What I did was completely unacceptable, and I cannot be excused. I am doing what I can to ensure that nothing like this happens again.[9]

1. Although not seeking to excuse her conduct, the respondent provides an explanation of the context in which she says the conduct occurred.
2. She had successfully completed the first two years of her post-graduate course. She hoped to complete the final year in 2020.
3. By email dated 12 March 2020,[10] the respondent was given formal notice that she was at risk of not progressing in the third year of her course. Concerns were raised about her standard of professional work and the appropriateness of her interactions with some teaching staff.
4. Her work was disrupted by the closure of clinical practice at that time due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When the closure was lifted, she was instructed that she could not resume clinical work until she had completed a list of tasks to address deficiencies identified by her supervisor. Her return to clinical work was delayed by about five weeks. On 27 May 2020 she was given a second formal notice of the risk of her not progressing.[11] This came the day before she was due to make two required presentations. She was very distressed by this notice and missed the seminar the next morning.
5. The respondent perceived that the relationship with her supervisor had broken down and that she was being treated unfairly. It is in this context that the misconduct occurred.
6. The respondent eventually sought leave from the study course and sought to complete her qualification elsewhere. She was accepted to do so at the University of Queensland[12] and studied there in 2021 and 2022. At the time of this hearing in December 2022, she had recently decided to seek leave from the course in Queensland. She now intends to return to Melbourne and to work in a general dental practice there. It is apparent that she has been unable to successfully complete the course during her time in Queensland.
7. The respondent maintains that there was a lack of structure and support in the course in Adelaide. She maintains that criticisms of her performance and conduct were unfair. These claims must be viewed with caution. We should not be understood as providing any endorsement of the respondent's views of her treatment in Adelaide. The respondent herself concedes, with the benefit of hindsight, that some of her supervisor's concerns had merit.[13] Further, the evidence before the Tribunal suggests that, despite receiving considerable support and mentoring, the respondent has been unable to meet the necessary requirements of the course over a period of two years in Queensland. Professor Walsh stated in his evidence that that her relationships with some colleagues in Queensland were "sub-optimal" until steps were taken to rectify this with the advice of her mentor.[14] These factors all suggest that the respondent's complaints about what occurred in Adelaide should be viewed with caution.
8. It is trite to observe that this Tribunal has not heard from those involved in supervising the respondent's course and we are in no position to assess the merits of the complaints that the respondent makes. That does not matter. We accept that this was a very stressful time for the respondent. She had completed two years of a specialist qualification and was faced with notice that she was at risk of not progressing. She would naturally have been distressed by that. Regardless of whether her views were soundly based, we accept that the respondent had a genuine perception that she was being treated unfairly and that her relationship with her supervisor had broken down. She was under significant stress and pressure. She says that her mind was in turmoil. We accept that this is the context in which the conduct occurred.

1. As the respondent freely admits, the conduct was inexcusable and breached the ethical requirements of truthfulness and integrity as contained in the Code of Conduct for Registered Health Practitioners.[15]
2. The respondent was not an undergraduate student with limited life experience. She was at the time 36 years of age and had been a registered dentist for about nine years.
3. Registered dentists are entrusted with responsibility for various formal documents of legal significance, such as prescriptions, medical certificates, and claim forms. The necessity for absolute honesty and candour in respect of such documents is well-recognised and made clear to practitioners in the Code of Conduct for Health Practitioners.[16] The respondent must have been aware how serious it was to fabricate a medical certificate.
4. The presentation of the false certificates was not done on the spur of the moment. It required a conscious decision to fabricate the certificates, a process of doing so, and a decision to forward the certificate to her supervisor. After the first false certificate was presented, the respondent had time to reflect on her actions. Some weeks later, she again fabricated and produced a false certificate.
5. As the respondent has acknowledged, her conduct dishonestly utilised the professional reputation and authority of an innocent third party (the medical practitioner whose name and signature was used). As a registered health practitioner herself, the respondent should have been very aware of the seriousness of doing so.
6. We have no hesitation in finding that the respondent's conduct was substantially below the standard to be reasonably expected of a registered dentist of the respondent's level of training and experience.
7. The conduct is properly categorised as professional misconduct.
8. The context in which the conduct occurred is of relevance to the consideration of the appropriate disciplinary sanctions. It does not change the appropriate categorisation of the misconduct. It cannot deflect us from a finding that the respondent behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct.[17]

