DCA22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. The applicant in this matter made an application to this Court for judicial review of a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refusing to grant her a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the visa).
2. The application was set down for a final hearing on 25 August 2025. When the matter was called, the applicant did not appear. The matter was consequently dismissed on that same date (being 25 August 2025) pursuant to rule 13.06(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (the Rules) (DCA22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1382) (DCA22).
3. The applicant now applies to this Court for reinstatement of her application for judicial review.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Vietnam (Court Book (CB) 1-3). She arrived in Australia in March 2019 as the holder of a visitor visa (CB 35).
2. On 26 April 2019, the applicant applied for the visa which is the subject of the application for judicial review before this Court (CB 1-21).
3. On 20 May 2020, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 35-40). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant "held a profile with the Vietnamese authorities, or had any outstanding matters with the authorities" and that, if she had, "she would have been prevented from departing Vietnam" (CB 39). The delegate was therefore not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations as set out in ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (CB 39-40).
4. On 10 June 2020, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 41-42).
5. On 15 October 2021, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal (by telephone) scheduled to take place on 1 November 2021 (CB 47-55).
6. On 29 October 2021, the applicant notified the Tribunal that she preferred to attend a hearing in person, that she had moved to Adelaide, and that she was unable to travel to Melbourne to attend a hearing due to COVID-19 travel restrictions (CB 56).
7. On 1 November 2021, the Tribunal agreed to postpone the hearing and notified the applicant accordingly (CB 57-58).
8. On 17 March 2022, the Tribunal again invited the applicant to attend a hearing, this time scheduled to take place (in person) on 18 May 2022 at the Tribunal's Melbourne offices (CB 59-62).
9. On 28 April 2022, the Tribunal reminded the applicant of the details of her in-person hearing (CB 63-65).
10. On 17 May 2022, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal (by email) advising that she had "just realised that the hearing...[would] take place in Melbourne" and asked that a new hearing be scheduled in Adelaide (CB 66).
11. On 18 May 2022, the Tribunal again agreed to postpone the hearing and asked the applicant to contact the Tribunal so that arrangements could be made to reschedule the hearing (CB 67-68).
12. That same day, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to ask for sufficient time to find a "pro bono lawyer" (CB 69).
13. On 1 June 2022, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing scheduled for 19 July 2022 in person in Adelaide (CB 70-73).
14. On 18 July 2022, the applicant requested an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that she was experiencing "Covid like symptoms and [had] booked a PCR test" for the following day (providing a copy of the test booking confirmation) (CB 74-75). The Tribunal agreed to postpone the hearing until 5 August 2022 (CB 76-78).
15. On 5 August 2022, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to say that she was "still sick and unable to attend the hearing" (CB 79). She provided a medical certificate along with that email (CB 80).
16. That same day, the Tribunal responded to advise the applicant that she should not assume that her hearing would be adjourned and asked her to advise if she wished to attend by telephone or by video (CB 81). The applicant did not respond to that correspondence.
17. On 9 August 2022, the Tribunal again agreed to postpone the hearing until 11 August 2022 (CB 82-84).
18. On 11 August 2022, the applicant emailed the Tribunal to advise that she was still "sick and unable to attend the hearing" scheduled for that day. The applicant's email set out her claimed medical conditions and asked that the hearing be postponed "for about [four] weeks" (CB 85). She also provided a medical certificate which stated that the applicant was "receiving medical treatment" and would be "unfit to continue her usual occupation" on that same date (being 11 August 2022) (CB 86).
19. The applicant did not appear at the hearing on 11 August 2022 (CB 87-90).
20. That same day (being on 11 August 2022), the Tribunal dismissed the applicant's review application on the basis of the applicant's non-appearance pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act (as was in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision) (the Non-Appearance Decision) (CB 93-95). The Tribunal notified the applicant of its Non-Appearance Decision that same day via email and advised her that she could apply in writing for reinstatement of the application by 25 August 2022 (CB 91-92).
21. On 24 August 2022, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal by email to request that her application be reinstated, providing a reason for her failure to attend that hearing (on medical grounds) and providing the Tribunal with medical evidence in that regard (CB 98-102).
22. On 25 August 2022, the Tribunal declined to reinstate the application and confirmed its Non-Appearance Decision to dismiss the applicant's review application (the Confirmation Decision) (CB 106-108). By virtue of s 426A(1F) of the Act, the delegate's decision was taken to be affirmed.
23. On 14 September 2022, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application sought review of the Tribunal's Non-Appearance Decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act.
24. The matter was listed for a final hearing before this Court on 25 August 2025 by video link. However, the applicant did not appear at that hearing and the matter was dismissed for non-appearance pursuant to r 13.06(1)(c) of the Rules (DCA22 at [1]-[2]).
25. Shortly after orders were pronounced in this matter, the applicant contacted the Court via email to advise that she was "waiting on the line". The applicant then joined the Webex video link (which had not yet expired) and was informed by my Associate that orders had been made and that her application had been dismissed. She was then advised she could apply for reinstatement of her application (DCA22 at [16]).
26. On 3 September 2025, the applicant filed an interlocutory application with this Court seeking reinstatement of her judicial review application.

