Dayman v Dayman

Supreme Court of NSW|2024-07-05|Before: Meek J

instance as a separate question Legislation Cited: Anatomy Act 1977 (NSW) Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) Cemeteries and Crematoria Act 2013 (NSW) Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) Coroners Act 2009 (NSW) Funeral Funds Act 1979 (NSW) Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) Public Health Act 2010 (NSW) Public Health Regulation 2022 (NSW) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Cases Cited: AB v CD [2007] NSWSC 1474 Abraham v Magistrate Stone, Deputy State Coroner [2017] NSWSC 1684 AG v JB (Anonymised) [2022] NSWSC 326 Angius v Salier [2019] NSWSC 184 Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65; (2016) 14 ASTLR 397 Brown v Weidig [2023] NSWSC 281; (2023) 22 ASTLR 386 Charafeddine v Magistrate R Denes sitting in the Coronial Jurisdiction at Ballina [2015] NSWSC 269 Darcy v Duckett [2016] NSWSC 1756 Dragarski v Dunn [2019] NSWSC 300 Frail v Shorey [2021] NSWSC 122 Gilliott v Woodlands [2006] VSCA 46 Kak v Kak [2020] NSWSC 140 Kitchener v Magistrate Thomas (in his capacity as a Coroner) [2019] NSWSC 701 McCredie v Batson [2020] NSWSC 1913 Milson v Milson [2020] NSWSC 919 Munro v Pitt [2019] NSWSC 1374 Nayacakalou v Vincent [2020] NSWSC 24 Novakovic v Joseph Medcalf Funeral Services [2021] NSWSC 166 Penfold v Perpetual Trustee [2002] NSWSC 648 Privet v Vovk [2003] NSWSC 1038 Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680 Ugle v Bowra & O'Dea [2007] WASC 82 Union Bank of Australia v Harrison, Jones & Devlin Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 492; [1910] HCA 44 Vosnakis v Arfaras [2015] NSWSC 625 White v Williams (2019) 99 NSWLR 539; [2019] NSWSC 437 Texts Cited: Abernethy John, et al, Waller's Coronial Law and Practice in New South Wales (4th ed, 2010, LexisNexis Butterworths) Bible - New International Version Coroners Court New South Wales, "Guidance and information" accessed 9 July 2024 Dal Pont, G E, Law of Executors and Administrators (2022, LexisNexis) Falconer, Kate, "Australian Burial Law 25 Years on from Smith v Tamworth City Council" (2022) 96 ALJ 581 Tuckey, John S (ed), Mark Twain's "Which Was the Dream?" and Other Symbolic Writings of the Later Years (1966, University of California Press) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Kate Dayman (Plaintiff) Glenys Dayman (Defendant) Representation: In person (Plaintiff and Defendant) File Number(s): 2024/228092

Introduction

HIS HONOUR: Mark Twain notably said that "nothing that grieves us can be called little": John S Tuckey (ed), Mark Twain's "Which Was the Dream?" and Other Symbolic Writings of the Later Years (1966, University of California Press) at 46. Those words are apt to bear in mind in dealing with the circumstances of this case.
The disposal of human remains is a critical yet sensitive issue which often arises in acute circumstances. It should be dealt with compassionately, having regard to the dignity of the memory of the deceased, the feelings of the deceased's family, relatives and acquaintances and, in the case of dispute, according to law.
On 12 May 2024, Brian Keith Dayman (the deceased) passed away. Sadly, his passing has led to some dispute within his family and those close to him regarding the disposal of his mortal remains.
The plaintiff is the deceased's daughter. She was born in 1980 and is currently aged 43. The defendant is the plaintiff's mother and was married to the deceased in 1978. The deceased had another child, the plaintiff's older brother, Michael, who died 15 years ago. The deceased and the defendant separated in around 2004. The deceased commenced a relationship with Cheryl Brown (Ms Brown) at about that time, which subsisted for a lengthy period but, on one view, ended sometime prior to the deceased's death. The deceased was also survived by siblings, the oldest of whom is Susan. His other siblings are Julie, Bronwyn, Terry and Scott.
The application before the Court, at least formally, is the plaintiff's statement of claim filed on 20 June 2024. The relief set out in the plaintiff's statement of claim essentially falls into two categories: 1. orders that the defendant release the deceased's body to the plaintiff for immediate creation (prayer 1) and the plaintiff "become" the deceased's "Senior Next Of Kin" to make funeral/memorial arrangements which the plaintiff can attend (part of prayer 2) (cremation and memorial relief); and 2. orders that the plaintiff be able to access the deceased's medical records (balance of prayer 2) and the defendant relinquish her role as nominated executrix of the deceased's Will to the plaintiff (prayer 3) (probate and related relief).
This matter has been mentioned before the Court on five occasions, being 20, 21 and 24 June 2024 and 1 and 5 July 2024. Only the plaintiff appeared on the first two occasions. Upon becoming aware of the proceedings, the defendant appeared on the last three occasions, in addition to the plaintiff.
With each mention a degree more information has come to light or been revealed as to the matters to which the parties are at issue.
Significantly, it was not until after the second listing that the Court became aware that the deceased's body had in fact been cremated barely hours before the initial listing, and that some form of funeral or memorial service had occurred on the day of the second listing.
Neither of the parties have been legally represented at the listings and one of the tasks of the Court, at least initially, has been to identify and to some extent refine the real issues between the parties.
It is evident from what has been noted above that the claim for cremation and memorial relief had been overtaken by events.
Nonetheless, it became clear by the fourth listing that the plaintiff sought other particular information in relation to the circumstances of the cremation and memorial.
In circumstances in which neither of the parties were legally represented and the plaintiff is estranged from the defendant, I sought on the third and fourth listings to attempt to record what appeared to be willing concessions made on the part of the defendant to provide to the plaintiff her share of the ashes and certain information regarding the cremation and memorial.
In many cases that come before the Court dealing with the disposal of bodies, one or more of the parties claim to have a statutory or presumptive legal right or entitlement to custody of the deceased's body for its carriage to burial or cremation or, in the case of cremation, to custody of the deceased's ashes.
It seems that it is not uncommon for people to claim that a designation of them by the coroner as "senior next of kin" gives them broad rights in respect of such matters.
It became obvious from the way in which the case was initiated that there was some confusion, or perhaps lack of understanding, on the part of the plaintiff as to the role of the coroner in recognising a "senior next of kin" and what, if anything, such a nomination (if made) permitted or entitled her to do. Similarly, the plaintiff was (understandably) not fully conversant as to the role of this Court in making orders to facilitate a dignified and appropriate arrangement for the disposition of a deceased person's remains.
It is unsurprising for there to be a degree of miscommunication and misunderstanding between family members and other interested parties immediately following a person's death: e.g. Charafeddine v Magistrate R Denes sitting in the Coronial Jurisdiction at Ballina [2015] NSWSC 269 (Charafeddine) at [18] per Slattery J.
Judges are mindful of such matters and astute to the importance of assessing and determining burial disputes in a context in which the parties' actions have often been taken in heartbreaking or anguished circumstances.
As will be seen from an outline of the essential facts below, including the progression of the matter to this point through a number of court listings, a solution has been able to be reached by consent between the parties at least in relation to the distribution of the deceased's ashes.
To illuminate how disputes involving the disposal of a deceased's remains are addressed, I will set out an outline of the applicable legal principles. Hopefully, this will assist the parties and may also provide benefit to others in future matters.
After addressing those principles, I will then record the factual background and details of the recent listings, including my attempts to distil a solution between the parties from the information that they had provided to the Court and their confirmation of the solution.

