Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Rollinson - [2023] NSWSC 1390 - NSWSC 2023 case summary — Zoe

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Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Rollinson

[2023] NSWSC 1390

Supreme Court of NSW|2023-11-15|Before: Payne JA, Wilson J, Campbell J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2023-11-15

Before

Payne JA, Wilson J, Campbell J

Catchwords

(2009) 71 ACSR 279 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2014) 47 VR 527
205 A Crim R 1
[2010] NSWCCA 194 Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (2018) 99 NSWLR 229
[2008] HCA 36 Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) (2017) 256 FCR 90

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

(2009) 71 ACSR 279 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2014) 47 VR 527205 A Crim R 1[2010] NSWCCA 194 Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (2018) 99 NSWLR 229[2008] HCA 36 Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) (2017) 256 FCR 90[2011] HCA 39 NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Corry (No 8) [2022] NSWSC 97 Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435

Judgment (38 paragraphs)

[1]

Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682 Matthews v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] NSWCA 155 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Corry (No 8) [2022] NSWSC 97 Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19 Stanizzo v Fregnan [2021] NSWCA 195 Veen [No 2] v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 465 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 Category: Consequential orders Parties: Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (plaintiff) Michael Kelvyn Rollinson (defendant) Representation: Counsel:

[2]

[5]

Evidence

The parties prepared statements of agreed facts both for the charges that have come before me and for those that came before Beech-Jones CJ at CL in Rollinson [2022] NSWSC 407. Those statements are: For the proceedings before Beech-Jones CJ at CL: 1. An agreed statement filed on 1 March 2022 in proceeding 2021/224727; 2. Another agreed statement filed on 1 March 2022 in proceeding 2021/265078; For the present penalty hearing: 1. An agreed statement filed on 10 November 2022 in proceeding 2021/224727; 2. Another agreed statement filed on 10 November 2022 in proceeding 2021/265078;
In addition, the following evidence was led, without objection, before me: 1. Exhibit 13: Affidavit of Michael Rollinson affirmed 15 February 2022; 2. Exhibit 14: Expert report of Dr Andrew Ellis dated 18 February 2022; 3. Exhibit 15: Affidavit of Michael Rollinson affirmed 1 December 2022; 4. Exhibit 16: Medico-legal report of Adjunct Professor Dr Tuly Rosenfeld, dated 7 March 2023; 5. Exhibit 17: Medico-legal report of Dr Andrew Ellis, dated 6 April 2023; 6. Exhibit 18: Medico-legal report of Dr Andrew Ellis, dated 14 April 2023; 7. Exhibit 19: Affidavit of Janice Robson, former clerk at Latham Chambers, affirmed 30 May 2023; 8. Exhibit 20: Medico-legal report of Dr Andrew Ellis, dated 4 June 2023; 9. Exhibit 21: Affidavit of Brian Ralston, former barrister, affirmed 6 June 2023; 10. Exhibit 22: Medico-legal report of Adjunct Professor Tuly Rosenfeld, dated 8 June 2023; 11. Exhibit 23: Affidavit of Michelle Dennis sworn on 3 October 2023; 12. Exhibit 24: Letter from Michael Rollinson to respondents on Stanizzo special leave application, dated 24 February 2022; 13. Exhibit 25: Email from Michael Rollinson to solicitors involved in the application to reopen Vincent Stanizzo's special leave application, attaching a letter, dated 17 June 2022; 14. Exhibit 26: Letter from Michael Rollinson to Lawyers Weekly, The Editor, Momentum Media Group Pty Ltd, dated 5 July 2022; 15. Exhibit 27: Email from Michael Rollinson to Local Court of NSW in Wollongong, dated 9 July 2022; 16. Exhibit 28: Email from Michael Rollinson to Frank Lo Pilato, dated 13 July 2022 at 3:36 pm; 17. Exhibit 29: Email from Michael Rollinson to Frank Lo Pilato, dated 13 July 2022 at 5:08 pm; 18. Exhibit 30: Email from Michael Rollinson to Frank Lo Pilato, dated 14 July 2022, attaching a letter dated 9 December 2018; 19. Exhibit 31: Email from Michael Rollinson to Frank Lo Pilato, dated 20 July 2022, attaching a letter; 20. Exhibit 32: Email from Michael Rollinson to Bruce McClintock SC, dated 8 August 2022; 21. Exhibit 33: Email from Bruce McClintock SC to Michael Rollinson, dated 10 August 2022; 22. Exhibit 34: Email from Bruce McClintock SC to Michael Rollinson, dated 11 August 2022; 23. Exhibit 35: Email from Jerome Doraisamy, Editor of Lawyers Weekly, to Michael Rollinson, dated 5 July 2022; 24. Exhibit 36: Email from Michael Rollinson to Vincent Stanizzo, dated 5 July 2022; 25. Exhibit 37: Email from Michael Rollinson to Jerome Doraisamy, dated 6 July 2022; 26. Exhibit 38: Email from Michael Rollinson to Jerome Doraisamy, attaching a letter, dated 18 July 2022; 27. Exhibit 39: Email from Leonie Young, Registrar of the High Court, to Michael Rollinson, dated 7 July 2022; 28. Exhibit 40: Email from Michael Rollinson to Vincent Stanizzo, dated 7 July 2022; 29. Exhibit 41: Email from Vincent Stanizzo to Michael Rollinson, dated 7 July 2022; 30. Exhibit 42: Email from Michael Rollinson to Canberra Registry of the High Court, dated 7 July 2022 at 2:31 pm; 31. Exhibit 43: Email from Charles Waterstreet to Vincent Stanizzo, dated 7 July 2022; 32. Exhibit 44: Email from Michael Rollinson to Canberra Registry of the High Court, dated 7 July 2022 at 2:35 pm; 33. Exhibit 45: Email from Vincent Stanizzo to the Sydney Registry of the High Court, dated 20 July 2022; 34. Exhibit 46: Email from Vincent Stanizzo to Michael Rollinson and Charles Waterstreet, dated 20 July; 35. Exhibit 47: Email from Michael Rollinson to Canberra Registry of the High Court, dated 20 July 2022.
The evidence was all admitted without objection and both parties submitted that I should take all of that evidence into account and that it was unnecessary to opine about whether the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) or the common law applied or whether I need make an order dispensing with the rules of evidence. I express at the outset my gratitude to Ms Richardson SC and D Habashy and their instructor and Mr Game SC and D Barrow SC and their instructor for their very capable and considerable assistance.

