CLL25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 333

Balbir Singh v Western Australian General Practice Education and Training Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 655

BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 788

CEPU (Western Australia Division) v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [2016] FCCA 1227; (2016) 310 FLR 1

CWX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 365

DDN23 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 895

DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1158

DMV22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 689

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

EQJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1476

FEH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 293

GKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1125

Hussain v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1035

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZANS [2005] FCAFC 41; (2005) 141 FCR 586; (2005) 215 ALR 733; (2005) 86 ALD 583

Myers v Myers [1969] WAR 19

MZZZL v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1309

NAKX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559

NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176

Rajmohan v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1556

Sali v SPC Ltd [1993] HCA 47; (1993) 67 ALJR 841; (1993) 116 ALR 625

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 108

Suh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 42; (2009) 175 FCR 515; (2009) 108 ALD 470

Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1569

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Annual Reports 2024-25

LawCite (Australasian Legal Information Institute (austlii.edu.au))

In person (by telephone), with the assistance of an interpreter

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

1. The first applicant's Application in a Proceeding lodged on 3 February 2026 and accepted for filing on 4 February 2026 be dismissed.
2. The first applicant have leave to appear at the final hearing of this matter on 9 February 2026 by either video link or telephone.
3. The first applicant pay the first respondent's costs of today which if not agreed are to be assessed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. These are the Court's Reasons for Judgment in relation to orders made on 5 February 2026 in relation to an application in a proceeding[1] made by the first applicant, CLL25, seeking adjournment of the final hearing of a migration judicial review application[2] listed for 2.00 pm on 9 February 2026. At the time the orders were made on 5 February 2026 the Court indicated that it would provide written Reasons for Judgment at a later date.[3] The orders made on 5 February 2026 were as follows:
   1. The first applicant's application in a proceeding lodged on 3 February 2026 and accepted for filing on 4 February 2026 be dismissed.
   2. The first applicant have leave to appear at the final hearing of this matter on 9 February 2026 by either video link or telephone.
   3. The first applicant pay the first respondent's costs of today which if not agreed are to be assessed.

1. The Adjournment Application was brought against the following backgound:

(a) on 24 February 2025 the applicants, CLL25 and CLM25,[4] filed the Judicial Review Application made under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);

(b) the first respondent, now the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,[5] filed a response on 10 March 2025 seeking orders that the Judicial Review Application be dismissed on the basis that the decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal[6] the subject of the Judicial Review Application was not affected by jurisdictional error;

(c) on 27 May 2025 a Registrar of the Court made the usual orders made by a Registrar at a first appearance in migration judicial review matters, including orders that:

(i) the matter be listed for final hearing on a date to be fixed; and

(ii) the Applicants file and serve written submissions at least 28 days before the hearing;

(d) the Court Book[7] was filed on 3 June 2025;

(e) on 4 August 2025 (and for reasons which are not readily apparent) another Registrar of the Court made further programming orders,[8] including orders that:

(i) the matter be listed for a final hearing on a date to advised; and

(ii) the Applicants file and serve any written submissions at least 28 days before the hearing;

(f) on 3 December 2025 a notice of listing for an in-person hearing in the Perth Registry of the Judicial Review Application on 9 February 2026[9] was sent to the parties by the Court;

(g) the Applicants did not file written submissions in accordance with the Registrar's August 2025 Orders, or at all; and

(h) on 23 January 2026 the Minister filed written submissions in accordance with the Registrar's August 2025 Orders.

(a) by email sent to the presiding Judge's Chambers on Saturday 31 January 2026 CLL25 requested an adjournment of the Final Hearing, and attached what he described as "relevant medical documents";

(b) on 2 February 2026 the presiding Judge's Associate emailed CLL25 and advised that to seek an adjournment of the Final Hearing, he may:

(i) seek the Minister's consent and file proposed consent orders for adjournment of the Final Hearing; or

(ii) file an application in a proceeding seeking orders for adjournment of the Final Hearing, together with a supporting affidavit,

and attached a link to information on the Court's website in relation to applications in a proceeding;

(c) on 3 February 2026 a confirmation of listing of the Final Hearing was sent to the parties by the Court by email; and

(d) the Adjournment Application, together with a supporting affidavit by CLL25, [10] was lodged on 3 February 2026 and accepted for filing on 4 February 2026.

