CVG23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 588

1. To obtain assistance in this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is therefore helpful to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal began by summarising the procedural background of the matter and the legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa (at [1]-[10]). The Tribunal then outlined the applicant's personal background to the extent that the Tribunal found it to be non-controversial (at [12]-[30]).
3. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's claims as set out in the statutory declaration attached to his visa application, as well as in his departmental interview, later statutory declaration provided to the Tribunal, and in written submissions prepared by his authorised representative (at [31]-[59]).
4. The Tribunal observed that the applicant's oral evidence did not support some of the claims made in written submissions. Specifically, the applicant said he did not know anything about Islamic State and he did not fear harm from Pakistan authorities. The applicant stated that his primary fears were the Taliban and his uncle, and that he did not identify any risk associated with having married a Shia woman other than those issues relating to his uncle. The Tribunal therefore indicated that it would deal with the applicant's claims made in oral evidence rather than those in the written submissions and that it would invite the applicant's representative to make further submissions if they believed that approach to be inadequate. However, the Tribunal noted that no further submission was made (at [56]-[59]).
5. The Tribunal then set out the further documentary and oral evidence which was before it, including oral evidence from the applicant's wife and over 800 pages of supporting documents and country information (at [60]-[173]).
6. The applicant referred to a letter dated 6 January 2015 (the 2015 letter) which he said his family received from the Taliban, however the Tribunal noted that there was no address on the letter and so it was not clear that the letter was referring to the applicant (at [69]-[73]). The applicant contended that the letter's reference to the Taliban having "killed a member of your organisation" is a reference to the DWO, although the Tribunal observed that the applicant was no longer working for that organisation in 2015 (at [70], [74]). The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence concerning this letter and earlier threats from the Taliban to be "inconsistent and unconvincing" (at [80]). In considering this evidence, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had received or was aware of any threats from the Taliban at the time he came to Australia. Further, the Tribunal found that that evidence appeared to have been "invented to support the subject application" (at [83]).
7. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of the applicant telling anyone about his fear of the Taliban until more than two years after he had arrived in Australia. When the Tribunal put to the applicant that this might suggest he had manufactured the claim after his partner visa application had failed and asked him why he had waited so long to tell anyone about this fear, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence "evasive and unconvincing" (at [92]-[101]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the 2015 letter or the applicant's claims about his father being kidnapped by the Taliban were genuine. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine fear of the Taliban or that the Taliban had an ongoing interest in the applicant (at [102]-[108]).
8. The Tribunal noted that the applicant's new wife is a Shia and a permanent resident and that they had met and married quite quickly. The Tribunal put to the applicant that this may suggest he had married her to strengthen his protection visa application, which the applicant denied and further stated that they had not even discussed her visa situation until after they decided to marry (at [111]-[114]). The Tribunal noted the evidence which it heard from the applicant's wife at the hearing (at [122]-[130]).
9. The Tribunal recorded the country information and submissions provided by the applicant (at [133]-[173]). Although the Tribunal largely accepted the country information, it found that the country information was not relevant to the applicant's circumstances, did not support the applicant's submissions, or did not suggest the applicant would be subject to relevant harm. Notably, the Tribunal observed that the applicant's submissions referred to difficulties faced by Pashtuns in some parts of Pakistan, but that the Tribunal had accepted the applicant's own evidence that he did not fear any harm with respect to his Pashtun ethnicity (at [142]).
10. In its consideration of the applicant's claims, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had been threatened by the Taliban whatsoever, or that he feared or would face persecution from the Taliban if he returned to Pakistan (at [174], [182], [193]-[194]).
11. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant feared or would face persecution from his uncle if he were to return to Pakistan since there was no evidence that the uncle was associated with extremist groups or had the capacity to arrange for the relevant harm to be inflicted on the applicant in Pakistan. In particular, there was insufficient evidence for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the uncle had been acting against the applicant's interests or promoting a false prosecution of the applicant in Australia (at [196]-[198]).
12. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant faced harm from authorities in Pakistan, noting that the applicant had himself denied fearing such harm in oral evidence (at [200]-[201]). Further, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would face persecution because of his Sunni religion or that he would face mistreatment as a returnee in Pakistan (at [202]). The Tribunal was also not satisfied that he would face persecution because of his marriage to a Shia woman, noting that the Tribunal was not satisfied that his wife would accompany him if he returned to Pakistan (at [203]).
13. The Tribunal then summarised the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act and the associated definitions of 'refugee' and 'well-founded fear of persecution' in ss 5H and 5J respectively (at [204]-[209]). In considering the applicant's claims, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution as required by s 5J(1)(a) (at [210]-[213]). The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy the refugee criterion (at [214]).
14. The Tribunal went on to summarise the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) and the associated definition of 'significant harm' in s 36(2A) (at [215]-[218]). In considering the applicant's claims, the Tribunal was again not satisfied that the applicant feared persecution or that the threats he claimed to fear were real (at [219]-[220]). Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real risk of any harm, including serious harm, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned to Pakistan (at [221]). The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy the complementary protection criterion (at [222]).
15. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (at [227]).