[8]

The current contempt proceeding

All of the offending conduct I must consider occurred between 17 June and 8 August 2022, a period of about seven weeks. Twelve of the 13 charges are framed as a breach of the August Injunction, granted by Wilson J on 16 August 2021. The terms of that injunction are as follows: 1. Pursuant to s 447(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), an injunction is to operate during the period in which the defendant does not hold a current practising certificate, including: a) restraining the defendant from engaging in legal practice in New South Wales; b) restraining the defendant from advertising or representing, or doing anything that states or implies, that he is entitled to engage in legal practice in New South Wales; and c) restraining the defendant from republishing his name and contact information on the website of Latham Chambers (at www.lathamchambers.com.au).
The thirteenth charge is framed as a breach of the September Injunction made by Campbell J. The terms of that injunction are as follows: The Court orders: 1. Pursuant to s 447(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), an injunction to operate during the period in which the defendant does not hold a current practising certificate, restraining the defendant from: a. engaging in legal practice in New South Wales by: i. communicating with any legal practitioner in relation to the matter of Vinja Holdings Pty Ltd v Style Investments Pty Ltd; ii. communicating with any employee or officer of the Local Court of New South Wales in relation to the matter of Vinja Holdings Pty Ltd v Style Investments Pty Ltd; b. doing the following things that state or imply that he is entitled to engage in legal practice in New South Wales: i. appearing before, or communicating with, any judicial officer of the Local Court of New South Wales in relation to the matter of Vinja Holdings Pty Ltd v Style Investments Pty Ltd; ii. describing himself as a "barrister" or as "counsel"; iii. using the email address michael.rollinson@lathamchambers.com.au. 2. Pursuant to s 447(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), an injunction requiring the defendant to take all necessary steps within 5 days to ensure that the email address michael.rollinson@lathamchambers.com.au is deactivated, or otherwise rendered inoperative and to not take steps to re-activate or render that email address operative unless authorised by a further order of the Court. 3. Pursuant to s 447(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), an injunction requiring the defendant to provide to the Council of the New South Wales Bar Association within 5 days details of an email address at which he can be contacted for the purposes of receiving communications in relation to these proceedings.
In the agreed facts tendered before me, Mr Rollinson agreed that he knew both injunctions had been made and understood their effect.