Sources of burial law

Applications dealing with issues of custody of a deceased's body for the purposes of burial or cremation, the distribution of ashes or other associated issues will often come before the Court in urgent circumstances.
In New South Wales, the law in respect of such matters is derived from a number of sources.
There is a broad array of statutory provisions that may in any given circumstance impact upon the authority given to persons to dispose of human remains. The main statutory provisions are found in the Coroners Act 2009 (NSW) (Coroners Act), the Cemeteries and Crematoria Act 2013 (NSW), the Funeral Funds Act 1979 (NSW), the Anatomy Act 1977 (NSW), the Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) and the regulations made under various Acts, including importantly Pt 8 of the Public Health Regulation 2022 (NSW) [1] (PHR).
This Court also has "inherent" jurisdiction, without a grant of probate or administration, to make orders governing the disposal of a dead body. Of course, Parliament may enact legislation which impacts upon that jurisdiction. However, the jurisdiction of this Court ought not to be considered ousted by legislation unless there is a clearly indicated legislative mandate to do so.
Further, whilst there are some provisions of the Coroners Act which in any given case may impact upon the jurisdiction governing the custody and release of a deceased's body, there is no suggestion that the Coroners Act ousts, in any general way, the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to deal with the burial of a deceased person.
Given the various sources of law, it may not be straightforward for laypersons to understand or conceptualise how all of the various potentially applicable legislative provisions interact with one another, as well as with the general law.
An obvious issue which may arise in any given case is whether the deceased should be buried or cremated. If the deceased is to be buried, questions may arise as to the location of the burial, access to the burial site, funding and payment for the burial and whether there should be any headstone or memorial. In relation to cremation, questions may arise as to whether the deceased's ashes should be distributed in a particular way or in particular proportions, and potentially how the ashes should be contained.
Other issues may arise where the deceased had expressed some wish for the use of his or her body for anatomical purposes or of any body organs for transplantation or other medical or scientific research purposes.
In light of the extensive statutory provisions and general law which bear upon this area, the precise nature and extent of the authority of a person to arrange for the disposal of a deceased body, as well as any cognate issues which may arise, will necessarily be fact and issue specific.
To give some conception of the different types of issues that may arise to be dealt with by this Court, a survey of cases dealing with burial over the last decade or so reveals that previous applications have raised the following issues: 1. whether the deceased should be buried or cremated, and competing claims to have carriage of the disposal of the deceased's body: Brown v Weidig [2023] NSWSC 281; (2023) 22 ASTLR 386 (Weidig) per Lindsay J; 2. who should have carriage of the funeral or burial and custody of the deceased's body, including contests between: 1. the deceased's biological parents: AG v JB (Anonymised) [2022] NSWSC 326 per Sackar J; Frail v Shorey [2021] NSWSC 122 per Sackar J (a case involving the tragic death of two young indigenous children); Nayacakalou v Vincent [2020] NSWSC 24 per Henry J (a case in which the deceased identified as an Aboriginal man); Abraham v Magistrate Stone, Deputy State Coroner [2017] NSWSC 1684 (Abraham) per Rothman J (a case involving the effect of Maori culture on the burial arrangements); 2. a wife of the deceased and the mother of the deceased: Milson v Milson [2020] NSWSC 919 (Milson v Milson) per Sackar J (a case involving an indigenous man); 3. a sibling (brother) of the deceased and a wife of the deceased: Kak v Kak [2020] NSWSC 140 per Hammerschlag J (as his Honour then was) (a case where the deceased professed both Muslim and Catholic faiths); or a sibling (sister) of the deceased and a de facto spouse of the deceased: Darcy v Duckett [2016] NSWSC 1756 per Campbell J (a case involving the significance of Aboriginal cultural, spiritual and religious beliefs); 4. the mother of the deceased and a de facto partner of the deceased: Kitchener v Magistrate Thomas (in his capacity as a Coroner) [2019] NSWSC 701 (Kitchener) per Emmett AJA; Dragarski v Dunn [2019] NSWSC 300 per Pembroke J; and 5. a son of the deceased and a recent spouse of the deceased and executor: Privet v Vovk [2003] NSWSC 1038 per Bryson J (as his Honour then was); 1. whether a hospital operated by a local area health district should release the deceased's body to an executor or a funeral director nominated by such executor: Novakovic v Joseph Medcalf Funeral Services [2021] NSWSC 166 per Campbell J; 2. whether orders should be made restraining the Coroner from releasing the remains of the deceased: AB v CD [2007] NSWSC 1474 per Harrison J (as his Honour then was); 3. how the funeral and cremation or burial should be conducted: McCredie v Batson [2020] NSWSC 1913 per Slattery J; 4. what final orders should be made for the burial of the deceased, including potentially exhumation of a buried body: White v Williams (2019) 99 NSWLR 539; [2019] NSWSC 437 (White v Williams) per Sackar J (a case involving the buried body of an intestate Aboriginal man); 5. whether to enjoin parties to inform other parties, and keep them informed, of all arrangements for the transfer of the deceased's body from New South Wales to another State or Territory, the details of any funeral, burial or memorial service to take place and to permit them to attend such service should they wish to do so: Munro v Pitt [2019] NSWSC 1374 per Campbell J; 6. who, as between competing claimants, should be entitled to exercise the right to nominate a second person who should be buried in a burial plot: Vosnakis v Arfaras [2015] NSWSC 625 per Robb J; 7. whether a person is entitled to reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses: Angius v Salier [2019] NSWSC 184 per Henry J (a case where there was a question as to whether the purchase of a twelve-person vault was "reasonable"); 8. what costs orders ought to be made in respect of the settlement of proceedings involving an application for release of the deceased's body from the Office of the New South Wales State Coroner and arrangements for burial: Charafeddine per Slattery J; and 9. whether a clause in a Will which conditions a gift by reference to burial or cremation of a person other than the deceased should be excluded on public policy grounds: Penfold v Perpetual Trustee [2002] NSWSC 648 per Windeyer J.
Clearly, in each case, it is important to define with precision the particular issue that is in dispute. For example, there are important differences between rights of burial and rights arising from or in respect of a burial licence: e.g. Vosnakis v Arfaras [2015] NSWSC 625; Arfaras v Vosnakis [2016] NSWCA 65; (2016) 14 ASTLR 397.

Some definitions

"Burial" is not a term that appears in the Coroners Act.
Other legislative provisions contain certain definitions of "bodily remains", "cremation", "natural burial" and "private burial", as noted by Sackar J in Milson v Milson at [27]-[30], referencing the provisions of the Cemeteries and Crematoria Act 2013 (NSW): 27. ... "Bodily remains" is said to mean: the whole or any part of the body of a person who has died (whatever its physical state may be) but does not include the whole or any part of a body that has been cremated. 28. "Cremation" means "a process for the reduction of bodily remains by fire or heat, alkaline hydrolysis or by other means prescribed by the regulations." 29. "Natural burial" of human remains means "burial in the ground": (a) without preparation of the remains using chemical preservatives and by containment of the remains only in a shroud or biodegradable coffin, and (b) with no memorialisation on the interment site. 30. While "private burial" means: placing human remains in a grave or vault located on private land where the area of landholding is 5 hectares or more and the location has been approved for that purpose by a local government authority or on other private land prescribed by the regulations.
In the case of an indigenous person, "buried" could be used to mean to bury a body or to bury ashes: Milson v Milson at [31].
Different terminology is used within the Coroners Act to describe different types of investigations. The noun "inquest" is used in respect of an investigation concerning the death or suspected death of a person: s 4 Coroners Act. The noun "inquiry" [2] is used in respect of an investigation concerning a fire or explosion: s 4 Coroners Act.

Funeral directors and the handling of deceased bodies

In the vast majority of deaths, arrangements for the initial handling and dignified disposal of a deceased person's body are made without the involvement of a coroner or the Court. Rather, they are made by family members contacting a funeral director or operator who attends to the collection, transport and holding of the body. The funeral director then arranges or facilitates the burial or cremation of the body with or without a funeral or memorial service.
Many funeral directors and staff often assist families expeditiously and seamlessly in a manner that belies the detailed regulation governing the disposal of human bodies.
The proper formality with which funeral directors are expected to act and the procedures which they undertake is, unsurprisingly, underpinned by comprehensive provisions for the handling, transport, holding and viewing of bodies, which are principally set out in Divs 1 and 2 of Pt 8 of the PHR. This is reflective, to some degree, of the gravity of the subject. Specific regulations cover the burial of bodies (e.g. regs 90, 92, 93 PHR) and the cremation of bodies (regs 98-110 PHR).

Coroner's jurisdiction

In the tragic number of cases in which the circumstances of a person's death give rise to it being considered a "reportable death", the jurisdiction of the coroner is engaged.
It is important to view that jurisdiction in its proper context.

Reportable deaths

For the purposes of the Coroners Act, a death that occurs in a number of specified circumstances, including a violent or unnatural death, a sudden death the cause of which is unknown or a death under suspicious or unusual circumstances, is specified as being a "reportable death": s 6(1) Coroners Act. Any person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a death or suspected death of another person is a reportable death must report the death or suspected death to a police officer, a coroner or an assistant coroner as soon as possible after becoming aware of such grounds: ss 35(1)-(2) Coroners Act. A medical practitioner must not certify the cause of death of a person if the death is a reportable death or otherwise would be examinable under the Coroners Act, subject to a number of specific exceptions: s 38 Coroners Act.

Inquest jurisdiction

The coroner has jurisdiction to hold an inquest concerning the death or suspected death of a person if it appears to the coroner that the death is a reportable death or a medical practitioner has not given a certificate as to the cause of death: s 21(1) Coroners Act.
However, exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on any coroner who holds office as the State Coroner or a Deputy State Coroner to hold an inquest concerning a death or suspected death in the circumstances identified in Div 2 of Pt 3.2: s 22 Coroners Act.
The coroner has the right to take possession of and retain the remains of a deceased person whenever the coroner has jurisdiction to hold or is holding an inquest concerning the death or suspected death of the person: s 56(1) Coroners Act.
In this respect, the right of the coroner has priority over any other right to possession of the remains of the person, but otherwise does not affect any other such right: s 56(2) Coroners Act.
Further, the coroner may dispense with an inquest unless an inquest is required to be held under Pt 3.2: s 25(1) Coroners Act.

Authorisation for disposal of human remains

Relevantly, one of the objects of the Coroners Act is to prohibit the disposal of human remains without appropriate authority: s 3(g) Coroners Act.
A person must not bury or cremate human remains unless the person has been given, or has in his or her possession, an appropriate disposal authorisation for disposal of the remains, or the disposal is otherwise authorised by regulations under the Coroners Act: s 100(1) Coroners Act. An appropriate disposal authorisation (other than in the case of a stillborn child) is a notice given by a medical practitioner for the purposes of s 39 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) (BDMR Act) relating to the deceased person, an order made by the coroner under s 101 of the Coroners Act authorising the disposal of the remains, or a certificate issued under s 51 of the BDMR Act that relates to the deceased person: s 100(3)(a) Coroners Act.
The coroner may, by order in writing, authorise the disposal of human remains: s 101(1) Coroners Act. The order may be made by the coroner who is holding, has held or is intending to hold an inquest in respect of the death, or has dispensed with the holding of an inquest in respect of the death: s 101(2) Coroners Act.

