//
austlii:cth/NNTTA/2026/9
General information, not legal advice.
NNTTA
2026-04-09
Original judgment source is linked above.
Daphne Huddleston & Ors obo The Wagiman, Warai & Jawoyn Peoples (Mary River West) and Another v Gempart (NT) Pty Ltd and Another [2026] NNTTA 9 (9 April 2026)
IN THE MATTER of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
IN THE MATTER of an inquiry into expedited procedure objection applications
Daphne Huddleston & Ors obo The Wagiman, Warai & Jawoyn Peoples (Mary River West) (DC2001/006)
Daphne Huddleston & Ors on behalf of the Wagiman Group (DC2023/001)
DECISION ON PRELIMINARY ISSUE OF WHETHER OBJECTION APPLICATIONS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Native title - future acts - proposed grant of exploration licence - expedited procedure objection applications - applications to dismiss expedited procedure objection applications under s 148(a) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) on the basis that the Tribunal is not entitled to deal with the expedited procedure objection applications due to non-compliance with s 76(c) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and s 8 of the Native Title (Tribunal) Regulations 2024 (Cth) - applications to dismiss expedited procedure objection applications dismissed
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 29, 32, 76, 77, 148, 237
Native Title (Tribunal) Regulations 1993 (Cth) sch 1
Dixon and Others v Northern Territory of Australia and Others [2001] NNTTA 29; [2001] NNTTA 29; (2001) 166 FLR 29 ('Dixon')
Josephine Forrest and Ors on behalf of the Yi-Martuwarra Ngurrara Native Title Claimants v State of Western Australia [2019] NNTTA 43 ('Forrest')
Top End (Default PBC/CLA) Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v Green Critical Minerals Limited & Anor [2024] NNTTA 5 ('Top End')
Northern Territory of Australia v Ward and Others [2001] NNTTA 163; (2001) 167 FLR 398 ('Ward')
Yanunijarra Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC and Another v Western Australia and Another [2020] FCAFC 64; (2020) 276 FCR 53 ('Yanunijarra')
[1] Before the Tribunal are contentions provided by the grantee party, Gempart (NT) Pty Ltd, which the other parties and the Tribunal take to be applications to dismiss pursuant to s 148(a) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) the two expedited procedure objection applications the subject of this inquiry (the dismissal applications).
[2] The dismissal applications proceed on the basis that the statement in each objection application as to why the relevant native title party believes the proposed grant of the exploration licence is not an act attracting the expedited procedure (in each case the relevant statement) fails to comply with s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Native Title (Tribunal) Regulations 2024.
[3] The native title parties, who respectively comprise the applicant in Daphne Huddleston & Ors obo The Wagiman, Warai & Jawoyn Peoples (Mary River West) v Northern Territory of Australia & Ors (NTD6006/2001) (the Mary River West Claim) and the applicant in Daphne Huddleston & Ors on behalf of the Wagiman Group v Northern Territory of Australia (Jindare Pastoral Lease) (NTD4/2023) (the Jindare Claim) (each a native title party and collectively the native title parties), oppose the dismissal applications.
[4] The Government party, the Northern Territory of Australia, takes no position on the dismissal applications.
[5] Having considered the contentions of the parties and the circumstances of this inquiry to date, I find that the dismissal applications fail and should be dismissed.
[6] The relevant background to the dismissal applications is as follows.
[7] On 25 June 2025, the Territory notified each native title party that it proposed to grant exploration licence 34114 (the exploration licence) to Gempart. The notice included a statement that the Territory considers the proposed grant of the exploration licence is an act attracting the expedited procedure under s 237 of the NTA.
[8] On 31 October 2025, each native title party objected to the Territory's inclusion of the expedited procedure statement by lodging their respective objection applications in the Tribunal.
[9] On 3 November 2025, the President of the Tribunal, through his delegate, assessed each objection application against the requirements of the NTA and the Regulations, including against the requirements of s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations, and decided to accept each objection application pursuant to s 77 of the NTA (collectively the acceptance decisions). The parties were advised of the Tribunal's acceptance of each of the objection applications the following day.
[10] On 3 November 2025, I was appointed as the Member responsible to conduct an inquiry into the objection applications.
