospect of harm. Given the statutory context - involving, as it does, an exception to the expectation that Australia will afford protection to refugees and others in need of it - it is likely that the Parliament intended that it should involve harm of non-trivial kinds. The likelihood - even a very high likelihood or certainty - that a person might cause others to feel anxious, offended, embarrassed, miserable or despondent, for example, is unlikely to suffice. "Danger" implies a prospect (howsoever measured) of injury (at the least), most likely of physical or psychological kinds.
When assessing the presence of danger (in the sense that the natural and ordinary meaning of that word imports), the required analysis is both quantitative (what is the level of probability that something might happen?) and qualitative (what are the consequences if it does?). They are related inquiries: a high probability of mid-level personal injury, for example, might bespeak the presence of danger no more tellingly as would a moderate or even low probability of serious injury or death... > > In its human form, then, "danger" presupposes that there should be something about a person's character or proclivities (or both) that suggests a probability and quality of harm to others that is beyond the typical consequences of routine interaction. Ordinarily, that would fall to be assessed by reference to the person's prior conduct and the likelihood that it might be repeated. A person with no history of violent offending would ordinarily be thought not to pose any danger to others, no matter that he or she might possess some real capability to inflict harm. A person with an appetite for and history of violence, on the other hand, might well be thought otherwise.
To the extent that there are differences between the construction of s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act favoured by Rares J in DMQ20 and the construction favoured by Thomas and Snaden JJ, it is the approach of the plurality that must be followed. In my view, their Honours held 'danger', as used in s 36(1C)(b), to be a word of ordinary English which is to be applied to all the facts and circumstances of the case and which is not susceptible of more precise definition. It would be consistent with their Honours' approach for the decision maker to consider whether the harm that will eventuate if the danger becomes a reality is non-trivial and whether it would be harm of a physical or psychological kind. It would also be consistent with that approach to consider whether the risk that the harm will eventuate goes beyond that which is contemplated in ordinary personal interactions. Both the plurality and Rares J endorsed a concept of danger that combines an assessment of how probable harm is with an assessment of the severity or seriousness if the probability eventuates. > > As to the object of the danger, it is the Australian community conceived of as the community as a whole and/or any person or persons who are part of it. > > On any view, in assessing these matters, the decision maker may consider the particularly serious crime of which the visa Applicant has been convicted and the risk that he or she will offend in that way in the future. More broadly, the risk of repetition of other past conduct may also be considered.
Is the Applicant a danger to the Australian community?
The seriousness and nature of the crimes committed, the length of the sentence imposed, and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
Possess offensive weapon/instrument in a place of detention
(on appeal, earlier sentenced quashed), imprisonment 5 years
S10A Conviction with no other penalty: Drug to be destroyed:
s. 9 bond, fines
Community Service Order: 300 hours, Disqualification: 2 years. s9 bond,
Drive while disqualified from holding a licence (2 counts)
The criminal record in totality - including the extent and nature of any prior convictions and the period over which they took place
The risk of re-offending and recidivism and the likelihood of re-lapsing into crime
(a) The Applicant had committed several serious and violent offences, > > (b) The offences were committed over a prolonged period and demonstrate a pattern of frequent offending with increase in seriousness, > > (c) The Applicant pleaded not guilty to most serious 2013 offending and continues to deny his involvement, showing lack of insight and remorse (and in oral evidence the Applicant continued to deny his involvement in the 2013 offending stating he was 'stitched up' by the police, despite the conviction which was upheld on appeal), > > (d) The Applicant had been sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, > > (e) Much of the offending took place after the Applicant was formally warned about the cancellation of his visa.
(a) Firstly, the Tribunal does not accept that while living in the community, the Applicant will not experience any number of stressors. If the Applicant suggests that the recent offending was due to stressors of imprisonment or immigration detention (rather than, for example, ongoing mental health issues), then the Tribunal must have strong evidence that the Applicant has learnt coping mechanisms and is able to deal with other stressors that he undoubtedly will experience in the community. The Tribunal is not convinced that there is persuasive evidence of the Applicant's improved coping skills. > > (b) Secondly, as noted elsewhere, the mere fact that the Applicant will have the ability to access psychological and medical help in the community does not necessarily mean that he will access such help or that he will consistently engage in such help. > > (c) Thirdly, the Tribunal has formed the view that the Applicant lacks insight into his past offending, despite his (and others') claims that he has gained such insight. The Applicant in oral evidence repeatedly stated that he was wrongly convicted for the 2013 offences and that offending in detention was justified because he was in a violent environment and was defending himself. > > (d) Fourthly, the Tribunal does not agree with the Applicant's apparent premise that there is no risk of future serious offending and therefore he is not a danger to the community. A danger to community may exist if the Applicant commits offending that is not a 'serious offence' or not the offence of the same nature as had led to the earlier finding that a serious offence was committed. Many of the offences committed by the Applicant could not be classified as 'serious' but could nevertheless pose significant danger for the community - for example, drink driving or negligent driving, assaults and grievous bodily harm. If the Applicant were to commit similar offences in the future, there would be a risk of significant physical harm or even death to members of the community.
[1] WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512; (2009) 110 ALD 434 at [25]- [26].
[2] DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63.
[3] KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 108.
[4] DMQ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 84 (DMQ20).
[5] SLGS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 104.
[6] NJCT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] AATA 117.
[7] MHCZ and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 4259.
DMQ20
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
DMQ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 84 ('DMQ20')
DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63
KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 108
MHCZ and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 4259
NJCT v MICMA, [2024] AATA 117
SLGS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 104
WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) [2009] AATA 512; 110 ALD 434
(2019) 269 FCR 636