Senior next of kin

Section 6A of the Coroners Act gives a number of cascading designations of a person as the "senior next of kin" (for the purposes of the Coroners Act), commencing with the deceased's spouse then, in the absence of a spouse, the deceased's adult children and so forth.
For the purposes of the Coroners Act, "spouse" means the person to whom the deceased was legally married or a de facto partner: s 4 Coroners Act. When there is more than one person who would so qualify as a spouse, the definition fixes upon only the last person so to qualify. "De facto partner" is defined by reference to s 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW).

Post mortems

For legal purposes, an autopsy is more specifically known as a "post mortem" in New South Wales. There are essentially three types of post mortem: s 89(1)(a)-(c) Coroners Act. A coroner may direct that an "appropriate medical investigator" conduct: 1. a general examination on the remains of the person - more particularly referred to as a post mortem examination on the remains of the deceased; 2. a specific examination or test - either on the remains of the deceased, the contents of the deceased's body or part of the body or tissue taken from the body prior to death; or 3. a review of medical records.
For the purposes of a post mortem investigation direction, an "appropriate medical investigator" is any of: (a) a Coronial Medical Officer; (b) a pathologist; or (c) any other person that the coroner considers has appropriate qualifications to conduct (or has the capacity to arrange for another appropriately qualified person to conduct) the examination, test or review specified in the direction: s 89(3) Coroners Act.
Such pathologists are often called or referred to as a "forensic pathologist".

Completion of post mortems

Once a post mortem examination or other test is complete, or the coroner has dispensed with a post mortem examination, the coroner will make an order under s 101 authorising the disposal of the human remains. Disposal without such an order is an offence under s 100: John Abernethy et al, Waller's Coronial Law and Practice in New South Wales (4th ed, 2010, LexisNexis Butterworths) (Waller) at 257 [101.1].

Practice where there are no disputes between interested parties

Usually, where there is no dispute about the matter, the coroner will release the deceased's body to a funeral director who has been instructed by the family members of the deceased (or presumably to the senior next of kin or other person recognised by the coroner as having appropriate authority): Waller at 68 [I.299].

Practice where there are disputes between interested parties

In cases where there is a dispute between family members as to where, how or by whom the deceased's remains should be disposed (whether by burial or cremation), there is no provision in the Coroners Act or any other legislation for resolution of such a dispute: Waller at 68 [I.301].
In other States, there is authority to the effect that the coroner's power to make an order for the disposal of human remains carries with it an implied power to decide such disputes: Waller at 70 [I.308]-[I.309], citing Gilliott v Woodlands [2006] VSCA 46 (Gilliott) at [20] and Ugle v Bowra & O'Dea [2007] WASC 82 (Ugle). In Gilliott, Maxwell P and Charles JA characterised that implied power at [20] by reference to the Victorian equivalent of s 101(1) of the Coroners Act, which required the coroner to issue "as soon as reasonably possible" a certificate permitting a certain form of disposal (footnotes omitted): 20. There is nothing in s 23(1) which authorises the Coroner to decide - where there is a contest - to whom the body is to be released or where the disposal of the body is to take place, issues which - as the present case demonstrates - are often intertwined. Nevertheless, we are in no doubt that the Coroner does have the power to decide those questions if and when they arise. The duty to issue "as soon as reasonably possible" a certificate permitting one or other form of disposal of the body carries with it, by necessary implication, the power to decide questions as to where and by whom the disposal will be carried out. The existence of the implied power is essential to the effective discharge of the Coroner's functions. Moreover, to deny the coroner this implied power and require the issue to be litigated elsewhere would only prolong and exacerbate the distress which inevitably attends any such dispute.
In Ugle, McKechnie J noted that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to deal with such disputes and was of the view that the coroner's decision in making a disposal order did not in oust the Court's jurisdiction: Ugle at [18]-[22]. His Honour further noted that obiter dicta in Gilliott doubted whether the Court retains jurisdiction to deal with such disputes. In any event, his Honour noted that, on grounds of public policy, the coroner is the officer principally entrusted with such decisions and a decision made by a coroner should not be lightly set aside: Ugle at [22].
As such, the coroner may wait for the dispute to be resolved between the family, or by this Court, or (at least on one view) the coroner may make his or her own decision: Waller at 68 [I.300].
In New South Wales, the "duty" referred to in Gilliott to issue a disposal certificate "as soon as reasonably possible" does not appear in the Coroners Act, as s 101 simply provides that the coroner "may" authorise the disposal of human remains: Waller at 70 [I.310].
The learned authors of Waller expressed the view that, regardless of the existence or otherwise of an implied power to do so, it is probably not advisable for the coroner to make a final determination as to who is entitled to take possession of the remains in circumstances where competing claims are made: Waller at 70-71 [I.310]. Their reasoning was as follows: The coroner is not in a position to test and resolve competing claims in a complex dispute where, as in many cases, there is no conclusive evidence resolving the matter one way or the other. Ultimately, if other attempts at resolution fail, there may be no option but for one or both of the parties to make an urgent application to the Supreme Court.
In practice, a coroner may (and often does) encourage the parties to resolve the dispute without resort to litigation, or may even attempt mediation between the parties either directly or indirectly. In New South Wales, experienced counsellors and mediation officers are employed by the Coronial Information and Support Program [3] (CISP) and can often provide great assistance in these matters: Waller at 70 [I.307].
Prima facie, the definition of "senior next of kin" may be of assistance to the coroner (or the Court) in determining the comparative claims of various relatives. However, it can often be the case that the claims are made by competing but "equivalent" next of kin: Waller at 68 [I.301].
Sadly, there are a number of cases in which the estranged parents of a deceased are unable to agree on the question as to whom carriage of disposal of the deceased's body is to be committed.
In such circumstances, the determination of who should have carriage of disposal of the deceased's remains, and other cognate issues regarding where and how the remains should be disposed of, will be informed by the general law position and any applicable legislation: see e.g. Waller at 68-69 [I.301]-[I.304].
If none of the disputing parties make an application to the Supreme Court, it may be appropriate for the coroner to approach the Supreme Court for a declaration in interpleader proceedings: Waller at 71 [I.310].
It is obvious from the above that, whilst the coroner has certain powers to authorise the disposal of human remains, there are cases in which the coroner may not seek to exercise the authority or determine issues about funeral arrangements. Rather, the coroner may encourage the parties who seek to have some input on the matter to correspond with the senior next of kin or, in the case of ultimate dispute, direct the parties for the matter to be dealt with by a higher court, specifically the Supreme Court: e.g. Kitchener at [17].

Access to documentation

If a person seeks to obtain copies of documents held on a coronial file, there is facility for an application to be made to the coroner or assistant coroner to be granted access to the coroner's file or part of it: s 65(2) Coroners Act. In determining whether it is appropriate to grant a person access to a coroner's file, the coroner or assistant coroner making the determination is to have regard to the matters set out in s 65(3).
If a disputing party seeks documents held by the coroner, the correct procedure for obtaining such documents is by request to the registrar of this Court, who must then make the request of the Coroners Court, rather than by issue of a subpoena to the Coroners Court: r 33.13 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR); Waller at 67 [I.294].

The nature of the jurisdiction

This Court's jurisdiction is now commonly described as "inherent", as explained by Lindsay J in Weidig at [24] as follows: 24. … It does not fit conveniently within the various heads of jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp), the Third Charter of Justice promulgated under that Act and the Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp), the effective operation of which has been continued by the Supreme Court Act 1970 NSW, section 22. That is because the structure of the Court upon its establishment did not exactly mirror English institutions or embrace a system for the administration of justice that privileged church courts in dealing with matters of spiritual concern. Nevertheless, the Court's jurisdiction may properly be regarded as incidental to the Court's establishment as a superior court of record responsible for the administration of justice within NSW: section 22. Whatever the historical foundations of the jurisdiction it is supported by section 23 which provides that "[the] Court shall have all jurisdiction which may be necessary for the administration of justice in New South Wales".
In certain areas of the law, it is recognised that there is a strong public interest element that may prevail over private claims. Probate is one of those areas of law. The disposal of human remains is another: Weidig at [26].
The purpose of the Court's jurisdiction is to facilitate, so far as may be reasonably practicable, an orderly disposal of the mortal remains of a person whose dignity should be respected; it is that purpose which governs the jurisdiction's exercise: Weidig at [28].
Jurisprudentially, the law governing the disposal of deceased bodies in contemporary Australian society has been said to occupy a unique space on the periphery of the law of succession, occupying a gap between the protective and probate jurisdictions where it is ancillary to both and not entirely part of either: Weidig at [29].