[23]

Charge: Submissions in Vinja proceedings (9 July 2022)

On 9 July 2022, Mr Rollinson sent an email to the Wollongong Local Court, with the subject line "No. 2010/129885 - VINJA HOLDINGS v STYLE INVESTMENTS - LISTED ON 12 JULY 2022".
Attached to the email was a document entitled "SUBMISSIONS IN REPLY TO APPLICANT'S AMENDED SUBMISSIONS FILED ON 17 JUNE 2022".
In the covering email, Mr Rollinson wrote: Dear Registrar, Attached is Reply Submission by Respondents to the Motion. The delay in filing this is regretted. Regards, Michael Rollinson Agent for the Respondents / Judgment Creditors
Mr Rollinson, as I have said, sent a copy of this email and attached submissions to the other legal practitioner in the matter, Mr Andrew Stewart of Stewart Law.
Mr Rollinson pleaded guilty to each of the 13 charges of contempt.
The Bar Council submits, and Mr Game SC appearing for Mr Rollinson agrees, that Mr Rollinson's contempts were "criminal". The distinction between "civil" and "criminal" contempt, while much criticised, persists: Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36. Ordinarily, breaches of court orders, like those Mr Rollinson has committed, are treated as "civil" contempt: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 530. However, if a breach of order can be characterised as "contumacious" or "defiant", then that breach amounts to a criminal contempt: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 489 per Barwick CJ; Witham v Holloway at 530 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, at 538-39 per McHugh J.
None of the 13 present charges accused Mr Rollinson, in terms, of "defiant" or "contumacious" conduct. All 13 did, however, accuse him of a "wilfully disobedient" breach of the relevant injunction. The case law establishes that "wilful disobedience", in the law of contempt, means conduct that was not accidental, casual or unintentional: Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 113. Wilful disobedience, in that sense, is the mental state a contemnor must, at minimum, display if they are to be convicted of a civil contempt: Doyle v Commonwealth of Australia (1985) 156 CLR 510 at 516; Witham v Holloway at 542 per McHugh J. But "wilful disobedience" does not, without more, mean "contumacious" or "defiant". There is authority for the proposition that the Court may make a finding of contumacy, even when contumacy was not charged: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2014) 47 VR 527; [2014] VSCA 261 at [299]. As I have said, the parties each urge me to treat the 13 charges as criminal contempts, and I do.

[24]

Principles of punishment

This Court's power to punish contemnors is inherent to its function as a superior court of record. That power is not subject to criminal law sentencing statutes, including the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW): Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court (2018) 99 NSWLR 229; [2018] NSWCA 340.
Instead, the purpose of imposing punishment for contempt emerges from the nature of the contempt jurisdiction. The power to deal with contempt exists to safeguard the administration of justice, by vindicating the court's authority and ensuring the integrity of its processes: Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682 at 693; Mudginberri Station at 108. That purpose governs the exercise of the contempt power whether the Court is dealing with a civil or a criminal contempt: Mudginberri Station at 107; He v Sun (2021) 104 NSWLR 518; [2021] NSWCA 95 at [10].
An order or penalty dealing with a contemnor must be calibrated so as to be effective in safeguarding the administration of justice, as the joint judgment in Mudginberri Station held at 115: It is required of the chosen remedy that it be effective, no more but no less. For, if it is not effective, serious and lasting damage to the fabric of the law may result.
What order or penalty will be effective in a given case of contempt depends on the nature of the contempt charged. If the contempt arises from a breach of orders, then an important purpose of punishment is to demonstrate that those orders will be enforced and to reiterate that they must be obeyed.
This principle was distilled by Kirby J in Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19 as follows (at [149], footnotes omitted): [149] Unless courts are seen to respond firmly to deliberate defiance of their orders, their effectiveness in the authoritative determination of disputes of law would be undermined. And if they were not effective, "serious and lasting damage to the fabric of the law may result". Obviously, the culpability of the contemnor is relevant to the order which must be made. The contemnor must then be punished in an emphatic way. He or she must be deterred effectively from any temptation to re-offend. However, the focus of attention is not solely on the contemnor. It is also addressed to the community at large and to any others who might consider acting in a similar manner.
It should, however, be understood that ensuring obedience is not the overriding objective of punishment: the objective is always the protection of the due administration of justice. Other considerations may be important to that end.
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Matthews [2009] NSWSC 285; (2009) 71 ACSR 279 at [26]-[27], Barrett J set out a list of factors relevant when fashioning a penalty for contempt: 1. the seriousness of the contempt proved; 2. the contemnor's culpability; 3. the reason or motive for the contempt; 4. whether the contemnor has received, or sought to receive, a benefit or gain from the contempt; 5. whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor; 6. the character and antecedents of the contemnor; 7. the contemnor's personal circumstances; 8. the need for deterrence of the contemnor and others of like mind; and 9. the need for denunciation of contemptuous conduct.
These observations were referred to with approval by the Court of Appeal in Matthews v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] NSWCA 155 and by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) (2017) 256 FCR 90; [2017] FCAFC 111 at [102] per Besanko, Wigney and Bromwich JJ. See also He v Sun at [10] and [55] per Bell P (Gleeson and McCallum JJA agreeing) and NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Corry (No 8) [2022] NSWSC 97 at [31]-[32] per Bell P. To Barrett J's list in Matthews should be added the likely effect that punishment will have on the contemnor, including any hardship it might cause.
An effective penalty is one that takes careful account of interrelated considerations like those set out in Matthews. If the penalty imposed is harsher than those considerations as a whole seem to demand, then the effect may be that confidence in the fairness of court processes and respect for the court's authority may be impaired, with the result that the administration of justice is harmed rather than protected.
Finally, it is important to note that sentencing a contemnor to a term of imprisonment is a penalty of last resort.

