the whole conduct was designed to thwart the recovery from the practitioner by his former client of the relevant fees charged by the practitioner, that is the fees for the work the subject of the client's professional negligence claim.

1. When considering the culpability of the behaviour, there was no utility in breaking the conduct up into sub-categories.
2. This was a case in which the Tribunal had little difficulty in coming to a conclusion in categorisation of the conduct of the respondent. He entered into an agreement with a former client regarding payment of a sum of money representing fees paid by the client to him which the practitioner should repay according to a judgment of the Court. The practitioner had agreed to the order for costs and to the quantification of the amount of it at mediation. These matters are referred to at paragraphs 5 to 10 of the Tribunal's Reasons for Decision of 2 October 2014, referred to above.
3. The practitioner reneged on his obligation at an early stage and did everything in his power to avoid the debt. This extended to deliberately misleading a Court and a fellow practitioner who was acting for the respondent. The Tribunal took the view that the conduct of the respondent at all stages was most dishonourable. He went to great lengths to use his training and experience in the legal profession and his knowledge of the courts and their procedures to thwart the legitimate entitlement of the former client. That conduct clearly drew on his knowledge of the reliance placed by courts and other practitioners on the veracity of what they are told by another legal practitioner in the course of day to day dealings and on the honesty and reliability of that person when doing so.
4. The Tribunal was referred to a number of decisions of this tribunal in disciplinary cases and to passages from the Riley Solicitors Manual.[2] Those statements taken in conjunction with the extent of the Tribunal's disapproval of the respondent's conduct can only lead to one conclusion: that the respondent was guilty of professional misconduct.
5. It is regrettable to note that the respondent effectively succeeded in his endeavours. This he has done without one shred of indication to the Tribunal of contrition or regret.

1. It is clear that the primary objective of the Tribunal in the sanction phase of the hearing is the protection of the public. That this is the case has been referred to in many reported decisions of this tribunal and in other jurisdictions. It is however inevitable that any outcome will have some element of punishment as a component; it being anticipated that having experienced a sanction a practitioner will not repeat the behaviour. Thus the objective of protection of the public is usually served.
2. That primary objective of protection of the public directly raises, in the circumstances of this case, the issue of whether the respondent is a fit and proper person to practise as a legal practitioner bearing in mind the gravity of his conduct. When considering that issue a number of matters are relevant.
3. The first matter for consideration is any prior disciplinary proceedings. The Tribunal noted with concern that the course of action amounting to professional misconduct in this case culminated in late May 2013, coinciding with a period of time during which the practitioner was involved in other disciplinary proceedings in this Tribunal. Those proceedings, which included an allegation, which was admitted, of misleading a Court, were finalised by consent orders on 8 August 2013. At the time that the behaviour the subject of the current proceedings occurred, the practitioner's obligations to the Court, clients and other practitioners should have been at the forefront of his mind. That they clearly were not, or that he chose to ignore those considerations, must reflect upon his character.
4. The previous disciplinary matters involving the practitioner include other occasions on which his obligations as a legal practitioner have been breached, albeit none of which involve conduct of the extent and duration as in these proceedings. The history does, however, stand to indicate that the respondent has not benefitted by learning from those outcomes, nor has he attempted to ensure that his conduct met acceptable standards.
5. Also relevant to the outcome to be imposed are those subjective factors related to the practitioner. The respondent's solicitor relied upon statements of support from other practitioners and family members to submit that the conduct the subject of these proceedings was out of character. One of the tendered statements suggested that there was some remorse. Although the respondent gave evidence during the hearing in the sense of entering the witness box for cross examination on affidavits filed, he gave no evidence independently of cross examination and volunteered no explanation for his conduct.
6. The Tribunal cannot accept that the conduct was out of character: it caused considerable harm; it was considered; it was constant over an extended period of time; and there are the prior disciplinary proceedings, one of which involved the issue of misleading a Court and was being finalised at the relevant time.
7. Likewise the Tribunal cannot accept that the respondent now bears any contrition or sorrow for what he did professionally or for his lack of concern at the relevant time for his former client. The practitioner did not himself offer any evidence indicating contrition or apology for his conduct. This was so even after the Tribunal on 23 February 2015 indicated to the parties its finding on categorisation of his conduct. The practitioner instead relied on the submissions of his solicitor, a report from his general practitioner, and a number of statements of support from friends and family.
8. The solicitor for the respondent urged the Tribunal to take into account, in considering the appropriate outcome, the significant stress the respondent had been under in the period leading to and encompassing the conduct. This is clearly relevant, and it explains in part why the respondent behaved the way he did. It provides, however, no justification or excuse for his behaviour.
9. Legal practitioners are also people, and can expect to experience at points in their careers, times of personal or financial stress, physical illness, loss or sorrow. The pressures of practice also can be at times overwhelming, and it is unsurprising that it is now reported that the legal profession experiences a high rate of mental health issues. The Tribunal is not unsympathetic to the personal situation this practitioner found himself in. Nonetheless, the high degree of trust placed in legal practitioners by the public, other practitioners and the Courts, which is necessary for proper functioning of our legal system, requires that even in times of great hardship a practitioner must be able to be relied upon to observe their obligations.
10. When the Tribunal takes into account the gravity of the conduct, the practitioner's lack of contrition, and the prior disciplinary history which demonstrates repeated failure to meet his obligations, it is driven to the conclusion that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to conduct the practice of law. It therefore made recommendations that his name be removed from the roll in the ACT and that his practising certificate in the State of NSW be cancelled.
11. In those circumstances and in the absence of any submission to the contrary, an order for costs was also made in favour of the applicant in accordance with section 433 of the Legal Profession Act 2006.

[1] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner 'P4' [2014] ACAT 64

[2] G. E. Dal Pont and Frank Riley, Riley Solicitors Manual (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005)