1. The power to reinstate a proceeding dismissed for non-appearance by a party is discretionary. Rule 24.04 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (which came into effect on 1 September 2025) provides as follows:

24.04 Varying or setting aside a judgment or order after it has been entered

The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:

(a) it was made in the absence of a party; or

...

1. In exercising that discretion, the Court is ultimately required to consider whether reinstatement is in the interest of justice: FBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 196 at [50]; CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344 at [18] (CAL15).
2. While regard should be given to all of the relevant circumstances of a particular matter, the following factors are usually considered (see MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 at [7]) (MZYEZ):

(a) whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party's absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out;

(b) the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the Court is empowered to grant; and

(c) whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application.

1. The explanation for any delay in bringing an application for reinstatement is also ordinarily considered (see, for example, AUJ19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 355 at [27] (AUJ19)).
2. As outlined above at [28]-[29] of these reasons, the matter was listed for a final hearing before this Court on 25 August 2025 by video link and was dismissed for non-appearance.
3. On 3 September 2025, the applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking reinstatement of her judicial review application. That interlocutory application was supported by an affidavit explaining why she had not attended the hearing and attaching supporting documentation in that regard.
4. Following receipt of the application for reinstatement, the matter was listed for a hearing of that interlocutory application on 24 October 2025. The applicant appeared at that hearing (by video link) without legal representation. She was assisted at that hearing by a Vietnamese interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that she had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
5. The materials before the Court relevant to the application for reinstatement included the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 14 September 2022 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the interlocutory hearing on 24 October 2025), a Court Book numbering 108 pages (marked as Exhibit 1 at the interlocutory hearing), written submissions filed by the Minister on 9 July 2025 and 10 September 2025, and the applicant's affidavit filed in support of the reinstatement application affirmed on 2 September 2025 (the September affidavit) (also taken as read and in evidence at the interlocutory hearing).
6. The Court took the applicant through each of the matters identified (at [32]) above at the interlocutory hearing of this matter. The applicant's responses, together with the Minister's submissions in that regard, will be addressed by the Court below.

Was there a reasonable excuse for non-appearance at the interlocutory hearing before this Court?

1. The applicant's explanation for her non-appearance on 25 August 2025 was set out in her September affidavit and can be summarised as follows:

(a) She attempted to attend the hearing by telephone at 11:31 am using the details provided by the Court in an email dated 23 July 2025 (see September affidavit at [3] and p 7).

(b) She remained on hold for 10 minutes before emailing the Court and the Minister's solicitors to advise that she was still waiting on the line (see September affidavit at [4] and p 9).