1. In the Adjournment Application CLL25 sought an order:
   1. That the Final Hearing listed on 9 February 2026 at 2:00 PM be adjourned to a later date.

and noted that the adjournment was sought on medical grounds due to CLL25's current medical condition and ongoing treatment.

1. On 4 February 2026 the parties were advised by the presiding Judge's Associate that the Adjournment Application had been listed for hearing on 5 February 2026 and that the Applicants had leave to appear via video-link.
2. At the hearing of the Adjournment Application:

(a) CLL25 appeared by telephone, with the assistance of an interpreter;

(b) CLM25 did not appear;

(c) the Minister did not oppose the tendering of CLL25's Adjournment Affidavit and did not seek to cross examine CLL25 on CLL25's Adjournment Affidavit, or otherwise; and

(d) CLL25 and the Minister's lawyer made oral submissions.[11]

1. In CLL25's Adjournment Affidavit CLL25 states that:

(a) the outcome of the proceedings primarily concern him, and he is required to personally attend and participate in the Final Hearing;

(b) he is currently suffering from lower back and gluteal pain, consistent with sciatic-type pain, which significantly restricts his ability to sit, stand, or remain in one position for extended periods;

(c) on or about 30 January 2026 he attended a medical clinic and was examined by a medical practitioner. He was issued a medical certificate[12] (which was annexed) confirming that he was unfit to continue his usual occupation for the stated period;

(d) he was further referred for physiotherapy treatment and additional medical investigation, including imaging, which was yet to be completed (and an imaging request[13] was annexed);

(e) due to his current medical condition he was not physically able to attend Court or meaningfully participate in a final hearing at this time;

(f) as he is the primary applicant, his inability to attend or properly participate would cause significant prejudice to the conduct of the proceedings;

(g) therefore he seeks a short adjournment to allow time for medical treatment and recovery so that he may properly present his case before the Court; and

(h) the request is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

1. The Medical Certificate, signed by a medical practitioner, relevantly provides as follows (with CLL25's name redacted):

1. The Imaging Request, which is signed by the same medical practitioner as signed the Medical Certificate, relevantly provides as follows:

1. At the hearing of the Adjournment Application CLL25 made the following oral submissions:[14]

(a) that he had a booking with the Imaging Request provider the next day;

(b) when prompted by the Court as to whether he wished to say anything specific about the Medical Certificate or the Imaging Request, said only that he had an appointment with the Imaging Request provider "to check my health";

(c) when asked by the Court why he could not appear at the hearing by telephone as he was presently doing, said "I can't stand for long time, and my back hurts. So I - I'm not feeling too well"; and

(d) in reply (to the Minister's oral submissions) said that he:

(i) was feeling too unwell to attend the Final Hearing in person, and he had an appointment to see a medical practitioner the next day; and

(ii) did not know whether the treatment would prolong to the day of Final Hearing or not.

1. At the hearing of the Adjournment Application the Minister made the following oral submissions:[15]

(a) there was no adequate explanation for the adjournment as the medical evidence does not indicate why CLL25 is unfit to appear in Court, but rather only that CLL25 is receiving medical treatment for the period to 4 February 2026 and that he was unfit to continue in his usual occupation;

(b) that the Minister did not oppose CLL25:

(i) being given leave to appear at the Final Hearing by video-link; and

(ii) sitting, or standing. or being given breaks to move around, if needed at the Final Hearing;

(c) in circumstances where the Court has a significant caseload and the time for the Final Hearing might otherwise have been allocated to another case, there would be a waste of the Court's time and resources if the Final Hearing were to be adjourned to a later date; and

(d) the Judicial Review Application lacks merit, and therefore an adjournment is not in the interests of the administration of justice.

