Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad
[2012] FCA 123
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2012-02-24
Before
Rares J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (15 paragraphs)
Background 3 Almost all of the principal findings of fact that I made in the service out reasons, Beluga (No 5) 278 ALR at 59 [10]-[50], [52]-[61], have been accepted by the three banks as being supported by the present evidence for the purposes of determining the questions that must be decided on these applications. Similarly, the parties accepted my findings and reasoning on the content and effect of Swiss Law in my reasons in relation to the notices to produce served by the Suzlon parties on each of the banks in September 2011: Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad (No 2) (2011) 198 FCR 1 at [30]-[54]. Rather than repeating those findings in these reasons I will proceed on the basis that they form part of the factual matrix for determining these applications.
Further evidence 4 The principal evidence on which the parties relied was tendered on the first day on which I began hearing the interlocutory applications by each of LB Swiss, Merrill Lynch, Credit Swisse to set aside notices to produce served on them by the Suzlon parties. I rejected certain evidence but granted leave to the parties affected to adduce further evidence. The parties adduced more evidence when the hearing resumed. Initially, I had rejected the expert report of Mr Martin as to banking practice when the Swiss banks objected to it at an interlocutory hearing. Previously, I had relied on his report in the service out reasons as providing an evidentiary basis for a reasonable prima facie case, that if proved at trial, would establish that each bank had sufficient knowledge of the facts to make it liable to the Suzlon parties as having assisted Mr Sridhar and his associates with knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to a third party: Beluga (No 5) 278 ALR at 71-72 [73]-[78]. 5 Mr Martin has now given additional evidence of his considerable specialised knowledge and experience of standards, practices and principles applicable to international payment systems including the "know your customer" or "KYC" principles, regulatory requirements to prevent money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, as well as the prevention and identification of fraud in relation to banks and financial institutions. Having regard to this further evidence, I admitted his evidence on the present applications because I was satisfied that, for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case under r 10.43(4)(c), Mr Martin was suitably qualified to express an expert opinion on the matters in his earlier affidavit on which I had made findings in the service out reasons: Beluga (No 5) 278 ALR at 66 [46]-[79]. 6 In addition, the Suzlon parties relied on the report of Dr Alessandro Bizzozero, a Swiss expert in Swiss banking customs, regulations and practices. I accept his evidence for the purposes of the present application with the exception of his concluding observations about Credit Suisse, for the reasons I will give when dealing with its position. Dr Bizzozero had considered the same material as Mr Martin had for his report. Dr Bizzozero opined in respect of the following: the Swiss regulatory requirements governing the commencement and subsequent conduct of a relationship between a banker and customer (referred to as a "client" in Swiss parlance) including the monitoring of transactions; the appropriate conduct by a Swiss bank of the banker-customer relationship with a customer who is a senior employee of a listed company; whether each of the three banks had conducted its relationship with Mr Sridhar in accordance with applicable Swiss banking customs, regulations and practices on the basis of the available material in evidence. 7 Dr Bizzozero recognised that the material on which he was expressing his opinions only gave a partial view of the relationship between each bank and Mr Sridhar and his associated companies. Dr Bizzozero said that this material did not include a potentially significant amount of information about the economic backgrounds of the customers (Mr Sridhar and his relevant companies) and the particular economic transactions that a bank would ordinarily obtain in meetings or communications with its customer. He said that this information would include underlying contracts for which payments were being made or received and documentation to identify the customer and assess his risk profile. 8 In Dr Bizzozero's opinion it was "quite obvious" that a banker, in the position of each of the three banks, exercising the due diligence required under Swiss law would have classified Mr Sridhar as a higher risk customer at the outset of each of his relationships with the respective bank. That was because, first, Mr Sridhar was a national and resident of India, a country that Swiss authorities considered to be high on their "bribery country index", secondly, he was active in emerging countries, and thirdly, he dealt with each bank in significant amounts of money, often through offshore companies. Dr Bizzozero said that if a customer or a transaction presents as a higher risk, then the Swiss law requires the bank to become more stringent in observing its due diligence obligations. 9 Dr Bizzozero explained that Swiss Law contained what he described as "due diligence" requirements that a banker or financial intermediary had to follow in respect of its customers. These included that the bank should: identify the nature and purpose of the business relationship sought by the customer; clarify the economic background and purpose of a transaction or business relationship, if it appears unusual (unless its legality is clear) or, if there are indications that assets are the proceeds of a serious crime or are under the control, or serve the purposes, of organised criminals or terrorism; maintain records that will enable both the Swiss banking regulator and an auditor to make an assessment of whether the bank has complied with the Swiss regulations relating to money laundering. For higher risk relationships the bank must maintain and keep up to date a specific "Know Your Customer" document that contains detailed information about the customer's business and source of funds, as well as information that corroborates the information its customer has provided it. This reflects the international regulatory requirements to which Mr Martin also referred. Swiss law allows each bank to determine its own method of weighing risk factors, but this must be both formalised by the bank and approved by an external auditor: see Arts 6 and 7 of the (Swiss) Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Financial Sector (the Anti-Money Laundering Act). 