Dalal & Bunha [2026] FedCFamC1A 13 (2 February 2026)

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 30 Fam LR 488; [2003] HCA 7

Boyle (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] SASCA 50

CPJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 212

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55

Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65

DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26

Douglass v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 699; [2012] HCA 34

Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296; [1971] HCA 54

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

Fuller v Fletcher Building Ltd (2024) 76 VR 276; [2024] VSC 712

Gabrielle v Abood (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 28

Ghosh v Nine MSN Pty Ltd (2015) 90 NSWLR 595; [2015] NSWCA 334

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Kingston & Field (No 2) (2020) FLC 93-986; [2020] FamCAFC 235

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17

NAEB/02 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1092

New South Wales v JR [2024] NSWCA 308

O'Connell v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 96

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550; [2016] HCA 22

Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88

SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668

Bunha & Dalal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 683

Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54

Storry v Business Licensing Authority [2022] FCA 1321

UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; [2018] HCA 45

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs on a party and party basis, in the sum of $14,416.12, within 28 days of the date of these orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dalal & Bunha has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 15 August 2025, Mr Dalal ("the appellant") appeals against property and ancillary orders made by a judge of Division 2 on 23 May 2025; Bunha & Dalal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 683 ("the primary judgment"). The appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal raises 12 grounds of appeal. In broad terms, he alleges multiple errors by the primary judge, including denial of procedural fairness, lack of transparency, improper treatment of evidence, inadequate reasons, actual and apprehended bias, and an erroneous exercise of discretion leading to an unjust outcome. For the reasons that follow, the appellant has failed to identify any appellable error and the appeal must be dismissed.

1. The appellant and the respondent wife, Ms Bunha ("the respondent wife"), commenced cohabitation upon their marriage in 1988 in Country B (the primary judgment at [5]-[6]). They have two children, born in 1990 and 1992. Both children are now adults and live independently. In 1995, the parties migrated to Australia and subsequently became Australian citizens (at [6]). In late 2000, they purchased a house in Suburb Z, ACT for $144,000, which they later sold in mid-2007 for $382,000 (at [10]). Following the sale, the parties moved into a rental property while searching for another home to purchase.
2. The parties' relationship experienced difficulties, leading to their separation in mid-2008 after an altercation involving the appellant and their eldest child (at [11]). A family violence order was made at that time which required the appellant to leave the home (at [11]). Around the beginning of 2009, the parties jointly purchased a property in Suburb T, ACT where they lived separated under one roof (at [12]). The appellant asserts this as the date of separation. However, the primary judge preferred the respondent wife's evidence that separation occurred in mid-2008 (at [12]). It appears to be uncontentious that the parties physically separated, on a permanent basis, at the end of 2017. The separation occurred following a further family violence order naming the appellant as the respondent (at [13]).
3. At the commencement of the parties' relationship, the respondent wife's parents gifted her a property at V Street, City L, Country B, as part of her dowry (at [132]). The transfer of property was subject to a life interest for her parents. At the beginning of 1996, with the agreement of the respondent wife and her parents, this property was sold for 2.8 million of Currency W (Country B's currency) (at [132]). Of the sale proceeds, 800,000 of Currency W was transferred to the respondent wife's sister, and the balance was deposited into the appellant's personal account with a bank located in Country B (at [58]).
4. In late 2004, the appellant used these funds to purchase three plots of land in City M, Country B, being two lots in Property H and a third property at Suburb X (at [59]). The Suburb X property was later sold, and the proceeds were used to purchase two apartments in City L, Country B, although the precise dates of these transactions are not specified in the evidence that was presented to the primary judge (at [75]).
5. Throughout the relationship and after separation, the appellant travelled regularly to Country B. This typically occurred during the Australian winter months, except for 2022 and 2023 (at [14]). The parties' financial arrangements were such that the appellant managed the family finances, and the respondent wife was often unaware of the details of significant transactions, including the proceeds of property sales (at [10]). The appellant's financial disclosure during the first instance proceedings was found to be inadequate, particularly in relation to his ownership of properties and financial interests in Country B (at [103]).
6. The litigation between the parties has been protracted. Previous property proceedings resulted in a judgment of the Court on 28 July 2023, which the appellant successfully appealed, leading to a rehearing.
7. Orders under ss 102NA(1)(c)(ii) and (iv) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") were made on 3 June 2022. The effect of that order was to prohibit the appellant from personally cross-examining the respondent wife. The matter was listed for trial on several occasions, with trial dates allocated on 14 December 2023 for April 2024. Due to late filing of expert evidence, the trial was adjourned, and ultimately, the final hearing took place over three days on 10, 11, and 15 October 2024, with final submissions received on 15 October 2024.
8. Judgment was delivered on 23 May 2025, with final property adjustment orders being made on that day.