[25]

Available penalties

As I have said, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act does not apply. Instead, the range of penalties derives from the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), read in light of the common law. Part 55 r 13(1) of the Supreme Court Rules allows the Court to punish contemnors by a fine or by committal to a correctional facility, or both. Rule 13(3) allows the Court to impose punishment on terms: The Court may make an order for punishment on terms, including a suspension of punishment or a suspension of punishment in case the contemnor gives security in such manner and in such sum as the Court may approve for good behaviour and performs the terms of the security.
In the first contempt proceedings, Beech-Jones CJ at CL made two important observations about the correct interpretation of r 55.13. First, r 55.13(3) does not limit the Court in the conditions it can attach to a suspended punishment: [87] I do not take the requirement to give security for good behaviour as limiting the conditions attaching to a suspension of any such penalty. In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 ("Maniam No 2") the Court of Appeal held that it had power to impose a condition that the contemnor perform community service as a condition of suspending a fine (at 319 per Kirby P; 320 per Mahoney JA and 321 per Hope AJA). Bell P, as his Honour then was, adopted that course in NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Corry (No 8) [2022] NSWSC 97 (at [96]; "NHB"; see also Mirus Australia Pty Ltd v Gage [2018] NSWSC 35; "Mirus") ….
Second, the terms of r 55.13(1) do not prevent the Court from declining to fine a contemnor or commit them: [87] … Further, just because SCR, r 55.13 empowers the Court to impose a fine or commit a contemnor to a correctional centre does not preclude a Court from determining that neither sanction should be imposed and, say, the making of a declaration or an order as to costs will serve the purposes of punishment.
The second observation has particular force in light of the principle that imprisonment is a punishment of last resort. That principle applies in contempt proceedings, notwithstanding that contempt is not part of the ordinary criminal law. As McCallum JA explained in He v Sun: [68] … imprisonment is a punishment of last resort: R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168; [2004] NSWCCA 131 at [115] (Spigelman CJ, Wood CJ at CL and Simpson J). While that is a proposition that arises most commonly in the discourse of the criminal law, there is no reason in principle why the same restraint should not apply to punishment of contempt and every reason why it should. That is a necessary incident of the common law's acceptance that the right to personal liberty is a fundamental common law right which "cannot be impaired or taken away without lawful authority and then only to the extent and for the time which the law prescribes": Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88 at 292 (Mason and Brennan JJ). In my view, it is appropriate to proceed on the basis that, where a person is being dealt with for contempt in civil proceedings, as where a person is being sentenced for a criminal offence, the course of committing the contemnor to a correctional centre or sentencing the offender to a term of imprisonment should not be taken before considering whether there is any alternative course that is appropriate in the circumstances, having regard to the nature and object of the function in question.
Bell P cited these remarks with approval in NHB Enterprises (No 8) at [30].