(c) The applicant subsequently realised that there was an alternate phone number provided for use in attending the hearing in an email from the Court dated 1 August 2025 and she attempted to join the hearing at 11:42 am using that alternate umber (see September affidavit at [5] and pp 11-12).

(d) After waiting on the line for a few minutes, she was told (with the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter) that her case had been dismissed. The applicant was distressed by that information and sent an email to the Court "conveying [her] profound disappointment" (see September affidavit at [6]-[9] and p 14).

1. At the interlocutory hearing, the applicant told the Court that she was "very disappointed" that the Minister still sought to have her case dismissed at the hearing on 25 August 2025 despite being aware of her technical problems in trying to connect to the hearing.
2. In written submissions (filed on behalf of the Minister on 10 September 2025 at [20]-[21]), the Minister submitted that the applicant's explanation for the delay was unsatisfactory because:

(a) the Court's listing notice dated 1 August 2025 clearly specified that the hearing would be conducted by Webex rather than by Microsoft Teams; and

(b) it was the applicant's responsibility to check her emails and identify the details needed to participate in the hearing (citing Lu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 1041 at [22]).

1. Whilst there is some force to the Minister's submission that the applicant ought to have been aware of how to join the hearing on 25 August 2025, the Court accepts that the applicant clearly tried to dial into that hearing and, once she realised her mistake, attempted to join using the correct details. It was simply too late by the time she did so. This is evidenced by the annexures to the September affidavit as outlined above.
2. The Court is satisfied that there was a reasonable excuse for the applicant's non-attendance at the hearing on 25 August 2025.
3. This weighs in favour of reinstating the applicant's judicial review application.

Was there a reasonable excuse for the delay in bringing an application for reinstatement?

1. The applicant's judicial review application was dismissed at the original hearing on 25 August 2025. The applicant then filed an interlocutory application requesting reinstatement of that application on 3 September 2025 (being nine days later).
2. The Minister submitted that, whilst the delay was "relatively short", the applicant had not provided any explanation for that delay (noting that the applicant had been in contact with the Court on the day of the initial hearing).
3. Whilst the Minister's submission is technically correct, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant was not legally represented and required the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter.
4. In those circumstances, the Court does not consider that the delay (to the extent that a period of nine days may even be considered to constitute 'a delay') was significant or that any excuse was required. It is likely that it would have taken some or all of that time for the applicant to put together the application for reinstatement and the supporting affidavit and to have those documents filed with the Court.
5. This also weighs in favour of reinstating the applicant's judicial review application.

1. The Minister accepted that there was no specific prejudice to the Minister (beyond the public interest in the finality of administrative decision making) if reinstatement were granted that could not be mitigated by a costs order (citing Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491 at [15]).
2. The Court agrees and considers that this weighs in favour of reinstatement.

Are there reasonably arguable grounds of application for judicial review?

1. Notwithstanding the above, the Court will not exercise its discretion to reinstate an application if the underlying substantive application for judicial review has no reasonable prospects of success. Quite clearly, there would be no point in reinstating an application which does not enjoy a chance of succeeding (MZYEZ at [7], citing MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) FCA 1066 at [18]). As observed by Mortimer J (as the Chief Justice then was) in CAL15 at [4]:

[I]f there were no arguable case on judicial review, it is unlikely it could be said that a favourable exercise of the discretion to reinstate would advance the interests of the administration of justice in terms of the effective use of judicial resources, costs to the respondent, and fairness to an applicant. It is not fair to exercise a discretion favourably to an applicant if the Court is not satisfied there is an arguable case, because it can create false hopes in an applicant and an expectation, not grounded in law and reality, that her or his application may be successful.