1. It is convenient at the outset to review some of the authorities concerning the nature of evidence required for the adjournment of hearings on the basis of the non-appearance of a party or person for medical reasons where a so-called "bare" medical certificate is provided.
2. In NAKX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs_[16]_ the Federal Court dealt with an adjournment application on the basis of two medical certificates as follows:
   1. The medical certificate dated 13 December 2003 in respect of the male applicant states as follows:

This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Dermatitis atopic and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 01/01/2004 inclusive.

The certificate of the same date in respect of the female appellant states:

This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above named person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Anxiety disorder/Depression and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 13/01/2004 inclusive.

1. The medical certificates are quite unsatisfactory. They do not address the critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the appellant from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a court hearing.
2. I do not accept that either of the medical conditions referred to would make the sufferer 'unable to attend court' - apparently each was able to attend upon the medical practitioner.
3. If the certificates were meant to say that the medical condition would prevent the sufferer from participating effectively in a court hearing, they do not in fact say that and do not explain why the medical condition would have that effect.
4. I take into account the fact that the two medical certificates are structured identically, use the expression 'he/she', and are dated the same day, which was only two days before the hearing. The certificates have the appearance of being pro forma certificates which are available for the asking.
5. In any event, even accepting the certificates on their face, I find them unpersuasive for the reasons given at [6]-[8] above.

1. In Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[17] the Federal Court had before it a request for an adjournment supported by a chiropractor's certificate indicating that the appellant was unfit due to a spinal injury, and, having referred to NAKX, it observed as follows:

The case [a reference to NAKX] indicates that what needs to be provided for a medical certificate to be meaningful is material that establishes why it is or how it is that the appellant suffering from a medical condition would be unfit for participation at a court hearing. In this case, neither the certificate by Dr Carbone, nor the letter enclosing it from the appellant, establishes why the appellant would be unable to attend court. We know from the certificate and the letter that the appellant has a spinal condition. We know also that it requires chiropractic treatment. We do not know what the spinal condition is or why the spinal condition would prevent him from attending court. The certificate says that the appellant is unfit for physical activity, but that description is of such a generality as to be unhelpful. It does not assist the court to evaluate why it is or how it is that the appellant's condition would prevent him from attending court. A certificate of the kind relied upon by the appellant does not assist him to make the case for an adjournment of a court hearing. Accordingly I find the certificate to be insufficient to warrant the grant of an adjournment. In addition, it was provided only on the last business day before the hearing, with no explanation about why the certificate was obtained only the last business day before the scheduled hearing of Mr Singh's appeal, or why the application for the adjournment was not made until then. These are all circumstances that militate against the grant of an adjournment. If the appellant had a condition of the kind that prevented him from attending court, an application should have been made earlier, and if there was some reason why it could not have been made earlier, that needed to be explained in his application. That has not occurred and the application for adjournment is rejected.[18]

1. In AAL17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[19] the Federal Court had before it a request, made the afternoon before the listing date, to adjourn the hearing of an appeal on the basis of a medical certificate as to which the Federal Court observed as follows:
   1. I have set out above the adjournment request. In my view the medical certificate provided was wholly deficient in apprising the Court of the circumstances which would lead the Court to conclude that the appellant has an acceptable explanation for not appearing this morning. As I explained in a similar context in SZWBK v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 1020 (at [15]), a case where the appellant sought an adjournment due to back pains:

The medical certificates do not purport to address the critical question of whether, and if so why, the relevant "medical condition" would prevent the first appellant from travelling to Court and participating effectively in the hearing. Like the position in NAKX and Singh, I do not accept, on the basis of the material provided, that the Delphically described "medical condition" would have prevented the first appellant from travelling to Court and participating effectively in the hearing. Even if I was wrong about this, there is no explanation as to why the first appellant could not have made the necessary arrangements to attend the hearing by telephone ... I agree, with respect, with what Pagone J said in Singh (at [2]), namely that:

... what needs to be provided for a medical certificate to be meaningful is material that establishes why it is or how it is that the appellant suffering from a medical condition would be unfit for participation at a court hearing.[20]

1. What all the cases referred to above demonstrate is that:

(a) it is unsatisfactory and insufficient for an applicant for an adjournment of proceedings to rely upon a medical certificate which asserts unfitness by reason of an unspecified medical condition with unspecified medical consequences beyond mere unfitness; and

(b) there needs to be meaningful detail and content provided by the medical practitioner to explain why the medical condition and its consequences mean that the person seeking the adjournment cannot attend the proceedings personally or participate in the proceedings electronically or telephonically.

1. The judgments in NAKX, Singh 2016 FCA and AAL17, being judgments of a single judge of the Federal Court dealing with subject matter (adjournment applications supported by medical or allied health certificates) being considered by this Court are binding on this Court.[21] Further, they have been regularly applied in this Court (and the Federal Circuit Court and Federal Magistrates Court as this Court was formerly styled): Singh FCA 2016 on at least 30 occasions and NAKX on more than 100 occasions.[22]

Observations on the Medical Certificate and the Imaging Request considered together

(a) is a bare medical certificate, and not one which provides meaningful material or information as to the nature of the medical treatment CLL25 is said to be receiving, or why it renders him unfit to continue his usual occupation. There is no evidence as to what CLL25's usual occupation is, and the want of evidence in that regard prevents inferences - either positive or negative - being drawn in relation to the Adjournment Application from whatever CLL25's usual occupation, if any, might be;

(b) does not say what condition CLL25 is actually suffering from (and in this respect the Medical Certificate is even barer than that considered in, for example, NAKX where the nature of the conditions suffered by the recipients of the medical certificates was set out);

(c) does not address how whatever medical condition the Medical Certificate refers to affects CLL25's ability to appear at the Final Hearing; and

(d) covers a period which expired the day before the Adjournment Application hearing and five days before the Final Hearing.

(a) is of a type - being so general as to be unhelpful[23] - the federal courts have consistently rejected as justifying the grant of an adjournment;

(b) generally speaking, suffers from many of the deficiencies identified in the NAKX line of cases discussed above; and

(c) does not extend to the date of the Final Hearing.

1. The Imaging Request does not advance CLL25's case much: it simply requests an ultrasound scan of CLL25's left gluteal, and notes "severe pain" in the "left gluteal region" which is "worse with movement" and suggests it might be a "tear" or "tendinopathy" (sic) in a muscle. The Imaging Request does not (and to be fair was probably never intended to) convey information specifically related to why CLL25 could not attend a court hearing, whether by travelling to and personally appearing in a courtroom, or appearing by video-link or telephone. In that regard it is also so general as to be unhelpful;[24]
2. The Court notes that CLL25 would have had to travel from his home to see his medical practitioner on 31 January 2026 (the date the Medical Certificate was "completed"), and that he had a further appointment with a medical practitioner the day following the hearing of the Adjournment Application.
3. CLL25 would also have to travel to the radiologist to fulfil the Imaging Request (something which had not been done at the time of the Adjournment Application).
4. The Court infers from the fact that CLL25 has had to travel to see his medical practitioner and would have to travel to fulfil the Imaging Request that he does have the capacity to travel if required for a particular purpose. Further, and in conjunction with the inferences drawn about CLL25's capacity to travel, the fact that there is no statement about the nature of the injury being one which might prevent CLL25 from travelling to attend Court, attending Court in person face-to-face, or by video-link or telephone, leads the Court to conclude that there is no substantive basis for an adjournment of the Final Hearing.