[31]

Mr Rollinson's association with Mr Stanizzo

A substantial amount of the legal work the contemnor performed in recent years, and all the legal work after the April 2022 penalty hearing, was for Mr Stanizzo. Michelle Dennis, the contemnor's solicitor, in an affidavit of 3 October 2023 detailed the history of this relationship. Annexure G to Ms Dennis' affidavit is a table of 28 cases available online where Mr Rollinson appeared for Mr Stanizzo.
Evidence suggests that Mr Rollinson was vulnerable to manipulation and pressure from Mr Stanizzo. The affidavit of Ms Janice Robson, the clerk at the defendant's chambers between 2001 and 2021 states: Mr Stanizzo was based in Wollongong; however he would come to Sydney often, demanding more and more of Michael's time. … Mr Stanizzo would ring Michael many times a day, every day. If he was in Sydney, I could hear him abuse Michael in the conference room repeatedly. The conference room was close to my desk. Eventually Mr Stanizzo was taking up all of Michael's time. I often worried that Michael was not being paid. No one could understand why Michael continued to represent him. I was very concerned about the relationship and for Michael's safety. Mr Stanizzo would telephone Michael every Friday night, just as Michael was beginning to relax a little over a glass of wine. This would be at 6:30 PM or 7 PM, when Michael should have been entitled to a break. I was always wanting to say Michael was unavailable, but Michael always took his calls. After I left Latham Chambers I heard from Fiona Foote, the current Clerk, that Mr Stanizzo continued to call Michael every Friday night.
Brian Ralston, a former barrister who shared chambers with the defendant for many years and whose affidavit dated 6 June 2023 is before me, observed: Prior to my leaving the floor I was aware that Michael was being briefed by a solicitor by the name of Vince Stanizzo. I do not personally know Stanizzo but saw him from time to time at Latham Chambers where he spoke to Michael. Our clerk, Janice, spoke to me on a number of occasions about her concerns that Michael was dealing with Stanizzo, who appeared from my limited observations to possess a bumptious and aggressive demeanour. The floor's Friday drinks took place at the floor's reception, and either Janice or the receptionist would answer calls that came while we were having our get together. The general approach of the members when advised that there was a call for them at such time was, unless for example they had a matter on the Monday and were waiting for a call, to say that they would get back to the caller. On many occasions Janice would say to Michael "It's Vince" following which Michael rushed to his room to take the call. I note that almost all of Michael's inappropriate behaviour has related to Stanizzo's personal court matters.
Both Dr Ellis and Adjunct Professor Rosenfeld were asked to consider the impact of Mr Stanizzo upon the defendant's capacity to make sensible judgments.
In answer to this question, Dr Ellis wrote in his Third Report: In summary his mental conditions would render him vulnerable to influence and impair judgement around decisions. This change in capacity would have been present for some time before 2021 and continue to be present. The effect of the COVID pandemic would have left him more socially isolated, and less able to reflect with others on the appropriateness of decisions. (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in his Supplementary Report dated 8 June 2023, Adjunct Professor Rosenfeld wrote: It is in my experience often the case that individuals suffering with mental and personality issues, particularly when worsened by brain disease and cognitive impairment, are adversely affected and likely to compensate poorly when additional stresses, anxiety, and adverse influences, are superimposed. In my view Mr Rollinson is particularly so vulnerable. The nature of the behaviours that Mr Rollinson has experienced and dealt with, as indicated in the history provided by Ms Robson, would in my view have adversely influenced, directed and affected Mr Rollinson's actions, judgement and decision making, and his ability to properly judge and respond to situations in the period from 1 July 2021.
I accept Adjunct Professor Rosenfeld's evidence.

[35]