1. In their reasons for judgment, the primary judge found that the appellant had failed to make adequate disclosure of his financial circumstances, particularly in relation to his ownership of real property in Country B. Despite his denials, the primary judge found that the appellant owned six properties in Country B. This included land at Property F and E Street, two lots in Property H, and two apartments in City L. In making this finding, evidence relied upon by the primary judge included title searches conducted by an attorney from Country B, Mr BB, and valuation evidence from Ms CC, a qualified valuer. The appellant's denial of owning these properties was found to be deliberately false and his credibility was significantly undermined by his evasive conduct, contradictory affidavits, and implausible explanations, including his unsubstantiated assertion that the documents were fraudulently produced.
2. Comparatively, the respondent wife was found to be a reliable witness, and her evidence was found to be consistent with documentary records (at [110]). In accepting the evidence of the respondent wife, the primary judge found that she had made greater initial and post-separation financial contributions (at [148]). These contributions included the use of her "dowry" property to fund the acquisition of several assets in Country B, and her significant contributions to the mortgage, including sole responsibility for mortgage and household expenses following the parties' physical separation.
3. The appellant's failure to disclose assets extended to his share trading account and bank accounts, which were only revealed through the respondent wife's efforts. The Court accepted that the appellant had the financial means to acquire and maintain the properties in Country B and that he continued to derive benefit from them, including rental income (at [152]).
4. In assessing contributions under s 79(4) of the Act, the Court found that the respondent wife's contributions warranted a 60/40 division in her favour (at [148]). Furthermore, given the practical difficulties in enforcing orders concerning foreign assets, the Court determined that the respondent wife should retain the Australian assets and superannuation, while the appellant should retain the Country B properties. No adjustment was made under s 75(2) of the Act, due to the appellant's ownership of the Country B properties which the Court held would provide him with the financial resources to support himself (at [156] and [159]). The division of property, though slightly less favourable to the respondent wife than the contribution-based assessment, was held to be just and equitable in all the circumstances.

1. The grounds of appeal, raised in the appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 15 August 2025, are as follows:

(1) The primary judge failed to give procedural fairness to the appellant.

(2) The primary judge failed to provide transparency and accountability.

(3) The primary judge failed to properly assess all available evidence when giving their views and decisions.

(4) The primary judge made decisions that were plainly wrong leading to injustice and inequity.

(5) There was a denial of natural justice.

(6) The primary judge gave inadequate reasons for their decisions, thus obstructing error of law findings.

(7) The primary judge was biased.

(8) The primary judge made mistakes of fact. The primary judge failed to consider relevant materials and considered facts that could not be supported by evidence. The primary judge also incorrectly assessed relevant materials.

(9) The primary judge made unjust and unreasonable decisions.

(10) The primary judge abused their discretion in the mention and full hearings, and when making their judgement.

(11) The primary judge had a conflict of interest and did not recuse themself when they were asked to.

(12) The primary judge intimidated the counsel with threatening words and asked the appellant to get out of the courthouse without any reasonable excuse to do so. Also, the primary judge was lying and cheating in mention hearings.

1. In making property adjustment orders pursuant to Part VIII of the Act, the primary judge was exercising a broad discretion reposed by the statute. Accordingly, the primary judge's conclusions attract the standard of appellate review articulated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 ("House v The King"). This requires, "in substance, identification of an error of principle or a material error of fact, or, if no specific error can be identified, demonstration that the decision is 'unreasonable or plainly unjust'" (UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77 at [74], citing Ghosh v Ninemsn Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 334; (2015) 90 NSWLR 595 at [37]).
2. Additionally, appellate intervention may be required in circumstances where a trial judge fails to provide adequate reasons "sufficient to identify the principles of law applied by the judge and the main factual findings on which the judge relied" (Douglass v The Queen [2012] HCA 34; (2012) 290 ALR 699 at [8]). The adequacy of reasons will depend upon an assessment of the issues in the case, including the extent to which they were relied upon by counsel, their bearing upon the elements of the relevant statutory criteria and their significance to the course of the trial (DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33], citing Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1987) 48 NSWLR 430 at 443).
3. Reasons will not be inadequate "merely because they fail to address an irrelevant dispute or one which is peripheral to the real issues. Nor will they be inadequate merely because they fail to undertake 'a minute explanation of every step in the reasoning process that leads to the judge's conclusion'" (DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33], referring to Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 259).

1. The appellant's grounds of appeal and supporting arguments, in essence, seek to re-agitate points that were unsuccessfully advanced at trial, or amount to mere disagreement with the outcome, rather than identifying any appellable error.
2. In circumstances where the appellant is self-represented, I have taken a relatively broad approach to the interpretation of his grounds of appeal but I have disregarded those arguments that were advanced in oral submissions that have no relationship to either the appellant's grounds of appeal or Summary of Argument.
3. There is also considerable overlap between the appellant's grounds of appeal. For clarity, I will discuss the appellant's grounds of appeal thematically, given the overlap between them. Counsel for the respondent contends that the grounds can conveniently be grouped into three categories. However, it is my view that the 12 grounds fall into four categories, which I will address in turn:

(1) Alleged procedural unfairness and related complaints about trial conduct (Grounds 1, 2, 5, 10, 12).

(2) Allegations of bias and failure of the judge to recuse themselves (Grounds 7, 11).

(3) Challenges to the factual findings and evidentiary rulings (Grounds 3, 4, 8, 9).

(4) An allegation of inadequate reasons (Ground 6).

1. Grounds of appeal in relation to bias and procedural fairness are challenges to the integrity of the administration of justice; thus, they must be dealt with first, before other discrete grounds of appeal: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577 at 581 and 611-612; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9]-[10].