1. Section 202 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)[25] provides as follows:

(1) The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) or a Judge may, for the purposes of any proceeding, direct or allow a person to appear before the Court or the Judge by way of video link or audio link.

(2) The power conferred on the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) or a Judge by subsection (1) may be exercised:

(a) on the application of a party to the proceedings concerned; or

(b) on the Court's own initiative or on the Judge's own initiative, as the case may be.

(3) This section applies whether the person appearing is in or outside Australia, but does not apply if the person appearing is in New Zealand.

1. The Court notes that, particularly in migration judicial review matters, it regularly grants parties leave to appear by video-link or audio-link. In recent years the Court has made a number of observations concerning the use of video-link technology to facilitate appearances in migration judicial review (and other) matters.
2. In CWX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs[26] the Court observed, ex tempore, that:
   1. These are interlocutory proceedings in relation to an application to reinstate judicial review proceedings. That is, administrative law proceedings in relation to the Migration Act. These types of proceedings in this Court are regularly heard by video link. And, if not the majority, then certainly a significant proportion of the applications of this type, both interlocutory and substantive in this Court, are heard by video link. Merely by way of example, the Court as presently constituted would hear eight or nine out of every 10 applications of this type by video link in relation to persons who are applicants in the Melbourne and Adelaide Registries. Because the proceedings are judicial review proceedings, there is generally no need for evidence to be led because what the Court is doing is seeking to establish whether or not there was jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. And even in cases where evidence does need to be led and cross-examination and re-examination need to occur, that regularly does happen by video link. Since the COVID pandemic, this Court has made a significant move away from face to face in-person hearings in the migration space. And as indicated earlier, if not the majority, then certainly a significant proportion of the applications before this Court in relation to Migration Act proceedings are heard by video link.
   2. It follows that, there is no necessity for applicants or lawyers to travel to the place or to the Registry where the Judge is sitting. And it is not uncommon, for example, to have a situation such as today's where the applicants are in Victoria; the Minister's lawyer is from Melbourne; and the Judge is sitting in Perth. And it is not unusual, again, for example, to have a judge sitting in Perth; applicants in South Australia; applicant's lawyers in Melbourne; and the Minister's lawyers in Sydney, all appearing or observing by video link. There is simply no necessity in a proceeding such as this for it to be heard on a face-to-face in-person basis.[27]
3. In Hussain v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[28] the Court observed that:

In denying the request to transfer the proceedings the Court as presently constituted was conscious of the duty that the Court has under the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act) to "facilitate the just resolution of disputes ... as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible." Further the Court has legislative objectives that include "the efficient disposal of the Court's overall case load" and "the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner." Adjourning the matter so as to transfer it to Queensland would have unnecessarily delayed the conduct of a hearing in circumstances where video-link facilities are equally effective. The FCFCOA Act provides that a "Judge may, for the purposes of any proceeding direct ... a person to appear before the ... Judge by way of video link...". The FCFCOA Act also provides for the making of submissions by video-link. In the present matter, the Court was satisfied that a hearing via video on Microsoft Teams would effectively facilitate a hearing and afford the Applicant procedural fairness.[29]

1. In Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[30] in relation to a Tribunal hearing conducted via video link the Court observed that:

These complaints cannot be sustained. There is nothing inherently unfair about using a remote hearing process like a video-link. The use of those processes is authorised in s 366 of the Act. Video-links in particular became a common (indeed, ubiquitous) and useful tool for executive decision-makers and courts during the lockdowns associated with the Covid-19 pandemic. These hearings use increasingly capable web-based applications that are easily accessed. Experience shows hearings of this kind can be adapted to effectively accommodate non-English speakers and interpreters. Many persons experiencing mental and physical health challenges may find a remote hearing from their home to be less confronting and arduous than alternative modes of participation. The success of the Covid-era experiment with video-link remote hearing processes understandably led to more extensive use of them by executive decision-makers once the pandemic receded. In any event, the practices of the courts in New South Wales or elsewhere are not inevitably a model. The Tribunal controls its own processes.[31]