Main types of disputes

It is said that an executor has a duty to arrange for the burial or cremation of the deceased: Union Bank of Australia v Harrison, Jones & Devlin Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 492 at 519 per Isaacs J; [1910] HCA 44 (Union Bank). For this purpose, the executor is said to have a concomitant right to possession of the body of the deceased: Union Bank at 519; Kitchener at [6] per Emmett AJA, citing Sharp v Lush (1879) 10 Ch Div 468 at 472.
In many cases there is, admirably, cooperation amongst family members and other persons who have been close to the deceased, one or more of which may or may not be a nominated executor under a Will or a putative administrator, in respect of the deceased's burial or cremation.
The main types of disputes which arise as to the carriage of burial arrangement and cognate issues involve contests over whether a person is the "spouse" of the deceased and disputes as between estranged parents of the deceased. Cognate issues might, for example, include claims for exhumation of a deceased's body, in which case appropriate relief might include a declaration to the effect that the applicant is entitled to make an application for exhumation to the Secretary of the Department of Health pursuant to regs 94 and 95 of the PHR: see e.g. White v Williams at [6].
What can be said is that, because the making of arrangements for a funeral and the disposal of the deceased's body will invariably be one of the earliest obligations of a nominated executor or putative administrator, the task that arises will frequently occur in circumstances in which there may be issues over his or her authority.
Issues may arise in circumstances where there are a number of competing Wills of the deceased that appoint different executors. There may be multiple executorial nominees. Questions may arise as to whether one or more of them wish to take on the office or renounce. However, the arranging of a funeral does not necessarily compel the person to formally take on the office of executor: e.g. G E Dal Pont, Law of Executors and Administrators (2022, LexisNexis) (Dal Pont) at 218 [10.3].
In the case of a deceased who dies intestate, there may be issues in relation to whether a person is a de facto spouse of the deceased.
There are guides to assist people in navigating disputes about authority over the disposal of human remains. Dal Pont devotes an entire chapter to issues that arise in relation to the disposal of human remains against the backdrop of disputes between family members or others seeking to have some involvement in the matter: Dal Pont at ch 10, and see specifically 218 [10.1].
Legislative provisions aside, the approach of courts to questions of the disposal of human remains has evolved significantly over the past two decades.

Consideration of mediation

The law governing the disposal of a deceased's body works best when there is a consensus about what is to be done or at least an acquiescence on the part of everybody who might reasonably be thought to have a right to object: Weidig at [36].
Burial disputes evoke strong feelings amongst the deceased's grieving family and community. Sometimes, perhaps the only thing that is common ground between the disputing parties is that they each, in their own way and at one time or another, loved or cared for the deceased. By their nature, burial disputes are the very sort of disputes which are apt for consideration of referral to mediation. Many mediators or conciliators are experienced in dealing with fractured families and people who are fraught with grief, skilled in helping parties to see beyond their own pain and perspectives, and often able to call upon reserves of Solomon like wisdom [4] in exploring and achieving seemly and honourable solutions, or at least meaningful and enduring solutions, which may go beyond the reach of a court-determined outcome.
If the coroner has been involved in the matter, the CISP mediators or officers will often explore consensual burial arrangement outcomes with the interested parties.
The Court may also order that the parties attend a mediation in an attempt to resolve such issues: s 26 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA); e.g. Weidig at [14].
However, in some cases (of which this was one), where the parties are unrepresented and either estranged or not on speaking terms, the Court in preliminary listings might nevertheless be able to discern sufficient common ground between them to record and approve an acceptable regime, without the necessity of suggesting (or directing) that the parties formally mediate their differences.
If, notwithstanding the encouragement of the CISP mediators or officers, or the Court, the parties are unable to consensually resolve the issues, the Court stands ready to independently adjudicate disputes: Weidig at [36].
In such cases, there is a strong imperative for the Court, consistent with the overriding purpose attending civil litigation (see s 56 CPA), to have the deceased's body disposed of with respect and without undue delay: Smith v Tamworth City Council (see below) at 694B (proposition 6); Waller at 68 [I.301].

Initial tasks including interlocutory relief, identification of parties and issues

Claims regarding the custody of a deceased's body might arise within 24 hours after the deceased's passing. Claims regarding the disposal or internment of the deceased's remains or the distribution of ashes might arise within days or a week after the deceased's passing.
Commonly, it is the Court's experience that such claims are urgently or hurriedly brought before the Court with parties seeking relief in rapidly evolving or quickly changing circumstances.
The Court is often asked to address matters, including the making of restraining orders or other orders preserving the status quo, and sometimes entertaining final relief, in circumstances where the parties (who are either family members or other persons who claim to be interested in such issues) have not even arranged for legal representation, let alone formalised any evidence upon which they seek to rely or, if there is any evidence, without testing of such evidence.
The initial task of the Court is often one of: gleaning information about the deceased; identifying the members of the deceased's immediate family and those who might be interested in the disposal, internment or distribution issues; clarifying who currently holds or has control of the deceased's body, and where it is located; and ascertaining whether there are any material cultural or spiritual factors as to how the deceased lived in his or her life which may bear upon appropriate orders to address the disposal, internment or distribution issues.
In the first instance, the Court seeks to ensure that no precipitous action is taken in relation to the disposal or internment of the deceased's body. The Court will frequently consider making orders to restrain any action in that regard whilst the claims of the party who has approached the Court are made known to the defendants and other interested parties by service of the document or documents initiating the claim.

Some guides to the resolution of disputes

Because of the range of different issues that may arise in any given case, there is little utility in attempting to exhaustively state the approaches that are taken to determining who has the authority to dispose of a deceased's remains.
Leaving aside legislative provisions which impact upon the position under the general law, a common starting point for considering that issue is the seminal decision of Young J (as his Honour then was) in Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680 (Smith).

Traditional approach

In Smith, having undertaken an extensive review of the authorities, Young J stated fifteen propositions regarding the then current legal position with respect to the right of burial in New South Wales: Smith at 693F-694E. The propositions are as follows. 1. If a person has named an executor in his or her will and that person is ready, willing and able to arrange for the burial of the deceased's body, the person named as executor has the right to do so. 2. Apart from appointing an executor who will have the right stated in proposition 1, and apart from any applicable statute dealing with the disposal of parts of a body, a person has no right to dictate what will happen to his or her body. 3. A person with the privilege of choosing how to bury a body is expected to consult with other stakeholders, but is not legally bound to do so. 4. Where no executor is named, the person with the highest right to take out administration will have the same privilege as the executor in proposition 1. 5. The right of the surviving spouse or de facto spouse will be preferred to the right of children. 6. Where two or more persons have an equally ranking privilege, the practicalities of burial without unreasonable delay will decide the issue. 7. If a person dies in a situation where there is no competent person willing to bury the body, the householder where the death occurs has the responsibility for burying the body. 8. Cremation is nowadays equivalent to burial. 9. A person who expends funds in burying a body has a restitutionary action to recover his or her reasonable costs and expenses. 10. A right of burial is not an easement, but a licence: it is irrevocable once a body has been buried in the licensed plot. 11. The cemetery authority is able to make reasonable by-laws as to the maintenance of the appearance of the cemetery. 12. Subject to such by-laws, the holder of the right of burial has the power to decide on the appearance of the grave and headstone. 13. The reasonable cost of a reasonable headstone is recoverable from the deceased's estate. 14. The holder of the right of burial cannot use his or her right in such a way as to exclude friends and relatives of the deceased expressing their affection for the deceased in a reasonable and appropriate manner such as by placing flowers on the grave. 15. After the death of the executor or administrator, the right to control the grave passes to the legal personal representative of the original deceased, not the legal personal representative of the holder of the right of burial.

Modern approach

In 2022, Young J's propositions were reviewed by Kate Falconer in her notable article "Australian Burial Law 25 Years on from Smith v Tamworth City Council" (2022) 96 ALJ 581 (Falconer). Ms Falconer concluded that, whilst many of the propositions in Smith were uncontroversial statements of long-standing legal principles that remained good law, courts ought to be cautioned against the uncritical citing of Smith as the ultimate authority in Australian burial law: Falconer at 594.
In particular, Ms Falconer concluded that a number of the propositions were of limited practical utility either as a result of difficulties regarding enforcement (proposition 3), supersession by statute (proposition 5) or confusion as to the content of the proposition itself (proposition 15): Falconer at 594. Further, she concluded that at least three of the propositions (being propositions 4, 6 and 10) had been the subject of dramatic and radical development. She stated that whilst those were accurate statements of the law when set out by Young J in Smith in 1997, they no longer reflected the true legal position taken by courts resolving burial disputes in 2022: Falconer at 594.
Whilst religious, cultural and spiritual considerations have from time immemorial been an important aspect of the Court's considerations, recently in Australia, and in New South Wales particularly, the arrangements for burial or disposal of the remains of indigenous people have been the subject of particular attention: e.g. White v Williams.
The state of the current authorities was very helpfully reviewed by Lindsay J in Weidig. His Honour reviewed the Court's jurisdiction through consideration of its nature and purpose. In analysing the position, his Honour noted the tension in authorities between claims of right in relation to the exercise of burial and the Court's task in the management and determination of disputes about disposal of a dead body. Lindsay J observed that there has been a shift away from rights-based jurisprudence in respect of the identification of a person to have carriage of disposal of a body: Weidig at [55]-[56]. In this regard, his Honour explained that Young J's propositions in Smith have been more recently considered as guidelines for decision-making rather than legal rules: Weidig at [42].
Even if the law facilitates an executor's authority and responsibility to make decisions in respect of the disposal of the deceased's body, it has been recognised that it is advisable for the executor to take into account any known wishes of the deceased and to consult with others (whether they be family members or not) who have an interest in the matter: Dal Pont at 255 [10.23]. In the event that independent adjudication is required, the factors to which the Court may have regard in determining a burial dispute (in the absence of legislation bearing upon the matter) were non-exhaustively summarised by Lindsay J in Weidig at [38] as follows: (a) the logistics and available funding for disposal of the body; (b) the wishes or preferences of the deceased, if known; (c) the wishes or preferences of the community or communities, in which the deceased lived (including, but not necessarily limited to, members of family); (d) any cultural or spiritual factors material to how the deceased lived life; and (e) the accessibility of the deceased's mortal remains to those who seek to mourn a death or to remember.