Procedural Fairness and Trial Conduct (Grounds 1, 2, 5, 10, 12)

1. The appellant's first cluster of grounds asserts that the trial judge failed to provide him with procedural fairness and natural justice, and mishandled the conduct of the hearing. In Ground 1, he claims a denial of procedural fairness; in Ground 5 a denial of natural justice. Both stem from the primary judge's refusal to grant him an adjournment of the final hearing on 10-11 October 2024, despite his difficulties securing legal representation. Ground 2 alleges a lack of "transparency and accountability" in the court process. Ground 10 claims the judge "abused [their] discretion" in case management decisions. Ground 12 further alleges that the judge "intimidated" the appellant's counsel and improperly removed the appellant from the courtroom without justification. The suggestion that the primary judge was "lying and cheating" is scandalous and will be ignored.
2. These grounds are each without merit. Far from denying the appellant a fair opportunity to present his case, the primary judge went to considerable lengths to ensure the hearing was conducted fairly despite the challenges posed by the appellant's self-representation and frequent disruptions.
3. A brief chronology is important. The matter before the primary judge was a re-hearing (after an earlier appeal had led to a retrial). The rehearing was initially listed for 11 April 2024, but at the respondent's request - because crucial evidence from witnesses from Country B had only just become available - the trial was adjourned for about six months (at [98]). By force of the orders made on 3 June 2022, the appellant was subject to a statutory ban on personally cross-examining the respondent (due to family violence allegations) under s 102NA of the Act. Accordingly, the appellant was eligible for legal representation under the scheme. Initially, the appellant refused to accept the offered Legal Aid, complaining that the funding amount ($7,500) was inadequate compared to what he believed the respondent had received (at [100]). This refusal caused some delay in finalising his representation (at [101]). Nevertheless, by the resumed trial date in October 2024, he did have counsel in place. It should be noted that the primary judge had made it clear at procedural hearings on 28 August 2024 and 10 September 2024 that the October 2024 dates would remain firm and that no further delays would be countenanced (at [99]-[100]).
4. On the morning of 10 October 2024, the appellant (through his counsel) sought an adjournment, arguing that the new counsel had insufficient time to prepare. The primary judge considered the request but refused it. The primary judge noted that the appellant had known since late August 2024 that he was without his previous barrister; indeed, two additional months had passed since that time and that was enough time to engage and brief new counsel. The primary judge acknowledged that the appellant's counsel faced a challenging task due to recently coming into the matter, but emphasised the need to balance fairness to both parties and to avoid further prolonging an already long-running dispute. The primary judge expressly stated that they did not wish the appellant to be disadvantaged; however, they concluded that another adjournment was not justified. In their reasoning, the primary judge observed that the appellant's own decision to reject the initial Legal Aid grant was a primary cause of his predicament (at [100]). The primary judge also noted that the matter had already been adjourned once. It is noted that the primary judge was initially mistaken in observing that the earlier adjournment was at the respondent's request - a fact the primary judge initially misstated as being at the appellant's request, but the primary judge immediately corrected themselves on the record when reminded of the misstatement (Transcript 10 October 2024, p.18-19).
5. Furthermore, the refusal of the adjournment was within the primary judge's discretion and that discretion was appropriately exercised. The decision of the primary judge to proceed with the hearing on the allocated dates was entirely consistent with the overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions, set out in ss 95-96 of the Act, which provides that it is the obligation of the court, the parties and their legal representatives to ensure that proceedings are conducted according to law and as "quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible." See also Aon Risk Services Australia v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175.
6. No party has an automatic entitlement to an adjournment; Dahdah v Platinum Distributors Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 65 at [166]. Parties are entitled to have an expectation that matters will be heard on the scheduled date and, in that context, matters should not be adjourned without cogent reasons; Gabrielle v Abood (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 28 at [6]. The appellant carried the onus of satisfying the primary judge that an adjournment should be granted. In circumstances where the reasons for the adjournment were essentially the result of the appellant's own indolence in arranging legal representation, it was entirely appropriate that the primary judge declined to grant his application for an adjournment.
7. I am satisfied that, despite the denial of more time to prepare his case, the appellant's counsel fully participated in the final hearing on 10-11 and 15 October 2024: counsel was able to cross-examine the key witnesses and make comprehensive submissions. When counsel for the appellant finished, the appellant himself was even permitted to address the Court directly for over an hour after he withdrew his instructions from counsel at the end of evidence. There is no indication that any evidence or argument the appellant wished to present was excluded due to the failure to grant an adjournment. On the contrary, the primary judge admitted voluminous materials that the appellant sought to rely upon. This included some very late-filed affidavits and exhibits. The primary judge showed remarkable patience in the face of the appellant's frequent interruptions and tangential arguments.
8. For these reasons Grounds 1 and 5 fail.
9. Ground 12, which claims the judge "intimidated" counsel and ordered the appellant out of the courtroom, is a mischaracterisation of what transpired. The transcript reveals that during the testimony of a valuation expert from Country B (who was appearing via audiovisual link and encountering technical difficulties), the appellant repeatedly stood up and tried to interject, despite being instructed to remain seated and speak through his lawyer (Transcript 11 October 2024, p.196). After polite requests failed, the primary judge warned the appellant that he must sit down or else leave the courtroom (Transcript 11 October 2024, p.196-198). The appellant persisted, insisting he needed to see the remote witness on the screen. In response, the court accommodated him: the witness's video feed was shared to a laptop near the appellant so he could view it. The hearing then proceeded without further incident.
10. The primary judge's firm instruction that the appellant follow courtroom decorum was not a punitive or biased act - it was necessary to maintain order. Neither counsel or a party are entitled to treat the trial judge or a witness with disrespect or contempt. Where a party acts contrary to appropriate decorum, "a trial judge must fairly and, if necessary, firmly deal with such behaviour"; O'Connell v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 96 [109]. Nothing in the transcript suggests any improper tone or language from the primary judge. The primary judge simply did what was required to ensure the orderly conduct of the proceedings, despite the appellant refusing to comply with reasonable directions. There was nothing untoward in the primary judge's conduct.
11. For these reasons Ground 12 fails.
12. Ground 2's complaint of a lack of "transparency and accountability" in the court process is so vague as to be meaningless. The primary proceedings were in open court and on the record. The primary judge adequately explained their reasons for procedural rulings and, by judgment dated 23 May 2025, delivered comprehensive reasons for the orders made. That judgment is the subject of this appeal. The suggestion that the process lacked transparency is baseless.
13. Ground 2 therefore fails.
14. The assertion in Ground 10 that the primary judge "abused their discretion" is also unsatisfactorily vague. The issue to be determined is whether the exercise of discretion by the primary judge miscarried in accordance with the principles adumbrated by the High Court in House v The King, to which I have earlier referred. No such error has been established.
15. The transcript shows that the primary judge judiciously and even‐handedly exercised their discretion in respect to procedural rulings. In that respect, for example, in considering the admissibility of evidence, the primary judge struck an appropriate balance between strict compliance with the rules of evidence and allowing the appellant, who was at times self-represented, appropriate leeway. The primary judge repeatedly gave the appellant opportunities to present his case, intervening only to keep the trial focused and within reasonable bounds.
16. The appellant has failed to establish any unfairness in the case management rulings made by the primary judge, or in the manner in which the primary judge prepared and delivered their final reasons for judgment.
17. For these reasons Ground 10 fails.
18. Even if, contrary to the view I have taken, one were to assume that a procedural ruling or rulings made by the primary judge could be criticised in hindsight, the appellant has not demonstrated that any such ruling deprived him of a fair chance to argue his case or caused any actual prejudice. It is well established that to justify appellate intervention on procedural fairness grounds, an appellant must show that the supposed error or unfairness "deprived [them] of the possibility of a successful outcome" - in other words, that the result could have been different had the procedural rulings been different; Stead v State Government Insurance Commission [1986] HCA 54; (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 147.
19. The appellant has failed to establish that to be the case. Despite the denial of an adjournment, the appellant was able to adduce all the evidence he wished and presented such arguments in support of his case as he wished. Procedural rulings made by the primary judge were properly considered and reflected a principled exercise of discretion. There is no reason to suppose that a further adjournment or any additional process would have led to a more favourable outcome for the appellant.
20. For this additional reason, Grounds 1, 2, 5, 10 and 12, the procedural fairness and trial conduct complaints, all fail.

