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[1946] HCA 49
High Court of Australia
1946-07-01
Latham CJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
THE DAIRY FARMERS' CO-OPERATIVE MILK COMPANY LIMITED AND PLAINTIFFS ; ANOTHER . : 5 ' : '
National Security - Defence - Price control - Milk - Declaration - Generality - Orders ¥f. (, ov A.
Prices Regulations Orders made under the National Security (Prices) Regula- Latham CJ., tions in respect of the sale of milk distinguished between wholesale and retail "Dixon,"
ixon, sales; between sales in the Sydney metropolitan milk distributing district 4gpieman and and in the Neweastle district ; between sales to retailers who operated milk rounds and those who did not and those who used milk in milk bars and, in particular, special prices were prescribed for sales for use in public hospitals and to the State Contracts Control Board (N.S.W.). 'The orders were revoked after the commencement but before the hearing of an action brought to test
the validity of the orders and to which the State was not a party.
(1) That the differentiations were in respect of matters proper to be taken into account in any scheme of control of prices as an element in economic organization and, therefore, came within the defence power.
(2) That milk having been declared under reg. 22 of the National Security (Prices) Regulations as " declared goods," the differentiations were authorized by reg, 23 (1) (a) and reg, 23 (14) (h) of those regulations.
(3) That it was not necessary that before fixing prices in relation to any particular individual purchaser the Minister should, under reg. 22 (3), have made a declaration in respect of that particular purchaser,
(4) That under the orders the vendors were bound in relation to their sales to all purchasers including the State Contracts Control Board and other State government agencies.
The Court will hesitate before making a declaration of right in the absence of an interested party.
In an action brought in the High Court by the Dairy Farmers' Co-operative Milk Co. Ltd. and the New South Wales Fresh Food and Ice Co. Ltd. against the Commonwealth of Australia, Douglas Berry Copland and Horace Eddy Bishop, the statement of claim was sub- stantially as follows : -
4, Pursuant to the provisions of the Milk Act 1931-1942 (N.S.W.), all milk supplied for consumption or use within the Metropolitan Milk Distributing District as set out in the schedule of that Act and the Newcastle Milk Distributing District as set out in the schedule of that Act as amended by Proclamation of the Governor of the said State made pursuant to the Act becomes with an exception not here material the property of the Milk Board.
Gazette No. 71, 12th April 1945, the said defendant purported to fix H- © oF A.
and declare the maximum prices at which milk might be sold for delivery in the Metropolitan Milk Distributing District or the New- castle Milk Distributing District by Prices Regulation Order No. 2041 which is in the words and figures following, that is to say : -
Prices Regulation Order No. 2041 Milk - Metropolitan and Newcastle Milk Distributing Districts - New South Wales.
In pursuance of the powers conferred upon me by the National Security (Prices) Regulations, I, Douglas Berry Copland, Common- wealth Prices Commissioner, hereby make the following Order : -
Citation.
Application. 2. This Order shall operate as from 13th April 1945.
'Newcastle Milk Distributing District' means the Newcastle Milk Distributing District as established under the Milk Act.
'Special Pasteurized Bottled' means bottled milk conforming to the requirements of by-laws 26 and 27 made under the Milk Act.
'The Milk Act' means the New South Wales Milk Act 1931-1942 of the State of New South Wales.
Maximum prices. 4, I fix and declare the maximum prices at which milk may be sold for delivery in the Metropolitan Milk Distributing District or the
Newcastle Milk Distributing District to be those specified in the Schedule to this Order.
He Cooney The Schedule. 1946. Masi 5 ah _ Maximum prices. Dine Sales by New South Wales Milk Board. FARMERS' 1s. 5.75d. per gallon. Co-oPpRRA- » MILK ae . Lirp. Sales by Wholesale and Certain Other Sales. a THe Sales in Sales in Common: Metropolitan Newcastle = Distributing Distributing District Disirict Per gallon Per gallon & Gk Es Gh, Sales to retailers who operate milk round Other than bottled .. .. leas3, 1 64 Bottled eee 2 OF 1 10} Special pasteurized bottled Pier eas ce SF = Sales for use in bufiets or hostels conducted exclusively for members of allied forces ' PO) 110
Sales to retailers who do not operate milk round or to
or for use in milk bars, cafes, restaurants orcanteens 2 1} 1114 Sales for use in public hospitals (including but without
Delivered to purchaser's premises 1 9} lo Delivered at depot .. 1 8h 1. 63 Sales by Retail. Sales in Metropolitan Milk Distributing District. Special Quantity. Other than Bottled Pasteurized Bottled Bottled seals 8. a soeds } pint 0 2 0 2% 0 2b 1 pint 04 oO 4 0 43 1f pints 06 0 64 07 2 pints .. 0 7% 0 84 09 0 9% oll 0 Us 0115 hal it i ih abe 13 14 x Tees 1 6 1 6 4 pints it 1 7} 1 8} ae & 1g 1 9} 1 104 5} pints 1 8 1 Ug 21 6 pints .. 1 105 214 ae 6} pints 2 Of 24 > T pints 2 2h 6 24 7} pints eee ce te 104 28 210 Spite eee 26 210 3.0
Any other quantity - the price calculated Per quart Per quart Per quart to the nearest downward half-penny,
Sales by Retail. Sales in Newcastle Milk Distributing District.