[11] On 28 November 2025, the preliminary conference was held in the inquiry into the objection applications. During this preliminary conference, Gempart indicated that it objected to aspects of the objection applications. In light of this indication, Gempart was invited to put its concerns in writing so that they could be considered by the other parties and the Tribunal.
[12] On 3 December 2025, Gempart provided to the other parties and the Tribunal written contentions comprising the dismissal applications.
[13] On 19 January 2026, I held a conference to discuss the dismissal applications. Immediately following this conference, I made directions reflective of the matters discussed. These directions provided an opportunity for the native title parties and the Territory to provide contentions in response to the dismissal applications, and for Gempart to provide contentions in reply.
[14] On 13 February 2026, the native title parties jointly provided their contentions in response to the dismissal applications (the native title parties' contentions). No contentions in response to the dismissal applications were provided by the Territory.
[15] On 4 March 2026, Gempart provided its contentions in reply to the native title parties' contentions (Gempart's contentions in reply).
[16] On 10 March 2026, I held a further conference to discuss aspects of the dismissal applications and the native title parties' contentions.
[17] Gempart essentially submits there are three reasons why the relevant statement in each objection application fails to comply with s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations and, as a consequence, the Tribunal should be satisfied it is not entitled to deal with the objection applications and should dismiss them under s 148(a) of the NTA.
[18] First, because the relevant statement in each objection application "provides incorrect information by referring to a different exploration licence application, held by a different party and subject to a separate proceeding before the Tribunal". For convenience, I will refer to this argument as the incorrect tenement argument.
[19] Secondly, because the relevant statement in each objection application comprises "a formulaic response that repeats in rote fashion section 237(b)" of the NTA and that this "deficiency is compounded in the that the [native title party] in each matter, by mentioning "community or social activities", appears to reserve their rights to submit contentions on sections 237(a) and 237(c) without providing any explanation whatsoever as to why they think the expedited procedure should not apply under those sections". Gempart also contends that "not only does there appear to have been no comprehensive survey or fulsome assessment, there also appears to have been no survey or assessment at all in advance of the lodging of either [objection application]". For convenience, I will refer to this argument as the formulaic response argument.
[20] And_,_ thirdly, because the relevant statement in each objection application contains "misleading information". This last argument is nuanced and is explained by Gempart at [18]-[21] of the dismissal applications in the following way:
For convenience, I will refer to this argument as the misleading information argument.
[21] To Gempart's arguments I would add a further issue which, for convenience, I will call the acceptance decisions issue. As this shorthand suggests, this issue arises in connection with the acceptance decisions. This issue is developed and addressed below, along with Gempart's three arguments.
[22] It is convenient to develop and address the acceptance decisions issue first before turning to address Gempart's three arguments.
[23] Nowhere in the dismissal applications, Gempart's contentions in reply or in the native title parties' contentions is the significance of the acceptance decisions emphasised save that, correctly in my view:
(a) the native title parties point out that if an objection application complies with s 76 of the NTA, the Tribunal must accept the application: see the native title parties' contentions at [8]; and
(b) Gempart points out that, consistent with Forrest and Yanunijarra, the objection applications cannot be amended at this time: see the dismissal applications at [10].
[24] Notwithstanding that the acceptance decisions are not a prominent feature of the parties' contentions, I raised the potential significance of the acceptance decisions with the parties in the conference on 10 March 2026.
[25] In particular, I invited the parties to address whether the dismissal applications might more properly be characterised as a purported review of the acceptance decisions given:
(a) the dismissal applications are solely directed to two provisions falling entirely within the scope of the acceptance decisions, namely, s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations; and
(b) the acceptance decisions presumably could have been, but were not, judicially reviewed by Gempart.
(a) Gempart contended that both pathways were available to it, that is, the judicial review pathway at the time the acceptance decisions were made and the dismissal pathway under s 148(a) of the NTA presently being pursued, with the dismissal pathway under s 148(a) being its preferred pathway and the basis upon which the dismissal applications proceed; and
(b) the native title parties confirmed that they had responded to the dismissal applications on the basis that Gempart was moving for dismissal under s 148(a) of the NTA.