Court's approach to hearings

As noted above, the initial listing and any interlocutory orders may take place in circumstances where there is a paucity of admissible evidence.
Even on a contested or final hearing of the matter, the need for the disposal of the deceased's body with respect and without undue delay will often give rise to circumstances in which there may be some material placed before the Court which is not in perfect evidentiary form and there is little opportunity for expert evidence to be obtained: see e.g. Abraham at [19] per Rothman J (due to the urgency with which the matter came before the Court, no expert had been qualified and the Court was not assisted by the provision of an independent expert report that accorded with the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). Ideally, the approach of the Court is to avoid any lengthy adversarial hearing and cross-examination should be either very limited or not undertaken at all: e.g. Waller at 70 [I.306], citing Dodd v Jones [1999] SASC 458; (1999) 205 LSJS 105 and Keller v Keller (2007) 15 VR 667; [2007] VSC 118.
The fact that the final hearing of the proceedings may be conducted in an informal manner is consistent with the nature of the Court's jurisdiction having a quasi-protective aspect: see e.g. Weidig at [12] per Lindsay J.
Particularly where there are closely competing parties or "equivalent" next of kin, [5] the Court's task been described as having to make an evaluative judgment as to who is best suited or best able to deal with the remains of the deceased given the various factors identified in the authorities: White v Williams at [114].

Factual background

What follows is a basic chronology of what occurred following the deceased's passing. It is drawn from the materials before the Court in a context in which there is no formal sworn evidence and no formal testing of the material, at least in the form of cross-examination, has been undertaken.

Deceased's passing

The deceased resided at Darlington Point in New South Wales, about 36 km south of Griffith.
On 12 May 2024, the deceased suffered a heart attack. He passed away at Griffith Base Hospital. At that stage, the plaintiff was located at Port Hedland, Western Australia. On 13 May 2024, the plaintiff travelled to New South Wales.

Initial involvement of the Coroner

On 20 May 2024, an officer from "Newcastle Forensics" identified by the plaintiff as "Noel" noted or made a report to the effect that the deceased had passed away as a result of complications of community acquired pneumonia.
The plaintiff was concerned regarding the cause of death and requested that an autopsy (i.e. a post mortem) be undertaken due to inter alia the squalid living conditions present in the deceased's house.
The plaintiff asserts that an autopsy was refused as Ms Brown had accepted the cause of death.
On 23 May 2024, the plaintiff returned to Port Hedland.
On 24 May 2024, a representative of Trenerry Funerals in Griffith emailed the plaintiff and provided her with what she describes as the Coronial Certificate as to Cause of Death for the deceased. Further, on that day the plaintiff received the deceased's Will from a legal firm in Broken Hill, DSK Legal, which informed her that the defendant was the executrix of the deceased's Will.
The Coronial Certificate as to Cause of Death was issued by the Assistant Coroner pursuant to s 89(6) of the Coroners Act.
The Certificate stated that the deceased died of natural causes. The direct cause of death was stated as being "complications of community acquired pneumonia". No antecedent causes or other significant conditions were listed. By the Certificate, the Assistant Coroner dispensed with a post mortem examination in circumstances where "on sufficient evidence" the Assistant Coroner was able to determine "the particulars relating to" the deceased's death.

Deceased's Will and estate

As matters presently stand, it appears that the deceased died testate, with his last known Will being a document dated 10 February 1992 (1992 Will). In its terms, the 1992 Will appoints the defendant as executrix and trustee of the deceased's Will and, in events which have occurred, left the entirety of the deceased's estate to the defendant.
The defendant has the original of the 1992 Will and has taken steps to apply for a grant of probate of the 1992 Will. She is presently doing that with the assistance of her estate planner, who is awaiting receipt of a death certificate.
The deceased's estate is small and (without being precise) is valued in the order of $25,000 according to the defendant or between $50,000 to $100,000 according to the plaintiff, and is comprised of: 1. a lot of land; 2. monies in two Westpac bank accounts; 3. monies in two ANZ bank accounts; and 4. cars or car parts and machinery.
The plaintiff has in her custody a degree of paper work which is relevant to the administration of the deceased's estate.
The expenses of Trenerry Funerals have been paid from the deceased's funds held with Westpac.
Consequent upon some funds having been removed from the deceased's bank accounts (according to the defendant, about which the Court makes no finding at this stage), there are now limited funds in the deceased's bank accounts.
The deceased's estate had certain expenses, including an ambulance invoice, rates due on the deceased's lot of land (as well as a lot of land which he leased) and for BOC gas bottles.

Funeral arrangements as between the plaintiff and Ms Brown

The plaintiff claims that, between 13 May and 10 June 2024, she had worked collaboratively with Ms Brown and the deceased's siblings to organise a funeral which they "were all satisfied with". She states that, as more time passed, she became quite upset that no plans were set in place and the deceased's body was "decomposing and not being laid to rest during this traumatic time".

A dispute emerges

On 5 June 2024, Misty Koulianos, the Coronial Information Support Officer communicating on behalf of Magistrate Lee, issued to the plaintiff a "Burial Dispute Notice" in the following terms: The death of Broam [sic] Dayman was reported to the Coroner at Lidcombe. Since that time, the Court has received competing requests regarding the release of Brian Dayman's body into the care of a funeral director. The coroner is of the view that this is not a matter the coroner can resolve. Accordingly, a decision has been made by the coroner to not release Brian Dayman's body, to provide both parties opportunity to achieve a resolution or seek legal advice. The Coroner encourages both parties to ensure timely action on this matter. While the Coroner cannot mandate a timeframe in which achieve a resolution or seek legal advice, a guideline of 48 hours is considered appropriate. Following 07/06/2024 at 4:30 PM, the coroner will release the body to the executor, Glenys Anne Dayman. Please ensure timely action in this matter.
Further, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant mentioned to Julie Warner (one of the deceased's sisters) that: … she will call the 'hard shots' as the Executor and follow my wishes, and request a cremation as she had sought legal advice to hand the Will over to me as the Administrator, however it was going to be quite costly.
On 6 June 2024, the plaintiff asserts that, as between herself and Ms Brown, they agreed for the deceased to be cremated.
According to the plaintiff's understanding, on 7 June 2024 Magistrate Lee ordered that the deceased's body be cremated and forwarded the order to Trenerry Funerals.
Notwithstanding the Magistrate's order, according to the plaintiff, on a number of occasions Ms Brown said to her and communicated with her in writing to the effect that the plaintiff could organise the deceased's funeral how she wished.
On 10 June 2024, the plaintiff says that she organised a funeral for the deceased with Trenerry Funerals.
On 12 June 2024, the plaintiff claims that Ms Brown changed the plans which the plaintiff had arranged with the Trenerry Funerals. On the same day, the plaintiff contacted Trenerry Funerals and the New South Wales Coroner, who informed her that "Olivia", a representative from Griffith Local Court, had "advised" that Ms Brown was considered to be the deceased's "senior next of kin", having regard to records from the deceased's hospital admission three weeks prior to his death which listed her as such.
On 13 June 2024, the plaintiff says that Ms Koulianos requested that she submit evidence before her of Ms Brown not being in a de facto relationship with the deceased (I infer at the time of death). According to the plaintiff, she did.
On 14 June 2024, Ms Koulianos and Amy Vincent-Pennisi (a Coronial Information and Support Coordinator) advised that they had attempted to resolve the dispute about funeral plans through counsellors within the Court and, despite attempts, the matter was not able to be resolved. The plaintiff claims they advised that the coroner proposed to release the deceased's body to a funeral director arranged by the defendant (likely in her capacity as putative executrix) by 4 pm on 18 June 2024.
At 7:09 am on 17 June 2024, Susan (the deceased's eldest sister) sent an email to the plaintiff in the following terms: Kate The coroner is releasing the body at 4.00 Tuesday. Cheryl & Glenys have agreed for a cremation. It would be fitting for a service to be held in Darlington point for Cheryl, Duke and his work colleagues there. The ashes will be given to you to hold your memorial service and spread or place somewhere of your choice. It will be wise to leave in the hands of Glenys, as she has yours and Cheryl's interests at heart. She is just doing what is legally required. Susan
The email provoked a strong response from the plaintiff sent in an email to Susan, Julie and the defendant on the same day. The content of the email is, on one view, not particularly edifying. Suffice it to say that the email flagged to the recipients the plaintiff's concerns regarding what should happen to the deceased's body and her intentions if what she proposed did not occur.
According to the plaintiff (albeit that the defendant disputes this), the defendant changed some of the funeral plans which the plaintiff had proposed, including it seems the timing for a service (which the plaintiff says she would be unable to attend due to her being in a remote location in Western Australia), with the service being arranged in "outback NSW".
The plaintiff claims that the defendant and the deceased "never spoke to one another" following a "toxic separation ending in court in 2004" due to the defendant "getting everything" and the deceased "not getting anything".
The plaintiff claims that, for her part, she has tried to resolve the dispute around funeral arrangements several times through calls, texts and emails to various parties including Ms Koulianos, Ms Vincent-Pennisi, Olivia, Trenerry Funerals and each of Ms Brown and the defendant.
The plaintiff asserts that the deceased's wishes were for his estate to be shared equally between her brother (by whom I assume she means those interested in her brother's estate) and herself.
In the early morning of 19 June 2024, there appear to have been the following communications: 1. at 1:20 am, the plaintiff sent an email to the administration contact at Trenerry Funerals, as well as others, as follows: To all parties, I disagree with this arrangement. I am unable to attend on this date as I'm in Port Hedland. This was noted to all parties last Thursday. I requested dad's body to be sent for immediate cremation when Glenys was going to have dad's body released to her on 18 June at 4pm. This way Cheryl /Glenys could go ahead with a memorial/ wake as planned, and I could do what i wish with the ashes if i'm around. Kate 1. at 5:30 am, the plaintiff appears to have sent an email in the following terms to Griffith Local Court: Cheryl and I both agreed on a cremation with the coroner (Misty) & Trenerry by the Thursday 6 June. We both had to sumbit it in writing to you. I did mine, & i was told Misty wrote Cheryl's after & phoenix call to her agreeing for a cremation. I thought I recall seeing an order was made and it was sent out the following week, possibly Tuesday or Wednesday? Then on Thursday Cheryl's went in and changed funeral plans I had in place when she founf out she could be SNOK. Thursday night I had to submit evidence to Misty & Amy. Friday night I received an email at 6pm WA time which stated: Dear Kate Dayman, My apologises that we have not been able to speak further and that this will be your first update regarding the late Brian Dayman, The death of Brian Dayman was reported to the Coroner at Lidcombe shortly after their death on 12th May, 2024. Since that time, the Court has received competing requests regarding the release of Brain Dayman's body into the care of a funeral director. The Coroner wishes to acknowledge the evidence provided to them for consideration. The Coroner has attempted to resolve the disagreement through counsellors within the Court and despite attempts, this matter has been unable to be resolved. The Coroner has proposed that Brian Dayman's release will occur to the nominated funeral director arranged by the Executor, Glenys Dayman by the 18th June, 2024, 4pm. Please ensure timely action in this matter. Yours sincerely, Amy Vincent-Pennisi I have not heard anything further since this email, nor do I know what is going on with dad's body or any arrangements. On Monday I sought legal advice & submitted an urgent matter before the Supreme Court. Now I need to provide evidence a cremation was ordered - to which I thought it was. Maybe it wasn't though. What you're saying is, there was no order on 7 June - just a verbal agreement between Cheryl & I through the Griffith Court & Trenerry Funerals? 13 June Misty & Amy were unable to decide who SNOK should be, so dad was going to be released to Glenys. However, I thought a cremation still had to go ahead as it went before the court? Sorry for all the confusion. What a messy situation. Kate Dayman 1. at 5:35 am, Olivia from Griffith Local Court sent the plaintiff an email as follows: Hi Kate, As both yourself and Cheryl provided written confirmation to the Court Brian was able to be released as per that agreement. Once that agreement was no longer in place Magistrate Lee provided the second direction. As a result of the agreement a document required by the funeral home for cremation was provided to them. This is not a court order but it is a permit to cremate. This document is only required by the funeral home and is not provided to family. Kind Regards Olivia

