Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Harmouche [2025] FedCFamC2G 1573

1. The respondent, Ms Harmouche, applies for the review of a sequestration order a Registrar of this Court made against Ms Harmouche's estate on 29 October 2024. The Registrar made the sequestration order on the presentation by the applicant (DCT) of a creditor's petition filed on 28 May 2024.
2. The act of bankruptcy on which the DCT relies is Ms Harmouche's failure to comply with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice (Bankruptcy Notice) that was issued on the DCT's application on 19 January 2024. The Bankruptcy Notice demanded that Ms Harmouche pay to the DCT $1,550,802.79, being the sum of a judgment of $1,519,145.46 (Judgment Debt) entered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales together with interest of $31,657.33.

1. Ms Harmouche has applied for a review of the Registrar's orders pursuant to s 256(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFC Act) which, together with s 256(2), provides:

(1) A party to proceedings in which a delegate has exercised any of the powers of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) under section 254 may:

(a) within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court; or

(b) within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court;

apply to the Court for review of that exercise of power.

(2) The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may, on application under subsection (1) or on its own initiative, review an exercise of power by a delegate under section 254, and may make any order or orders it thinks fit in relation to the matter in respect of which the power was exercised.

1. The time for applying for review has been prescribed by r 2.02(3) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Rules), and it is within 21 days after the day on which the power was exercised.
2. A review under s 256(2) of the FCFC Act is a "hearing de novo". That means that: [1]

An applicant for review under [s 256(2)] is under no obligation to demonstrate error on the part of the Registrar, and does not need to establish that the Registrar's exercise of discretion miscarried in the sense described in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505: Pattison v Hadjimouratis [2006] FCAFC 153 at [153]- [154].

The hearing (or rehearing) of the creditor's petition is not prosecuted by the debtor (applicant for review) but by the creditor in the proceeding in which the registrar's order was made.

The application for review is a demand that the claim for relief (the sequestration order) be heard by a judge.

The onus is upon the creditor to prosecute its petition. The only onus of the debtor/bankrupt against whose estate a sequestration order has been made is to prove either solvency or any other sufficient cause under s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

1. The application for review first came before me on 4 February 2025. On that occasion I ordered that the matter be listed for further directions on 19 March 2025. On that date I listed the matter for further directions on 30 April 2025 which, at my request, was rescheduled to occur on 13 May 2025. On 13 May 2025 I set down the matter for hearing at 2.15 pm on 8 July 2025.
2. On 8 July 2025 Ms Harmouche appeared by her counsel who had been newly briefed. Counsel indicated that Ms Harmouche intended to raise an issue under the Constitution, and applied for an adjournment. I granted the adjournment, and listed the matter for hearing on 20 August 2025. I directed Ms Harmouche to file and serve by 25 July 2025: (a) a document that states with specificity the grounds on which Ms Harmouche relies for claiming that a sequestration order ought not be made; (b) any additional evidentiary material on which Ms Harmouche intended to rely; and (c) written submissions. Ms Harmouche did not comply with these orders.
3. On 20 August 2025 Ms Harmouche, through her solicitor, again applied for an adjournment. The principal basis on which Ms Harmouche applied for an adjournment was that her counsel had been ill. I granted the adjournment, and listed the application for review for hearing at 10.15 am on 12 September 2025.

Application for stay under s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act

1. At 4:43 pm on 11 September 2025 Ms Harmouche filed a document titled "Notice of a Constitutional matter under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903". The document read as follows:

The APPLICANT gives notice that the proceeding involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation within the meaning of section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903.

Nature of Constitutional matter

In Proceedings Number SYG1039 of 2024 in the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia so much of the Judgment as related to a taxation penalty in the circumstances amounts to an acquisition by the Commonwealth on other than just terms

Facts showing that section 78B Judiciary Act 1903 applies

1. The applicant has applied for review of a sequestration order made against her by a registrar of the court on the application of the respondent.
2. The respondent relies on a judgement for outstanding debts relating to unpaid taxation assessments and penalties.
3. The applicant asserts that in the circumstances where she was not aware of the assessments and had not lodged any tax assessments, and had a genuine belief that she was not required to lodge any tax assessments, the imposition of punitive penalties amounts to an acquisition by the Commonwealth on other than just terms