[27] I have since reflected further on the circumstances of both the acceptance decisions and the dismissal applications. In my view, it is significant that:
(a) each of the arguments raised by Gempart in support of the dismissal applications are aimed to satisfy me that the objection applications fail to comply with s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations;
(b) each objection application has already been assessed against the requirements of these provisions by the President's delegate in the course of making the acceptance decisions (as well as against s 76(a), (b) and (d) of the NTA among other provisions of the NTA and s 9 of the Regulations among other provisions of the Regulations);
(c) Gempart has elected not to seek judicial review of the acceptance decisions;
(d) the only substantive steps taken in this inquiry since the acceptance decisions were made have been solely in connection with the dismissal applications; and
(e) no new factual material has been placed before the Tribunal since the acceptance decisions were made, nor has any new appreciation of the factual basis underpinning the objection applications become apparent since the acceptance decisions were made. This is not a case where, by way of example, one of the essential pre-conditions necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, namely the requirement that the objection application be made by a native title party, was absent at the time a purported objection application was purportedly accepted by the Tribunal under s 77 of the NTA and, where this absence once identified, revealed a basis on which the Tribunal could be satisfied that it was not entitled to deal with the purported objection application under s 148(a) of the NTA: cf. Forrest.
[28] In light of the matters set out in [27] above, I am of the view that the dismissal applications are, in truth, no more than purported applications for review of the acceptance decisions, which the Tribunal has no power to determine. In the circumstances of this matter, I am satisfied that, once the acceptance decisions were made, the objection applications were lodged in the Tribunal within the meaning of s 32(3) of the NTA and the Tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with the objection applications was invoked. The acceptance decisions have not been disturbed by a Court since that time, and there is no power by which the Tribunal can revisit the acceptance decisions.
[29] This line of reasoning reveals the paradoxical nature of the dismissal applications. It is tolerably clear that the President's delegate considered the objection applications to be compliant or substantially compliant with the requirements of s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations (as well as other provisions of the NTA and the Regulations); so much is apparent from the fact of the acceptance decisions. Yet by the dismissal applications, Gempart urges the Tribunal to find that the objection applications do not comply, not even substantially, with the requirements of s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations, with the consequence being that there are presently no objection applications before the Tribunal with which it can deal. For the reasons already provided, I do not share this view.
[30] However, if I am wrong in finding that the Tribunal has no power to reconsider issues resolved by the acceptance decisions then, in my opinion, the dismissal applications still fail and should be dismissed for separate reasons which I will now turn to explain.
[31] As already noted, by the dismissal applications, Gempart proceeds under s 148(a) of the NTA.
[32] This provision was considered by President Dowsett in Forrest and by the Full Court of Federal Court of Australia in the appeal from this decision, Yanunijarra, upon which decisions Gempart relies (among others).
[33] As found in Forrest at [70]-[83] and as upheld in Yanunijarra at [52]-[56], the Tribunal's acceptance of an objection application is not conclusive of its jurisdiction to deal with it, and so much is apparent from s 148(a) of the NTA.
[34] However, as explained at [27(e)] above, I consider the circumstances of this matter to be distinguishable from the circumstances of Forrest which turned on the fact that the objection application had been lodged by persons with no entitlement to do so.
[35] Be this distinction as it may, assuming s 148(a) of the NTA is engaged in the present circumstances, none of Gempart's three arguments persuade me that I am not entitled to deal with the objection applications. As will be explained, having regard to the content of the relevant statement in each objection application, I am satisfied that the relevant statement in each objection application complies with s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations.
[36] Regarding the incorrect tenement argument, I accept that the relevant statement in each objection application incorrectly refers to "EL(A) 34093".
[37] However, I do not consider this reference impugns the relevant statement in each objection application to the extent that I am not entitled to deal with the objection applications.
[38] This is because the specific panel of each objection application headed "DESCRIPTION OF THE FUTURE ACT" correctly identifies the exploration licence as "Exploration licence 34114" and correctly identifies Gempart as "Gempart (NT) Pty Ltd".
[39] Additionally, the specific panel of each objection application headed "NOTIFICATION DAY" correctly identifies the notification day for the exploration licence as "2 July 2025".
[40] As well, in the specific panel of the objection applications headed "IDENTIFY THE APPLICANT", reference is made to each of the claims affected by the exploration licence, being the Mary River West Claim and the Jindare Claim respectively.
