CSH20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is therefore necessary to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal began by identifying the visa decision under review, noting that the applicant had made a valid application for review, and that he attended the hearing to give oral evidence and present arguments along with his wife (at [1]-[3]).
3. The Tribunal set out the legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, namely, the refugee and complementary protection criteria (at [4]-[8]). The Tribunal confirmed that, in accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 84, made under s 499 of the Act, it also had regard to the 'Refugee Law Guidelines' and 'Complementary Protection Guidelines', as well as country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (at [9]).

1. The Tribunal then set out the applicant's protection claims (at [13]-[29]). The Tribunal noted that, in his protection visa application, the applicant identified himself as a Sunni Muslim and stated that he had never been married or in a de facto relationship (at [13]). The applicant claimed to have left Malaysia because he feared harm from loan sharks due to a debt owed by his brother (at [14]).
2. The Tribunal had regard to the materials received from the applicant in December 2023, and to his oral evidence at the hearing relating to his family background, his religion and relationship status (at [15]-[16]). The applicant also gave oral evidence about his fear of harm from a loan shark (at [17]), and that he came to Australia because his wife's family did not approve of their marriage, as she is a Sunni Muslim and he is a Shia Muslim (not a Sunni Muslim as he had originally claimed in his visa application) (at [18], [20]).
3. When asked why he did not include the claim about his wife's family in his visa application, the applicant said that he only told the friend who was helping him about the loan shark issues (at [19]).
4. When asked why he stated he was a Sunni Muslim in his visa application, the applicant said "maybe the person who filled out the form misunderstood". He did not elaborate on this further or explain why he had earlier confirmed that he was a Sunni Muslim (at [21]).
5. With respect to the wife's oral evidence, she considered that the applicant "may" face harm in connection with the loan shark debt if he were to return to Malaysia. In response to whether the applicant would face harm from anyone else, she again referred to the loan shark debt and stated that he had previously been beaten by the loan shark (at [29]).

1. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant's wife also had an application before the Tribunal in relation to her own protection visa refusal decision, the hearing of which occurred directly after the applicant's hearing and was conducted by the same Tribunal member. Pursuant to s 424AA of the Act, the Tribunal put to the applicant that there was a contradiction between his wife's application and his own evidence concerning whether he was beaten by her father and uncle because they disapproved of the relationship due to the applicant being a Shia Muslim. The Tribunal noted that this claim was contrary to the applicant's written statement in his visa application and oral evidence at the hearing that he was a Sunni Muslim (at [34]-[36]).
2. The Tribunal explained to the applicant that if it accepted he was a Sunni Muslim, then it may not accept that he faced a risk of harm from his wife's family due to them being of different religions. The Tribunal would therefore not be satisfied that he is entitled to protection in respect of that claim. The applicant was invited to comment on that information and was granted a five-minute adjournment at his request. Following the adjournment, the applicant acknowledged that he had claimed to be a Sunni Muslim. He noted that his Malaysian ID card simply says 'Muslim' but does not refer to any specific branch of Muslim faith. He stated that the person who filled out the form might have misunderstood (at [37]-[39]).

1. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant has been in a relationship with his wife since 2015, that they are married and have a son together, and that they are settled in Australia. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant is employed in Australia, and that he has a hearing impairment (at [40]).
2. The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence regarding his brother's loan shark debt to be vague and unconvincing. Specifically, the Tribunal found it was unlikely that the applicant's brother had borrowed such a significant sum of money in 2016 and that, almost eight years later, the applicant was still unsure of the reason for borrowing the money, particularly since the applicant and his brother came to Australia at the same time and lived near one another (at [42]). The Tribunal therefore did not accept that the applicant's brother had a debt to a loan shark, and accordingly did not accept that the applicant had been beaten by a loan shark or that his hearing loss was because of an assault by a loan shark (at [43]).
3. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant is a Shia Muslim, or that he was beaten or threatened by his wife's family because they did not approve of the relationship because of his religion (at [44]-[45]). The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant did not have a reasonable explanation for not raising that claim before the delegate and therefore drew an unfavourable inference as to the credibility of that claim pursuant to s 423A of the Act (at [30]-[33]). Further, the Tribunal considered that if he had indeed faced harm from his wife's family, he would have included details about this claim and about their relationship in his visa application (at [44(a)]). The Tribunal also considered that the applicant's evidence had changed over time, and it preferred his earlier evidence that he is a Sunni Muslim. The Tribunal did not accept that he is a Shia Muslim or that his friend misunderstood when he was completing the visa application form. The Tribunal considered that the applicant's explanation regarding the Malaysian ID card did not assist him (at [44(b)]).
4. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant's father had mental health issues and a history of aggressive behaviour (at [46], [49]). However, the Tribunal observed that the applicant's audiologist report did not state that his hearing loss was caused by trauma, and it was apparent to the Tribunal that the applicant's evidence about his hearing loss was in connection with his claim to have suffered harm from a loan shark (at [27]). The Tribunal observed that the applicant did not claim protection on the basis of his father's behaviour and further found that he would face a low risk of being harmed by his father if he were to return to Malaysia on the basis that the applicant would return with his wife and child and would live independently from his father (at [50]).
5. For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution based on any of his claims (at [47]-[51]). The Tribunal therefore found that he did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act (at [56]).
6. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant would face significant harm by reason of any of his claims as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned to Malaysia (at [53]-[55]). The Tribunal therefore found that he did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (at [57]).
7. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (at [59]).

1. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 23 February 2024 contains five grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm as set out in section 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958.
   2. The Tribunal construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicant upon his return to Malaysia for his debts with a loan shark and as a Shia Muslim.
   3. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act.
   4. The Tribunal has failed to investigate applicant's claim, especially the grounds of persecution in Malaysia.
   5. The second respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 424A(read with section 424AA) of the Migration Act to give the applicant clear particulars of information it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, to ensure the applicant understood why that information was relevant to the review and the consequence of its being relied upon, and to invite the applicant to comment upon or respond to that information.
2. The applicant appeared before the Court on 1 September 2025 without legal representation but with the assistance of a Malay interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 23 February 2024 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 1 September 2025), a Court Book numbering 103 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 20 May 2024.
4. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DDQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2013] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228 at [18]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decision and/or procedure.
5. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354- 355);

(e) where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant's claims (or integers of the claims) made (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 2121 FCR 99 at [111]);

(f) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(g) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and he should attempt to tell the Court why he said the Tribunal had fallen into error. Against this background, the applicant made a number of oral submissions to the Court. Firstly, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal did not consider the letter from his audiologist (CB 77-78) and that the "hearing problem was caused by the punches that I received in an incident". The Court put to the applicant that the Tribunal did in fact consider the letter at [27] of its reasons, but that the letter simply stated he had reported suffering a trauma in Malaysia; not that the hearing loss was caused by that trauma. The applicant explained that he told the Tribunal he was attacked by gangsters and loan sharks which had caused the trauma that resulted in his hearing loss.
2. Secondly, the applicant submitted that his friend had made two mistakes regarding his date of birth and religion when filling out his visa application form. The applicant said he only realised the error in his date of birth after receiving a copy of the Court Book. With respect to his religion, the applicant told the Tribunal that his religion had been incorrectly recorded as Sunni and it should be Shia, but the Tribunal did not accept his evidence in that regard. The Court explained to the applicant that the Tribunal had considered his evidence, weighed up all of the matters before it, and made a finding that the applicant was not a Shia Muslim. When pressed as to what the Tribunal did wrong in the treatment of his evidence, the applicant said the Tribunal's error was that "they did not accept the mistake on the form".
3. The applicant was granted a five-minute adjournment at his request, following which the Court took the applicant through the written grounds of his application. The applicant reiterated that the Tribunal misunderstood his submission by not accepting the medical report in relation to the injury he sustained. He said he was beaten up and lost his hearing, and now he is afraid that he might be harmed or beaten up again if he returns to Malaysia.
4. When asked to explain what he meant by ground three, the applicant said he was unable to expand upon or clarify those grounds because somebody else drafted the application and he didn't understand what was written.
5. In reply to the Minister's oral submissions, the applicant reiterated that he was the one who had been beaten up by the loan shark because of a debt taken on by his brother and that the Tribunal did not believe this. He said that the Tribunal did not accept his hospital report either with respect to this incident. The Court understands this to be re-statement of claims already raised by the applicant earlier in the hearing, which will be addressed below.

1. As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains five grounds asserting jurisdictional error. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant's grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392).