1. At the hearing on 12 September 2025 Ms Harmouche appeared by her counsel; and I invited submissions on whether s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Judiciary Act) applied such as to require me to adjourn the hearing. Subsection 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act provides:

Where a cause pending in a federal court including the High Court or in a court of a State or Territory involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, it is the duty of the court not to proceed in the cause unless and until the court is satisfied that notice of the cause, specifying the nature of the matter has been given to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and of the States, and a reasonable time has elapsed since the giving of the notice for consideration by the Attorneys-General, of the question of intervention in the proceedings or removal of the cause to the High Court.

1. I asked counsel for Ms Harmouche to identify the matter he submitted arose under the Constitution. Counsel submitted that part of the Judgment Debt was constituted by administrative penalties that were imposed on Ms Harmouche pursuant to s 284-75 and s 286-75 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). In broad terms, s 284-75 provides for the imposition of an administrative penalty for making false or misleading statements in a material particular in relation to the matters identified by that section; and s 286-75 provides for the imposition of an administrative penalty in relation to the failure to give a return, notice, statement of other document to the Commissioner of Taxation. Counsel submitted that these provisions, as they applied to Ms Harmouche, constituted a law for "the acquisition of property" other than on just terms, and, therefore, were laws that exceeded the legislative power conferred by s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.[3]
2. I directed counsel's attention to the judgment of French J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors,[4] I also directed counsel's attention to the judgment of Gageler J (as his Honour then was) in Attorney-General [NT] v Emmerson,[5] who quoted the following passage from the judgment of Brennan J in Re Director of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler:[6]

A law which imposes a penalty or sanction for breach of a provision prescribing a rule of conduct and which, apart from its imposition of the penalty or sanction, is a law with respect to a head of power other than s 51(xxxi) cannot be classified as a law with respect to the acquisition of property within s 51(xxxi). To place it within the s 51(xxxi) category would be to annihilate the penalty or sanction and thus to weaken, if not destroy, the normative effect of the prescription of the rule of conduct. The irrelevance of s 51(xxxi) to the imposition of fines and forfeitures is trite law.

1. I asked counsel for Ms Harmouche whether, if she were correct on the matter she wished to raise under the Constitution, Ms Harmouche would still owe a debt to the DCT. Counsel accepted there is a part of the Judgment Debt that would not be subject to the constitutional challenge; and that that amount would be sufficient to found a sequestration order. I asked whether, in that case, even if Ms Harmouche had a sound constitutional case, s 78B(2)(c) of the Judiciary Act permitted me to proceed with the hearing of the application for review. Counsel accepted that was so. Subsection 78B(2) provides:

For the purposes of subsection (1), a court in which a cause referred to in that subsection is pending:

(a) may adjourn the proceedings in the cause for such time as it thinks necessary and may make such order as to costs in relation to such an adjournment as it thinks fit;

(b) may direct a party to give notice in accordance with that subsection; and

(c) may continue to hear evidence and argument concerning matters severable from any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.

1. After hearing submissions I indicated I would make a declaration and give my reasons later. I then made the following declaration:

The Court is not under a duty not to proceed with the application for review of the sequestration order made by a Registrar of this Court on 29 October 2024, unless and until the Attorney General of the Commonwealth and the Attorneys General of the States and Territories are given sufficient time to respond to the notice purportedly given under s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) filed by the respondent on 11 September 2025.

1. After I made the declaration counsel for Ms Harmouche applied for an adjournment of the hearing of the application for review. The basis of the application was that counsel had given advice concerning the conduct of the case that had not been followed; and that he had only recently been re-engaged. That meant counsel was not in a position to present Ms Harmouche's case. Counsel accepted there was no material before the Court that explained why counsel ceased to be engaged, and why he had been engaged one day before the hearing.
2. I also asked counsel what would be the utility of my granting the adjournment Ms Harmouche was seeking. Counsel said there were two things. One was that Ms Harmouche would be able to commence proceedings "in another place" to challenge the Judgment Debt, although counsel accepted that Ms Harmouche's challenge would only relate to a portion of the Judgment Debt. The second thing was that Ms Harmouche would be able to tender evidence relating to solvency. Counsel accepted, however, that Ms Harmouche had already filed an affidavit in relation to those matters. Counsel also referred to Ms Harmouche's husband taking steps to refinance properties and thus be in a position to pay the Judgment Debt.
3. At the conclusion of these submissions I indicted I would dismiss Ms Harmouche's application for an adjournment, but would give reasons later. I then proceeded to hear Ms Harmouche's application for a review.