Plaintiff's approach to the Court

Later on 19 June 2024 at 11:58 am, the plaintiff sent an email to the mailbox of this Court's Duty Registrar noting that she was in a remote town in the Pilbara in Western Australia and wished to file certain documents in relation to her urgent matter.
On 20 June 2024, client services officers of this Court communicated with the plaintiff and directed her to the Equity Duty Judge.
Later on 20 June 2024 at 2:56 pm, the plaintiff sent an email to my Associate indicating that she wished to make an urgent application in relation to the release of the deceased's body for immediate creation, as well as the other relief I have described earlier. She provided a number of documents, including a form of statement of claim and an unsworn version of an affidavit. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff and to the Court at that time, Trenerry Funerals had earlier that morning arranged, on the instruction of the defendant, for the cremation of the deceased at 1:30 pm, approximately 90 minutes before the plaintiff's contact with my Associate. That fact was not ultimately made known to the Court until the afternoon of Saturday, 22 June 2024.
At 3:30 pm, having briefly reviewed the materials, my Associate (at my request) notified the plaintiff that the matter was listed for mention at 4 pm that afternoon and permitted the plaintiff to attend via audio-visual link.

Listings and orders

Shortly after 4 pm, the plaintiff emailed my Associate and indicated that she had just been released from class (as she is a teacher) and would arrange to connect to the Court shortly.
The listing commenced at 4:11 pm and, following some questions to the plaintiff regarding a number of matters, including her understanding of the present position and the location of the deceased's body, I made the following orders: 1. Grants leave to file in Court the statement of claim dated 17 June 2024. 2. Directs that the statement of claim be listed before the Equity Duty Judge, Meek J at 9am tomorrow, 21 June 2024. 3. Directs the plaintiff serve the named first defendant Glenys Dayman with the statement of claim and a copy of these orders at the following email address: Gd4142000@yahoo.com.au. 4. Abridges the time for service to 7pm 20 June 2024. 5. Directs that the statement of claim be permitted to be filed on the undertaking of the plaintiff in due course to either pay the filing fee or to obtain an order from the Court which waves or remits payment of the filing fee. 6. Orders that these orders are entered forthwith.
At 11:14 pm that night, the plaintiff provided a form of affidavit of service and requested clarification as to whether the audio-visual link was being extended for the following morning's hearing.
On 21 June 2024 at 7:47 am, my Associate, by email to the plaintiff and the defendant's specified email address, indicated that I permitted the parties to attend the listing via audio-visual link, and a link was provided.
At 9:03 am, while the plaintiff was connected to the Court's link, there was no appearance on behalf of the defendant. I indicated that I would wait for about 15 minutes to allow the defendant time to join the link. At 9:17 am, there still being no appearance for the defendant (either as a result of the matter being called outside Court or via connection through audio-visual link), I proceeded to address the matter.
I made the following orders: 1. Notes that the plaintiff informs the Court that: a. she is not precisely aware of who holds the dead body of her father Brian Dayman (the deceased); b. at least within the last two weeks the deceased's body was released to Trenerry Funerals; c. Trenerry Funerals may possibly have released the body of the deceased to the defendant on or about Tuesday, 18 June 2024. 2. Orders that the defendant, by herself, her servants and agents, be restrained from taking any action to dispose of or interring the body of the deceased by any means up to an including 5pm on Monday, 24 June 2024. 3. Orders that the owner or director of Trenerry Funerals, if it has the dead body of the deceased, be restrained from releasing the dead body to any person including the defendant up to and including 5pm on Monday, 24 June 2024. 4. Directs that a copy of these orders be served as soon as possible and, in any event, no later than 11am today, 21 June 2024. 5. Directs that a copy of these orders may in the first instance be served by email upon the defendant and Trenerry Funerals. 6. Orders that the statement of claim stand adjourned until 9am on Monday, 24 June 2024 before the Equity Duty Judge. 7. Reserves liberty to both parties and to Trenerry Funerals to apply for such if any relief as they may wish to seek, such claim for relief to be returnable at 9am on Monday, 24 June 2024 before the Equity Duty Judge. 8. Orders that these orders be entered forthwith. 9. Directs pursuant to rule 40.7 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 that the persons served with these orders, being the defendant and Trenerry Funerals, may be liable to imprisonment or to sequestration of property if they disobey the restraining orders 2 and 3 above.
On Saturday 22 June 2024 at 2:58 pm, the director of Trenerry Funerals sent an email to the plaintiff in response to her email serving the above orders, copying in the defendant and also my Associate, in the following terms: Good Afternoon Kate, Please note I have cc'd Glenys and the NSW Supreme Court into this email. Thank you for this email, I note that this email has just been received today Saturday June 22, 2024 by our office as our office was closed Friday 21st June 2024. Upon reading the court documents I also note that it states that these documents should be served no later than 11:00am on Friday 21st June 2024. I attach a snippet of when the email arrived in our inbox at 2:01pm on Friday 21st June 2024, I also note that the court document was issued at 10:25am. Further to this and unbeknownst to you I received call from Mrs Glenys Dayman (The Executor) on Thursday 20th June 2024 at approximately 8:00am to which she was extremely upset with what was going on in relation to the funeral of Mr Dayman. At this time we were instructed to cremate Mr Dayman on Thursday 20th June 2024. Cremation Details: Central West Crematorium Thursday 20th June 2024 at 1:30pm Crematorium Ref No: TF008/24 In summary the cremation has already taken place and we hold the cremated remains of Mr Dayman at our offices. At a later date we can provide you with a copy of the Death Certificate showing the cremation date.
On Sunday 23 June 2024 at 11:57 pm, the plaintiff sent to my Associate a form of affidavit of service of court orders upon the defendant and Trenerry Funerals.
On the morning of 24 June 2024, there were a series of emails (commencing at 1 am) sent between the plaintiff and the defendant, which emails were copied to my Associate, leading up to the listing at 9 am.
The crux of the emails received from the defendant at 8:30 am was that she was seeking an adjournment of the matter to get legal advice and to answer what she alleged were false submissions made by the plaintiff.
At 9:09 am, the matter commenced before me with each of the plaintiff and the defendant appearing on their own behalf by telephone.
After hearing from each of them and having discussed a number of matters, I made the following orders: 1. Notes further to the notations made on 21 June 2024 that by email sent at 12:58 PM on Saturday, 22 June 2024 from the operator of the Administration email of Trenerry Funerals to the plaintiff, which email was copied to the associate to Meek J and to the Chambers of Meek J, the administrator informed the plaintiff (and inferentially informed the Court) that: a. it received a call from the defendant at approximately 8 AM on 20 June 2024 in a state of extreme upset and instructed the administrator to cremate the deceased on 20 June 2024; b. the cremation took place at 1:30 PM on 20 June 2024 at Central West Crematorium; c. Trenerry Funerals holds the cremated remains of the deceased at its offices. 2. Notes that by correspondence this morning 24 June 2024 received from the defendant, the defendant seeks to adjourn the matter to obtain legal advice and to answer what she alleges are false submissions made by the plaintiff. 3. Notes the matter has been mentioned at 9AM this morning and a further update has been provided to the Court by the parties and the defendant still wishes to adjourn the matter. 4. Notes that on the untested information available to the Court as it presently stands another person who has a direct interest in the matter is Cheryl Brown, a person with whom the deceased was apparently in a lengthy relationship with from approximately 2004 until sometime prior to the deceased's death. 5. Directs that the plaintiff serve by 4:30 PM today a copy of the statement of claim on Cheryl Brown by email to an email address for Cheryl Brown indicating that if Ms Brown wishes to be heard in relation to the issue of the distribution of the deceased's ashes she should attend Court on the listing on 1 July 2024 at 9 AM before Meek J (which appearance may be in person or by some other means or some other representative). 6. Orders that the owner or director of Trenerry Funerals be restrained from releasing the cremated remains of the deceased person until further order. 7. Directs that the plaintiff and the defendant confer with themselves (whether directly or by representatives on their behalf) and if and when they are able, to further confer with Ms Brown (also directly or by representative on her behalf) to attempt to consider whether they can reach agreement in relation to the distribution and in what proportion each reach of the deceased's ashes and regarding any other aspect of the plaintiff's claim. 8. Orders that the matters stand over for mention on Monday, 1 July 2024 before Meek J at 9 AM to provisionally address the question of distribution of the deceased's ashes and to clarify what, if any, further relief the parties seek in relation to the matter and to consider whether any other person including Ms Brown may need to be joined to the proceedings.
On the listing on 24 June 2024, the defendant intimated that, insofar as the distribution of the ashes was concerned, she understood that the division of the ashes would likely be such that the plaintiff would receive one-third, Ms Brown would receive one-third and the deceased's brother and sister would receive one-third. The defendant confirmed that she did not have any interest in receiving a share of the ashes.
Further, as far as the defendant was aware, there was no Will of the deceased other than the 1992 Will. She outlined a number of respects in which she had difficulty in administering the estate without yet formally having obtained a grant of probate.
In circumstances in which it appeared from statements made by the plaintiff and the defendant that they were estranged, I indicated that any discussions between them could be facilitated by representatives on their behalf.