Alleged Bias and Refusal to Recuse (Grounds 7 & 11)

1. The next set of grounds contends that the primary judge was biased against the appellant (Ground 7) and erred by refusing to recuse themselves at the start of the trial when the appellant's counsel applied for their disqualification (Ground 11).
2. The appellant alleges both actual bias and apprehended bias, relying on several points which, by way of summary, are as follows:

(a) at a pre-trial directions hearing, the primary judge misspoke about who requested the April 2024 adjournment (saying it was the appellant when it was the respondent), which led the appellant to accuse the primary judge of lying;

(b) the primary judge serves as Chair of the Court's Family Violence Committee, which the appellant believes predisposed them to favour the respondent (who had raised family violence allegations) and to disfavour the appellant;

(c) the appellant's outburst calling the primary judge "a liar" at the mention hearing created personal animosity; and

(d) the judge's conduct of the trial (such as their interventions to keep the appellant on track and, ultimately, the primary judge's adverse findings against him).

1. Allegations of actual bias concern "the state of mind of the decision maker": NAEB/02 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1092 at [23]-[24]. Consequently, it is necessary for the complainant to establish evidence regarding "the subjective motives, attitudes, predilections or purposes of the decision-maker;" Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at 541 [111] (Kirby J). The appellant has failed to present any evidence that enables such a determination to be made and the allegation of actual bias will not be further considered.
2. The principles in respect to apprehended bias were recently set out by the NSW Court of Appeal in New South Wales v JR [2024] NSWCA 308 at [253]-[254] as follows:
   1. The test for apprehended bias is the "double might" test of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably consider that the judicial officer might not carry out his or her judicial functions with an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issues arising on the motion: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy  (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6]; Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls  (2011) 244 CLR 427; [2011] HCA 48 at [31]. This test is objective. It does not require an assessment of the state of mind of the judge, as is necessary on an inquiry about actual bias: Michael Wilson at [33].
   2. The application of this test requires, first, the identification of what it is said might lead the decision-maker to decide a question other than on the merits of that question and, second, an articulation of the logical connection between the matter identified and the apprehended or feared deviation from the course of deciding the question other than on its merits: Ebner at [8], Michael Wilson at [32]-[33]. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. This is sometimes referred to as the third step: Ebner at [8]; Isbester v Knox City Council  (2015) 255 CLR 135; [2015] HCA 20 at [59] (Gageler J); Charisteas v Charisteas  (2021) 273 CLR 289; [2021] HCA 29 at [11]; CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another  (2019) 268 CLR 76; [2019] HCA 50 at [21] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J).