STAY UNDER s 78B(1)?

1. Section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 "only operates when the circumstances it postulates are made to appear to the Court: it does not operate simply because a party asserts those circumstances".[7] The section contemplates "a constitutional question which is a live issue in the proceedings".[8] Further, section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903:[9]

does not impose on the Court a duty not to proceed pending the issue of a notice no matter how trivial, unarguable or concluded the constitutional point may be. If the asserted constitutional point is frivolous or vexatious or raised as an abuse of process, it will not attach to the matter in which it is raised the character of a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.

1. I made the declaration that the Court was not under a duty not to proceed with the application for review of the sequestration order under s 78B of the Judiciary Act for two reasons, each of which was sufficient. The first is I was satisfied there was no substance to the asserted constitutional matter. I was satisfied that a provision which imposed an administrative penalty could not reasonably be characterised as a law relating to the acquisition of property on other than just terms. Second, to the extent there was any substance to the asserted constitutional point, it related only to part of the Judgment Debt. That meant there was a matter that I could proceed to decide that was severable from the asserted constitutional matter, the severable matter being whether, notwithstanding the challenge to part of the Judgment Debt, the unchallenged part of the Judgment Debt was sufficient to warrant a sequestration order being made, assuming the DCT established the preconditions for the making of a sequestration order provided for by s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act).

1. I refused Ms Harmouche's application for an adjournment, first, because I was not satisfied with the reasons Ms Harmouche's gave for claiming she was not ready to proceed; and, second, because I was not satisfied there would be any utility in granting the adjournment Ms Harmouche sought.

PROOF OF MATTERS IN s 52(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND BANKRUPTCY RULES

1. Subsection 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides as follows:

At the hearing of a creditor's petition, the Court shall require proof of:

(a) the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);

(c) the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;

and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.

1. The matters that must be stated in a creditor's petition are prescribed by s 47(1A) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that if "the rules of court prescribe a form for the purposes of this subsection, the petition must be in the form prescribed". Rule 4.02 of the Bankruptcy Rules prescribes a form for the purposes of s 47(1A) of the Act. The form requires the creditor, among other things, to identify the act of bankruptcy on which the creditor relies, and the debt or debts the creditor claims the debtor owes the creditor.
2. In the creditor's petition filed on 28 May 2024, the DCT claims Ms Harmouche failed to comply, on or before 4 March 2024, with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Notice, being 21 days after 10 February 2024 when the Bankruptcy Notice was served on Ms Harmouche. The creditor's petition is in the prescribed form, and, as required by s 47 of the Bankruptcy Act, an affidavit verifying it has been made by an authorised person.[10] The DCT also filed, at the time he filed the creditor's petition, an affidavit required by r 4.04(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Rules,[11] and, on 28 May 2024, an affidavit of service of the Bankruptcy Notice.[12]
3. The creditor's petition filed on 28 May 2024, together with the affidavit required by r 4.04(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Rules, and the affidavit of service of the Bankruptcy Notice, were served on Ms Harmouche on 16 June 2024.[13] Further, I read an affidavit of debt,[14] being an affidavit which, under r 4.06(4) of the Bankruptcy Rules, must be made as soon as practicable before the hearing of the creditor's petition, and also an affidavit of search,[15] as required by r 4.06(3) of the Bankruptcy Rules.
4. I am satisfied the DCT has proved the matters it is required to prove under s 43 and s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act and under the Bankruptcy Rules and, for that reason, the preconditions for the making of a sequestration order are satisfied.