Recent listings and distilling a solution regarding disposal of the deceased's remains

On 1 July 2024, the parties appeared before me again by telephone link.
Immediately prior to the listing, the plaintiff emailed to my Associate a document setting out orders which she was seeking (relief document).
In particular, the plaintiff had by her relief document (and previously) foreshadowed that she would seek some form of mediation through the NSW Community Justice Centre.
It appeared to me that, from the plaintiff's relief document, what I had gleaned from the parties at the court listings and all of the material that was on the Court file or had otherwise been sent by the parties to my Associate, there was an imperative to separate out questions in relation to the disposal of the deceased's remains (in this case his ashes) on the one hand and the plaintiff's other claims in relation to probate and administration of the deceased's estate on the other hand.
Consistent with the provisions of s 56 of the CPA and having regard to the nature of the Court's inherent jurisdiction in relation to the disposal of the deceased's remains, I attempted to glean from the parties whether, notwithstanding their personal differences, they were agreeable to a regime that at least addressed the disposal of the deceased's ashes in the first instance, whilst leaving other remaining issues to be dealt with later.
The listing lasted for a close to an hour. On the listing, I sought to clarify certain information about the family and to establish whether some agreement regarding the issues in the matter could be reached.
I subsequently marked the plaintiff's relief document as Exhibit P1. Exhibit P1 records issues raised by the plaintiff in relation to: 1. the distribution of the deceased's ashes and related information in respect of that (ashes issues); and 2. the administration of the deceased's estate including issues (probate and other issues) regarding: 1. the provision of and access to medical and financial information of the deceased; 2. a claim by the plaintiff that the defendant relinquish her role as executrix of the deceased's Will to the intent that the plaintiff become the administrator of the estate; and 3. compensation and loss of wages for alleged stress and pain.
Specifically, in Exhibit P1 the plaintiff set out the orders which she sought in relation to the ashes issues as follows: Ashes • A share of dad's ashes in an urn & enough of them for some jewellery. Ashes to be sent to my address in WA. All to be paid for by dad's estate. If ashes are divided by thirds, I would like Michael's share & I will put him on our childhood station; Kudgee. I do not want Glenys to have any. She has no interest in any. … Trenerry Funerals • Supply me the following information to eliminate some hurt & stress I've experienced: • The link to dad's funeral • The details of dad's funeral - date, time, location, who organised it, who paid for it & using what money, including the total cost • The date & time Glenys called Trenerry Funerals • The reason Glenys was so upset to request an instant cremation 2 days after dad's body was released to her • The date and time dad's body was released from their morgue to be transported to Central West Crematorium (they own) in Parkes •The name of the company and the driver that transported dad's body to their crematorium •The date and time dad's body arrived at their crematorium • The date and time dad's ashes departed their crematorium • The transport company that couriered dad's ashes from their crematorium to Trenerry Funerals, Griffith • The date and time dad's ashes arrived at Trenerry Funerals … Funeral Costs • Whoever organised dad's funeral/wake etc (anything outside of an instant cremation) be paid for by that party & not from dad's estate.
I have decided to deal with the ashes issues, as they are set out in the above extract from Exhibit P1, as a question separate to the balance of the matters raised in Exhibit P1 and the prayers for relief sought in the plaintiff's statement of claim (excluding those that have been superseded by events): r 28.2 UCPR. In doing so, I note that, for the purposes of UCPR Pt 28, "question" includes "any question or issue in any proceedings, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise": r 28.1 UCPR. The intention behind this approach is, as I have alluded to above, to deal with the disposal of the deceased's remains without undue delay.
In light of some of my questions, it seemed to me that there was either willingness or non-resistance on the part of the defendant to address quite a few of the matters that the plaintiff sought by way of relief in respect of the ashes issues.
Provisionally, it seemed to me that, in light of what appeared to be substantial agreement between the parties, there was little point in the parties seeking to mediate the ashes issues in circumstances where I could potentially make notations and orders as between them which addressed those issues, and which left the probate and other issues to be subsequently addressed by the Court.
Thus, on 1 July 2024 I made the following orders: 1. Notes that: a. Meek J will seek to formalise orders in relation to the disposal of the deceased's ashes; b. the proposed orders received by the chambers of Meek J on 1 July 2024 have been marked exhibit P1; c. Meek J will make notations including requesting the plaintiff to reflect upon what if any other relief that she seeks, by the time of the next Court listing. 2. Stands the matter over to before Meek J at 9am on Friday, 12 July 2024, subject to further confirmation.
The parties continued to send email correspondence to my Associate regarding the matter.
On 2 July 2024, I instructed my Associate to send an email to the parties setting out a list of proposed notations and orders which recorded, as I understood it, matters which appeared to be common ground between the parties in relation to the ashes issues.
The email expressly noted that it was the intention of the proposed orders to see if it was possible for there to be recorded notations and orders addressing the ashes issues in light of what appeared to be substantial agreement between the parties and to defer the probate and other issues for the plaintiff to reflect upon and be dealt with later by the Court.
In particular, the email indicated that the intention of the draft orders was to obviate the need for any mediation before a Community Justice Centre at least in respect of the ashes issues. The email invited the parties to review the draft orders and to indicate whether they were agreeable to them, noting that unless there was agreement the current position (namely that Trenerry Funerals would retain the ashes) would subsist pending any further order of the Court.
On 3 July 2024, my Associate had not yet received a response from the parties. At my request, she sent a subsequent email requesting that the parties provide a response and indicate whether they were agreeable to the orders proposed.
The parties responded to the subsequent email. Whilst it appeared that the plaintiff was seemingly agreeable to the proposed notations and orders, the parties were potentially seeking to continue with arrangements for a mediation before the Community Justice Centre without having first indicated agreement with the proposed orders.
On 4 July 2024, in light of the above, and seeking to avoid the parties potentially taking matters further into their own hands without an orderly regime in place which was reflected in court orders, I requested that my Associate list the matter. For the purposes of ensuring that Trenerry Funerals had an opportunity to be heard (as it would be affected by the outcome of the matter), my Associate requested that a representative of Trenerry Funerals appear on the listing.