1. The respondent had previously been the subject of a formal caution administered under s 178 of the National Law.
2. It related to conduct in May 2014 when the respondent had written a script for a person who was not her patient. The prescribed medications included temazepam, which was prescribed to treat a complaint of anxiety. The recipient of the script was a former employee of the dental practice where the respondent then worked, and a person described by the respondent as a "good friend".
3. When the script was questioned by a pharmacist, the respondent initially denied to the practice manager that she had written it. She states that she panicked after hearing that police had been contacted. A short time later the respondent contacted the practice manager and admitted writing the script. The respondent resigned from the practice forthwith.
4. The respondent admitted to AHPRA that she had written the prescription and acknowledged that it was inappropriate to prescribe for a non-patient and inappropriate for a dentist to prescribe to treat anxiety. She stated that she was extremely disappointed by her lack of judgement and undertook not to repeat the conduct.
5. By letter dated 19 October 2015 the respondent was formally cautioned under s 178 of the National Law to abide with legislation when prescribing and to observe appropriate professional boundaries.
6. After this caution, the respondent was clearly on notice concerning the need for strict adherence to ethical responsibilities.

1. By letter dated 15 November 2020 addressed to AHPRA, the respondent provided a very detailed response to the notification.[18] In the proceedings before this Tribunal, she again provided a detailed statement.[19] She later provided an addendum statement concerning some aspects.[20] We have carefully considered the material contained in those documents. We shall not repeat that material here, save to emphasise some aspects.
2. The respondent moved from Victoria to Adelaide with her then partner and young child in 2018 for the purpose of undertaking the post-graduate degree. In 2019 she was diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Since March 2019 she has been under the care of specialist psychiatrist, Dr Rajan Singh, for this disorder. The disorder appears to be well-managed and it is not suggested that it is a significant factor in relation to this misconduct.[21]
3. The respondent successfully passed the first two years of her course in 2018 and 2019. She states that she "did not thrive professionally" at the start of 2020 as her supervisor was constantly critical of her performance. Her despondency was aggravated by the COVID-19 shut-down which excluded all clinical work for a period of time. She found it more difficult to do her training remotely. She was further stressed when required to complete a list of tasks before her supervisor would allow her to return to clinical work. She became resentful of her supervisor and perceived that the relationship had broken down. This led to "turmoil" in her mind. The professional misconduct occurred in this context.
4. After the misconduct the University conducted an inquiry. The respondent was eventually required to give an undertaking that the conduct would not be repeated. The respondent wrote letters to her supervisor and the Dean of the faculty, apologising for her conduct.[22]
5. The respondent's academic situation did not improve, and she eventually decided to take a leave of absence from the course. Subsequently, she accepted an offer to complete the third year of her course at the University of Queensland under Associate Professor David Thomson. Prior to accepting the offer, she had advised Professor Thomson of the matters now before the Tribunal.
6. The respondent indicated that she had sought mentoring from Emeritus Professor Alastair Goss and others. She stated that she had been reading material relevant to professional ethics. In Queensland the respondent arranged mentoring with Emeritus Professor Laurence Walsh AO. We received a report from Professor Walsh and heard oral evidence from him. In general terms, Professor Walsh spoke of the respondent's remorse and shame arising from the misconduct. He deposed to the respondent's increased insight following the mentoring she has received. He described his attempts to equip the respondent with "tools" to deal with the various challenges that she will continue to face in life and professional practice. He deposed to substantial development in these areas but indicated that continued mentoring would be desirable for some years into the future.
7. It was of concern to the Tribunal that the respondent had not advised Professor Walsh of the notification concerning her conduct in 2014 and the caution administered at that time. We would consider such disclosure as a necessary part of fully facing up to her situation and taking responsibility for her actions in the context of seeking mentoring from Professor Walsh.
8. The respondent has deposed that she suffered considerable hardship and financial loss. She accepted that she had brought this on herself. To the extent that it is possible, we take the respondent's personal circumstances into account. We accept that the respondent is genuinely remorseful and motivated to avoid misconduct in the future. There remains, however, a concern about her ability to cope with the challenges of professional practice and life generally, and to respond appropriately when under significant stress.
9. In her response on 15 November 2020, the respondent stated:[23]