1 08 ig 4 pints .. i 2 a a 4} pints fis 6) 5 pints .. 1 53 1 8 5} pints ig 110 6 pints .. 9) 2 @ 6} pints 1 DR 2 7 pints .. 2 OF 24 7k pints Sota oe es ie ee 26 Sintec ate od, 2
Any other quantity - the price, calculated to the nearest Per quart Per quart
Note. - Except where the contrary intention appears, the prices specified in this Schedule include any delivery which is made. Dated this eleventh day of April, 1945. D. B. COPLAND
Prices Regulation Order No. 2071. Milk - Metropolitan and Newcastle Milk Distributing Districts, New South Wales.
In pursuance of the powers delegated to me by the Commonwealth Prices Commissioner pursuant to regulation 46 of the National Security (Prices) Regulations, I, Horace Eddy Bishop, Second Assistant Prices Commissioner, Prices Branch, Canberra, hereby make the following Order : -
Datry FARMERS' Co-oPERA- tive Mirk Co. Lrp. 2. TuE Ce SROs
The Schedule. Maximum Prices. Sales by Wholesale and Certain other sales.
Metropolitan Newcastle Milk lk Distributing Distributing District District Per gallon Per gallon aa, s. d. Sales to retailers who operate milk round - Other than bottled 1 8¢ 1 64 Bottled 7 2 Of 1 10} Special pasteurized bottled Dey ~
Sales for use in buffets or hostels conducted exclusively
Other than bottled . 110 Bottled 22) Special pasteurized bottled = Sales to retailers who do not operate milk round or to or for use in milk bars, cafes, restaurants or canteens Other than bottled . } Li} Bottled re + oy aay Special pasteurized hottled S + - Sales for use in public hospitals (including, but without limiting the generality thereof, those hospitals specified in the Schedules of the Public Hospitals Act of the State of New South Wales), or to State Contracts Control Board, or Australian or Allied Governments for the use of their armed forces, including Military Hospitals, but not canteens - Delivered to purchaser's premises - Other than bottled 1 9h ea Bottled .. pre 2 oe 1 Special pasteurized bottled 2 3h = Delivered at depot - Other than bottled 1 8} 1 6% Bottled . pe 2 08 1 104 Special pasteurized bottled .. 2 4 a
Dated this twentieth day of Aarti, 1945. H. E. BISHOP,
(i) A declaration that Prices Regulation Order No. 2041 and Prices Regulation Order No. 2071 so far as they respectively related to the sales referred to under the headings "Sales by Wholesale and Certain Other Sales" in the respective schedules thereto appearing were invalid and beyond the powers conferred upon the Commonwealth Prices Commis- sioner by the National Security (Prices) Regulations or alternatively were invalid and beyond any powers which could be conferred upon the Commonwealth Prices Com- missioner under the National Security Act 1939-1943 or the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
(ii) Alternatively a declaration that the said Prices Regulation Orders so far as they respectively relate to " Sales to State Contracts Control Boards" were beyond the powers conferred or beyond any powers which could be conferred upon the Commonwealth Prices Commissioner as aforesaid.
The defendants demurred to the whole of the statement of claim upon the grounds: (a) that it disclosed no cause of action; (b) that it disclosed no ground for the relief sought ; and (c) that the National Security (Prices) Regulations made under the National Security Act 1939-1943 and the Prices Regulation Orders made thereunder and more particularly Prices Regulation Orders Numbers 2041 and 2071 were valid laws of the Commonwealth and the acts which the defen- dants were alleged to have done were authorized by those Regulations and Orders. The action was commenced on 18th December 1945 and the demurrer was filed on 26th April 1946. Prices Regulation Orders Numbers 2041 and 2071 respectively were revoked in Sep- tember 1946.