1. In DDN23 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[32] in dismissing an interlocutory application for a venue change in migration judicial review proceedings the Court observed that "there is no reason why a fair hearing cannot be conducted by video".[33]
2. In Balbir Singh v Western Australian General Practice Education and Training Ltd[34] the Court, albeit in relation to an interlocutory application by an applicant to appear by telephone in a human rights matter, observed that:

1. In issuing Order 1 of the 12 April 2023 Orders the Court effectively granted the Telephone Appearance Application. In so doing the Court had regard to a number of factors:

(a) first, that the practice and procedure of this Court (and many other courts) has changed since the onset and post the COVID pandemic. That change means that, certainly in this Court that the vast majority of directions hearings and a significant proportion of applications in a proceeding where evidence is not subject to challenge or cross-examination, are now heard, primarily by video-link, but also by telephone; > > (b) second, the hearing of directions and applications in a proceeding hearings other than in person where there is no evidence sought to be challenged or cross-examined upon is consistent with the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions in s 190 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ("FCFCOA Act"), applicable to Division 2 of the Court, in as much as it: > > > (i) enables the resolution of any issues at that stage of the proceedings to be dealt with quickly, inexpensively and as efficiently as possible; > > > > (ii) is more efficient use of judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court; and > > > > (iii) effects a more efficient disposal of the Court's overall case load and a disposal of the interlocutory proceedings in a timely manner: FCFCOA Act, s 190(1) and (2); and > > (c) third, in these proceedings the parties did not seek to cross-examine on the affidavit evidence in relation to any of the applications in a proceeding filed by Dr Balbir Singh, and therefore issues associated with the difficulties of a party cross-examining remotely via technology do not arise (but as to which see, for example, the helpful analysis in relation to video-link evidence in ASIC v Rich [2004] NSWSC 467; (2004) 49 ACSR 578 (2004) 22 ACLC 1125 at [43] per Austin J; see also R v Goldman [2004] VSC 165; (2004) 148 ACrimR 40 at [15]-[18] per Redlich J; Tetra Pak Marketing Pty Ltd v Musashi Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1261 at [19] per Katz J; and, more recently, Auken Animal Husbandry Pty Ltd v 3RD Solutions Investments Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1153; (2020) 147 ACSR 521; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Wilson [2020] FCA 873; (2020) 146 ACSR 149; Capic v Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd [2020] FCA 486; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GetSwift Ltd [2020] FCA 504 and Rooney v AGL Energy (No 2) [2020] FCA 942.[35]

3. It suffices to observe that for the hearing of migration judicial review applications (whether interlocutory or final), and particularly where there is no evidence to be led orally or evidence to be cross-examined upon, the practical reality and now almost daily practice in this Court, is that parties can and frequently do appear by video-link. Similarly, they often appear via audio-link. Personal face-to-face attendance in a courtroom in these circumstances is not necessary to facilitate a fair hearing. In this case, and contrary to CLL25's submission, no unfairness or prejudice would arise from his appearing by video-link or audio-link at the Final Hearing. The submissions would be the same whether CLL25 appeared in person or by video-link or audio-link. Indeed, if any medical condition that CLL25 actually has might be aggravated or cause him discomfort by his having to travel or because of the physical environment of a courtroom, that can be ameliorated by his appearing from home by video-link or audio-link with appropriate arrangements to ensure his comfort during the course of the hearing (which typically would not extend beyond 60 to 90 minutes in duration).[36] In these circumstances, CLL25's appearance by video-link or audio-link would obviate any need for an adjournment of the Final Hearing.

