[2025] FWC 888
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2025-03-31
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2025] FWC 888 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2025/3138) was lodged against this decision.]
s.394 - Unfair dismissal
Sydney International Container Terminals Pty Limited
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - employee tendered resignation - whether resignation effective to terminate the employment - whether in acting on the resignation the employer dismissed the employee - no termination at the initiative of the employer
We refer to your resignation from your employment with Hutchison Ports Sydney, given today 26 September 2024.
This email response is to confirm receipt of your resignation and confirm that your last day of employment will be 26 September 2024. We advise that payment of your outstanding wages will be paid into your usual bank account. ...
... We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your hard work during your employment at Hutchison Ports Sydney and wish you well in your future endeavours."
"Sorry disregard my previous email. I wasn't thinking straight due to stress. i'll be in tonight for a night shift."
Your resignation has already been accepted and it has been processed through our payroll for payment."
"[35] Additional but not unrelated to the concept of 'forced' resignation is a line of cases concerned with the circumstances in which an ostensible indication of an intention to resign on the part of an employee may not be effective to terminate the employment on the employee's initiative. Where the resignation is ineffective, purported acceptance of the resignation by the employer forthwith, without clarifying with the employee whether resignation was truly intended, will constitute a termination of employment at the initiative of the employer. The usual position is that where an employee uses unambiguous words of resignation, the employer is entitled to treat this as an effective resignation which operates to terminate the employment. However an expression of resignation which cannot reasonably be regarded as voluntary may not operate as an effective resignation capable of acceptance by the employer. ..."
"[47] Having regard to the above authorities and the bifurcation in the definition of 'dismissal' established in s.386(1) of the FW Act, we consider that the position under the FW Act may be summarised as follows:
(1) There may be a dismissal within the first limb of the definition in s.386(1)(a) where, although the employee has given an ostensible communication of a resignation, the resignation is not legally effective because it was expressed in the 'heat of the moment' or when the employee was in a state of emotional stress or mental confusion such that the employee could not reasonably be understood to be conveying a real intention to resign. Although 'jostling' by the employer may contribute to the resignation being legally ineffective, employer conduct is not a necessary element. In this situation if the employer simply treats the ostensible resignation as terminating the employment rather than clarifying or confirming with the employee after a reasonable time that the employee genuinely intended to resign, this may be characterised as a termination of the employment at the initiative of the employer."
When did Hutchison Ports purport to accept the resignation?
Were there "special circumstances" in this case?
"I wish to enquire about information regarding a possible future resignation settlement, and also information regarding the possibility of termination. With the current circumstances of the shipping lines reducing volume, my hours and employment status is uncertain."
"I've taken time off for mental health and deciding if I want to move on or not Comrade."
"It's one thing if the parties have a mutual understanding because they've had some back and forth between them, but when an email is sent out of the blue ending a career an employer should have an obligation. That in and of itself should be a special circumstance, and this wouldn't overburden any employer to at least check in with the employee to say, 'Is this really what you intended?'"
"THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Bond, can I just clarify something, and maybe I am reading too much into your submissions, but it seems that what you're saying is the fact that there was an email resignation that comes out of the blue is of itself a special circumstance which put the respondent on notice at the very least to contact Mr Gourlay to ask if that was freely and consciously given. Is that right?
MR BOND: I didn't make that submission in my written submissions, but, yes, I'm making that submission - - -
THE COMMISSIONER: But that's what I heard you to say just now.
MR BOND: That's right, I believe that's the case, because the case (indistinct) has developed and special circumstances based on the interactions between the parties. It was a unilateral communication from the employee to the employer on something as important of, 'I'm giving up my career.' Yes, I believe that should give rise to special circumstances where the employer at the very least give the employee a call and say, 'Did you mean to submit your resignation?' Yes, I do say that it's special circumstances if an employee unilaterally quits their job with an email without any further communications with the employer. That certainly would not be a burden to someone, any employer."
