ABRAHAM J
1 The applicant, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner), has made an application on an ex parte basis pursuant to r 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), for a freezing order against CE Wang (first respondent) and Zhao Hui Shao (second respondent), who are husband and wife. On 23 November 2020, I made ex parte freezing orders against each respondent. These are my reasons for doing so.
2 The applicant relies on the affidavit of Fiona Biltris, affirmed 20 November 2020, and the documents to that affidavit in exhibit FB-1, who is authorised to speak for and on behalf of the Commissioner.
3 In a nutshell, the applicant relied upon claims based upon a debt that arises as a result of an audit conducted and assessments made under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Notices of Amended Assessments dated 20 November 2020 have been issued to the first respondent in respect to the income assessment years ended 30 June 2008 to 30 June 2019 and Notices of Shortfall Penalty dated 20 November 2020 for the same income years, with total outstanding tax liability being approximately $31,717,768.96. Notices of Amended Assessments and Notices of Shortfall Penalty dated 20 November 2020 for the same period have been issued to the second respondent with total outstanding tax liability being in the amount of $31,767,420.58.
4 The Court has power to make a freezing order: see generally s 23 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), rr 7.31 - 7.38 of the Rules.
5 Relevantly, r 7.32 provides:
(1) The Court may make an order (a freezing order), with or without notice to a respondent, for the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied.
(2) A freezing order may be an order restraining a respondent from removing any assets located in or outside Australia or from disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of, those assets.
6 Rule 7.35, sets out the circumstances in which that power, which of its nature is discretionary, is enlivened. It is in the relevantly following terms:
7.35 Order against judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor or third party
(1) This rule applies if:
…
(b) an applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in:
(i) the Court; or
(ii) for a cause of action to which subrule (3) applies - another court.
…
(4) The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because any of the following might occur:
(a) the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person absconds;
(b) the assets of the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person are:
(i) removed from Australia or from a place inside or outside Australia; or
(ii) disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value.
7 The applicant has the burden of satisfying the Court that he has a good arguable case, that this claim is justiciable in the Federal Court, and that there is a "danger" that the judgment which he seeks will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because of the removal of assets from Australia or from a place inside or outside Australia, or disposed of, dealt with, or diminished in value.
8 The principles relating to the making of a freezing order were recently summarised by Wigney J in Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 743 at [7] - [9]:
The purpose of a freezing order is to prevent an abuse or a frustration of the Court's process by depriving an applicant of the fruits of any judgment obtained in the action: Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612 at 625. It is "no light matter" to freeze a party's assets and there is, accordingly, a need for the Court to exercise caution: Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 at 324F. A freezing order is a "drastic remedy" which should not be lightly granted: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at [51] citing Frigo v Culhari (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal 17 July 1998 at 10-11).
An applicant has a good arguable case if they have "a reasonably arguable case on legal as well as factual matters": Cardile at [68]; Insolvency Guardian Melbourne Pty Ltd v Carlei (2016) 111 ACSR 236; [2016] FCA 72 at [18]. It has also been said that a "good arguable case" is one "which is more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one the judge considers would have better than a fifty per cent chance of success": Curtis v NID Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1072 at [6] citing Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesselschaft mbH & Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] Com LR 234 at 235 (affirmed on appeal: [1983] 1 WLR 1412); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Greenfield Electrical Services Pty Ltd (2016) 103 ATR 327; [2016] FCA 653 at [7].
Where a freezing order is sought on the basis of a danger of the dissipation of assets, it is not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the risk of dissipation is more probable than not. Nor is it necessary for the applicant to adduce evidence of an intention on the part of the respondent to dissipate assets: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (2010) 273 ALR 194; [2010] FCA 1014 at [8]-[10]; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 4) (2012) 90 ATR 711; [2012] FCA 1064 at [23]. The making of a freezing order involves a discretionary exercise of power. The Court retains a discretion to refuse relief even if the requirements in r 7.35 of the Rules are satisfied: Patterson at 321-322.
Good arguable case
9 The production of a notice of assessment is conclusive evidence that it was properly made and, except in proceedings under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) on a review or appeal relating to the assessment, that the amounts and particulars contained within it are correct: Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Sch 1, s 350-10(1), Item 2 and section 175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The same applies to amended assessments. The production of a notice of assessment gives rise to a present debt, not one that arises in future if payment is not made by the date specified in the notice: Commissioner of Taxation v Ornelas [2016] FCA 457 at 7.
10 It is not necessary for the Commissioner to show that the time for payment of the assessments has elapsed: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (ACT) v Sharp (1988) 91 FLR 70 at 74; and see: Commissioner of Taxation v Growth Investment Fund SA [2014] FCA 780 at [7]-[13].
11 In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad [2010] FCA 1014; (2010) 273 ALR 194 at [14]-[16] Kenny J observed:
The Commissioner issued notices of assessment for unpaid income tax and notices of assessment for administrative penalties to each of the respondents on 12 August 2010. On the same day, the notices were sent by ordinary prepaid post to each of them, together with advice on the outcome of audits undertaken by the…ATO. Under s 255-5 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ('TAA'), the Commissioner may sue in the Federal Court to recover any tax liability that is due and payable. Pursuant to s 204(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ('ITAA') (and subject to the issue of service discussed below) the income tax liabilities were due and payable at the time the Commissioner instituted this proceeding in this Court. The administrative penalties were due when assessed and notices of the assessment served, although not payable until 10 September 2010: see Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 40; (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 16-17; TAA, s 298-15 of Sch 1.