Weston K.C. (with him Holmes), for the plaintiffs. The differentia- tions in Prices Regulation Orders Numbers 2041 and 2071 are not justified by the defence power ; there is no sufficient nexus between those difierentiations and the defence power. Those differentiations or distinctions as between various classes of purveyors or users have no real connection with defence. They have, it is conceded, a relation to price-fixing in the abstract if the Commonwealth has power to give an unlimited power to fix prices. The National Security (Prices) Regulations do not empower the Prices Commissioner to differentiate in the way he has done in the Prices Regulation Orders now under consideration. Any differentiation based upon the personality of the consumer or the purchaser must be a differentiation which itself has a real, direct or sufficient relation to defence. In a Prices Regulation
Farmers relates; it must go further in itself. The State Contracts Control
te Mux Board pays the declared prices whereas the plaintiffs maintain that
Co. Tap. the Orders are invalid and that the Board should pay the prices ee agreed upon under contracts between it and the plaintifis.
g Teg [Wituiams J. Tf there is a dispute between the plaintiffs and the
ALTH. Gt ate of New South Wales, should not that State be represented before this Court? See London Passenger Transport Board v. Moscrop (1).]
The State is not a necessary party: See Carter v. Hyg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vict.) (2). The State Contracts Control Board has knowledge of these proceedings. The Prices Regulations do not expressly bind the Crown either in right of the Commonwealth or in right of the State of New South Wales. Impliedly they do not bind the Crown. It follows that if the Crown is at liberty to buy from vendors irrespective of any Prices Regulation Order then vendors must be at liberty to sell to the Crown irrespective of any such Order. If the act be a sale to the Crown then the particular pro- hibition ad hoc the Crown is bad because it would prevent the Crown from buying milk. In the case of such a sale unless the Order applying thereto were bad the Crown, in its character of purchaser, would be participating in an offence. Prohibitions upon subjects in relation to particular matters do not apply to transactions between subjects and the Crown in respect of those particular matters. If the prohibition is general the Crown is prohibited from buying. If under the Regulations, and particularly reg. 23, there can be a differ- entiation in respect of persons, the person has to be declared by the Minister under reg. 22 (3); thus if there can be a differentiation in respect of the State Contracts Control Board there has to be a declaration by the Minister naming that Board. The Regulations do not purport to allow differentiation in respect of a purchaser irrespective of other elements in the transaction. A power differ- entiated with respect to a person, whether vendor or purchaser, can be utilized only when there is a declaration under reg. 22 (3). There has not been any such declaration. Regulation 23 (1) (a) does not apply to this case. Regulation 23 (1) (6) is inapplicable because there has not been a declaration under reg. 22 (3) in respect of a person. The person referred to in reg. 23 (1) (6) is that specified person who is the subject of a declaration. A comparison with reg. 45p shows that reg. 23 (1A) does not permit of discrimination in
(1) (1942) A.C. 332, at p. 344. (2) (1942) 66 C.L.R. 557.
respect of other purchasers, other things being equal. The words els (ey
"condition or conditions " in reg. 23 (1a) (d) mean conditions of the contract of sale, and the words " according to or upon any principle or condition specified by the Commissioner " in reg. 23 (1) (g) mean. principle or condition irrelevant to prices. " Other circumstance " in reg. 23 (1a) (h) must be restricted to circumstances relevant to defence. Regulation 458 deals with persons in such a way as to exclude a differentiation for sale by persons generally to a specific purchaser. Regulation 45x (a) was intended to mean the sale of goods to a particular person by any persons generally. Consideration of the history of this regulation shows that it was obviously thought that reg. 458, which was introduced in 1945, was necessary or, at the very least, desirable. Whether or not it was necessary or desirable, if such a fixation as took place in this case was permitted by reg. 23, it was prohibited by reg. 45.