1. The applicant filed an amended application for judicial review on 7 October 2025 containing the following seven grounds of review (reproduced verbatim):

Failure to Apply the Correct Legal Test - Well-Founded Fear

The Tribunal erred in law by treating credibility findings as determinative and requiring proof of past threats, instead of applying the correct test of whether there is a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Failure to Consider Cumulative Harm

The Tribunal considered each claimed risk (Taliban threats, inter-sect marriage, risk as a returnee, family enmity) in isolation, and failed to consider whether the cumulative effect of these claims established a real chance of persecution.

Failure to Consider Relevant Cultural Evidence (Pashtunwali / Time Factor)

The Tribunal dismissed submissions regarding the enduring nature of revenge in Pashtun culture as "irrelevant" because the applicant was not in a blood feud, thereby failing to engage with relevant anthropological and cultural evidence.

Failure to Assess Risk in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future

The Tribunal relied on outdated country reports (2012-2014) and discounted more recent DFAT and NGO reports (2021-2023) that demonstrated heightened Taliban and sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

This was a legal error, as the assessment must be directed to future risk.

Error in Treatment of Sur Place Claim (Inter-Sect Marriage)

The Tribunal erred by dismissing the risk from the applicant's marriage to a Shia woman solely on the basis that his wife would not return with him.

The Tribunal failed to consider that the relationship itself, known to family and community, may create a risk of persecution (e.g. blasphemy accusations, sectarian hostility).

Improper Approach to Credibility Findings

The Tribunal's rejection of the 2015 Taliban letter as "not genuine" was treated as fatal to the applicant's case, without considering whether, despite doubts, broader country evidence showed a real chance of harm.

Failure to Properly Consider Complementary Protection (s 36(2)(aa))

The Tribunal rejected complementary protection by repeating its adverse credibility findings without conducting a separate assessment of whether the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm (s 36(2A)).

1. The applicant appeared before the Court on 12 November 2025 without legal representation but with the assistance of a Pashto interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
2. The materials before the Court include:
   • the amended application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 7 October 2025;
   • the affidavit of the applicant filed on 24 November 2023 (taken as read and in evidence at the hearing);
   • a Court Book in two volumes numbering 1217 pages (marked as Exhibit 1);
   • written submissions filed by the applicant on 7 October 2025; and
   • written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 29 October 2025.
3. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [25] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228 at [18]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decision and/or procedure.
4. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272) (Wu Shan Liang) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);

(e) where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant's claims (or integers of the claims) made (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [111]);

(f) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(g) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and he should attempt to tell the Court why he said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. When invited to address the Court as to what the Tribunal did wrong, the applicant said that his ex-partner had withdrawn their sponsorship. The Court reminded the applicant that it can only consider errors made by the Tribunal in respect of his protection visa application. The applicant then said that the Tribunal ignored evidence about the organisations he had claimed to work for in Pakistan, namely, that the Tribunal did not accept a letter which it found to be "fake". The applicant contended that the Tribunal not only ignored the threats he had received from the Taliban, but also the increased threat that he would now face if he were to return.
3. The applicant submitted that he cannot return to Pakistan because he would be executed as a Sunni who has married a Shia woman, a claim which is echoed in ground five of his amended application. The applicant stated that he had purchased a house here with his wife and that they are living a happy life and paying a mortgage and taxes. He said he cannot return to Pakistan because he married a Shia woman, and his wife would be forced to stay in Australia and pay the mortgage on her own. The applicant was again reminded that the Court cannot make findings in relation to the merits of his protection claims, although the Court notes the applicant's complaint that the Tribunal ignored or did not consider his risk of harm as a Sunni who is married to a Shia. The applicant submitted that "whatever evidence I have given to the Tribunal, they just ignored it" and "didn't accept anything".
4. In reply to the Minister's oral submissions at the hearing, the applicant referred to the country information that was before the Tribunal and which informed its decision. The applicant queried whether media reports from two days ago of a bomb blast one kilometre from his home area would be relevant, however the Court reminded the applicant that it cannot consider material that wasn't before the Tribunal.
5. The applicant reiterated that the Tribunal had failed to consider the risk of extortion from his ex-wife who had threatened to cause problems or arrange for someone to kill him in Pakistan if he did not pay money to her. He also added that he had applied for a new passport in 2024 but the Pakistan government is still considering it because they are not issuing new passports to people who seek asylum in foreign countries.