1. Subsection 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that if satisfied that a creditor has proved the matters specified in s 52(1) but also that the debtor is able to pay his or her debts, or, for other sufficient cause, the Court is satisfied a sequestration order ought not be made, the Court may dismiss the creditor's petition.
2. Ms Harmouche has not filed a notice stating grounds of opposition to the creditor's petition; but she has filed a number of affidavits. They indicate Ms Harmouche relies on two grounds for submitting a sequestration order ought not be made. The first is the contention that Ms Harmouche was not aware of the notices of assessment the DCT had issued to her on the basis of which the DCT obtained the Judgment Debt, and Ms Harmouche held a genuine belief she was not required to lodge any tax returns. The second ground is that she is in a position to pay her debts.

1. Ms Harmouche relies on an affidavit made by her husband, Mr Chahab, and two made by Ms Harmouche. In his affidavit made on 2 July 2025 Mr Chahab deposes as follows:

(a) Mr Chahab married Ms Harmouche in Lebanon in 2000 after which he and Ms Harmouche migrated to Australia. Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche have seven children.

(b) Mr Chahab adopted the role of financial provider for the family, and Ms Harmouche adopted the role of "a traditional Muslim wife and mother". Throughout their marriage, Mr Chahab has taken all business and financial decisions, including property investments which he and Ms Harmouche made from time to time.

(c) Mr Chahab rarely had any discussions with Ms Harmouche about business matters. From time to time Mr Chahab gave Ms Harmouche documents to sign, and he observed her do so without reading them:

Therefore, to the extent that there may have been an unexplained increase in our net assets (which is not admitted), I am solely responsible for it, rather than [Ms Harmouche], and feel that any tax and penalties which may be imposed should be imposed against me solely, and not against [Ms Harmouche].

(d) When he first arrived in Australia, Mr Chahab was employed as a builder's labourer. In about 2008 Mr Chahab opened a coffee shop in Lakemba.

(e) In about 2013 Mr Chahab arranged for his accountant to incorporate a company which commenced a cleaning business. That business lasted four to five years.

(f) In about 2019 Mr Chahab arranged for his accountant to incorporate another company and commenced a warehousing business.

(g) In about 2007 Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche bought a family home in Greenacre for $420,000. The purchase was funded by a loan Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche took out.

(h) Mr Chahab caused the Greenacre property to be sold in 2013 for $670,000; and he and Ms Harmouche used the proceeds of sale to purchase another property at Greenacre for the price of $1.2 million. Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche borrowed $800,000 to fund the purchase.

(i) In about 2017 Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche sold the second Greenacre property for $1.7 million. After the sale Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche rented a house in Greenacre.

(j) In about December 2019 Mr Chahab and Ms Harmouche purchased another property for $1,020,000 (Maiden Street Property). Mr Chahab lodged a development application for a project Mr Chahab estimated would cost $1,108,483. Mr Chahab completed the project, but it cost 20% less that he had estimated.

(k) In about January 2018 Mr Chahab purchased a commercial property in Lakemba (Lakemba Property) with another person for $2.7 million. Mr Chahab and the other person contributed $650,000, and they borrowed the balance of the purchase price. Mr Chahab and the other person still own the Lakemba Property, which is valued at approximately $4 million.

1. In an affidavit made on 3 February 2025 Ms Harmouche deposes to the purchase and sale of the Greenacre properties to which Mr Chahab refers in his affidavit. Ms Harmouche also deposes to her having a number of bank accounts, some of which have been joint accounts with Mr Chahab, and some of which Ms Harmouche was the sole account holder. Ms Harmouche then notes she has been shown a document headed "Reason for Decision" dated 8 December 2022 from the Australian Taxation Office, in relation to which Ms Harmouche deposes as follows:

(a) The document shows that for each of the years 2014-2021 Ms Harmouche did not lodge an income tax return. For each of those years Ms Harmouche's sole income was Centrelink benefits. Ms Harmouche does not recall signing any administrative statement to the ATO to the effect that lodging a return was not necessary.

(b) From around 2023, from time to time, some documents from the ATO arrived at Ms Harmouche's and Mr Chahab's home. Ms Harmouche invariably opened the letters and gave them to Mr Chahab.

(c) Ms Harmouche understood that Mr Chahab had a lawyer, Mr Haddad. Ms Harmouche met him once when she was shopping at Woolworths in Chullora when, by chance, she observed him with Mr Chahab having coffee. Mr Chahab introduced Mr Haddad as "our solicitor". Mr Haddad requested Ms Harmouche provide some bank statements.