1. When determining how the Court ought to exercise its discretion on the Adjournment Application, the Court is required to consider case management issues and, in particular, the overarching civil practice and procedure provisions of s 190 of the FCFCOA Act. Section 190(1) and (2) of the FCFCOA Act provides that:

(1) The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:

(a) according to law; and

(b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives:

(a) the just determination of all proceedings before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2);

(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;

(c) the efficient disposal of the Court's overall caseload;

(d) the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner;

(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

1. It follows from the above that for the purposes of s 190(1) and (2) of the FCFCOA Act the factors for consideration in relation to whether to adjourn the Final Hearing will include:

(a) the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible;

(b) the efficient use of the Court's judicial and administrative resources; and

(c) the efficient disposal of the Court's caseload.

1. The factors in the preceding paragraph can to some extent be informed by earlier judgments concerning case management considerations, and might therefore include matters referred to in Sali v SPC Ltd[37] and Aon Risk Services Australia Pty Ltd v Australian National University,[38] such as:

(a) the effect on the Court's resources; and

(b) the effect and possible detriment to other litigants in other cases awaiting listing for hearing before the Court.

(a) would result in an unnecessary and unwarranted delay of several months in the further listing of the Final Hearing, probably until May, June or July of this year, and therefore delay the disposition of the Judicial Review Application;

(b) because of the lateness of the Adjournment Application (it first being raised on 31 January 2026 and not lodged until 3 February 2026)[39] it is not possible to list another matter for hearing at the present date and time of the Final Hearing. The adjournment of final hearings in this Court to later dates thereby deprives another litigant (often a migration judicial review applicant) of that later hearing date. That is a particularly relevant consideration in this Court where delays of five to eight years in the listing for final hearing of migration judicial review hearings are notorious: this Court has, for some years now, had delays of several years in the hearing of migration judicial review cases,[40] and had a backlog of 18,266 "pending" migration judicial review cases (that is, cases filed but not yet listed for hearing) as at 30 June 2025, up from 16,536 in 2022-2023;[41] and

(c) would result in the incurring of further costs in the administration of justice by the unnecessary wastage of the Court's time and resources.

1. In the circumstances, consideration of the objects of the over-arching civil practice and procedure provisions in s 190(1) and (2) of the FCFCOA Act weighs against granting the Adjournment Application.

1. The Minister submitted that the Judicial Review Application lacked merit, and that this ought to be considered in exercising the discretion as to whether to grant or refuse the Adjournment Application. Whilst reluctant to make observations on the merit of the Judicial Review Application for the purposes of an adjournment so close to a Final Hearing the Court notes that:

(a) the grounds of the Judicial Review Application lack particulars, and the failure to particularise grounds is a sufficient reason to warrant dismissing grounds, or a judicial review application as a whole where all the grounds are unparticularised,[42] subject to giving an applicant an opportunity at a final hearing to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to a ground or grounds of review;[43] and

(b) the Applicants did not file written submissions in accordance with the Registrar's August 2025 Orders, or at all,[44]

which might give some indication that the Judicial Review Application may face difficulty in succeeding, but the Court does not place any weight on this particular issue.

1. Ultimately, the Court retains a broad discretion in relation to whether it adjourns a final hearing.[45]
2. The fact that CLL25 can go to see a medical practitioner and to see a radiologist would indicate to the Court that he can move, and travel, and wait, as required to attend to those matters. And albeit they may be medical necessities for CLL25, a Court appearance on a migration judicial review application might be said to be not just a legal nicety, but in some cases (and bearing in mind this Court is dealing with judicial review and not merits review) may be matters having major life consequences, here in particular for CLL25 claimed financial and economic difficulties,[46] if as a consequence of an unsuccessful judicial review application an applicant has to return to their country of origin. On the evidence there is in the Court's view no real impediment to CLL25 attending a face-to-face in person hearing in this Court. The Court however does not need to go that far, because, for reasons set out above, and having regard to:

(a) the Court's capacity to facilitate CLL25's appearance by video-link or audio-link;

(b) the nature of the matter as a migration judicial review proceeding;

(c) the matters related to video-link hearings in matters of this type referred to in the cases set out above,[47]