1. The law is clear that "the mere making of an insubstantial objection" is not enough to disqualify a judicial officer: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 348 [20] ("Ebner").
2. Courts must be cautious not to accede too readily to recusal applications, otherwise litigants could effectively choose their judge by levelling unsupported allegations. As the High Court warned in Ebner at [20], if judicial officers stood down whenever a flimsily founded bias claim was made, "the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable."
3. Moreover, a judicial officer should not disqualify themselves on the basis of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias, unless substantial grounds are established: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 30 Fam LR 488 at 496 [36], and see also Fuller v Fletcher Building Ltd [2024] VSC 712; (2024) 76 VR 276; Storry v Business Licensing Authority [2022] FCA 1321; CPJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 212.
4. I respectfully agree with counsel for the respondent that the application for the primary judge to recuse themselves was totally without merit. As earlier noted, there is no evidence whatsoever of actual bias on the part of the primary judge and no reasonable observer would entertain an apprehension of bias on the facts of this case. The transcript shows that the primary judge approached the case impartially and decided it based on the evidence and applicable law. Bias is not demonstrated merely by a judge making an adverse finding about a party (SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38]).
5. I will address each of the appellant's bias contentions in order.

(a) Primary Judge's Misstatement at Pre-trial Mention

1. It is the case that during a procedural mention, the judge erroneously remarked that the April 2024 adjournment had been granted at the appellant's request, whereas, as I have noted, it was at the respondent's request. The respondent's counsel corrected the primary judge's recollection on that point, and the primary judge acknowledged the correction (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraphs 12, 23(d); Transcript 10 October 2024, p.20 lines 7-8). The appellant reacted by accusing the primary judge, in open court, of lying (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 23(d)). This brief incident does not evidence bias. A momentary factual slip, promptly corrected, would not cause any fair-minded observer to think the judge may have prejudged the case or was deceitful. Indeed, the appellant's own counsel at trial did not seriously press this as a basis for recusal. A reasonable, informed bystander would appreciate that judges are human and can misremember a detail. That does not equate to partiality. As counsel for the respondent rightly observed, if every litigant could manufacture an appearance of bias by seizing on a judge's innocent error and overreacting to it, then "any litigant who did not want a particular judge could easily have them removed" (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 23(d)).

(b) Primary Judge's role in Family Violence Committee

1. The fact that the primary judge chaired the Court's internal Family Violence Committee does not remotely support a reasonable apprehension of bias in this case. It is not alleged that the primary judge had any personal connection to the parties, or any direct involvement in the facts at issue. The appellant's contention is that because the respondent raised family violence allegations, the primary judge's professional role related to family violence policy means they would side with the respondent. This is untenable.
2. The Family Violence Committee role is a general administrative function; it does not involve adjudicating individual cases or taking up causes for one side. There is no personal interest or extraneous information arising from that role that might cause a reasonable observer to doubt the judge's neutrality. To suggest bias on this basis misconceives the Ebner test. Judges often have background expertise or committee roles in areas of law. The recusal application on this basis ground was appropriately described by counsel for the respondent as "extraordinary and unsupported by any evidence".

(c) The Appellant's Personal Outburst and the Primary Judge's Reaction

1. The appellant furthermore argues that because he had a contentious exchange with the primary judge (accusing the primary judge of lying at the mention hearing), the primary judge might have borne ill-will toward him thereafter. However, judges are trained to decide cases on the evidence and the law, not personal feelings. The transcript of the recusal motion shows that the primary judge explicitly stated on the record that the pre-trial incident would not affect their impartiality going forward. The primary judge then proceeded to hear the case on its merits. As earlier explained, a litigant cannot, by their own belligerence or offensive remarks toward a judge, create a ground for that judge's disqualification. As the primary judge correctly observed during argument: if litigants could force a judge off a case by insulting them, it would set a dangerous precedent (Transcript 10 October 2024, p.11 lines 16-19).
2. The law expects judicial officers to be robust and unbiased, even in the face of provocation by a belligerent litigant or advocate. In Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2; (2006) 224 ALR 51 ("Antoun"), Kirby J stated (at [27]):

... it is certainly true that the trial judge's remarks were strong and forthright. In some circumstances, that will be a permissible expression to adopt, especially where the trial judge is conducting a trial as the sole judge of fact and law and the parties are legally represented by counsel able to respond with clarity and forthrightness. Judicial indignation at a particular course of action, or proposed action, may on occasion be understandable. Couched appropriately, at the proper time and in due sequence, it may give rise to no reasonable apprehension of bias. For centuries in courts of our tradition, judges have been telling parties and their lawyers, sometimes in quite robust terms, that they consider that a particular submission or course of action is hopeless, a waste of the court's time or doomed to fail. I would not want to say anything that needlessly mollycoddled candid judicial speech addressed to trained advocates.

