4.1 Power to make a freezing order
39 Division 7.4 of the FCR supplements s 23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) and the Federal Court's implied power as a superior court of record: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Huang [2021] HCA 43; 96 ALJR 43 (Huang) at [16] (Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ). Relevantly, r 7.32 in Division 7.4 of the FCR provides:
(1) The Court may make an order (a freezing order), with or without notice to a respondent, for the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied.
(2) A freezing order may be an order restraining a respondent from removing any assets located in or outside Australia or from disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of, those assets.
Note: Without notice is defined in the Dictionary.
(Emphasis in italics and bold added.)
40 Thus, in Huang the majority held that:
17. The power conferred by r 7.32(1) is expressly subject to two limitations: first, the purpose of the order must be "the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process"; and secondly, the order must address that purpose "by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied". … More broadly, a freezing order is directed to dispositions "which are intended to frustrate, or have the necessary effect of frustrating, the plaintiff in his attempt to seek through the court a remedy for the obligation to which he claims the defendant is subject" [quoting Riley McKay Pty Ltd v McKay [1982] 1 NSWLR 264 at 276].
41 Significantly, it is apparent from the passage from Riley McKay Pty Ltd v McKay [1982] 1 NSWLR 264 quoted with approval that it is not necessary to establish that the person against whom the order is sought intends to frustrate the judgment creditor or prospective judgment creditor in its attempt to seek relief from a court. It is sufficient if the feared disposition would have that necessary effect. However, the majority in Huang also emphasised that "[t]he danger must be sufficiently substantial to warrant the freezing order" (at [18]).
42 Rule 7.35 sets out the circumstances in which the discretionary power to make a freezing order is enlivened, relevantly:
7.35 Order against judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor or third party
(1) This rule applies if:
…
(b) an applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in:
(i) the Court; or
(ii) for a cause of action to which subrule (2) applies - another court.
…
(4) The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because any of the following might occur:
(a) the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person absconds;
(b) the assets of the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person are:
(i) removed from Australia or from a place inside or outside Australia; or
(ii) disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value.
(5) The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a person other than a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor (a third party) if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that:
(a) there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because:
(i) the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(ii) the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(b) a process in the Court is or may ultimately be available to the applicant as a result of a judgment or prospective judgment, under which process the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute toward satisfying the judgment or prospective judgment.
(6) Nothing in this rule affects the power of the Court to make a freezing order or ancillary order if the Court considers it is in the interests of justice to do so.
(Emphasis in bold and italics added.)
43 In Huang, the majority rejected the proposition that r 7.35(4) covers the field of events which might give rise to a danger of the kind necessary to enliven the power in r 7.32, holding that "both r 7.35(6) and r 7.36 explicitly contemplate that a freezing order may be made even though the applicant is unable to satisfy r 7.35(4)" (at [22]).
44 Furthermore and importantly, rule 7.35 expressly provides for the making of an order:
(1) against a "prospective judgment debtor", being State Grid; and
(2) against "a third party", being AusNet, which at the time of the interlocutory application was in possession of the consideration to be paid to State Grid (and the other Scheme Shareholders) via the ANZ account and had responsibility for the disposition of those funds under the Scheme.
45 The burden lies upon the Commissioner of satisfying the Court that she has a good arguable case, that this claim is justiciable in the Federal Court, and that there is a "danger" that the judgment which she seeks will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because of the removal of State Grid's assets from Australia.
46 The principles relating to the making of a freezing order were conveniently summarised by Wigney J in Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 743 (recently approved in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Wang [2020] FCA 1711 at [8] (Abrahams J)):
7. The purpose of a freezing order is to prevent an abuse or a frustration of the Court's process by depriving an applicant of the fruits of any judgment obtained in the action: Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 625. It is "no light matter" to freeze a party's assets and there is, accordingly, a need for the Court to exercise caution: Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 at 324F. A freezing order is a "drastic remedy" which should not be lightly granted: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [51] citing Frigo v Culhari (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal 17 July 1998 at 10-11).
8. An applicant has a good arguable case if they have "a reasonably arguable case on legal as well as factual matters": Cardile at [68]; Insolvency Guardian Melbourne Pty Ltd v Carlei (2016) 111 ACSR 236; [2016] FCA 72 at [18]. It has also been said that a "good arguable case" is one "which is more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one the judge considers would have better than a fifty per cent chance of success": Curtis v NID Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1072 at [6] citing Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesselschaft mbH & Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] Com LR 234 at 235 (affirmed on appeal: [1983] 1 WLR 1412); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Greenfield Electrical Services Pty Ltd (2016) 103 ATR 327; [2016] FCA 653 at [7].
9. Where a freezing order is sought on the basis of a danger of the dissipation of assets, it is not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the risk of dissipation is more probable than not. Nor is it necessary for the applicant to adduce evidence of an intention on the part of the respondent to dissipate assets: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (2010) 273 ALR 194; [2010] FCA 1014 at [8]-[10]; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 4) (2012) 90 ATR 711; [2012] FCA 1064 at [23]. The making of a freezing order involves a discretionary exercise of power. The Court retains a discretion to refuse relief even if the requirements in r 7.35 of the Rules are satisfied: Patterson at 321-322.
(Emphasis added.)
See also e.g. Perram J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1064; (2012) 90 ATR 711 with respect to the relevant "danger" in the context of tax debt recovery proceedings; and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ghaly [2016] FCA 707; (2016) ATR 376 (Perry J).
47 Finally, and in line with the purpose to which a freezing order may be directed, the majority in Huang explained at [29] that:
A freezing order operates to preserve the status quo and not to change it in favour of the party who seeks the orders. ... The status quo to be preserved by the freezing order is the existence of assets which could be realised to pay the prospective judgment debt.
(Emphasis added.)