1. With respect to the applicant's claim in oral submissions that the Tribunal did not give consideration to the audiologist's report, counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did indeed have regard to that evidence at [27] of its reasons. Contrary to the applicant's submission, the Tribunal did not reject that evidence. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had a hearing impairment but, critically, did not accept that the applicant's brother owed a debt to a loan shark because it found the applicant's evidence in that regard to be vague and unconvincing (at [40]-[42]). The Minister submitted it was therefore open and permissible for the Tribunal to reject the applicant's claim about being beaten by a loan shark for the reason that it did not accept the underlying claim about the brother's debt.
2. The Court accepts that the Tribunal appropriately evaluated and rejected this claim, notwithstanding that it accepted the applicant had otherwise suffered a hearing loss. The Court finds no jurisdictional error in that respect.
3. With regard to the mistakes the applicant claimed his friend had made on his visa application form, counsel for the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did not express any concerns about the applicant's date of birth. In terms of his religion, the Tribunal provided reasons for rejecting the applicant's claim to be a Shia Muslim, including the applicant's own evidence at the Tribunal hearing that he was a Sunni Muslim. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim that his friend had misunderstood the answers he provided because there was no suggestion that any other answer had been entered incorrectly in the visa application form.
4. The Court accepts the Minister's response to this claim. The Tribunal expressed no concerns about the discrepancy in the applicant's date of birth, and its rejection of the applicant's claim to be a Shia Muslim was justified by the applicant's own oral evidence to be a Sunni Muslim. The Court finds no error in the Tribunal's approach to this finding.

1. The Minister addressed grounds one and two together, noting that the applicant alleges the Tribunal misconstrued the definition of significant harm as set out in s 36(2A) of the Act (ground one), particularly in relation to his claims regarding the loan shark and the applicant's faith as a Shia Muslim (ground two).
2. The reference to 'significant harm' relates to the Tribunal's requirement to consider the applicant's claims against the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa), namely, whether there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned to Malaysia. The definition of 'significant harm' is set out in s 36(2A) of the Act as follows:

(2A) A non-citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a) the non-citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non-citizen; or

(c) the non-citizen will be subjected to torture;

(d) the non-citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e) the non-citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

1. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's decision demonstrates it had regard to the correct test for complementary protection, as well as the definition of 'significant harm'. The Tribunal set out the complementary protection criterion and the meaning of 'significant harm' at [8] of its reasons and in the extracts of the Migration Act attached to its decision. It then had regard to that test in considering the applicant's evidence at [52]-[55] and [57] of its reasons.
2. In considering the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal relied on the findings it made earlier under the refugee criterion. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's claim that his brother owed a debt to a loan shark, and that he feared harm on that basis, because it found the applicant's evidence to be vague and unconvincing. The Tribunal also rejected the applicant's claim to fear harm as a Shia Muslim on credibility grounds, particularly in circumstances where he had given evidence he was in fact a Sunni Muslim. The Minister submitted the Tribunal was permitted to use all of its factual findings under its assessment of the refugee criterion in reaching its conclusion that the applicant did not face a real risk of significant harm on the basis of those claims (citing DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; (2021) 273 CLR 1 at [27]; SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774 at [56]).
3. The Court accepts the Minister's submissions in that regard. The Tribunal's reasons clearly demonstrate that it understood the definition of 'significant harm' (as set out in s 36(2A) of the Act) in applying the complementary protection test. Given it had rejected the applicant's claims under the refugee criterion, it was entitled to rely on the same findings in assessing those claims against the complementary protection criterion. Indeed, as submitted by the Minister, it is difficult to see how the Tribunal could have found there was a genuine "risk to life" or fear of significant harm on the basis of those claims.
4. No jurisdictional error arises with respect to grounds one and two.

1. By ground three, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make its decision because it did not reach "reasonable satisfaction" in accordance with the Act. The applicant does not specify how the Tribunal's decision was not arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the Act and, without further clarification, appears to simply disagree with the Tribunal's findings. The Minister submitted that mere disagreement with the Tribunal's conclusion does not establish jurisdictional error (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [40]).
2. The Court accepts the Minister's submission in that regard. The Tribunal did not reach the requisite level of satisfaction to conclude that the applicant met the requirements for the visa because it rejected the applicant's underlying claims with respect to the loan shark debt and with respect to his religion. Absent any particulars, and noting that the applicant was unable to expand on this ground at the hearing, this ground does not establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
3. No jurisdictional error arises with respect to ground three.