(Citations omitted)

1. A "fair minded lay observer" is "a rational person who is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious and...someone who is aware of the oath or affirmation taken by judges and their judicial obligations more generally" (Kingston & Field (No 2) (2020) FLC 93-986 at [25] citing Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [232]).
2. The fact that a tense exchange has occurred does not indicate that the judicial officer is unable to bring an impartial mind to the adjudication of the issues in dispute. To the contrary, as noted above, the primary judge continued to extend courtesies to the appellant, thoroughly addressed his arguments, and afforded him considerable latitude as a self-represented litigant. There is no reasonable basis to contend that the primary judge was actually or ostensibly biased as a result of the exchange that the appellant relies upon.

(d) The Primary Judge's General Conduct of the Trial and Adverse Findings

1. The appellant points to the primary judge's firm management of the proceedings (for example, limiting repetitive cross-examination, redirecting him when he strayed into irrelevancies, and enforcing time allocations) and the fact that the primary judge's findings went against him, as evidence of bias.
2. This submission conflates adverse rulings and efficient case management with partiality. I have previously noted that the primary judge had a statutory obligation to manage the proceedings in accordance with the overarching purpose set out in s 95 of the Act.
3. Not only is a judge entitled to control the courtroom and ensure the trial progresses efficiently - they have an obligation to do so in the interests of the litigants in the case and also in the interests of other litigants who are waiting for their case to come before a judicial officer. Doing so does not mean the judge is biased against the party who needs managing.
4. Similarly, as earlier noted, making findings that reject a party's evidence is not proof of bias; it is the judge's job to assess credibility and weigh evidence. In this case, nothing in the transcript suggests the primary judge prejudged issues. The primary judge considered all the evidence - including evidence favourable to the appellant. The fact that the overall outcome was adverse to the appellant reflects the weight of evidence, not a skewed or biased perspective by the primary judge.

1. The recusal application was correctly dismissed at trial, and I find no basis to disturb that decision on appeal. A fair-minded observer, cognisant of all the above circumstances, would not reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the adjudication the case. The respondent's characterisation of these bias allegations as "extraordinary and unfounded" is apt (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 22).
2. Grounds 7 and 11 (bias and recusal) therefore fail.

Evidentiary Rulings and Factual Findings (Grounds 3, 4, 8, 9)