"...the mere fact that a person resigns in circumstances of heightened tensions or strong emotions will not turn a rash or imprudent decision made by an employee into a dismissal at the initiative of the employer. Rather, if, applying the objective test referred to by the Full Bench, it can be said that the employee could not reasonably be considered to have conveyed a real intention to resign, then there may be a termination on the employer's initiative if the employer treats the resignation as effective. The conclusion must be that objectively no such intention was evident, not simply that it is fair to allow the employee an opportunity to rethink the matter. There is no statutory 'cooling off' period for resignations. It is for the Parliament to create any such rule. The Commission cannot fashion one."
The language and structure of the email, and the time at which it was sent
Mr Hughes's decision not to allow Mr Gourlay to retract his resignation
"It is clear that the company knew that David Gourlay was not in the right frame of mind when he sent the email. We had long term employees, good employees, reliable employees who had expressed concern to Mr Hughes; so much concern that it caused him to call him. We had Mr Keating who said he talked to him, was concerned about him. They all described Dave Gourlay as being in the midst of a mental health crisis. Mr Hughes accepted that. He even said in his text message to Mr McGrath that he doesn't sound good at all. 'I think he genuinely needs some help.' And yet they accepted the resignation." (Emphasis added)
"Certainly the law can't be the case that an employer can say, 'All right, Dave sent in his resignation, we accept. The employment relationship is over.' They have to consider the entirety of the communications between the parties on that day, and the entirety of the communication points to a conclusion that he didn't intend to resign." (Emphasis added)

Kirk S Bond of Maritime Union of Australia for the Applicant.
[1] I am mindful that a resignation is a unilateral act, the exercise of which does not depend on it being accepted by the employer: Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission [1984] FCA 378; (1984) 9 IR 101 at 109. I use the term "accepted" in part for consistency with other decisions of the Commission and in part for convenience. When I refer in this decision to a resignation being "accepted", I am referring to it being actioned or processed by the employer.
[2] Unless otherwise stated, all references to legislative provisions in this decision are to provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009.
[3] This was in accordance with the "Adverse Conditions" provision of the Hutchison Ports Australia (HPA) and Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) Enterprise Agreement 2021
[4] He may have been mistaken in this regard. The evidence suggests that his income would have been maintained, at least for a period. However, for present purposes all that is relevant is Mr Gourlay's understanding.
[5] Saeid Khayam v Navitas English Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 5162 at [75], citing Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] IRCA 625; (1995) 62 IR 200
[8] See Koutalis v Pollett [2015] FCA 1165 at [43]- [44]
[9] Kane Davy v O'Connor Engine Services Pty Ltd [2021] FWC 6697 at [29]
[10] Transcript 24 January 2025, PN 274
[11] Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, 23 December 2024, par 9
[12] Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, 23 December 2024, par 14
[14] Statement of David Gourlay, par 14
[15] Statement of David Gourlay, par 11
[21] Statement of Barry McGrath, par 10
[25] Statement of David Gourlay, par 22
[26] Statement of Barry McGrath, par 15 and Annexure BM1
[27] I have determined to accept these documents into evidence, subject to weight, over the objection of Hutchison Ports.
[28] Reply Witness Statement of Paul Keating, par 1 and Attachment PK-1
[29] Statement of David Gourlay, par 26 and Attachment DG7
[33] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN229
[34] Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, par 6
[35] Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, par 14
[36] Reply Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, par 14. See also Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN275, PN278, PN347,
[37] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN275
[38] Statement of Geoff Hughes, par 29(b) and Attachment GH-5
[39] Reply Witness Statement of Dan Hanford, par 6 and Attachment DH-1
[40] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN108
[41] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN117
[42] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN116
[43] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN215
[44] Under the enterprise agreement applying to Mr Gourlay, employees may access long service leave after seven years of service.
[45] Statement of Geoff Hughes, 13 January 2025, par 29
[46] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN259
[47] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN348
[48] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN358-PN361
[50] Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, par 13
[51] Outline of Submissions of the Applicant, par 6
[52] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN132
[53] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN124
[54] Transcript, 24 January 2025, PN252
[61] Ngo v Link Printing Pty Limited (1999) 94 IR 375 at [16]
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
David Gourlay
Sydney International Container Terminals Pty Limited [2025] FWC 888
(2017) 271 IR 245
(1984) 9 IR 101
(1995) 62 IR 200
(1999) 94 IR 375