10 Dr Bizzozero stated that the due diligence obligations imposed by Swiss Law required a bank to implement an effective and efficient internal control system to detect higher risk relationships. He explained that this involved the bank devising an intelligent weighting of criteria that must be applied to evaluate whether a customer relationship presents as higher risk. Each bank had to have formal procedures in place requiring its staff to assess the risk presented by a customer relationship using the criteria and weighting that the bank had selected. Dr Bizzozero said that the due diligence assessment should consider the following risk factors and matters: risk of money laundering. This required consideration of the origin of the customer's funds having regard to possibilities such as corruption, misappropriation and misuse of company property. In assessing this risk, the bank had to determine what its customer's activity or business was, what his or her position was in a company (to assess whether he or she could take advantage of his or her position) and the nature of the actual or proposed activity on the customer's accounts; reputational risk. This required the bank to consider the risk to its own reputation posed by its being associated with a scandal, even though the funds the bank received might not have been the proceeds of crime. Dr Bizzozero said that this risk was assessed by considering what the customer's activity or business was, the nature of the customer, whether the customer had any political influence or links to criminal organisations; risk of losing control over a relationship. This required the bank to assess difficulties in documenting or corroborating details about the customer or his, her or its activities. This risk was accentuated the more active the accounts of customers of this class were. Dr Bizzozero said that assessment of this risk involved the bank considering the activities on the customer's accounts, including any business that the bank did not have documents for, in particular for cash movements, any connection with countries with which the bank did not have a connection, the use by such customers of the accounts for commercial purposes and the customer's underlying purpose or aim for establishing and using the account; risk of financing terrorism. Dr Bizzozero said that this was the most difficult risk to detect because it was essentially related to the use of funds that appeared to have a legitimate origin. 11 As Dr Bizzozzero observed, there was a degree of overlap in the matters that a bank had to assess for each of the above risks. He noted that the bank may need to consider the significance of the criteria overall, rather than separately for each risk in arriving at its assessment of whether the relationship were higher risk. In addition, Dr Bizzozero said that the importance (which I infer means the relative size) of the customer's assets may accentuate any risk that the bank detected using the weighting criteria. 12 Next, Dr Bizzozero said that once a customer had been identified as higher risk, (as in Dr Bizzozero's opinion Mr Sridhar should have been) Swiss law required the bank to perform additional due diligence duties. These include: doing sufficient research and investigation of the risk of entering into a relationship with the customer. In particular, the bank was not entitled to accept unconvincing explanations from the customer. Rather, it was to consult or investigate sources other than the customer, for example, by obtaining copies of contracts, and investigating websites for corroborating material; periodic and regular further due diligence monitoring. This included the bank updating the information it had about the customer, seeking corroborating material, assessing the plausibility of the new material and then checking the more recent information against the bank's current database on the customer for any possible contradictions. 13 Swiss law required the bank officer responsible for the customer relationship to document each due diligence review and submit that review to whoever in the bank was responsible for making a decision about whether or not to maintain the relationship. 14 Dr Bizzozero stated that Swiss law imposes similar requirements on banks to consider and assess higher risk transactions such as any initial cash deposit of more than CHF (Swiss francs) 100,000. He said that banks had to investigate every higher risk transaction, using substantially the same processes as those for investigating higher risk customers. If a bank cannot understand a transaction and its bona fides from what it knows about the customer, it must obtain sufficient credible explanations, as are appropriate, to justify that transaction, after its own critical examination of this material. For example, a bank would not be justified in proceeding with a high risk transaction involving the deposit of funds simply because the customer said that its interest rate was competitive. 15 Where a customer presented as a similar higher risk, like Mr Sridhar or his associated companies, Dr Bizzezero opined that a bank had to establish and document comprehensive "know your customer" information about the customer's business and source of funds including obtaining corroborating materials. He said that if activity on the account changed or became different from that suggested by the customer at an earlier time, the importance of obtaining corroborating material became greater, especially when an unexpected transaction occurred on the account.