1. Several grounds challenge the trial judge's handling of evidence and the factual findings made. Ground 3 asserts that the primary judge "failed to properly assess all available evidence" and did not give due weight to the appellant's evidence. Ground 8 similarly alleges the judge made "mistakes of fact," ignored relevant material, and relied on unsupported findings. Ground 4 and Ground 9 contend that the decision was "plainly wrong," "unjust and unreasonable," or against the weight of the evidence. In essence, the appellant argues the primary judge should have believed his version of events, particularly in respect to his claim that he had no foreign assets and that any unaccounted funds had innocent explanations. He contends the primary judge's contrary findings are erroneous.
2. Notably, however, the appellant has not pointed to any specific item of evidence that was overlooked by the judge, nor identified any evidence wrongly considered by the primary judge. This is despite r 13.23(3) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) requiring the appellant's Summary of Argument to contain specifics in respect to the finding, or non-finding, of facts.
3. An appellate court should not interfere with a finding of fact if there was evidence on which that finding could be made; that is if it was reasonably open on the evidence (Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 at 304). The primary judge undertook a meticulous analysis of the evidence in a 164 paragraph judgment. The primary judge systematically itemised the evidence regarding each disputed asset and each allegation of non-disclosure. The primary judge gave detailed reasons for preferring certain evidence over other evidence, and addressed each of the appellant's counter-arguments in turn. The factual findings that were made were reasonably open on the evidence.
4. The primary judge's critical factual findings, to which I have earlier referred, were supported by unchallenged or inherently credible evidence, whereas the appellant's denials were uncorroborated or in some instances affirmatively disproven. In that respect, for example, a central issue at trial was whether the appellant had an ownership interest in six properties in Country B. The respondent produced extensive documentation in respect to those properties. This included certified copies of Country B title registers, deeds of transfer bearing the appellant's name and personal details, translations by accredited translators, and an affidavit from an attorney from Country B who personally searched the land records and later testified via video link. On the basis of that evidence, it was reasonably open for the primary judge to find that the appellant had acquired and retained ownership of multiple real estate parcels in Country B.
5. It was reasonably open for the primary judge to find that the appellant owned the property, despite complex transactions entered into by the appellant. This included, for example, one property referred to as "Property F", which was shown as having been gifted to the appellant in 1987; it was briefly transferred to a third party in 2004, then transferred back into the appellant's name in 2005 (at [39]). The primary judge found that the Land Registry documents bore the appellant's own passport number and had official registry stamps (at [41]). The appellant's response, that these official records were "fraudulent" or forged, was not supported by credible evidence (at [40]). He did not, in that respect, obtain any statement from Country B's land authorities to contradict the testifying Country B solicitor's evidence that the documents had been obtained by his search of the land titles office in Country B. In those circumstances, it was reasonably open to the primary judge to find that it strains credulity to suggest that multiple independent Land Registry records, across different locations and years, were all falsified to reflect the appellant as owner.
6. Similarly, regarding the parties' finances, the primary judge found that the proceeds from the sale of the respondent wife's premarital "dowry" property were used by the appellant in 2004 to purchase additional assets in Country B; specifically two lots in Property H, and land at Suburb X which was later sold to purchase two apartments in City L (at [58], [59], [61], [81] and [89]). This finding was based on bank passbook records, the appellant's own contemporaneous statements to the respondent wife and email chains. The appellant had argued on this point that those funds were actually used elsewhere, or that the respondent wife merely assumed he invested them in property (appellant's Summary of Argument filed 15 August 2025, p.5). But as the primary judge noted, he produced no bank statements or other credible evidence to rebut the strong inference that the timing and amount of the withdrawal corresponded to the property purchases (at [69]-[71], [80]). Again, these findings were reasonably open to the primary judge.
7. There are particular challenges for an appellant in appeals relating to a trial judge's findings of fact, where those findings "are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence": Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55] ("Lee"). In the present case, on the major factual questions, the evidence in the respondent wife's favour was cogent, independent, and largely unchallenged, whereas the appellant's blanket denials were unsupported by any objective evidence. It was, in those circumstances, reasonably open for the primary judge to find the respondent wife a more credible witness and to conclude that the appellant's denials were not credible (at [110]). Indeed, the primary judge identified instances where the appellant's testimony was demonstrably false. For example, he claimed never to have engaged in share trading, yet documents showed he did have share transactions (at [106]); he denied writing a certain letter to police about land dealings, but the evidence, including the respondent wife's testimony, attributed the letter to him. When the appellant's evidence was contradicted by documents and prior inconsistent statements, the primary judge was entitled to prefer the objective documentary evidence.
8. It is well established that an appellate court will not disturb a trial judge's findings of fact unless the appellant can show a clear error - for instance, that the judge acted on no evidence, misapprehended the evidence, or reached an inference that is "glaringly improbable" or inconsistent with incontrovertible facts (Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [29]; Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 331 ALR 550 at [43]). In the present case, the appellant has not come close to demonstrating any such error.
9. To the contrary, as the respondent submits, the trial judge's findings were not only open on the evidence, but essentially inevitable, given the evidentiary material. Many of the key findings were supported by contemporaneous documents or even by the appellant's own prior admissions (for example, bank records, letters, and observations noted in the previous appeal's judgment). None of the findings can be said to be against the weight of the evidence. On this appeal, the appellant's arguments essentially repeat the explanations he offered at trial - all of which were considered and rejected by the primary judge for sound reasons. It is not the role of an appellate court to re-try the case, or substitute its own view of the facts, simply because the appellant disagrees with the result. Absent a demonstrated legal error or clear factual misapprehension, the trial judge's findings must stand (Lee at 148).
10. One specific evidentiary ruling complained of by the appellant concerns a letter from a lawyer from Country B about litigation over the "Suburb N" property (appellant's Summary of Argument, p.6). The appellant had included this letter in one of his late affidavits filed shortly before trial, and he attempted to tender it. The primary judge excluded the letter after upholding the respondent's objection to it. The appellant argues this exclusion was wrong because the letter was "very important" to show how his grandmother lost a court case related to that property (appellant's Summary of Argument, p.6).
11. An erroneous evidentiary ruling resulting in a miscarriage of justice can establish an appellable error. However, in this case, the primary judge's ruling was plainly correct in law. The letter was hearsay, being an out-of-court statement by the lawyer about what happened in a foreign court case (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 28). Further, the letter contained inadmissible opinion. The author was not called to give evidence or be cross-examined. The letter did not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule. It was prepared for litigation, not as a contemporaneous business record or public record (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 28).
12. Moreover, even if one assumed the letter's contents were true, the appellant has failed to establish that the letter's admission into evidence would have affected the outcome. At best, the letter purported to explain that the appellant's grandmother's claim to the Suburb N property failed in court. But the primary judge, in their reasons, assumed in the appellant's favour that the grandmother lost that case; the primary judge still found that title to one of the Suburb N lots had vested in the appellant in 1995 (via a transfer from the grandmother) and remained in his name. This was in the context of an absence of any subsequent court order overturning that title. The appellant provided no evidence of any such order. Thus, whether or not the grandmother had unsuccessfully litigated, one lot was on the title record as belonging to the appellant, and that supported the primary judge's conclusion (at [52]-[54]). In short, exclusion of the lawyer's letter worked no injustice - it was inadmissible hearsay that, even if admitted, would not have changed the result.
13. Aside from that letter, the appellant has not pointed to any other evidence that was improperly excluded or ignored by the trial judge. On the contrary, as noted earlier, the trial judge admitted a great deal of material (including the appellant's own lengthy affidavits and documents) and clearly did consider the points the appellant wanted to make. The fact that the primary judge was not persuaded by them does not establish an appellable error.
14. Ground 4's contention that the overall decision is "plainly wrong" or "unjust" is really a catch-all claim, inviting the appellate court to second-guess the trial judge's discretionary decision on property division. An appellate court will set aside a discretionary decision, such as the adjustment of property interests under s 79 of the Act, only if an error of principle is shown, a material fact was ignored or mistaken, irrelevant matters are considered, or the result is "plainly unjust" in the sense that it reflects a failure to properly exercise the discretion (House v The King at 505). The appellant's arguments do not establish any such error. The primary judge correctly identified the applicable legal principles (in particular, they considered the parties' contributions and the relevant factors in s 75(2) of the Act). The primary judge found that the appellant's non-disclosure of assets, combined with the respondent wife's greater contributions to the known property pool, justified an unequal division in the respondent wife's favour (at [163]). That conclusion was well within the reasonable range of outcomes on the facts found. The mere circumstance that the result of the retrial was less favourable to the appellant than the earlier 2023 trial outcome (which had been set aside on appeal) does not demonstrate error. The retrial had the benefit of more complete evidence about the appellant's overseas assets, and thus it is not surprising the outcome differed. An appeal is not an opportunity for a disappointed litigant to seek a more sympathetic decision; it must be founded on specific identified errors. Here, no such errors have been established.
15. Accordingly, Grounds 3, 4, 8, and 9, which attack the fact-finding and evidentiary aspects of the judgment, fail. The primary judge's findings were supported by evidence and were reached through a fair process. There is no basis for this Court to interfere with those findings. Far from being "contrary to compelling inferences," the conclusions drawn by the primary judge were consistent with the reliable evidence that was before the Court (Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [29]). The respondent accurately describes the judge's determination regarding the appellant's asset ownership as an "irresistible" conclusion on the evidence (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 33). I agree with that description.
16. Accordingly, for these reasons, Grounds 3, 4, 8, and 9 fail.

