[2025] VSCA 109
General information, not legal advice.
Court of Appeal (Vic)
2025-05-22
Mr JJ, Orr JA, Kaye JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
(4 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
Commences 1 year after expiration of the State non-parole period
Use carriage service to transmit child abuse material (s 474.22 Criminal Code)
(5 years from date of sentence)
Use carriage service to transmit child abuse material (s 474.22 Criminal Code)
Commences at the expiration of the State non-parole period
Use carriage service to transmit child abuse material (s 474.22 Criminal Code)
Commences at the expiration of the State non-parole period
Use carriage service to transmit child abuse material (s 474.22 Criminal Code)
Commences at the expiration of the State non-parole period
Use carriage service to transmit child abuse material (s 474.22 Criminal Code)
(4 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
Use carriage service to transmit child abuse material (s 474.22 Criminal Code)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(3 years from date of sentence)
(2 years prior to expiration of the State non-parole period)
(3 years from date of sentence)
6 months' imprisonment
(3 years from date of sentence)
6 months' imprisonment
(3 years from date of sentence)
(5 years from date of sentence)
Ground 1: The sentences imposed - in particular, the individual sentences, the orders relating to commencement dates later than 31 March 2023 (that provided for cumulation), the total effective sentence and the non-parole period fixed - were each manifestly excessive.
Ground 2: The sentences imposed on the applicant now contravene the parity principle having regard to the sentences that his co-offender is now serving.
(a) On 3 May 2021, Heels sent to the applicant a video of a male child (not victim C) attending a piano lesson with Heels. The focus of the video was on the child's shorts. The video prompted an exchange between Heels and the applicant in which the applicant described sexual acts that Heels could have engaged in with victim C before driving him home.
(b) On 6 May 2021, the applicant sent a photograph of victim C holding a toy banana near his mouth to Heels, followed by a Telegram message in which he expressed the wish that the toy banana was the applicant's penis.
(c) On 14 May 2021, in an exchange of messages on Telegram between the applicant and Heels, the applicant expressed a desire to sexually penetrate victim C's mouth with his penis.
(d) On 20 May 2021, a further exchange of messages on Telegram occurred between the applicant and Heels, in which the applicant, in crude terms, expressed a desire to hold victim C's legs to his head, and to penetrate his anus.
(a) In one conversation, prompted by the applicant sending Heels a video of victim D downloaded from a publicly accessible Instagram account in victim D's name, the applicant said to Heels, 'I would destroy this kid'.
(b) In a further conversation, prompted by the applicant sending Heels two further videos of victim D downloaded from victim D's Instagram account, the applicant twice expressed a desire to 'fuck' victim D and on one of those occasions he also expressed the desire to penetrate victim D's toddler brother.
(a) On 4 May 2021, the applicant sent Heels five photos of victim E downloaded from victim E's mother's Facebook page, which prompted a Telegram conversation in which the applicant described fantasised sexual activity with victim E. This conversation contained Category 2 child abuse material.
(b) On 5 May 2021, the applicant sent Heels a further photo of victim E, again downloaded from victim E's mother's Facebook page. This was followed by another Telegram conversation containing Category 2 child abuse material, in which both the applicant and Heels described imagined sexual activity with victim E. The applicant then sent Heels further photos of victim E, as well as a video of an unidentified male child engaged in sexual activities, which constituted Category 1 child abuse material. This video prompted further exchanges of messages on Telegram of the same nature as the prior conversations.
(c) On 6 May 2021, the applicant and Heels exchanged further Telegram messages containing written descriptions of fantasised sexual activity with victim E, after which Heels sent the applicant a video of himself. In that video, Heels exposed his penis and masturbated in a toy tent at one of the performing arts studios, while orally describing fantasised sexual activity with victim E. The sending of the video was again followed by a Telegram conversation between Heels and the applicant containing Category 2 child abuse material. The conversation included descriptions of explicit sexual activities that the applicant and Heels desired to undertake with victim E.
(a) On the first occasion, the applicant and Heels exchanged messages in which the applicant described Heels committing a serious sexual assault on victim L.