Generally, a taxpayer cannot challenge the correctness of an assessment except under Part IVC of the TAA, that is, by making a taxation objection as prescribed and pursuing an appeals process under Pt IVC if the objection decision is unfavourable. In any proceeding other than a proceeding under Part IVC, the production of a notice of assessment, or a document under the hand of the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner purporting to be a copy of a notice of assessment, is conclusive evidence of the due making of the assessment and that the amount and all the particulars of the assessment are correct: s 177(1) of the ITAA and s 298-30(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA; also FJ Bloeman Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 27; (1981) 147 CLR 360 at 376 and Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32; (2008) 237 CLR 146 at 157 and 166-7. The Commissioner has produced documents under his hand purporting to be copies of the notices of assessment. Thus, in a recovery proceeding such as the proceedings on foot or contemplated here, the correctness of the assessments in question is not an issue the court can consider. Once an assessed liability is due and payable, the Commissioner may move for judgment in reliance on the conclusive evidence provision of s 177(1)…
The result is that the Commissioner plainly satisfied the "good arguable case" requirement for obtaining a freezing order, although, in the case of the administrative penalties, the cause of action was prospective at the time the proceeding was instituted…
12 As the applicant submitted, those observations are apt in this case.
13 On the evidence presented, I was satisfied that the applicant had established a good arguable case within the meaning of r 7.35 in respect of each of the respondents.
Danger that prospective judgment will be unsatisfied
14 I was also satisfied, for the reasons given in the affidavit of Ms Biltris, that there is a danger that a prospective judgment against the respondents will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because the assets of the respondents will be removed, disposed of or diminished in value.
15 As the applicant submitted, each of the respondents have both the "means and the motive" to dissipate the relevant assets: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1064 (DCT v Chemical Trustee (No 4)) at [24]. The debt for each respondent is substantial. In DCT v Chemical Trustee (No 4) Perram J observed at [24]:
In my opinion, in this case there is a danger of dissipation. My reasoning for this conclusion begins with the observation that the amount of tax (and penalties and interest) is very large.
16 The applicant submitted that it does not rely on evidence of an intention by the respondents to dissipate assets, but that such evidence was not necessary: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (2010) 273 ALR 194; [2010] FCA 1014 at [10]; DCT v Chemical Trustee Ltd (No 4) at [23].
17 The circumstances in this case include, inter alia, that:
(1) the Commissioner's audit concluded that the respondents' true income is far in excess of the income reported by them, such that they have substantially underreported their income across a sustained period, namely 12 consecutive income years, and consistent with the position in this respect, the respondents may take steps to avoid the payment of tax. The evidence points towards false, misleading or otherwise incomplete provision of information in relation to tax affairs demonstrated by under-declarations of income, false declarations in relation to offshore assets and to direct or indirect interest in foreign controlled companies and, in the case of the first respondent, in his interactions with the ATO. I note in this respect that evidence of apparent dishonesty in relation to tax affairs over a substantial period is capable of supporting the inference that the relevant taxpayer is not the sort of person who would, unless restrained, preserve assets intact so that they might be available to a judgment creditor: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ghaly [2016] FCA 707 at [30];
(2) the respondents have the means to dissipate their assets. In respect to the second respondent, a significant component of her asset base is in the form of real properties in Australia. In those circumstances, the risk is that the second respondent may be able to borrow against those properties in a manner which would frustrate the Commissioner. The applicant pointed out that while real property assets are not themselves relatively liquid in nature, steps may be taken by way of encumbering those assets such that they would be readily dissipated. This risk is particularly so where the respondents have existing relationships with multiple banks and a proven ability to borrow against the assets they own;
(3) it is clear from the affidavit evidence that the respondents have significant financial connections outside of the jurisdiction, particularly in China, and that they have connections to entities and associated entities with commercial activities and access to bank accounts overseas. In this regard the applicant relied on evidence of the transfer of substantial funds from Hisun Rubber (of which the first respondent is sole director and shareholder) and China Hisun (an offshore entity associated with the respondents) to Australian bank accounts of the respondents, and the transfer of funds offshore by the respondents through their related entities. I note also that each of the respondents are signatories or have authority to operate bank accounts held in the name of others.
(4) the first respondent has recently taken steps to dissipate assets he previously owned by transferring to the second respondent the interest in several residential properties in April 2020, and the interest in Jingshi Pty Ltd in January 2020, for no consideration. The applicant pointed out that a legal representative for the respondent indicated in early April to the Commissioner that there had been a recent separation between the respondents and there was to be a transfer of property as a result, however noting that the Commissioner has not found evidence of any Family Court proceedings in that respect.
18 After addressing the Court on matters in accordance with the applicant's duty of candour the applicant submitted that in the circumstances (including those referred to above) the orders should be made, with it being submitted that the documents before the Court speak to "two individuals with complex financial back stories that have amassed quite a significant amount of financial interest in the course of their adult lives and have connections to a raft of bank accounts and related entities".
19 On the evidence I am satisfied that the freezing orders should be made.
Balance of convenience
20 I was satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the making of the freezing orders sought. There is a real risk of dissipation in the absence of such an order. The form of the orders proposed by the applicant have a number of protections. The position of each of the respondents is protected by the Commissioner's undertaking as to damages: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Ghaly [2016] FCA 707 at [35]. The proposed freezing order is limited, in terms, by reference to the size of the relevant taxation-related liabilities. The orders do not prohibit the respondents' ability to meet their living expenses and reasonable legal expenses. The quantum of the taxation related liabilities is considerable, especially when measured against the known assets of each of the respondents: see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Greenfield Electrical Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 653 at [13].
Conclusion
21 Accordingly, I made the orders sought by the applicant.
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Abraham.