(d) Ms Harmouche was shown on the day she made her affidavit a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales entered on 10 January 2024. That was the occasion on which Ms Harmouche became aware of the judgment. Ms Harmouche was not told by Mr Chahab or any other person that she was required to prepare or swear any affidavit in the Supreme Court.

(e) Ms Harmouche was also shown consent orders made by a Registrar of this Court on 30 July 2024 in which the Registrar ordered, among other things, that the hearing of the creditor's petition be adjourned to 29 October 2024. Ms Harmouche says she was not made aware that she was required to attend. Ms Harmouche knew there was some sort of court proceeding on foot, but she was always told by Mr Chahab that "the solicitor says everything is under control".

(f) Ms Harmouche was shown a copy of the sequestration order made by a Registrar on 29 October 2024. Neither Mr Chahab nor Mr Haddad informed Ms Harmouche that she was required to attend Court at the hearing of the creditor's petition before the Registrar.

(g) Having been made aware of the sequestration order Ms Harmouche instructed new lawyers to set aside the sequestration order. Ms Harmouche's solicitor "is currently obtaining evidence from an accountant in relation to statements from bank accounts"; and she has instructed her solicitor to prepare a complaint.

(h) Ms Harmouche annexes a property appraisal of the Maiden Street Property, which values it at between $3.4 and $3.5 million.

1. In her affidavit made on 10 September 2025 Ms Harmouche deposes to matters relating to the Maiden Street Property as follows:

(a) The current value of the Maiden Street Property is $3.925 million. It is subject to a mortgage of $712,000.

(b) Mr Chahab and another person are joint owners of the Lakemba Property. Mr Chahab informed Ms Harmouche that the Lakemba Property is currently listed for sale, and he expects to receive $950,000, which will be applied to meet any debts attributed to Ms Harmouche.

(c) Ms Harmouche and Mr Chahab are in the process of applying to refinance "the property" to obtain more funds to be ready to meet any debts attributed to Ms Harmouche. Ms Harmouche annexes what she describes as a "copy of a lending proposal quote provided by the finance broker to my solicitor". The document that is annexed is dated 11 September 2025, one day after the date on which Ms Harmouche made her affidavit.

1. At the hearing counsel for Ms Harmouche submitted that a sequestration order ought not be made because the evidence shows there is real estate whose underlying value will be sufficient to meet the Judgement Debt. I will take this to be a submission that Ms Harmouche is able to pay her debts.
2. As I have already noted, s 52(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the Court may dismiss a creditor's petition, even where the matters specified in s 52(1) are satisfied, if the Court is satisfied the debtor is able to pay his or her debts. Although s 52(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act does not use the word "solvent", that paragraph has been interpreted as requiring the Court to be satisfied the debtor is "solvent", in the sense of not being "insolvent" as that term was explained in Sandell v Porter:[16]

Insolvency is expressed in s. 95 [of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth)] as an inability to pay debts as they fall due out of the debtor's own money. But the debtor's own moneys are not limited to his cash resources immediately available. They extend to moneys which he can procure by realization by sale or by mortgage or pledge of his assets within a relatively short time - relative to the nature and amount of the debts and to the circumstances, including the nature of the business, of the debtor. The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor's financial position in its entirety and generally speaking ought not to be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity. It is the debtor's inability, utilizing such cash resources as he has or can command through the use of his assets, to meet his debts as they fall due which indicates insolvency. Whether that state of his affairs has arrived is a question for the Court and not one as to which expert evidence may be given in terms though no doubt experts may speak as to the likelihood of any of the debtor's assets or capacities yielding ready cash in sufficient time to meet the debts as they fall due.

1. Some of the relevant principles for determining whether, on this approach, a debtor is able to pay his or her debts were identified by Driver FM (as his Honour then was) in Deputy Commissioner Of Taxation v Caporale as follows (references omitted):[17]

The inquiry emphasises that it involves a consideration of the ability to command cash resources through his or her own assets. The Court must also look at the level of the debtor's recurrent expenses and earnings in addition to whether there are cash resources from assets.