1. The Court approaches this assessment of the merits of the substantive application for judicial review at an impressionistic or threshold level, which is the approach taken in applications for an extension of time (Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 at [19]). The principles governing the assessment of the merits of a case in extension of time cases also apply in applications concerning reinstatement (Chhabra v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1053 at [20], citing AVC19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1752 at [3]- [5]; see also AUJ19 at [43]).
2. The applicant was not represented at the interlocutory hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 931 at [10]. Accordingly, at the hearing of the reinstatement application, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what she believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decisions or conduct in this case.
3. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal's decisions revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decisions being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);

(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28] (Li) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and that she should attempt to tell the Court why she said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. Against this background, the applicant told the Court that, from her perspective, the Tribunal erred by failing to consider her situation and the explanation she had given as to why she had been unable to attend the Tribunal hearing, including the medical certificate she had provided. The applicant stressed that this meant that she had lost the opportunity to properly present her case and prove that she deserved to have her matter reconsidered by the Tribunal.
3. The applicant's submissions to this Court largely mirror the concerns raised in the three grounds of review contained in her substantive application. Those grounds broadly allege that the Tribunal:

(a) erred by failing to grant the applicant an adjournment based on the medical certificate provided;

(b) erred or otherwise acted unreasonably when failing to reinstate the applicant's review application; and

(c) erred by failing to consider the merits of the applicant's case, or otherwise denied the applicant an opportunity to present evidence and arguments in support of her review application.

1. These issues will be considered by the Court below.

1. Before turning to consider the above grounds of review, it is useful to set out the Tribunal's reasons for its decisions.

1. The Tribunal began by setting out the background of the applicant's matter and noted, in particular, that after multiple adjournment requests, the hearing scheduled to take place on 11 August 2022 was the fifth hearing listed in this matter. The Tribunal noted that the applicant was advised that the "hearing would only be adjourned for good reason and that if she [did] make application to adjourn, she should not assume an adjournment ha[d] been granted unless she [was] so advised". The Tribunal also explained that the hearing invitation advised the applicant that if she was unable to attend the Tribunal offices, the matter could still proceed by phone or video, and the Tribunal had put the applicant on notice that if she did not participate in the hearing, the Tribunal may dismiss her application without any further consideration of the application or the information before it (at [2]-[23]).
2. The Tribunal acknowledged that it received an email from the applicant on the day of the hearing, stating that she was "still sick and unable to attend the hearing", providing a medical certificate, and seeking a postponement of the hearing for a further four weeks. The applicant's email stated that she had "recently suffered a miscarriage", that she was suffering from depression and would "see a psychologist soon". The Tribunal explained that the medical certificate stated the applicant was "receiving medical treatment and [would] be unfit to continue her usual occupation" on 11 August 2022, the medical certificate being dated that same day (at [24]-[26]).
3. The Tribunal noted that the medical certificate provided by the applicant did not specify whether the doctor had examined the applicant, how the doctor had determined that she was unfit to continue her usual occupation, what the doctor understood her usual occupation to be, or whether she was unfit to attend the Tribunal. The Tribunal also noted that it did not make any reference to a miscarriage or depression, and certified that the applicant was unfit for one day but did not suggest any chronic condition (at [27]-[28]).
4. The Tribunal was satisfied the applicant was properly notified of the rescheduled hearing and that no satisfactory reason for the applicant's non-appearance was given. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the applicant's review application (at [29]-[31]).