(b) On the second occasion, the applicant sent Heels a video file, categorised as Category 1 child abuse material, depicting a female child aged between 10 and 18 months being vaginally raped by an adult male (this video was also included in charge 5 against the applicant, discussed below). This prompted an exchange of messages on Telegram in which, in effect, the applicant (in crude terms) fantasised about Heels raping victim L.
(c) The third exchange of messages between the applicant and Heels contained a similar suggestion.
(d) The fourth exchange contained disturbing suggestions as to what the applicant wanted to do to victim L.
(a) On the first occasion (which was not the subject of a charge against the applicant), Heels sent the applicant two videos he had filmed of himself and victim L, each of which contained Category 1 child abuse material.
(b) On the second occasion (which was the subject of a charge against the applicant), the applicant sent Heels the video file, to which we have referred, depicting a female infant being raped, in response to which Heels expressed the wish to perform the same act on victim L.
(c) On the third occasion (which was the subject of a charge against the applicant), Heels sent the applicant another video of himself and victim L.
(d) On the fourth occasion (which was the subject of a charge against the applicant), Heels participated in the disturbing exchange with the applicant about what the applicant wished to do to victim L.
(a) On 14 May 2021, Heels sent the applicant a video of himself and victim O, which contained Category 1 child abuse material. This was the same day that Heels sent the applicant the photos of victim O that prompted the Telegram message that was the subject of charge 18 against the applicant.
(b) On 21 May 2021, Heels sent the applicant another video he had filmed of himself and victim O, and which contained Category 1 child abuse material.
(a) multiple occasions on which the applicant transmitted child abuse material to Heels in the form of 637 image and video files depicting unidentified child victims; and
(b) five occasions on which the applicant transmitted child abuse material to Heels in the form of Telegram messages containing sexually explicit descriptions of unidentified child victims.
I have considered the obvious that much of the offending was similar to both of you. However, Heels committed some contact offences and transmitted material to others. Cullinan-Smayle sought contact. Some differences in sentences arise as a result.[53]
Albeit that the content of these written communications was vile, no children were harmed or actually physically abused in order to produce the transmitted child abuse material. ... That said, the distribution of prose describing child sex abuse, especially when it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification has the tendency to normalise or encourage child sex abuse, ignore the harm that such abuse occurs and undermines the unequivocal societal standard that such abuse is abhorrent.[59]
(a) First, the child abuse material that was the subject of charge 5 against the applicant formed part of the subject matter of charge 7 against Heels, a charge of using a carriage service to transmit child material to himself. Charge 7 also concerned the child abuse material that the applicant had transmitted to Heels that informed charges 7 to 21 against the applicant. Counsel noted that on charge 7, Heels was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months' imprisonment, which, on appeal, was reduced to 3 years' imprisonment. Counsel further noted that charges 7 to 14, and 16 to 21 (constituting 14 of the 23 charges) against the applicant generally comprised the exchange of written fantasies, which (counsel contended) did not involve actual harm to a child.
(b) Secondly, charge 8 against Heels related to the transmission of child abuse material by Heels to the applicant. Charge 8 alleged that Heels sent the applicant child abuse material which comprised 16 images of unidentified children and 10 written descriptions of unidentified and hypothetical children. On that charge, Heels had initially been sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment. On appeal, that sentence was reduced to 4 years' imprisonment.
Possession and transmission of child abuse material - principles
"child abuse material" means:
(a) material that depicts a person, or a representation of a person, who:
(i) is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age; and
(ii) is, or appears to be, a victim of torture, cruelty or physical abuse;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(b) material that describes a person who:
(i) is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age; and
(ii) is, or is implied to be, a victim of torture, cruelty or physical abuse;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(c) material that depicts a person, or a representation of a person, who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age and who:
(i) is engaged in, or appears to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons); or
(ii) is in the presence of a person who is engaged in, or appears to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(d) material the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of:
(i) a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age; or
(ii) a representation of such a sexual organ or anal region; or
(iii) the breasts, or a representation of the breasts, of a female person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age;
in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(e) material that describes a person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age and who:
(i) is engaged in, or is implied to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons); or
(ii) is in the presence of a person who is engaged in, or is implied to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(f) material that describes:
(i) a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age; or
(ii) the breasts of a female person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(g) material that is a doll or other object that resembles:
(i) a person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age; or
(ii) a part of the body of such a person;
if a reasonable person would consider it likely that the material is intended to be used by a person to simulate sexual intercourse.