1. As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains seven grounds asserting jurisdictional error. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant's grounds as broadly as possible (per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392).

1. By grounds one and six, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal erred by treating its credibility findings as determinative and by requiring proof of past threats instead of applying the correct legal test, being whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution or faced a real chance of harm upon return to Pakistan.
2. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's reasons (at [204]-[209]) clearly demonstrate that the Tribunal understood the relevant test for determining whether the applicant satisfied the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Act. To the extent that the applicant takes issue with the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings, and in particular, the Tribunal's finding that the applicant did not receive any threats from the Taliban, the Minister submitted that credibility findings of this nature were factual determinations which were open to the Tribunal to make (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67]). Furthermore, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal was not required to uncritically accept any and all claims made by the applicant, nor was it required to possess evidence to the contrary before holding that a particular assertion is not established (AAJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 205 at [24]).
3. The Court accepts the Minister's submissions. It was indeed open to the Tribunal to consider the factual basis of the past threats which the applicant claimed to have experienced, and the lack of evidence provided in support of those threats. In reaching its finding that the applicant had come to Australia for the purpose of marriage rather than because of any purported threat from the Taliban, the Tribunal explicitly noted that it was not satisfied that the Taliban had threatened the applicant or that the 2015 letter was genuine (at [182], [186] and [193]).
4. With specific regard to the 2015 letter, the Court accepts that the weight given to that letter was a matter for the Tribunal (NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]), particularly in circumstances where the Tribunal had doubts about the authenticity of the letter. The Tribunal's finding in that respect was based on the fact that the letter was not addressed to anyone in particular, did not specifically refer to the applicant, and was received after the applicant had ceased working for the DWO (at [73]-[74]). This was a rational finding which was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the material before it.
5. In any event, the Court accepts that the Tribunal had proper regard to the country information which it outlined in some detail at [133]-[173] of its reasons. The Tribunal largely accepted the applicant's country information but found that the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) or the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) because it did not accept the applicant's claims. The Tribunal provided cogent reasons for not accepting the applicant's claims, including because the applicant's documentary evidence was dated after his arrival in Australia and in circumstances where he appeared to have applied for a protection visa after his partner visa application had been cancelled (at [80], [92] and [97]).
6. The Court also accepts that the Tribunal provided comprehensive reasons for its adverse credibility findings, including because of the applicant's failure to support his own written submissions and because of inconsistencies between the applicant's written and oral evidence (at [56]-[58] and [80]). These were all findings which were reasonably open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave. It is not the case that the Tribunal rejected the entirety of the applicant's evidence because of a credibility finding on an objectively minor matter of fact (see ARG15 v Minister for Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 at [83]; DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175 at [30]).
7. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of grounds one and six.

1. By ground two, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to consider the cumulative harm that the applicant would experience as a result of the risk he claimed to face because of Taliban threats, his inter-sect marriage, his risk as a returnee to Pakistan and because of family enmity, and whether that cumulative harm established a real chance of persecution.
2. As submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal did consider the combined risk that the applicant would face as a former NGO worker and as a man married to a Shia woman, however the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would face such risk of harm (at [156]-[158]). In any event, and in circumstances where the Tribunal did not accept any of the applicant's individual protection claims (at [174]-[203]), the Court accepts the Minister's submission that the Tribunal was not required to consider the cumulative harm the applicant would experience when it had already individually rejected those claims.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground two.