I acknowledge that there is no excuse for my dishonesty, no matter the surrounding circumstances. > > As stressed as I was at the time, this cannot in any way justify what I so foolishly did. > > I have had some considerable time now to reflect my actions (sic), to spend time with my daughter and partner, and to see my actions in proper context by looking at myself in the mirror as it were and see myself as I truly am. > > I realise now that professional life will always throw up challenges that are not necessarily patient-related and that I must learn to deal with them professionally.

10. These are appropriate reflections.
11. It is our view that the respondent has gained considerable insight, but her development in this area is still a work in progress. She has clearly profited from mentoring. We consider that the respondent is likely to struggle with the pressures of life and professional practice for the foreseeable future. Ideally, mentoring should continue for the next few years. Professor Walsh has indicated that he is still available to be her mentor.

1. Disciplinary sanctions are entirely protective. They are never imposed for the purpose of punishment.[24]
2. The purposes for which sanctions may be imposed have been considered in many cases. We do not repeat the principles here. They were most recently outlined by this Tribunal in Pharmacy Board v Roberts (Unreported decision of the Tribunal given 13 December 2022 (2022/SHP000011 at paras [38] - [46]).[25]
3. The Board submitted that the respondent should be reprimanded. The respondent submitted that a caution would be sufficient. We do not agree. This professional misconduct, by a reasonably experienced dentist, is too serious. It requires a reprimand to express the Tribunal's condemnation of the conduct. The public and the profession must be assured that such conduct is regarded as inconsistent with the responsibilities of a registered person and will not be tolerated. We impose a formal reprimand.
4. Both parties submit that conditions should be imposed on the respondent's registration, requiring her to have further mentoring. The Board provided a draft condition, and we understood the respondent to be content with the drafting.
5. The parties submitted that a period of 12 months would be an appropriate period for mentoring, but we indicated during the hearing that we considered that this period may be insufficient. We do not consider that it would adequately protect the public. The respondent is about to embark on a new phase of her career in a new setting. Her career pathway in the future is uncertain. She is likely to meet new challenges in her professional and private life over the next two years. We intend to impose a condition requiring mentoring for two years, but not as frequently as suggested in the Board's draft. We have tried to minimise any further hardship to the respondent, but sometimes a sanction needed to protect the public will have to be imposed despite the effect on a practitioner.[26]
6. We propose a total of 15 mentoring sessions, each of at least one hour in duration. For the first six months, the sessions should be conducted on a monthly basis. For the balance of the two-year period, the sessions should occur bi-monthly. We would amend the Board's Schedule of Conditions accordingly. We direct the Board to file an amended schedule consistent with these Reasons.

1. The Board sought, and the respondent resisted, an order for costs. The Board has been successful in these proceedings and there has been a finding of professional misconduct. We do not consider that any basis has been demonstrated to deny the Board an order for costs. The respondent must pay the Board's costs to be agreed, or in default of agreement, to be fixed by the Tribunal.