(a) material that depicts a person, or a representation of a person, who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age and who:
(i) is engaged in, or appears to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons); or
(ii) is in the presence of a person who is engaged in, or appears to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(b) material the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of:
(i) a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age; or
(ii) a representation of such a sexual organ or anal region; or
(iii) the breasts, or a representation of the breasts, of a female person who is, or appears to be, under 18 years of age;
in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(c) material that describes a person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age and who:
(i) is engaged in, or is implied to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons); or
(ii) is in the presence of a person who is engaged in, or is implied to be engaged in, a sexual pose or sexual activity;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive; or
(i) a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age; or
(ii) the breasts of a female person who is, or is implied to be, under 18 years of age;
and does this in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive.
The offences of access to and possession of child pornography are regarded as very serious, involving morally depraved conduct that is extremely harmful to children. Those who are inclined to exploit children, by involving them in the production of child pornography, are encouraged by the fact that there is a market for that material. In other words, the possession of child pornography material creates a market for the continued corruption and exploitation of children by fuelling demand for that material. In that way, it normalises behaviour, which is depraved and exploitive of children.
In that context, it is relevant that offending involving accessing or possession of child pornography occurs on an international level and is becoming increasingly prevalent, with the advent and proliferation of the Internet as a means of enabling people to access and retain child pornography.
In any case, the objective seriousness of the offending is ordinarily determined by reference to a number of different factors, a number of which were conveniently identified by Johnson J in De Leeuw in the following terms:
The objective seriousness of the offending is ordinarily determined by reference to the following factors:
(i) the nature and content of the material, in particular the age of the children and the gravity of the sexual activity depicted;
(ii) the number of items or images possessed;
(iii) whether the material is for the purpose of sale or further distribution;
(iv) whether the offender will profit from the offence;
(v) in the case of possession or access of child pornography for personal use, the number of children depicted and thereby victimised;
(vi) the length of time for which the pornographic material was possessed.
In recent times, offending involving child pornography has proliferated, and is difficult to detect in view of the anonymity that is provided by the Internet. Its increasingly pervasive and toxic influence informs the inherent gravity of the offending and the importance of the role of sentencing in addressing the grave harm occasioned by it.
It is for those reasons that the purpose of general deterrence is accorded primacy in sentencing offending involving child pornography. In essence, it is necessary that the sentences imposed by the courts are such that those persons, who might contemplate being involved in the depraved and pernicious reception of child pornography, well understand that if their offending is detected, they will lose their right to be at liberty within society for a substantial period of time. It is only in that way that the courts can perform the vital function of providing protection to vulnerable children.[66]
The capacity of child exploitation material, even that which does not depict real children, to affect the community goes beyond the tendency to normalise exploitive sexual activity involving children or even to stimulate potential participants in it. In my view, it serves to fuel the demand for such material, whether or not it involves real children. Further, such material has the capacity to groom not only the recipients of it, but those who may be affected by recipients of it. That is to say, its impact may well be ... to normalise it with the recipients or to encourage the recipients to take a step further, moving from the cartoon world or anime world to that of the real world in the sense of involving real children.[68]
[T]he distribution of prose describing child sex abuse, especially where it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification has the tendency to normalise or encourage child sex abuse, ignore the harm that such abuse occurs and undermine the unequivocal societal standard that such abuse is abhorrent.[69]
Accepted distinctions between the applicant and Heels
[1] The Criminal Code comprises the schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
[2] Section 474.19(1) of the Criminal Code has subsequently been repealed and the conduct proscribed by that provision is now proscribed by s 474.22(1).
[3] Section 16BA of the Commonwealth Crimes Act enables a court that is sentencing a person who has been convicted of a federal offence or offences to take into account further admitted offences provided certain procedural requirements are satisfied.
[4] Heels v The King [2024] VSCA 133 ('Heels').