Consideration

Mr Rollinson committed his further 13 contempts while already under the suspended order of committal imposed by Beech-Jones CJ at CL. His breach of the terms of that suspension bears on the appropriate penalty for the present 13 charges.
Ordinarily, I would have no hesitation in imposing a sentence of full-time imprisonment in relation to a barrister who re-offended during the period that an earlier sentence of imprisonment had been suspended. I have concluded here, however, that exceptional circumstances have been shown, and that this is not a case where the suspension should be lifted such that Mr Rollinson serve a sentence of full-time imprisonment. My reasons are as follows.
All 13 instances of contempt since 8 April 2022 involve the defendant communicating either by email or letter on behalf of Vincent Stanizzo or his private company Vinja Holdings. On the evidence Mr Stanizzo was a bully who took advantage of Mr Rollinson's vulnerability. I find that but for Mr Stanizzo taking advantage of Mr Rollinson's mental deterioration the conduct the subject of these proceedings would not have occurred.
The offending spanned the period between 17 June and 8 August 2022. The principal feature of the conduct is the breach of the orders of the Supreme Court and the terms of the suspended sentence imposed on 8 April 2022. There is no evidence the defendant benefitted financially from this conduct and every reason to think he did not. Whilst I accept that the letter styled as a "concerns notice" led to Lawyers Weekly taking down an article from the internet, there is no evidence that Mr Rollinson's conduct had a negative impact on the administration of justice generally. At the time of this offending, Mr Rollinson was the subject of demanding and abusive conduct from Mr Stanizzo and was also impacted by his progressively deteriorating mental state.
Prior to July 2021 the defendant was a person of good character. At that point he was 61 years of age. These further offences are a continuation of his early misconduct, dealt with in April 2022 by Beech-Jones CJ at CL.
The defendant's deteriorating mental condition, his pre-existing personality traits and the oppressive impact of Mr Stanizzo's conduct are the principal causative factors regarding all of his conduct since July 2021 in breach of orders of the Supreme Court. In the circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a considerable measure of leniency.
Mr Rollinson has pleaded guilty to each of the 13 present charges. The guilty pleas were entered at the first opportunity. The entry of the pleas and the agreement with the facts alleged by the Bar Council indicates a willingness on his part to facilitate the course of justice.
The 13 offences that are the subject of the further proceedings occurred between 17 June 2022 and 8 August 2022. As noted, on each occasion the defendant acted at the behest of Mr Stanizzo. There have been no further instances of this conduct for the last 15 months. I conclude that the oppressive influence exerted upon the defendant by Mr Stanizzo during 2021 and 2022 is no longer occurring, and that further offending is unlikely.
I am fortified in that conclusion by the steps Mr Rollinson has latterly taken to seek treatment and improve his circumstances. As detailed in the affidavit of Ms Dennis, Mr Rollinson applied at Centrelink for the JobSeeker allowance in September 2023.
Ms Dennis also records that the defendant has now applied for a Medicare card and obtained a referral from Dr Charles Geale, a general practitioner, to Professor Rebekah Ahmed at the Memory and Cognition Clinic run at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital.

[37]

Orders

I emphasise to Mr Rollinson that the orders I will shortly pronounce afford him considerable leniency. If there is a breach of the orders, I will have no choice but to impose a term of full-time imprisonment.
For the foregoing reasons I make the following orders: 1. Remand the proceedings for sentence to 13 November 2024 at 10am on the condition that Mr Rollinson enter an agreement to comply with the following conditions: 1. To be of good behaviour (which includes, for the avoidance of doubt, compliance with the orders of the Court made by Wilson J on 16 August 2021 and Campbell J on 16 September 2021). 2. To accept no contact from and initiate no contact with Vincent Stanizzo. 3. To attend the medical practice East Sydney Doctors at 102 Burton Street, East Sydney, at least once every three months and to accept all reasonable advice, treatment and referral. 4. Upon the receipt of his Medicare Card, to make an appointment within 7 days to attend the Memory and Cognition Clinic at the Prince Alfred Hospital and thereafter accept the treatment, assistance and supervision made available to him by the staff of the Centre. 5. To appear before the Supreme Court as directed. 6. A written report about compliance with orders (a) to (e) is to be provided by email to the plaintiff's representatives and to the Associate to Payne JA by 9 February 2024 at 4pm. 7. A further report about compliance with orders (a) to (e) is to be provided by email to the plaintiff's representatives and to the Associate to Payne JA by 6 November 2024 at 4pm. 8. Liberty to apply to the Court for a variation of the conditions on 3 days notice. 1. Adjourn the plaintiff's application for costs on the amended notice of motion filed on 23 September 2022 and the notice of motion filed 11 August 2022 until 13 November 2024.
Mr Rollinson's agreement to these conditions may be effected by signing a copy of these orders. A signed copy of the orders should be provided by Mr Rollinson's representatives to the plaintiff's representatives and to my associate by 5pm on Friday 17 November 2023.

Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Rollinson

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (38 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (38)

Cited By (7)