1. The Confirmation Decision dated 25 August 2022 is three pages long and spans 22 paragraphs.
2. The Tribunal observed that it had dismissed the applicant's review application pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act on the basis of the applicant's non-appearance at the scheduled hearing on 11 August 2022. The Tribunal further observed that the applicant was notified of the Non-Appearance Decision (pursuant to s 426B(5) of the Act) and informed that she could seek reinstatement of her application within 14 days (at [2]-[3]).
3. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had advised the Tribunal by email on 11 August 2022 that she had suffered a miscarriage, was suffering from depression and would soon see a psychologist. The Tribunal also noted that the correspondence did not make reference to a headache or a migraine, that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had demonstrated that she was unable to attend the hearing, and that on that basis, the Tribunal had dismissed the application (at [5]-[7]).
4. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had sought reinstatement of her application on 25 August 2022 because she "had suffered a miscarriage and suffered stress and anxiety". The Tribunal recorded the applicant also stating that she had "suffered from a migraine" and her "doctor arranged a Brain CT scan" for her (at [8]-[9]).
5. The Tribunal acknowledged that the applicant had provided a referral for a brain scan and a prescription and that both were dated 11 August 2022 (being the date of the Tribunal hearing). The Tribunal ultimately accepted that the applicant had "probably presented to her doctor on 11 August 2022 complaining of a headache" and that the doctor had prescribed medication and arranged for investigative tests (at [10]-[15]).
6. The Tribunal found, however, that the evidence before it did not support the applicant's claim "to have suffered a miscarriage and be contemplating psychological intervention", nor did it demonstrate that the applicant was unable to attend the Tribunal hearing or why she was unable to do so. On that basis, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was unable to attend the hearing on 11 August 2022 because of a medical condition (at [16]-[20]).
7. The Tribunal confirmed its decision to dismiss the application before it. In those circumstances, the decision under review was taken to be affirmed (at [21]-[22]).

Whether the Tribunal erred by failing to grant the applicant an adjournment based on the medical certificate provided

1. To the extent that the applicant suggests that the Tribunal failed to consider her circumstances, as well as the reasons and evidence she provided for being unable to attend the Tribunal hearing, this ground fails on a factual level.
2. The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence, including the medical certificate, in the Non-Appearance Decision.
3. As outlined above, the applicant provided a medical certificate to support her adjournment request and then provided further medical documentation to support her reinstatement request. The medical certificate relevantly stated as follows (CB 86):

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

[the applicant]

IS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND FOR THE PERIOD

Thursday 11 August 2022 TO Thursday 11 August 2022 INCLUSIVE

She WILL BE UNFIT TO CONTINUE her USUAL OCCUPATION

This Certificate was completed on 11/8/2022

1. As outlined above, the Tribunal had regard to the applicant's email and the medical certificate attached to that email (both dated 11 August 2022) in its Non-Appearance Decision (at [24]-[28]). However, the Tribunal noted that the medical certificate was lacking in that it simply stated that the applicant was unfit to continue her usual occupation and did not contain necessary information about whether the applicant was unfit to attend the Tribunal hearing (see the Non-Appearance Decision at [27]).
2. To the extent that the applicant suggests that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in failing to accept that she was unwell and unable to participate in the Tribunal hearing on that basis, the Court disagrees.
3. In relation to the Tribunal's comments about the nature and contents of the medical certificate and information provided, the Court notes that the Federal Court has provided appropriate guidance in this regard. In particular, the Court refers to NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Ethnic Affairs [2003] FCA 1559 at [5]- [10] (NAKX) with respect to medical certificates which provided greater detail and information than the certificate provided by the applicant in this matter, as follows:
   1. The medical certificate dated 13 December 2003 in respect of the male applicant states as follows:

'This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Dermatitis atopic and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 01/01/2004 inclusive.'

The certificate of the same date in respect of the female appellant states:

'This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above named person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Anxiety disorder/Depression and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 13/01/2004 inclusive.'

1. The medical certificates are quite unsatisfactory. They do not address the critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the appellant from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a court hearing.
2. I do not accept that either of the medical conditions referred to would make the sufferer 'unable to attend court' - apparently each was able to attend upon the medical practitioner.
3. If the certificates were meant to say that the medical condition would prevent the sufferer from participating effectively in a court hearing, they do not in fact say that and do not explain why the medical condition would have that effect.
4. I take into account the fact that the two medical certificates are structured identically, use the expression 'he/she', and are dated the same day, which was only two days before the hearing. The certificates have the appearance of being pro forma certificates which are available for the asking.
5. In any event, even accepting the certificates on their face, I find them unpersuasive for the reasons given at [6]-[8] above.