1. In summary, the orders of the Tribunal are as follows:

(a) The Tribunal decides that the respondent has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct. > > (b) The respondent is reprimanded. > > (c) Conditions are imposed on the registration of the respondent as indicated herein. > > (d) The respondent must pay the costs of the Board to be agreed, or in default of agreement, to be fixed by the Tribunal.

1. The Board sought an order under s 60 of the South Australia Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 prohibiting the publication of the names of, or any material tending to identify persons referred to in the evidence before the Tribunal, save for the respondent and Professor Walsh.[27]
2. The respondent opposed that application. It was asserted that no basis had been shown for the order and the principle of open justice should prevail.
3. The Tribunal considered the provisions of s 60 in the case of Medical Board of Australia v Martin [2021] SACAT 12. The Tribunal stated:[28]
   1. The bases for making a direction under s 60(2) are set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of the subsection. They are extremely broad; much broader than the bases upon which suppression orders may usually be made by courts. They are deliberately broad, to cater for the breadth of jurisdictions conferred on SACAT and the range of issues which might arise.[29] The range of orders that may be made, as set out in paragraphs (e) to (i), are also broad. Nonetheless, the breadth of the powers does not detract from the need to recognise the fundamental principle of open justice and the aspects of the public interest that it seeks to protect. The powers under s 60(2) should be exercised cautiously and with these principles in mind. Nonetheless, the section recognises that there will be circumstances where those aspects of the public interest are outweighed by other factors.
   2. In health practitioner disciplinary matters, the evidence and documents before the Tribunal often refer to third parties. Such persons may, for example, be patients of the practitioner whose conduct is in question. They may be the alleged victims of the misconduct. Some may have been the victim of sexual misconduct of a highly intimate nature. Some may be children, even young babies. Some may suffer from a mental illness or condition. These third parties may or may not be witnesses in the case. In some cases, they may be unaware of the proceedings. There will often be little or no public interest in the identities of such third parties being published to the world at large, together with confidential and intimate detail concerning their medical history. On the other hand, there may well be a public interest in the identities of such third parties being protected from publication if the prospect of such confidentiality encourages victims of misconduct and other informants to report such conduct to the authorities.[30] (Some citations removed).
4. Section 60 directs attention to the interests of justice. In this case, material filed by the respondent included material which was critical of her supervisor and other officials at the University of Adelaide. In our view, there is little or no public interest in the identities of such persons being published. These persons were not parties to the proceeding and have had no opportunity to respond to the respondent's claims. Publication of the identities of the supervisor and other officials, together with detail of the unsubstantiated complaints made against them, would be unfair and contrary to the interests of justice. It would tend to undermine confidence in the role of the Tribunal. In our view, it is in the public interest to make the confidentiality order.
5. The Tribunal prohibits the publication of the names of, or any material tending to identify, any person referred to in the evidence before the Tribunal, save for those persons named in the Tribunal's order and this Statement of Reasons.

[1] The National Law is to be found in Schedule 2 to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (the Act).

[2] Statement of Agreed Facts: exhibit C2.

[4] Statement of medical practitioner: TB page 17ff.

[6] Statement of medical practitioner: TB page 17ff.

[12] The respondent was candid with the University concerning the misconduct now before this Tribunal.

[17] Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Ardalich [2005] SASC 478, [42]-[49].

[18] TB pages 156-159, 161-171 and 212-220.

[19] TB pages 296ff. The respondent also gave oral evidence.

[21] Medical report of Dr Singh dated 19 November 2020: TB pages 241ff.

[24] Craig v Medical Board of Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545, 553-554.

[25] Now reported at [2022] SACAT 111.

[26] Craig v Medical Board of Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545 at 553-554 at [43].

[27] We have also identified various other persons in these Reasons where appropriate to do so.

[28] Medical Board of Australia v Martin [2021] SACAT 12, [56]-[57].

[29] Re XHQ [2018] SACAT 11.

[30] Medical Board of Australia v Shetty [2014] VCAT 136, [1]; Williams v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2008] VCAT 1784, [5].