1. Ground 6 alleges that the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons for their decision, supposedly making it difficult for the appellant to identify "error of law findings" (appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal filed 15 August 2025).
2. As noted above, it is well established that appellate intervention may be required in circumstances where a trial judge fails to provide adequate reasons "sufficient to identify the principles of law applied by the judge and the main factual findings on which the judge relied" Douglass v The Queen [2012] HCA 34; (2012) 290 ALR 699 at [8].
3. Reasons will not be adequate where the appellate court is required to guess or speculate as to what a judge, at first instance, may or may not have meant, particularly on an important issue: Boyle (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] SASCA 50 at [119]. In that context, reasons must clearly state the primary judge's findings upon material questions of fact and provide an explanation for those findings: DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [32]-[33].
4. I am satisfied that the primary judge provided adequate reasons consistent with their obligation as a judicial officer. The reasons provided by the primary judge set out the background facts, summarised the parties' arguments, reviewed the evidence on each issue, and explained why each of the appellant's contentions, of substance, was or was not accepted.
5. The appellant's submissions on appeal do not identify any particular aspect of the case that was supposedly not addressed in the reasons. The appellant simply asserts, in general terms, that the reasons were inadequate. Contrary to that which is asserted by the appellant, the reasoning is comprehensive and clear.
6. In fact, the primary judge devoted extensive attention to the very issues the appellant emphasises. Relevantly at [38]-[47], the primary judge discussed, in detail, the evidence regarding the Property F land and why it was concluded that the appellant indeed owned it. At [49]-[56], the primary judge addressed the E Street property, reconciling conflicting accounts and ultimately finding that the appellant held a lot in that property. At [57]-[64], the primary judge considered the Property H parcels and the source of funds used to acquire them.
7. As earlier noted, the primary judge also explained their assessment of the parties' credibility, noting that the respondent wife made appropriate concessions under cross-examination, whereas the appellant's sweeping denials were implausible in light of objective documents (at [105]). In short, as the counsel for the respondent submitted, how the primary judge reached their conclusions "is obvious from a fair reading of the judgment" (respondent's Summary of Argument filed 5 September 2025, paragraph 35). I agree there is no mystery as to why the primary judge decided as they did.
8. The reasons may not have been what the appellant wanted to hear, but that is not the test. The reasons were thorough, logical and well-structured and the appellant was left in no doubt as to what findings were made and why. That is all the law requires. Far from obstructing appellate review, the primary judge's detailed reasons have enabled me to understand the issues and the basis of the decisions made in respect to each relevant issue. There is no merit in the complaint about adequacy of reasons.
9. For these reasons, Ground 6 fails.

1. As I have found no merit in any of the grounds of appeal, the appeal must be dismissed.
2. Having considered the factors in s 114UB(3) of the Act, and in circumstances where the appellant has been wholly unsuccessful and where there are no other mitigating circumstances, it would be unfair to deprive the respondent of compensation for the costs incurred.
3. I am satisfied that the costs sought by the respondent, in the sum of $14,416.12, have been assessed on a party and party basis in accordance with the relevant scale set out in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), and that they are logical, fair and reasonable. I will make an order that the appellant pay those costs in that amount within 28 days of these orders.

I certify that the preceding ninety-one (91) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice McClelland.