1. As discussed by Judge Kendall in Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 941 (Singh), the reasoning in NAKX was subsequently applied in Quach v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (Adjournment) [2023] FCA 576 (Quach) where a medical certificate (again containing greater detail than the one provided to the Tribunal in this case) was provided in support of an adjournment request. In Quach, the Federal Court found at [9] as follows:

As to the first medical certificate, it does not provide a diagnosis of the condition suffered by Dr Quach or explain the nature of that condition. The certificate does not contain an opinion about whether or not Dr Quach is or was prevented or hindered in his preparation for, attendance at or participation in, a hearing. Necessarily, it contains no reasons for any such opinion sufficient to enable the Court to form its own view about the reliability of the opinion - see further: BXD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 765 at [35]; Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 565 at [12]- [14]; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 108 at [2]; NAKX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559 at [5]- [11]; MZZTC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1209 at [2].

1. In Singh, Judge Kendall found that, in following the Federal Court authorities referred to above, the Tribunal had not acted unreasonably in determining that the medical certificate provided by the applicant was insufficient.
2. In this matter, the Court finds that the Tribunal (in the present case) also did not act unreasonably in determining that the medical certificate was insufficient. Importantly, the applicant's medical certificate did not "address the critical question of whether, and if so why, the [applicant's] medical condition would prevent the [applicant] from...participating effectively in a [Tribunal] hearing" (see Singh at [86]; NAKX at [6] & [8]).
3. The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal considered all of the information before it in relation to why the applicant was unable to attend the Tribunal hearing (including the relevant medical certificate) and that the Tribunal did not act unreasonably in determining that the applicant's medical certificate in this matter was insufficient and did not explain why the applicant was unable to participate in the Tribunal hearing.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.

Whether the Tribunal erred or otherwise acted unreasonably when failing to reinstate the applicant's review application

1. Insofar as the applicant claims that the Tribunal ought to have reinstated her application upon receipt of the further medical evidence she provided, the Court again disagrees for the reasons that follow.
2. The Court notes that the Tribunal was required to determine, when making its Confirmation Decision, whether it was appropriate to reinstate the applicant's review application (following the non-appearance decision and subsequent receipt of the applicant's reinstatement request). In doing so, the core issue for the Tribunal was whether there was a reasonable explanation as to why the applicant was unable to participate in the hearing on 11 August 2022 (Singh per Judge Kendall at [77], citing Kumar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 479).
3. As outlined above, the Tribunal (in its Confirmation Decision) accepted that the applicant had likely attended her doctor on the date of the hearing and that the doctor had prescribed medication and referred the applicant for tests (at [14]-[15] in the Confirmation Decision). However, the Tribunal found that neither of those things demonstrated that the applicant was unable to attend the Tribunal hearing on 11 August 2022, and the further medical evidence presented by the applicant also failed to address that concern (at [16] and [19] of the Confirmation Decision).
4. As outlined above with respect to the previous ground, the applicant's medical certificate did not "address the critical question of whether, and if so why, the [applicant's] medical condition would prevent the [applicant] from...participating effectively in a [Tribunal] hearing" as it was required to by the authorities previously referred to (Singh at [86]; NAKX at [6] & [8]).
5. In circumstances where the Tribunal found that there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the applicant was unable to attend the Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal's decision to refuse to reinstate the applicant's review application was reasonable and open to it on the evidence before it.
6. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.

Whether the Tribunal erred by failing to consider the merits of the applicant's case, or otherwise denied the applicant an opportunity to present evidence and arguments in support of her review application

1. Before considering this ground, it is useful to first set out the relevant legislative provisions applicable in circumstances where an applicant fails to appear before the Tribunal. Of particular relevance in this regard is s 426A of the Act (as was in force at the time of the Tribunal's decisions). Those provisions relevantly provided as follows:

426A Failure of applicant to appear before Tribunal

(a) is invited under section 425 to appear before the Tribunal; but

(b) does not appear before the Tribunal on the day on which, or at the time and place at which, the applicant is scheduled to appear.