A respondent debtor bears the onus of proving to the Court that their assets are sufficient to pay their liabilities as and when they become due and payable. It is not sufficient to simply show an excess of assets over liabilities. The respondent debtor must also establish that their assets are available to be realised and that they are capable of ready realisation.

1. The material on which Ms Harmouche relies is incapable of showing that she is in a position to pay her debts. Ms Harmouche has not purported to identify all of her debts or the source of funds with which to pay those debts. Moreover:

(a) The material on which Ms Harmouche relies shows that the equity she has in the Maiden Street Property is less than the Judgment Debt.

(b) Ms Harmouche does not say she and Mr Chahab intend to sell the Maiden Street Property; she deposes that she and Mr Chahab intend to raise $1 million finance. But that is less than the Judgment Debt.

(c) Although Ms Harmouche says that Mr Chahab intends to sell the Lakemba Property, the material does not satisfy me that the Lakemba Property has the value Mr Chahab asserts it does, or that Mr Chahab intends or will be able to sell the property in the near future. There is no evidence that Mr Chahab has in fact taken any such step after 29 October 2024 when the Registrar made the sequestration order that is the subject of this application for review.

1. The only conceivable relevance of Ms Harmouche's asserted ignorance to whether the sequestration order ought not be made is whether it affords a basis for "questioning whether behind the [Judgment Debt] . . . there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioning creditor",[18] here, the DCT. I am not satisfied that Ms Harmouche's asserted ignorance gives rise to any such question. The Judgment Debt is founded on a debt that has arisen under the relevant tax laws; and Ms Harmouche has not articulated any basis on which it could be said that her asserted ignorance affords a basis for doubting the debt behind the Judgment Debt. Further, there is no evidence that suggests Ms Harmouche has taken any steps to challenge that debt; and it is not possible to identify how Ms Harmouche's asserted ignorance could be relevant to whether Ms Harmouche is truly indebted for the amount of the Judgment Debt. Finally, and as I have already noted, Ms Harmouche appears to accept that she has no right to challenge that part of the Judgment Debt that does not comprise administrative penalties.

1. I am not satisfied that a sequestration order ought not be made.

1. I propose to order that the application for review be dismissed, and affirm the sequestration order the Registrar made on 29 October 2024. I also propose to order that the DCT's costs be paid out of Ms Harmouche's estate, and that they have the same priority as the costs of the creditor's petition.

I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Manousaridis.

[1] Conlan v Mladenis [2007] FCA 1129, at [5] (Sundberg J).

[2] Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34, at [27].

[3] Which provides that "Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to... The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws".

[4] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 167 ALR 303 at [14].

[5] Attorney-General [NT] v Emmerson [2014] HCA 13, at [112].

[6] Re Director of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler [1994] HCA 10; (1994) 179 CLR 270, at page 278.

[7] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 167 ALR 303 at [13] citing Burchett J in Amrit Lal Narain v Parnell [1986] FCA 89; (1986) 9 FCR 479 at 489.

[8] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 167 ALR 303 at [13] citing Burchett J in Amrit Lal Narain v Parnell [1986] FCA 89; (1986) 9 FCR 479 at 489.

[9] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 167 ALR 303 at [14].

[10] Affidavit verifying creditor's petition of Khaja Ahmed Mohiuddin made on 22 May 2024.

[11] Affidavit of C Alvaro made on 27 May 2024 (incorrectly stated to have been made pursuant to r 4.06(3) and (5), an error that is immaterial).

[12] Affidavit of Service of Bankruptcy Notice made on 27 February 2024, deposing that the Bankruptcy Notice was served on Ms Harmouche on 10 February 2024.

[13] Affidavit of Service of Nadia Iannitti made on 18 June 2024.

[14] Affidavit of Debt of R El Dergham made on 11 September 2025.

[15] Affidavit of Search of B Pan made on 11 September 2025.

[16] Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666, at 670-671. The cases which so construed s 52(2)(a) of the Act were identified by Cowdroy J in Rigg v Baker [2006] FCAFC 179, at [104].

[17] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Caporale [2013] FMCA 5, at [23] and [24].

[18] Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126 CLR 212, at page 224 (Barwick CJ).