[41] In these circumstances, I find that the objection applications substantially refer to and respond to the exploration licence.
[42] As with the preceding argument, I am not persuaded by the formulaic response argument.
[43] The formulaic response argument concerns the following part of the relevant statement in each objection application, which are in identical terms to this extent:
The objector believes that the proposed act is not a future act attracting the expedited procedure because, contrary to s 237(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the act is likely to interfere with areas or sites of particular significance, in accordance with their traditions, to the native title holders.
In particular, the objector believes there is an unacceptable risk of interference with areas or sites of particular significance to the registered claimants on or near the tenement area in circumstances where the Northern Territory of Australia does not require the proponent to obtain (and where the proponent has not obtained) an authority certificate in accordance with the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 (NT).
To avoid doubt, the objector notes it has not yet had the opportunity to comprehensively survey or fulsomely assess the proposed tenement area (including adjacent areas) in respect of community or social activities, sacred sites and other Aboriginal heritage, and/or major disturbance within the statutory timeframe.
[44] I do not consider this part of the relevant statement in each objection application to be formulaic. In my opinion, when read as a whole, this part of the relevant statement in each objection application conveys to a reader the primary reason why the relevant native title party believes that the exploration licence is not an act attracting the expedited procedure, namely because the relevant native title party believes there is an unacceptable risk of interference to areas or sites of particular significance to the relevant registered claimants on or near the area of the exploration licence.
[45] Additionally, and significantly in my view, the relevant native title party goes on to explain that its belief in this regard arises in the context of two supporting circumstances: where the Territory does not require Gempart to obtain an authority certificate in accordance with the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 (NT); and where Gempart has not obtained such a certificate, neither of which supporting circumstances are disputed by any party.
[46] Relatedly, it is a well-accepted principle in matters involving an objection to the application of the expedited procedure that one consideration to be weighed by the Tribunal when determining the extent to which the proposed grant is likely to interfere with an area or site of particular significance is the application of the relevant State or Territory heritage protection regime which, in the circumstances of the objection applications, would include consideration of any protections afforded under the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 (NT): see, for example, Top End.
[47] Moreover, that the relevant native title party in each case identifies that "it has not yet had the opportunity to comprehensively survey or fulsomely assess the proposed tenement area (including adjacent areas) in respect of community or social activities, sacred sites and other Aboriginal heritage, and/or major disturbance within the statutory timeframe" does not, in my view, detract from the primary reason and two supporting circumstances provided by each native title party.
[48] I do not consider any of the preceding analysis in relation to this argument to be inconsistent with the observations of Deputy President Franklyn in Dixon or Member Sosso in Ward, being two key authorities upon which Gempart relies in support of this argument.
[49] Indeed, for reasons which will be explained, I consider that Dixon and Ward indicate that even a "formulaic" response provided in the context of s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations does not prevent the Tribunal from determining that it has jurisdiction to accept an expedited procedure objection application (as per Ward) or require the Tribunal to dismiss an expedited procedure objection application previously accepted by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction (as per Dixon).
[50] Before turning to discuss Dixon and Ward in turn, it is important to make an observation which applies equally to both decisions.
[51] Both decisions refer to expedited procedure objection applications in the form of a Form 4, which was the relevant form at the time Dixon and Ward were decided.
[52] Significantly in my view, paragraph 7 of Form 4 at the time Dixon and Ward were decided and, which paragraph is variously referred to in Dixon and Ward, provided:
A statement why the objector believes that the proposed act is not an act attracting the expedited procedure that includes a statement of the likely impact of the act on community or social activities of the native title holders, areas or sites of particular significance to any land or waters concerned.
[53] The words I have highlighted above in bold go beyond the words of s 8 of the Regulations, which provides:
For the purposes of paragraph 76(c) of the [NTA], a statement why the applicant believes that the future act is not an act attracting the expedited procedure (see section 237 of the [NTA]) is information that must be contained in an expedited procedure application.
[54] However, the words I have highlighted above in bold owe their legitimacy to the fact that Form 4 was included at schedule 1 to an earlier version of the regulations, the Native Title (Tribunal) Regulations 1993 (Cth).