Tribunal may make a decision on the review or dismiss proceedings

(1A) The Tribunal may:

(a) by written statement under section 430, make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable the applicant to appear before it; or

(b) by written statement under section 426B, dismiss the application without any further consideration of the application or information before the Tribunal.

Note 1: Under section 430A, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision on the review.

Note 2: Under section 426B, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision to dismiss the application.

1. As can be seen from the extracted provisions above, when an applicant fails to appear at a Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal is legislatively empowered (pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act) to "dismiss the application without any further consideration of the application or information before it".
2. That is what the Tribunal did in this matter.
3. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was not required to consider the merits of the applicant's case (BYF16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2023 at [21]).
4. The Court notes, however, that the Tribunal's power to dismiss the application is a discretionary one. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was required to exercise that discretion reasonably.
5. In the context of this matter, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss this application was reasonable. In particular, the Court notes that:

(a) the applicant sought and was granted an adjournment of the first Tribunal hearing (scheduled to take place on 1 November 2021) (CB 47-48);

(b) the applicant sought and was granted an adjournment of the second Tribunal hearing (scheduled to take place on 10 May 2022) (CB 59-68);

(c) the applicant sought and was granted an adjournment of the third Tribunal hearing (scheduled to take place on 19 July 2022) (CB 70-78);

(d) the applicant sought and was granted an adjournment of the fourth Tribunal hearing (scheduled to take place on 5 August 2022) (CB 76-84);

(e) the hearing invitation for the fourth Tribunal hearing put the applicant on notice that the Tribunal would "only make changes" to the Tribunal hearing if satisfied that the applicant had "a good reason for being granted an adjournment" and noted that, if the applicant did not attend, the Tribunal "may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable [her] to appear" before the Tribunal (CB 84); and

(f) the applicant sought an adjournment of the fifth Tribunal hearing (scheduled to take place on 11 August 2022) on the morning of the Tribunal hearing and provided a medical certificate that included minimal information in support of that request (CB 85-86).

1. The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal gave the applicant multiple opportunities to appear before it to present evidence and make arguments in support of her application. Indeed, the Tribunal tried to schedule hearings on multiple occasions between November 2021 and August 2022 (being a period of nearly 10 months).
2. The Court also notes the High Court's comments in Li at [82], which make it clear that there is no obligation on the Tribunal to afford an applicant every opportunity to present his or her case, as follows (emphasis added):

It cannot be suggested that the Tribunal is under an obligation to afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case and to improve upon the evidence. Of course it may decide, in an appropriate case, that "enough is enough", but it is not apparent how that conclusion was reached in the present case, having regard to the facts and to the statutory purpose to which the discretion to adjourn is directed.

1. In the context of this matter, the Tribunal scheduled a hearing on multiple occasions as set out above. The applicant sought and was granted adjournments in relation to many of those hearings. Prior to the final scheduled hearing on 11 August 2022, the applicant again sought an adjournment. The Tribunal did not grant an adjournment on that occasion and the applicant failed to appear at that hearing.
2. As outlined above, the Tribunal exercised its discretionary power to dismiss the applicant's matter on the basis of that non-appearance (pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act). The Tribunal ultimately determined that "enough was enough" and that the applicant in this case had been given sufficient opportunity to attend a Tribunal hearing but had failed to do so.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.

Conclusion regarding merits of substantive application

1. The applicant's grounds of review (as set out in her application for judicial review and as articulated in her oral submissions before this Court and assessed at a reasonably impressionistic level only) do not identify any issue that would suggest the applicant has any reasonable prospect of being successful in her application.
2. This weighs against reinstating the applicant's judicial review application.

1. For the reasons detailed above, the application for reinstatement is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and two (102) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.