[5] This is the s 6AAA declaration made on appeal. The sentencing judge only made a s 6AAA declaration for the State offences, which was 7 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years. As this Court observed in Heels v The King, the usual practice in this Court has been to treat s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 as applicable to sentences for Commonwealth offences: [2024] VSCA 133, [54] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[6] DPP v Cullinan-Smayle and Heels [2023] VCC 480 ('Reasons').
[9] Ibid [81]-[82]. The judge described the images as comprising Category 1 child abuse material, but it appears they were in fact Category 2 child abuse material.
[52] [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA); [2007] VSCA 102 ('Verdins').
[56] Heels [2024] VSCA 133, [36] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[57] Ibid [37] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[58] Ibid [39] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[59] Ibid [40] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[60] Ibid [42] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[63] [2024] VSCA 211 ('Crowder').
[64] [2015] NSWCCA 183 ('De Leeuw'); see also DPP v Garside [2016] VSCA 74; (2016) 50 VR 800, 819 [62] (Redlich and Beach JJA); [2016] VSCA 74; R v Coffey [2003] VSCA 155; (2003) 6 VR 543, 552 [30] (Callaway JA, Buchanan JA agreeing at [32], Eames JA agreeing at [33]); [2003] VSCA 155.
[66] Ibid [40]-[44] (Macaulay and Kaye JJA) (citations omitted).
[68] Ibid [61] (Morrison JA, Philippides JA agreeing at [104], Boddice J agreeing at [105]).
[69] Heels [2024] VSCA 133, [40] (Priest and Niall JJA).
[70] Cf Whiley v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 53, [63] (James J, McClellan CJ at CL agreeing at [1], Rothman J agreeing at [76]); Burton v The Queen [2020] NSWCCA 127, [33]-[34] (Harrison J, Hoeben CJ at CL agreeing at [1], Walton J agreeing at [2]).
[71] Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); [2011] VSCA 157; DPP v MacArthur [2019] VSCA 71, [58] (Ferguson CJ, Kaye and Weinberg JJA).
[72] See, eg, Abela-Rogers v The Queen [2022] VSCA 34, [9]-[10], [35] (T Forrest and Whelan JJA).
[73] [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606, 610 (Gibbs CJ), 613-14 (Mason J), 623-4 (Dawson J); [1984] HCA 46.
[74] [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295, 301-2 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ), 309 (McHugh J), 323 (Gummow J), 338 (Kirby J); [1997] HCA 26.
[75] See, eg, R v Mercieca [2004] VSCA 170, [17] (Winneke P); Anthony v The Queen [2016] VSCA 22, [12] (Redlich and Beach JJA); Hilder v The Queen [2011] VSCA 192, [38]-[39] (Maxwell ACJ); Roujnikov v The Queen [2015] VSCA 97, [25] (Weinberg and Kyrou JJA); Ryan v The Queen [2016] VSCA 255, [42] (Weinberg, Whelan and Priest JJA).
[76] As we have noted, there are a total of five schedule offences which the Court may take into account, if it thinks fit, when imposing sentence on the applicant for particular charged offences: s 16BA(1).
[77] 'Commonwealth child sex offence' includes any offence against Subdivisions D and F of Division 474 the Criminal Code: Commonwealth Crimes Act s 3 (definition of 'Commonwealth child sex offence'). Section 16A(2AAA) therefore applies to the sentencing for all charges against the applicant except for charge 2, which concerns an offence that was repealed before s 16A(2AAA) came into force on 22 July 2020.
[91] Heels [2024] VSCA 133, [42] (Priest and Niall JJA).
Cullinan-Smayle
The King [2025] VSCA 109
DPP v Cullinan-Smayle & Heels [2023] VCC 480 (Judge Syme)
Heels v The King [2024] VSCA 133; R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v D'Alessandro (2016) 26 VR 477; Crowder (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 211; R v De Leeuw [2015] NSWCCA 183; R v Edwards [2019] QCA 015; Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606; Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295.
(2003) 6 VR 543
(2011) 32 VR 361
(2007) 16 VR 269
(2016) 26 VR 477
(1984) 154 CLR 606
(1997) 189 CLR 295
(2021) 96 MVR 344
(2016) 50 VR 800