[55] Form 4 ceased to be the approved form upon the commencement of the Regulations on 1 October 2024, when the current expedited procedure objection application form (the current form) came into use. While nothing turns on it, the current form is not included in a schedule to the Regulations.
[56] The objection applications have been prepared using the current form. In contrast to Form 4, the section of the current form which invites the applicant to provide the statement required by s 76(c) of the NTA and s 8 of the Regulations is headed "STATEMENT WHY THE APPLICANT BELIEVES THE FUTURE ACT IS NOT AN ACT ATTRACTING THE EXPEDITED PROCEDURE", and under this heading the following instructions appear:
Briefly set out the reasons why you believe the expedited procedure does not apply to the future act.
Note: The circumstances in which as act attracts the expedited procedure are set out in s 237 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
[57] As can be seen, the differences between the two forms are material. What follows from this, in my opinion, is that the observations made by the Tribunal in both Dixon and Ward in relation to what should ideally be included in a statement provided for the purposes of s 76 of the NTA and Form 4, need to be read in this context.
[58] Turning to Dixon, I acknowledge the obiter dicta observations of Deputy President Franklyn at [18], as extracted at [12] of the dismissal applications. However, the extract at [12] of the dismissal applications overlooks the immediately preceding observations of the Deputy President (also at [18]):
Section 77 of the Act provides that "if an application complies with s76 the National Native Title Tribunal must accept the application." That wording is somewhat peculiar in that it carries the implication that if the application does not comply with s76 the Tribunal has discretion whether or not to accept it. The right to object is conferred by s32(3) of the Act. Section 32(4) provides that when such an objection is made the Arbitral Body must determine whether the act this one which attracts the expedited procedure. It seems to me that the effect of s76 and s77 is to set out conditions which, if fully complied with, compel the Tribunal to accept the application. The application is then "lodged" within the meaning of s32(3). Section 77 however leaves opens to the Tribunal the right to accept or reject an application which does not fully comply**.** That, I understand, is how the Tribunal has acted. It seems to me however that that discretion should only be exercised if there is shown to be a good reason for non-compliance with the requirements of Form 4.
[59] As well, the extract at [12] of the dismissal applications overlooks the immediately following observations of the Deputy President (also at [18]):
It seems to me however that if the Form 4 is deficient but is accepted as a matter of discretion, and the evidence produced at the inquiry is such as to lead to the conclusion that the act does not meet each of the criteria of s237(a),(b) and (c), then the Tribunal must find, as a matter of law, that the act is not one attracting the expedited procedure regardless of any relevant omission by the objectors of information required by the Form 4.
[60] Additionally, the Deputy President's ultimate finding adds still further context to the extract at [12] of the dismissal applications (also at [18]):
I find that the objections having being accepted by the Tribunal and thereby "lodged" within the meaning of s 32(3) even though they did not comply with the requirements for compulsory acceptance by the Tribunal, are each validly before the Tribunal for determination. The application to dismiss each such objection is consequently dismissed.
[61] By including these additional observations of the Deputy President I do not mean to suggest that the Tribunal has a discretion to accept an expedited procedure objection application which does not comply or substantially comply with the NTA and the Regulations; the Tribunal is not able to do so: see Ward at [84] and Forrest at [47].
[62] At the least though, these additional observations of the Deputy President serve to further contextualise the extract at [12] of the dismissal applications and draw attention to the significance of the Tribunal's acceptance of the expedited procedure objection applications before the Deputy President in Dixon.
[63] More to the point however, it is significant in my view that the Deputy President declined to dismiss the relevant expedited procedure objection applications notwithstanding that the statements provided in the context of s 76 of the NTA and as required by paragraph 7 of Form 4 were recitations of s 237 of the NTA. His Honour considered the applications were, in their terms, each validly before the Tribunal for determination, notwithstanding that his Honour found the Tribunal was without jurisdiction for other reasons related to the relevant s 29 notices.
[64] Turning to Ward, I acknowledge the observations of Member Sosso as extracted at [13] and [15] of the dismissal applications. However, Ward is also relevant in the present context for three additional reasons in my view.