1. By ground three, the applicant contends that the Tribunal wrongly dismissed and thereby failed to engage with his evidence about revenge and blood feuds in Pashtun culture.
2. The Minister submitted that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach because the applicant's protection claims did not arise from his involvement in a blood feud, but rather were based on his inter-sect relationship, family enmity, and claimed threats from the Taliban due to his volunteer work with an NGO. The Tribunal did not consider the evidence regarding blood feuds because it was irrelevant to the applicant's claims.
3. The Court agrees with the Minister's position that the Tribunal was correct not to place any weight on the applicant's evidence regarding revenge and blood feuds in circumstances where the Tribunal had determined it was not relevant to the applicant's claims because there was no suggestion that the applicant was involved in a blood feud (at [144]).
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground three.

1. By ground four, the applicant contends that the Tribunal erred by relying on outdated country reports and discounting more recent country information.
2. The Court notes that the Tribunal considered the DFAT country information assessments on Pakistan (at [10]), as it was required to by Ministerial Direction No. 84, along with country information provided by the applicant including "a copy of the relevant DFAT report, and various items of country information including various newspaper articles" (at [132]).
3. The Minister submitted that the DFAT report which the Tribunal relied on was the most recent DFAT country information report available at the time of its decision and was the same DFAT report provided by the applicant, being dated 25 January 2022 (CB 630-676). The Tribunal considered the additional information provided by the applicant (at [133]-[173]) and provided reasons for the conclusions which it reached concerning that information (at [174]-[226]). Although the Tribunal accepted some of the country information provided by the applicant, the Tribunal found that much of that material was of little assistance since it was either irrelevant to the applicant's claims or did not suggest that the applicant would be subjected to the relevant harm. In particular, the Tribunal considered an article concerning attacks on charity workers but found it did not greatly assist the Tribunal given the article was more than 10 years old and the applicant had ceased working for the relevant charity for just as long (at [133]-[137]).
4. The Court accepts the Minister's submissions regarding the Tribunal's treatment of the country information. There is nothing in the Tribunal's decision record to suggest that it relied on outdated country information. In fact, the Tribunal was mindful that some of the country information provided by the applicant was possibly outdated, or irrelevant to the applicant's claims, and the Tribunal therefore tempered the weight to be placed on that particular evidence. Where the Tribunal preferred the 25 January 2022 DFAT country information report over more outdated country information provided by the applicant, the Tribunal in fact did the opposite of what the applicant alleges by this ground.
5. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground four.

1. By ground five, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal dismissed the applicant's fear of persecution in Pakistan due to his inter-sect marriage solely on the basis that his wife would not be returning to Pakistan with him.
2. The Tribunal's reasons note that the applicant claimed he would experience harm upon return to Pakistan because of this relationship, even if his wife did not return with him (at [113]). This proposition was supported by the applicant's wife in her own oral evidence (at [128]).
3. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal acknowledged and considered this claim, however reached its conclusion that the applicant would not experience harm for this reason after considering the country information before it and finding that the country information did not "purport to draw a conclusion that is helpful to the Tribunal" (at [147]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the country information showed the applicant would face a risk of harm if he returned to Pakistan without his wife or that he would suffer relevant harm as a result of the ban on Sunni-Shia marriages which post-dated his own marriage (at [149] and [152]). Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the applicant's evidence about the conflict between Sunni and Shia sects did not suggest that he would be "viewed as a blasphemer because of his marriage or for any other reason" (at [157]). While the Tribunal accepted there were sectarian tensions and violence against religious minorities (including the Shia) in the general area of the applicant's home in Pakistan, the Tribunal noted the applicant is not himself in a religious minority as a Sunni and the Tribunal was not satisfied that he would be targeted by extremists because of his marriage to a Shia woman (at [159]-[161]).
4. The Court accepts the Minister's submission. The Tribunal clearly understood the nature of the applicant's claim and considered all the evidence before it with respect to religious tensions and inter-sect marriages. Contrary to the applicant's position, the Tribunal did not dismiss the applicant's claim solely on the basis that his wife would not be returning to Pakistan with him. Rather, the Tribunal found that the country information did not support a conclusion that he would be targeted because of his marriage to a Shia woman, regardless of whether she returned to Pakistan with him. This was a finding that was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and the Tribunal provided cogent reasons for reaching that conclusion.
5. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground five.