CLL25 can appear by video-link or audio-link, and the Court will make any necessary adjustments during the hearing in terms of breaks or other accommodations to facilitate CLL25's appearance by video-link or audio-link. In this regard the Court also observes that for the Adjournment Hearing CLL25 appeared by telephone, without any apparent or expressed difficulty, for a 23-minute hearing. Given that he was able to do so there should be no difficulty in CLL25 appearing by video-link or audio-link at the Final Hearing, which is unlikely to be longer than 60 to 90 minutes, and in relation to which the Court will permit CLL25 to take breaks and sit, stand or lie as he pleases.

1. At the hearing of the Adjournment Application the Court made orders (as set out at [1] above) dismissing the Adjournment Application but permitting CLL25 to appear at the Final Hearing by video-link or audio-link. Costs followed the event, and consequently there was an order that CLL25 pay the Minister's costs of the Adjournment Application to be assessed if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Lucev.

[6] "Tribunal Decision" and "Tribunal" respectively.

[11] Which are summarised at [10] (CLL25) and [11] (Minister) below.

[14] Summarised from the Transcript at pp 3-4.

[15] Summarised from the Transcript at pp 3-4.

[16] [2003] FCA 1559 at [5]-[10] per Lindgren J.

[17] [2016] FCA 108 ("Singh 2016 FCA").

[18] Singh 2016 FCA at [2] per Pagone J.

[19] [2021] FCA 815 ("AAL17").

[21] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZANS [2005] FCAFC 41; (2005) 141 FCR 586; (2005) 215 ALR 733; (2005) 86 ALD 583 at [38] per Weinberg, Jacobson and Lander JJ; Suh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 42; (2009) 175 FCR 515; (2009) 108 ALD 470 at [29] per Spender, Buchanan and Perram JJ; CEPU (Western Australia Division) v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [2016] FCCA 1227; (2016) 310 FLR 1 at [50] -[55] per Judge Lucev.

[22] LawCite (Australasian Legal Information Institute (austlii.edu.au)).

[23] Singh 2016 FCA at [2] per Pagone J.

[24] Singh 2016 FCA at [2] per Pagone J.

[26] [2024] FedCFamC2G 365 ("CWX17").

[27] CWX17 at [6]-[7] per Judge Lucev.

[28] [2025] FedCFamC2G 1035 ("Hussain").

[29] Hussain at [52] per Judge Johns.

[30] [2025] FedCFamC2G 1569 ("Wong").

[31] Wong at [22] per Judge McCabe.

[32] [2024] FedCFamC2G 895 ("DDN23").

[33] DDN23 at [21] per Judge Ladhams.

[34] [2025] FedCFamC2G 655 ("Balbir Singh").

[35] Balbir Singh at [163] per Judge Lucev.

[36] Cf Wong at [22] per Judge McCabe (albeit there in relation to the Tribunal's processes).

[37] [1993] HCA 47; (1993) 67 ALJR 841; (1993) 116 ALR 625.

[38] [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175; (2009) 83 ALJR 951; (2009) 258 ALR 14.

[40] See, for example, observations from 2021 in AFP21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1322 at [25] per Chief Judge Alstergren and Rajmohan v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1556 at [7]- [8] per Judge Lucev.

[41] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Annual Reports 2024-25, p 181.

[42] NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 at [37] per Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ; WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 ("WZAVW") at [35] per Gilmour J (and cases there cited); DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1158 ("DKN20") at [60] per Perry J (citing WZAVW).

[43] DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9] ("DQQ17") per Colvin J; EQJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1476 at [11] per Burley J; GKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1125 at [26] per Banks-Smith J; BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 788 at [3] per McKerracher J.

[45] Myers v Myers [1969] WAR 19 at 21 per Jackson J; FEH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 293 at [15] per Judge Given; MZZZL v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1309 at [9]-[10] per Judge Lucev; DMV22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 689 at [13] per Judge Lucev.