Mason K.C. (with him Brennan), for the defendants. It would appear that the defendants are no longer interested in these proceed- ings inasmuch as the Prices Regulation Orders under consideration were, subsequently to the initiation of these proceedings, rescinded. So far as the defendants are concerned, the questions involved are purely abstract questions. As to whether or not the matter should proceed either with or without the State Contracts Control Board as a party is entirely a question for the Court. The dispute seems to be between the plaintiffs and the State Contracts Control Board. There is no question of the Crown being bound. The Orders provide for a maximum price for milk sold to the State Contracts Control Board and the fixing of that maximum price is for the benefit of the Crown. The Board was dealt with as a purchaser and not as a seller, therefore the Board was not bound. Under his wide powers the Prices Commissioner is entitled to fix maximum prices in such a way as he thinks fit, subject, always, to it being a fixed price. Under those powers he is entitled to differentiate as between different classes of vendors or users. The powers conferred under reg. 23 (14) are only by way of illustration and do not in any way detract from the generality of the powers conferred by reg. 23 (1) (a). The differentia- tions made in the Orders could be regarded as conditions imposed under reg. 23 (1a) (d) or as coming within the wide powers conferred by reg. 23 (1a) (4). Under reg. 23 (1) (a) the Commissioner has fixed and declared the maximum price at which milk may be sold in certain areas, and in doing so he was entitled under the Regulations to fix a maximum price having regard to the place where, or the
1946, a) Datry FarMERS' Co-OPERA- vive MILK Co. Lrp. 2. THE Common- WEALTH.
1946, Se Dairy Parwers' Co-OPERA- ove MK Co. Lrp. v. Tue Common- WEALTH.
nature of the business by which, the milk was to be sold. The pro- visions of reg. 458 do not in any way cut down the powers conferred by reg. 23 (1) (a) or reg. 23 (1a). There was nothing in the Prices Regulation Orders that was outside the ambit of the Regulations.
Weston K.C., in reply. Notwithstanding the rescission of the Prices Regulation Orders under consideration the plaintiffs are entitled in the circumstances to proceed, even if only in order to determine the matter of costs. That matter cannot be determined
unless the issue also be determined. Our. adv. vult.
Latnam (C.J., Ricu, Drxon, McTrernan anp Wiii1aMs JJ. This is a demurrer to a statement of claim whereby the plaintiffs claim a declaration that certain orders fixing the prices of milk are invalid because beyond the powers conferred upon the Common- wealth Prices Commissioner by the National Security (Prices) Regulations or, alternatively, as beyond any Commonwealth legis- lative powers. The plaintiffs also claim a declaration that the orders in question are invalid in so far as they relate to sales to the State Contracts Control Board, which is an agency of the Government of New South Wales. The Court was informed that the orders have been revoked since the action was instituted. The plaintiffs plead that they have contracts to supply milk to the State Contracts Control Board and it is stated at the Bar that if the Orders fixing the price for sales to that Board are held to be invalid the plaintiffs will claim the higher price provided for in their contracts with the Board.
The Orders in question distinguish between wholesale and retail sales, between sales in the metropolitan milk distributing district and in the Newcastle district, between sales to retailers who operate milk rounds and those who do not and those who use milk in milk bars and, in particular, special prices are prescribed for sales for use in public hospitals and to the State Contracts Control Board. It is contended that there is no relation between considerations of defence and the dificrentiations contained in the order relating to the specified char- acteristics of purchasers of milk. The Court has held in Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers v. The Commonwealth (1) that the Prices Regulations under which authority is given to fix prices of goods generally are valid. In particular, the determination of the prices of food in time of war is within the defence power: Stenhouse v. Coleman (2). Tf it were sought to use this power by determining
(1) (1943) 67 C.L.R. 335. (2) (1944) 69 C.L.R. 457.
prices by reference to considerations which could not possibly have
any relation to the organization and control of the community for,
defence purposes as, for example, according to religious distinctions, such an exercise of the power would be invalid. But the orders in question provide for different prices in relation to considerations of time and place and circumstance and character of purchaser, which are elements which may naturally be taken into account in any scheme of control of prices as an element in economic organization. Accordingly, the principal objection to the Order fails.
In the second place, it is contended that there was no power to fix prices in relation to particular individual purchasers unless, in addition to an exercise of the power of fixing prices in such a manner by the Prices Commissioner, the Minister had, under reg. 22 (3) of the Prices Regulations, made a declaration in respect of that particular purchaser. There is no substance in this objection. In the present case the Minister has declared milk as " declared goods" under reg. 22, and the Commissioner then has power under reg. 23 (1) (a) to declare the maximum price at which milk may be sold generally or in any part of Australia. This power is sufficient to warrant the Orders, but the power is further defined under reg. 23 (14) (2), under which it is expressly provided that the Commissioner may determine maximum prices in relation to certain circumstances mentioned in par. (h) and, in particular, may fix prices so that "' such prices shall vary in accordance with a standard or time or other circumstance : as are determined by the Commissioner." This power is sufficiently wide to authorize the differentiations which are to be found in the orders in question. :
Finally, it is contended that the Prices Regulations and Orders made under the Regulations do not bind the Crown in right of the State of New South Wales and therefore do not bind the State Con- tracts Control Board. We do not see, however, how any question as to the Board being bound arises in the present proceedings. The Board is referred to in the Orders only as a purchaser and not as a vendor. Even if it were held that the Regulations and Orders did not bind the Crown in right of a State, this conclusion would, we think, leave unaffected the proposition that the plaintiff companies were bound in relation to their sales to all purchasers, including State Government agencies. Thus a decision that the Crown in right of a State was not bound by the Regulations or Orders would afford no ground for making either of the declarations sought by the plaintifis in this action.