1. By ground seven, the applicant contends that the Tribunal ought to have conducted a separate assessment of whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. That criterion requires that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm.
2. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's assessment of 'real risk' for the purpose of s 36(2)(aa) is "expressly linked" to its earlier findings on 'real chance' as articulated in s 5J for the purpose of assessing the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) (citing MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614 at [31]) (MZYXS). The Minister correctly submitted that the threshold is the same for both tests (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 at [246] per Lander and Gordon JJ) and there was no error in the Tribunal relying on its earlier factual findings for the purposes of assessing the 'real risk' of significant harm.
3. The Court accepts the Minister's submissions. The Tribunal made findings throughout its assessment of the applicant's claims and evidence, and it was entitled to rely on those findings in its assessment of the complementary protection criterion and the associated 'real risk' test. Importantly, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant met the refugee criterion "because the Tribunal was not satisfied that the threats he claims to fear are real" (at [220]). The Tribunal then "expressly linked" that finding (as per MZYXS) to its conclusion that the applicant would not face a 'real risk' of any harm, let alone significant harm, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Pakistan (at [221]). Accordingly, there was no error in the Tribunal relying on the same reasoning it gave earlier in respect of the 'real chance' test for the refugee criterion, nor was there a requirement for the Tribunal to conduct a separate assessment of 'real risk' for the purpose of the complementary protection criterion.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground seven.

1. In addition to the written grounds in his amended application, the applicant also made oral submissions at the hearing before the Court as outlined at [32]-[35] of these reasons.
2. The applicant alleged that the Tribunal ignored evidence about the organisations he had claimed to work for in Pakistan, and in particular, that the Tribunal rejected a letter which it found to be "fake". The Court understands the applicant to be referring to the 2015 letter which is purportedly from the Taliban to his family (CB 172-173).
3. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal provided cogent reasons, which were reasonable and open to it, for finding that the 2015 letter was not genuine and for ultimately not accepting that the applicant had received any threats from the Taliban at the time he came to Australia. As outlined at [16] and [40] of this decision, the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting that letter were that there was no addressee on the letter and it was therefore not clear that the letter was intending to refer to the applicant; that the applicant was no longer working for the relevant organisation as at the date of that letter; and that the applicant's evidence concerning earlier threats was "inconsistent and unconvincing". The Tribunal found that the evidence "appears to have been invented to support the subject application" (at [83]) and it was therefore "not satisfied that the supposed written threat from the Taliban of 6 January 2015 is genuine" (at [103]).
4. The Court accepts the Minister's submission that, while the Tribunal did not specifically make a finding that the letter was "fake", the Tribunal provided reasons for rejecting the letter and put its concerns to the applicant for comment during the hearing (at [71]-[83]). The Tribunal's decision to reject the 2015 letter for the reasons outlined above was reasonable and open to it, and the Tribunal provided clear reasons for doing so.
5. With respect to the applicant's more general assertion that the Tribunal ignored evidence, including concerning the organisations he had claimed to work for in Pakistan, counsel for the Minister observed that the Tribunal had provided a detailed summary of the 800-plus pages of country information and supporting documents which the applicant had submitted to the Tribunal (at [131]-[173]). The Tribunal made findings about whether it accepted each particular piece of country information, including those relevant to the applicant's relationship to charitable and non-government organisations, and provided reasons for each of those findings.
6. The Court finds no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's approach to the applicant's evidence, particularly regarding the 2015 letter and the organisations which the applicant claimed to have worked for. It is clear that the Tribunal considered (in some detail) all of the evidence put before it by the applicant and provided reasons for accepting or not accepting that evidence.
7. To the extent that the applicant's oral submissions otherwise express mere disagreement with the Tribunal's findings, the Court acknowledges that such contentions rise no higher than a request for the Court to engage in merits review of the Tribunal's decision, which of course it cannot do (Wu Shan Liang at 272).
8. The Court also asked counsel for the Minister at the hearing if there were any other matters which, as model litigant, her client wished to draw to the Court's attention. There were none.
9. It is also not evident to the Court that any other potential error arises in respect of the Tribunal decision. The Court is satisfied that, even adopting the broad approach referred to at [36] of these reasons, no jurisdictional error is apparent.

1. The amended application for judicial review, along with the written and oral submissions advanced at the hearing, have failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.