CPSU, The Community and Public Sector Union v Telstra

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 On 23 June 2000 I delivered judgment in this proceeding, dismissing the claim made by the applicant unions that Telstra had injured or prejudicially altered the position of its employees for a prohibited reason contrary to s 298K(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), or that it had made a threat to that effect. Briefly stated, it had been alleged that Telstra proposed or had threatened to discriminate against award-based employees or those who were employed under certified agreements for the purpose of determining which of its employees would be made redundant. I found that no employee had been injured or prejudicially affected and that all that had occurred was an instruction that could be construed by some as a direction that discrimination should occur. I said that it was necessary to find an actual injury or alteration of position. As regards the allegation that there had been a threat, I found that on the proper construction of s 298K it was necessary that Telstra's intention of inflicting injury on or prejudicially affecting the position of its employees must be communicated to those employees, and there had been no communication. The order dismissing the proceeding has not been perfected, that is to say, it has not been passed and entered. 2 The unions now ask that I recall the order and hear further argument on one issue. The unions wish to contend that I did not place a proper construction upon the word "threaten" in s 298K(1). They go further and say that I overlooked a decision of the Full Bench of the Commonwealth Industrial Court, Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) (1959) 1 FLR 465, which gave a different construction to the word and that I should follow that case. 3 It is settled law that until a judgment is passed and entered it is under the control of the judge who may recall it or alter it. Until the order is entered it is only provisionally effective. A judge has inherent jurisdiction to recall an order and, in cases in the Federal Court, the judge may also rely upon the power found in O 35 r 7(1) of the Rules. Although plainly there is power to recall the order I pronounced, the critical question I must determine is whether, in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to do so. 4 It is generally accepted that the power to vacate an order should be exercised with great caution. The circumstances which would justify a rehearing must be exceptional: State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Codelfa Construction (No 2) (1982) 150 CLR 29 at 38 per Mason and Wilson JJ; at 45 per Brennan J. Normally the power will be exercised only to deal with technical or incidental changes to the formal contents of an order. It should not be used as a substitute for an appeal. In Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 264-266 Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said of a case where reasons for judgment had been given, that the power will be exercised only if there is some matter calling for review. In Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 Mason CJ, after referring to Smith v New South Wales Bar Association said (at 303): "What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to reargue their cases." 5 The unions contend that my reasons demonstrate a clear error of law which, in the interests of justice, should be corrected by me instead of requiring the unions to take this case on appeal. They contend that the error is manifest in view of the decision in Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2), which places a different construction on the word "threaten" in s 298K. The unions say that Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) stands for the proposition that in s 298K(1), "threaten" does not mean that the proposed action must be uttered in the presence of the person threatened. They say that the case is authority for the view that a threat is constituted whenever a statement that prohibited conduct will be engaged in is uttered in the presence of any person whatsoever. 6 I must confess immediately that in deliberating on the case I paid no regard to Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2). I did not pay any attention to that authority because I was not aware of its existence. In passing, I note that it appears in the same volume of the Federal Law Reports as does Geitzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 1) (1959) 1 FLR 456, a decision to which I did make reference. 7 I accept some responsibility for not having discovered the case. I do not always rely on counsel to refer me to all decisions that may be in point. Often, following old habits learned at the Bar, I undertake my own research to satisfy myself that I have all the relevant cases, and sometimes those that are only remotely relevant. I did not do so on this occasion and, in the circumstances, that is a matter of some regret. I suppose it to be inevitable that I will find myself in the same position again in the future. Be that as it may, assuming for the moment that Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) is a decision that supports the unions' case, is the fact that I did not discover the case a reason to recall my judgment? 8 I am satisfied that it is not a sufficient reason to adopt the course the unions seek. The meaning of the word "threaten" was one of the issues that the parties came to court to argue. Before the commencement of the trial, Telstra had filed and served an outline of argument that referred to Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 1) as a relevant authority on the point which ultimately found favour with me. Neither in their written submissions nor in their oral argument did the unions refer me to Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) nor to any other decision dealing with the meaning of the word "threaten". 9 I must treat the present application as an attempt by the unions to reargue their case now they have found an authority which they say supports their position. This is not a case where the unions were deprived of an opportunity to present full argument on the construction of the section. The unions cannot show that by accident, or without fault on their part, they had not been heard on the point. 10 In rejecting the request to recall my order, I have proceeded on the basis that I am wrong as regards the meaning I attributed to the word "threaten" and that my judgment may be set aside by a Full Court. But that is not a sufficient reason to recall the order. Judges are often wrong. I may be wrong in this case. The fact that a judge gives a ruling in error is not, without more, a sufficient reason to allow an unsuccessful party to obtain a rehearing of a case on the merits. This is all the more so in a case where the authority upon which the unions now seek to rely was there to be found when the case was heard. 11 In the foregoing discussion I have assumed, in the unions' favour, not only that I was in error in my construction of s 298K(1) but that Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) demonstrates that error. As I have said, as regards the first point, I accept that a judge may be wrong even if very clear in his or her decision. No judge is infallible. But I do not agree that Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) demonstrates error on my behalf, or demonstrates error so clearly that it might be said that I should save the unions the trouble of taking the case on an appeal on which they will necessarily succeed. 12 Gietzelt v Craig-Williams Pty Ltd (No 2) involved a charge under the provision in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) which was the predecessor to s 298K. The charge alleged that the defendant threatened to dismiss an employee because the employee proposed to become a member of a union. The threat was said to have been made at a meeting called by the employer to inform staff of their impending dismissal. The person allegedly threatened was not in attendance at the meeting. In the event, the court dismissed the charge because it found that the employer had not threatened to dismiss its staff but had in fact dismissed them on the day in question. However, in the course of their reasons, the members of the court expressed the obiter opinion that a threat to dismiss an employee need not be made to the person threatened. Dunphy J said (at 467-468): "In my opinion it is not necessary under the section that the threat should be communicated to the persons threatened. If, for instance, an employer said to a union secretary 'I will dismiss any of my employees who proposes to join your union" a prosecution would lie if the employees never heard about the matter at all."