Confirmation of the proposed solution

On 5 July 2024, the matter was listed at 9 am.
Overnight and on the morning of 5 July 2024 prior to the listing, my Associate received further materials from the plaintiff.
My provisional assessment of those materials was that they bore upon questions as to the probate and other issues, as distinct from the ashes issues.
The listing proceeded. The plaintiff and the defendant appeared by telephone link to the Court, as they had previously done. Further, Mr Calabro, one of the owners and directors of Trenerry Funerals, also appeared by telephone.
I reminded the parties that what the Court was attempting to do was to separate the ashes issues from the probate and other issues in order to see whether there could be agreement in respect of the former. That way, the remains of the deceased could be expediently addressed with appropriate dignity, leaving the other issues to be later resolved.
In discussion with the plaintiff and the defendant, I confirmed that the orders that I had proposed were acceptable to them. I noted that the intent of the proposed orders was to ensure that Trenerry Funerals, to the extent that it incurred any further expense in relation to compliance with the orders, would have such expense regarded as an administration expense for the estate, and that it would be at liberty to enforce against the estate payment in respect of such costs. I expressly gave Mr Calabro an opportunity to indicate whether there was anything that he wished to say or sought to be heard on in relation to the proposals. He indicated that there was nothing that he wished to state.
In the above circumstances, I make the following orders which are intended to finalise any disputation between the parties in relation to the ashes issues, with allowance for liberty to apply in relation to the working out and enforcement of the orders.

Orders

The orders of the Court are as set out below.
The Court, with the consent of the parties: Notations as to issues 1. Notes the orders previously made on 20, 21 and 24 June 2024 and 1 July 2024 by Meek J. 2. Notes that the plaintiff's outline of orders that she was seeking on 1 July 2024 was marked as exhibit P1. 3. Notes that, at the mention of the matter before Meek J on 1 July 2024, a further update regarding the issues in the matter had been provided to the Court by the parties. 4. Notes that Exhibit P1 records issues raised by the plaintiff in relation to: 1. the distribution of the deceased's ashes and related information in respect of that (ashes issues); and 2. the administration of the deceased's estate including issues (probate and other issues) regarding: 1. the provision of and access to medical and financial information of the deceased; 2. a claim by the plaintiff that the defendant relinquish her role as executrix of the deceased's Will to the intent that the plaintiff become the administrator of the estate; and 3. compensation and loss of wages for alleged stress and pain. Notations as to the deceased's estate and administration 1. Notes that: 1. as matters presently stand the last known Will of the deceased is the Will dated 10 February 1992 (1992 Will) appointing the defendant as executrix and sole beneficiary of the deceased's estate; 2. the defendant has the original of the 1992 Will and has taken steps to apply for a grant of probate of the 1992 Will, and is presently doing that with the assistance of her estate planner, who is awaiting receipt of a death certificate; 3. the deceased's estate is small, which (without being precise) is valued in the order of $25,000 according to the defendant, and valued at $50,000 to $100,000 according to the plaintiff, and is comprised of: 1. a lot of land; 2. monies in two Westpac bank accounts; 3. monies in two ANZ bank accounts; and 4. cars or car parts and machinery; 1. the plaintiff has in her custody a degree of paper work which is relevant to the administration of the deceased's estate; 2. the expenses of Trenerry Funerals have been paid from the deceased's funds held with Westpac; 3. consequent upon some funds having been removed from the deceased's bank accounts (according to the defendant, about which the Court makes no finding at this stage), there are limited funds in the deceased's bank accounts; and 4. the deceased's estate had certain expenses, including an ambulance invoice, rates due on the deceased's lot of land (as well as a lot of land which he leased) and for BOC gas bottles. Orders and notations regarding the ashes issues 1. Notes that Trenerry Funerals holds the cremated remains of the deceased at its offices and, by the orders made on 24 June 2024, the owner or director of Trenerry Funerals is restrained from releasing the cremated remains of the deceased until further order. 2. Orders, subject to the orders below, that Order 6 made on 24 June 2024, being the order restraining Trenerry Funerals from releasing the cremated remains of the deceased, is discharged. 3. Notes that the Court has been informed by Trenerry Funerals that the deceased's body was cremated at 1:30 pm on 20 June 2024 at Central West Crematorium. 4. Notes that the defendant has informed the Court that a funeral/memorial service was arranged to be held at Darlington Point Hall at 2 pm on Friday, 21 June 2024, which service occurred and a coffin was transported to the Hall (albeit with no body in the coffin). 5. Notes that the defendant authorises Trenerry Funerals to provide to the plaintiff: 1. a link to the recording of the funeral/memorial service or, if there be any technical issue with the link, alternatively to provide any recording on a USB stick to the plaintiff; and 2. a copy of the funeral/memorial service booklet. 1. Notes that the defendant authorises Trenerry Funerals to provide to the plaintiff the following further details of the cremation of the deceased's body, including: 1. the name of the company and the driver who transported the deceased's body to the crematorium and the deceased's ashes back from the crematorium to Trenerry Funerals; and 2. the times or approximate times on 20 June 2024 at which: 1. the deceased's body was transported from Trenerry Funerals to Central West Crematorium; 2. the transport vehicle arrived at the crematorium; and 3. the transport vehicle departed from the crematorium to transport the deceased's ashes back to Trenerry Funerals. 1. Approves the arrangement as between the plaintiff and the defendant that: 1. the deceased's ashes will be released by Trenerry Funerals as specified below, unless otherwise agreed by the parties; 2. the deceased's ashes are to be distributed to the following persons and in accordance with the arrangements specified below: 1. the plaintiff as to one-third (plaintiff's share); 2. the deceased's sister Susan (Susan) as to one-third (Susan's share); and 3. Cheryl Brown (Cheryl) as to the remaining one-third (Cheryl's share); 1. the plaintiff's share of the deceased's ashes is to be sent by Trenerry Funerals, by appropriate means, to the plaintiff and the costs associated with such sending is to be an estate expense for which Trenerry Funerals may be reimbursed out of the deceased's estate; 2. Susan's share of the ashes is to be sent by Trenerry Funerals, by appropriate means, to Susan in Clare, South Australia, to the intent that arrangements will then be made (as between Susan and the plaintiff) for that one-third of the ashes (or part thereof as otherwise agreed) to be dispersed or buried with or placed near the resting place of the deceased's son Michael; 3. the defendant will speak with Cheryl with a view to ascertaining whether Cheryl wishes to collect Cheryl's share of the ashes directly from Trenerry Funerals, or alternatively whether Cheryl wishes the defendant to collect her share of the deceased's ashes on Cheryl's behalf, to eventually be provided to Cheryl by the defendant. 1. Directs that such if any further expense that may be incurred by Trenerry Funerals in facilitating the above arrangements be an estate testamentary expense. 2. Notes that presently there may be insufficient funds within the deceased's estate to purchase an urn to hold the above-mentioned shares of the deceased's ashes. 3. Reserves to the parties any further relief to be sought in respect of any such urn or urns to be dealt with as part of the probate and other issues. 4. Notes that the Court proposes also, on notice to the parties, to provide to Trenerry Funerals via email a copy of these orders. 5. Grants to both parties, and to Trenerry Funerals, liberty to apply for such, if any, further orders as may be required in the implementation of these orders and enforcement of these orders, including in respect of the approved arrangement. 6. Orders that, in the context in which to date neither of the parties have appeared before the Court with legal representation, there be no order as to the costs of the ashes issues, to the intent that each party will bear their own costs of the ashes issues. Orders and notations regarding the probate and other issues 1. Notes that, as matters presently stand, there is no material before the Court which is currently suggestive that there is any legal basis for passing over the defendant as executrix nor any reason why a grant of probate should not be issued to the defendant upon the defendant making an application for probate of the 1992 Will. 2. Notes that the Court has requested the plaintiff to reflect upon whether: 1. there is any utility in her seeking to challenge the defendant's authority to administer the estate, particularly in the context in which the deceased's estate appears (on the information available to the Court at the moment) to be a small estate, and that the costs associated with the appointment of any independent administrator other than the defendant, if ordered to be paid out of the estate, may consume the value of the assets of the estate or significantly consume the value of such assets; and 2. in light of notation 20(a) which, if any, of the probate and other issues she wishes to pursue. 1. Orders that the listing before Meek J at 9 am on 12 July 2024 be relisted for 12 pm on 12 July 2024 before Meek J. 2. Notes that on the listing on 12 July 2024 the Court will (as indicated in the orders made on 1 July 2024) address questions of what if any orders, including case management orders, ought to be made in respect of the probate and other issues, including but not limited to considering whether the plaintiff ought to be granted leave to amend the statement of claim to pursue any relief in respect of the probate and other issues. 3. Orders nunc pro tunc, pursuant to r 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), that the ashes issues, as identified by reference to Exhibit P1, be determined separately from the balance of the matters raised by the plaintiff in Exhibit P1 and the prayers for relief in the plaintiff's statement of claim (excluding those that have been superseded by events).

Endnotes

Made pursuant to s 134(2)(n)-(v) of the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW).
The coroner also has jurisdiction to hold an "inquiry" concerning the cause and origin of a fire or explosion if the coroner is satisfied that the fire or explosion has destroyed or damaged any property within the State: s 30(1) Coroners Act. The jurisdiction in respect of inquiries is more particularly described in Pt 3.3 of the Coroners Act.
Coroners Court New South Wales, "Guidance and information" https://coroners.nsw.gov.au/help-and-support/guidance-and-information.html accessed 9 July 2024.
1 Kings 3:16-28, Bible - New International Version.
See Waller at 68 [I.301]. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 10 July 2024

(Coroners Act), the Cemeteries and Crematoria Act 2013(NSW)

(NSW), the Funeral Funds Act 1979(NSW)

(NSW), the Anatomy Act 1977(NSW)

(NSW), the Human Tissue Act 1983(NSW)

At a glance

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Judgment (35 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (16)

Cases Cited (30)

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