For the reasons set out above, I have made the following findings about the considerations in Direction 110:

(a) Primary consideration 1, protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, weighs in favour of exercising the discretion to refuse to grant the visitor visa;

(b) Primary consideration 2, whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence, is of neutral weight;

(c) Primary consideration 3, the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia, weighs heavily against exercising the discretion to refuse to grant the visitor visa;

(d) Primary consideration 4, the best interests of minor children in Australia, weighs against exercising the discretion to refuse to grant the visitor visa;

(e) Primary consideration 5, expectations of the Australian community, weighs in favour of exercising the discretion to refuse to grant the visitor visa;

(f) Other consideration 1, legal consequences of decision, is of neutral weight;

(g) Other consideration 2, extent of impediments if removed, is of neutral weight; and

(h) Other consideration 3, impact on Australian business interests, is of neutral weight.

There has been extensive judicial consideration of how the exercise of balancing and weighing the considerations contained in the relevant Ministerial Direction is to be undertaken (considering a number of Ministerial Directions preceding the current Direction 110).[18] Relevantly, the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the operation of Direction No. 90 in CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138. While the Court was considering Direction No. 90, its observations would apply to Direction 110. The Court found that the Tribunal must weigh the various primary and other relevant considerations outlined in the Direction (in this case Direction 110) against each other and undertake an evaluation of whether there was 'another reason' why the cancellation should be revoked.[19] As I observed in relation to Nathanson earlier in these Reasons, similar observations apply to consideration of whether to exercise the discretion to refuse to grant the visitor visa for the purposes of subsection 501(1), the relevant issue in relation to this application.
The Respondent submits[20] that Primary consideration 1, protection of the Australian community and Primary consideration 5, the expectations of the Australian community weigh heavily in favour of refusal and outweigh any factors in favour of Mr McLaughlin.
I have had regard to the 8 principles set out in paragraph 5.2 of Direction 110 and note that the safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. I have had regard to clause 7 of Direction 110 and have taken into account that Primary consideration 1 (protection of the Australian community) is generally to be given more weight than other primary considerations and that, otherwise, primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than other considerations and that one or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations. I note that the process of assigning greater weight to Primary consideration 1 over the other primary considerations does not require me to automatically assign greater weight to Primary consideration 1 and that the other primary considerations can in fact be given greater weight than Primary consideration 1. I also note that the weight to be attributed to considerations is a matter for the decision-maker and requires that the individual facts and circumstances of the case be taken into account.
The Respondent's concerns are not without foundation. However, having weighed and balanced the various relevant considerations against each other, I find that the Primary considerations 3 and 4, the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia and best interests of the minor child, Cassi, combine to outweigh the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community. I have therefore decided to set aside the decision of the Respondent's delegate and substitute it with a decision not to exercise the discretion to refuse to grant the visitor visa pursuant to subsection 501(1).

The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the delegate of the Respondent dated 4 August 2025 to refuse to grant the Applicant a Subclass 600 (Visitor) visa and substitutes a decision that the discretion in subsection 501(1) of the Migration Act 1954 should not be exercised to refuse to grant the visa to Mr McLaughlin.

[1] With sentence defined by subsection 501(12) to include any form of determination of the punishment of an offence.

[3] Personal circumstances form, letter to Department dated 1 May 2024, letter to Department dated 20 February 2024 and letter to Department dated 24 August 2024 at pages 94 to 106, 112 to 117, 118 and 139 of Exhibit R1.

[4] Department of Home Affairs, Migration Act - Character and security instructions, Section 501: The character test, visa refusal and visa cancellation, Migration Policy and Operational Instructions as in force from 22 January 2026.

[5] Paragraph 21 of the Respondent's SFIC, Exhibit R2.

[6] Paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Respondent's SFIC, Exhibit R2.

[7] Pages 125 to 127 and page 128 of Exhibit R1.

[11] Paragraph 31 of the Respondent's SFIC, Exhibit R2.

[13] Paragraph 8.4(1) of Direction 110.

[14] Paragraph 8.5(2) of Direction 110.

[15] Paragraph 8.5(3) of Direction 110.

[16] This approach is consistent with the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185; Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 791, at [17]; Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2, at [51]-[52]; DBWG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 3.

[17] Paragraphs 37 to 41 of the Respondent's SFIC, Exhibit R2.

[18] See Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594, Minister for Home Affairs v HSKJ [2018] FCAFC 217; (2018) 266 FCR 591.

[20] Paragraph 44 of the Respondent's SFIC, Exhibit R2.

McLaughlin and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2026] ARTA 178 (3 February 2026)

CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138

Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 6

MDXJ v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] FCA 1767

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v HSRN [2023] FCAFC 68

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Thornton [2023] HCA 17

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 46

The part which a governmental policy should ordinarily play in the determinations of the Tribunal is a matter for the Tribunal to determine, in the context of the particular case, informed by considerations of the desirability of consistency of administrative decisions, but balanced against the ideal of justice in the individual case (Hneidi v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 20: (2010) 182 FCR 115 at [43]). Further, it is well-established that the Tribunal must make the correct or preferable decision in each case on the material before it and that the Tribunal is at liberty to adopt whatever policy it chooses, or no policy at all, in fulfilling its statutory function (Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 642-643 per Brennan J). The important matter is compliance with the terms of the relevant statute itself Minster for Home Affairs v G [2019] FCAFC 79; (2019) 266 FCR 569.

CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (18 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (14)

McLaughlin and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2026] ARTA 178 (3 February 2026)