1. Ground four alleges that the Tribunal failed to investigate the applicant's claims, particularly with respect to his claims of persecution in Malaysia. Noting again that the applicant only refers broadly to his claims of persecution in Malaysia and does not specify which claim he says the Tribunal failed to consider, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal's reasons nevertheless demonstrate it had regard to all of the applicant's claims and evidence.
2. The Court agrees with the Minister's submission. The Tribunal's reasons accurately set out all of the claims raised by the applicant in his visa application (at [13]-[14]). The Tribunal identified the documents the applicant had provided in December 2023 (at [15]) and it set out the claims made in both the applicant's and his wife's oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing (at [16]-[29]). The Tribunal's findings and reasoning (under the heading 'Tribunal consideration' at [40]-[55]) then demonstrate an active and intellectual engagement with all of those claims in its assessment of whether the applicant satisfied the criteria in ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act (as required by well-established authority such as Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352 at [43]- [46] and Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; (2019) 272 FCR 589 at [37]). It is clear from a reading of the Tribunal's decision that the Tribunal did not fail to consider or investigate the applicant's claims.
3. To the extent that the applicant alleges that the Tribunal ought to have conducted its own investigation of the applicant's claims, the Court notes that the duty imposed on the Tribunal is a duty to review and not a duty to make inquiries. Whilst a failure to make inquiries about a critical fact which can easily be ascertained may lead to a jurisdictional error in certain circumstances, there is no overarching duty on the part of the Tribunal to make its own inquiries (see Minister for Immigration v SZIAI [2009] HCATrans 165; (2009) 259 ALR 429 at [18]- [25]; Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88; and Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155).
4. As such, no jurisdictional error arises with respect to ground four.

1. By ground five, the applicant alleges that he was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Act.
2. Section 424A provides as follows:

424A Information and invitation given in writing by the Tribunal

(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(2A) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.

(3) This section does not apply to information:

(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or

(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or

(c) that is non‑disclosable information.

(4) A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 426A(1F).

1. Relevant to s 424(2A), section 424AA provides as follows:

424AA Information and invitation given orally by Tribunal while applicant appearing

(1) If an applicant is appearing before the Tribunal because of an invitation under section 425:

(a) the Tribunal may orally give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) if the Tribunal does so - the Tribunal must:

(i) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review, and the consequences of the information being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(ii) orally invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information; and

(iii) advise the applicant that he or she may seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information; and

(iv) if the applicant seeks additional time to comment on or respond to the information - adjourn the review, if the Tribunal considers that the applicant reasonably needs additional time to comment on or respond to the information.

1. Sections 424A and 424AA operate in a complementary manner, with s 424A(1) prescribing what the Tribunal must do subject to the exceptions in subsections (2A) and (3). The complementary nature of these provisions is further extrapolated in SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; (2009) 174 FCR 415 per Tracey and Foster JJ at [80]-[105].
2. In this case, the exception in s 424A(2A) applied. The Tribunal was not obliged to follow s 424A because it gave the applicant clear particulars of the information it considered would be the reason (or part of the reason) for affirming the delegate's decision, namely, that it had information from his wife's protection visa application which stated he was a Shia Muslim, thereby contradicting his claim to be a Sunni Muslim, and invited him to comment on or respond to the information under s 424AA. Having presented the applicant with clear particulars of the information under s 424AA(1)(a), the Tribunal's obligations under s 424AA(1)(b) were enlivened.
3. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrate compliance with its obligations under to s 424AA(1)(b) (at [37]-[38]). Pursuant to subsection (i), the Tribunal explained that if it accepted he was a Sunni Muslim, then it might not accept that he faced a risk of harm from his wife's family due to his Shia faith and he would therefore not be found to be owed protection on that basis. Pursuant to subsections (ii) and (iii), the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on that information and advised he could seek additional time to do so. Pursuant to subsection (iv), the Tribunal granted the applicant's request for a five-minute adjournment.
4. The Court accepts the Minister's submissions with respect to the operation of these sections of the Act. It is apparent from the above paragraphs that the Tribunal did not fail to comply with s 424A because it was in fact exempt from doing so pursuant to the operation of s 424A(2A), which in turn enlivened its obligations under s 424AA instead. The Tribunal's reasons demonstrate that it did comply with its obligations under s 424AA by putting the adverse information in his wife's visa application to the applicant and inviting him to comment. It is clear to the Court that the applicant was given a real and meaningful opportunity to present his case at the Tribunal and that the Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations under ss 424A and 424AA.
5. No jurisdictional error arises with respect to ground five.
6. The Court asked counsel for the Minister at the hearing of this matter whether there were any matters which his client, who is subject to a direction to behave as a model litigant, wished to draw to the Court's attention. There were none.
7. It is also not evident to the Court that any other potential arguable error arises in respect of the Tribunal decision. The Court is satisfied that, even adopting the broad approach referred to in [40] of these reasons, no jurisdictional error is apparent.

1. The application for judicial review and additional submissions made by the applicant have failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Court is otherwise unable to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.