Accordingly, all the objections of the plaintiffs to the validity of the Orders and of the Regulations fail. If, however, we had been of
Latham C.J. Rich J. Dixon J. McTiernan J. Williams J.
H.C. or A. opinion that there was any substance in the objections it would have
been necessary to consider whether any relief should be given to the plaintiffs in these proceedings. The parties who are, as far as the Court is informed, really interested in the question whether the Orders are valid or not are the plaintiffs and the State Contracts Control Board as a department of the Government of New South Wales, with which the plaintiffs have contracts.
The Commonwealth and a past and present Prices Commissioner (but not the State of New South Wales) are the defendants in the proceedings. The Orders have been revoked, they will have no application in the future to the business of the plaintiffs, and the defendants have no interest whatever (except as to the costs of these proceedings) in defending their validity. If we had been of opinion that there was any substance-in the contentions submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs we would have hesitated before making any of the declarations sought in the absence of the State of New South Wales, which is the other party really interested in the issue raised in this litigation.
The demurrer is allowed with costs and the action is dismissed with costs.
Srarke J. Demurrer toa statement of claim claiming declarations that certain Prices Orders, so far as they relate to "Sales by Wholesale and Certain Other Sales," were beyond the powers conferred upon the Prices Commissioner by the National Security (Prices) Regulations, the National Security Act 1939-1943 and the Constitution, or alterna- tively a declaration that the said Prices Orders, so far as they relate to "Sales to State Contracts Control Boards," were beyond any powers that could be conferred upon the Prices Commissioner.
Tt was stated at the Bar that these Orders have been revoked since action brought. Therefore there is no " live issue " in this litigation between the parties (cf. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis
ne Court has, no doubt, jurisdiction to make binding declarations of right in actions properly brought whether consequential relief is or could be claimed or not. The jurisdiction, however, should be exercised with care. A decision upon this demurrer would be "in the air" so to speak, for no declaration of right should follow in the circumstances of the case. The plaintiffs should attack, if they attack at all, those relying upon the provisions of the Prices Orders as an answer to contractual rights claimed against them and not the
Commonwealth or the Prices Commissioner appointed under the !. ©. or A.
Nevertheless the demurrer was argued. But there does not appear to be any substance in the argument. The validity of the Prices Regulations was not challenged. It was said, however, that the Prices Orders did not comply with or were not authorized by the Regulations.
They did not comply with the Regulations because the Minister had not made a declaration in respect of any person or body or association in accordance with reg. 22 (3). But the Minister, it was conceded, had declared certain goods generally, namely milk, pur- suant to reg. 22 (1) and (3) to which the Prices Orders related. That declaration is sufficient to support Prices Orders in respect of milk.
They were not authorized by the Regulations because they exceeded any powers conferred upon the Prices Commissioner under reg. 23. But the powers granted to the Commissioner are amply sufficient to warrant the Orders (reg. 23 (1) (a), (14) (a), (g) and (h) ).
It was also contended that the Prices Orders were bad in so far as they regulated the prices at which persons might sell the declared goods to the State Contracts Control Board because reg. 32 pro- hibited the sale of declared goods to the Board except at the prices fixed by the Commissioner. The argument invokes, in a strange way, the exploded doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities. Nothing in the Constitution supports the argument or precludes the enact- ment of reg. 32 and the sanction thereby imposed or the particular provision contained in the Prices Orders, which operate in this case in favour of the Contracts Board. But then it was argued that the State and its instrumentalities are also prohibited from selling declared goods except at the declared prices. The plaintiffs have no interest in this question, which involves a constitutional question, but depends primarily upon the interpretation of the words " any person " in the Prices Orders and "a person" in reg. 32. It will be time enough to consider the question when, if ever, it arises.
The appropriate order in the present case is, I think, that the action be dismissed.
Demurrer allowed with costs. Action dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Aitken & Pluck. Solicitor for the defendants, H. F. H. Whitlam, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.
Si Darry FarMERS' Co-OPERA- tive Mitk Co. Lrp. v. ale ComMon- WEALTH.