[65] First, Ward comprised a decision by the Tribunal to accept the relevant objection applications: at [104]. The applications had purportedly been accepted by the Registrar of the Tribunal under s 77 of the NTA but Member Sosso found that only the Tribunal itself had the power to do so. This aspect of the decision distinguishes it from the present circumstances where Gempart seeks the dismissal of objection applications already accepted by the President through his delegate.
[66] Secondly, as Gempart points out at [15] of the dismissal applications, Member Sosso observed at [77]:
... A formulaic response which repeats in rote fashion the paragraphs of section 237 is not good enough and can result in the expedited procedure objection application not being accepted.
Yet this extract overlooks what Member Sosso goes on to observe at [78]-[81]:
"The cases show various factors that have proved decisive in various contexts, but they do no more than provide guidance in analogous circumstances. There is no decisive rule that can be applied; there is not even a ranking of relevant factors or categories to give guidance on the issue."
Looked at from this perspective, to determine in any given case if an objector has complied with paragraph 7, regard must be had not just to the actual response given, but also the circumstances surrounding that response. This simply means that a contextual analysis by the Tribunal conducting the inquiry is apposite.
[67] And, thirdly, the expedited procedure objection applications considered in Ward were ultimately accepted by Member Sosso despite the fact that the relevant statements provided in the context of s 76 of the NTA and as required by paragraph 7 of Form 4 were recitations of s 237 of the NTA. At [104] Member Sosso relevantly found that:
The native title party in each objection matter have lodged with the Tribunal, a Form 4 that sufficiently complies with the relevant statutory requirements. Responsibility for acceptance of the expedited procedure objection applications, as I have indicted, resides with the Member conducting the inquiry. Pursuant to section 77, if an expedited procedure objection application complies with [section] 76, the Tribunal must accept it. Accordingly, I accept each of the expedited procedure objection applications.
[68] At [16] of the dismissal applications, Gempart contends:
The Grantee Party acknowledges that the deficient statements were nevertheless accepted in Ward. The acceptance, though, was specific to the circumstances, which centred on the lack of comprehensive guidance on completion of an objection application that existed at the time the applications were lodged. Those circumstances do not exist here, and the decision in Ward took great pains to note that its findings did not mean objectors who provided manifestly inadequate information would have their objection applications accepted.
[69] It may readily be accepted that Ward, as with any decision, is situated in its particular factual circumstances. However, the key point in my view is that Member Sosso was ultimately satisfied that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to accept expedited procedure objection applications which included statements provided in the context of s 76 of the NTA and as required by paragraph 7 of Form 4 which were recitations of s 237 of the NTA. How and why the statements came to be framed in this way is neither here nor there in my view. The Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to accept or, adopting the language of s 148(a) of the NTA, to deal with, the applications, and in my view this is what is salient.
[70] Turning now to the misleading information argument. As with the preceding two arguments, I am unpersuaded by this argument.
[71] Gempart invites the Tribunal to infer that "at least some" of the area of the exploration licence has been "surveyed or assessed" because the activity status of a separate inquiry involving the native title parties concerning a neighbouring proposed tenement is described as "awaiting compliance" in an overlap analysis report produced by the Tribunal.
[72] In my opinion, for the reasons already provided, inferences which may be drawn from the activity status of a separate inquiry into a neighbouring proposed tenement, the extent of any pre-lodgement survey activity in the area of the exploration licence or adjacent areas, and/or what has not been included in the relevant statement in each objection application in these regards, have no bearing on whether the Tribunal is entitled to deal with the objection applications.
[73] Further and in any event, this argument is difficult to reconcile in at least one further respect. By this argument, Gempart, in part, seeks to establish that "at least some" of the area of the exploration licence has been "surveyed or assessed" by the native title parties. Yet Gempart itself argues in the alternative to this very argument, as well as elsewhere in its contentions, that each native title party has done nothing in the four-month statutory timeframe and has provided no information in support of their respective objection applications.
[74] For at least these reasons, this argument does not advance the dismissal applications to any extent in my view.
[75] In these circumstances, I would direct that:
Daphne Huddleston & Ors obo The Wagiman, Warai & Jawoyn Peoples (Mary River West) and Another
Gempart
(2001) 166 FLR 29
(2001) 167 FLR 398
(2020) 276 FCR 53