CJ v AKJ

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE BEARING UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S (IN)CAPACITY

The preponderance of medical evidence, and that evidence most directly related to the question(s) for determination, is to the effect that the plaintiff is capable of managing the ordinary, every-day affairs of life, but is not capable of managing on his own account the proceedings he has instituted, and which he seeks to maintain, against AW and the State of New South Wales.
That is the effect of the evidence of Dr Large (the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist), Dr Janus (the plaintiff's treating GP) and Dr Phillips (the independent psychiatrist). The medicos differ to some extent in their precise diagnoses, but those differences are immaterial to their ultimate expressions of opinion.
Each of Dr Janus (on 21 February 2017) and Dr Phillips (on 31 May 2017) gave oral evidence in support of a written opinion and was cross examined by the plaintiff. The opinion of Dr Large was available to the Court only through documentation because, although arrangements were made for him to examine the plaintiff specifically for the purpose of giving oral evidence, the plaintiff withdrew consent to his provision of a report to the Court. Rather than interfere with the plaintiff's relationship with a treating doctor, no attempt was made to force Dr Large's attendance before the Court.
In 2010 the plaintiff was formally diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia by Dr Large. He remains under treatment by Dr Large.
The medical consensus is that the plaintiff has an ongoing mental illness which can generally be managed by medication when he is not engaged in litigation; but his symptoms are exacerbated when he is engaged in litigation, rendering him dysfunctional and reinforcing a personality given to persecutionary delusions.
Each of Dr Janus and Dr Phillips was confirmed in his assessment of the plaintiff's capacity when exposed to cross examination by him. Each of them gave evidence to the effect that, not only is the plaintiff unable to deal rationally and reasonably with the subject matter of the principal proceedings, but the stress of his engagement in the proceedings is such as to affect his general health adversely. This is consistent with views expressed by Dr Large so far as they are known.
The plaintiff relies upon a medical report prepared by Mr Terry Smith in 2009 which suggests that that the plaintiff was not, at that time, lacking capacity. Even if otherwise worthy of adoption, that report is not sufficiently proximate in time to warrant adoption now.
In substance, I accept the evidence of Drs Large, Janus and Phillips. I agree with the ultimate opinion, expressed by both Dr Janus and Dr Phillips in the witness box, that, although the plaintiff is capable of managing his day-to-day affairs, he is not capable of managing the subject proceedings without the intervention of a tutor.
Those opinions are consistent with my observations of the plaintiff in court. He generally presents as a well-groomed, quiet, polite gentleman. He has the support of his wife, who attended court with him and gave evidence in aid of his claim to be fully capable of managing his own affairs.
Her loyalty is not sufficient to displace other, more objective evidence. He is not without guile or an ability to adapt his behaviour in a manner calculated to advantage himself in litigation. An opportunistic mindset emerges when he assesses his need for a tutor, or otherwise, according to a personal assessment of adversarial tactics; he was grateful to have a tutor in his successful defence of the civil proceedings determined by Bergin CJ in Eq, but he disclaims a need for a tutor when he casts himself in the role of a plaintiff.
He is prone, particularly (but not only) in the written word, to give way to disordered, rambling rants about what he regards as his wrongful convictions. As Dr Janus remarked, he nurses his sense of injustice, beyond the norm, to the prejudice of his general health, despite disruption within his family, in circumstances in which a normal, well-adjusted person would leave the past in the past. He is fixated by a perception that he is a victim of the justice system. A lack of insight into his medical condition affects: (a) his ability to judge what is relevant, and what is not, in the conduct of litigation; and (b) his ability to understand, and to make prudential judgements about, the nature and course of proceedings in court.
His written submissions, and the stream of unsolicited emails he insists on sending to all and sundry complaining of injustices suffered by him, betray obsessive, disordered thought patterns; an inability to see where his best interests lie; and a compulsive refusal, or inability, to conform to procedural norms.
Framed in terms of the criteria suggested in Slaveski v Victoria, I make the following findings concerning the plaintiff's capacity to conduct the present proceedings: 1. The plaintiff does not understand the factual framework for his claims and the evidence required to succeed. This is illustrated by his pursuit of both "contempt" proceedings in the Court of Appeal and an "appeal" from NCAT as vehicles for repetitive complaints about his conviction and loss of licence. It is also illustrated by his obsessive preoccupation with injustices allegedly suffered by him on a hearing limited to the question of his capacity for self-management. 2. Although the plaintiff does appear to understand the proceedings in a general way, he is unable consistently to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant considerations. 3. The plaintiff does not appear to be able to assess the impact of particular evidence on his or her case. Illustrations of this may be found in the emphasis he gave to the 2009 Smith report, and in misguided submissions about the effect of the evidence of Dr Janus, suggesting (contrary to the fact) that Dr Janus' evidence supports a finding of capacity. 4. The plaintiff has a basic understanding of court processes, but he has not demonstrated an ability to abide by them for any length of time. He returns, repeatedly, to disordered complaints about his wrongful conviction, consequent injustices and (tragic as it may be) the personal suffering of himself and his family. 5. The plaintiff appears to have a basic understanding of court rulings when explained to him, but the appearance may not be matched by reality. He quietly submits to adverse rulings for a time, but he tends to re-agitate his complaints without restraint. 6. The plaintiff appears incapable of complying with orderly procedures for the conduct of proceedings. This has manifested itself in his different formulations of the same complaint in different types of proceedings, his withdrawal of consent to the provision to the Court of a medical report by Dr Large, and his peppering of the Court (and others) with unsolicited, procedurally inappropriate emails. 7. The plaintiff generally engages with counsel and the Court politely in a courtroom setting, but in writing he frequently makes scandalous allegations about those he perceives to be adversaries. 8. The plaintiff appears at times to be incapable of controlling his emotions. From time to time he has made impassioned, tearful speeches to the Court about injustices suffered by him, and his family, as a result of his wrongful conviction. The timing and content of those speeches have been outside the parameters of normal behaviour. Sympathy for his suffering cannot deflect an assessment of the plaintiff's (in)capacity. 9. The plaintiff appears to have no regard for the adverse consequences of his actions on the defendants or the scarce resources of the Court. 10. The plaintiff appears to have no appreciation that he might lose the present proceedings. That lack of appreciation manifested itself in a settlement proposal, disclosed to the Court, in which he sought $25 million in damages. A pattern of unsuccessful litigation arising out of his conviction, and his loss of a licence, has not caused him to doubt his prospects for success in the current proceedings. 11. The plaintiff does not appear, consistently, to understand that the factual allegations asserted by him in the present proceedings might appear to an objective bystander to be delusional. He is not entirely uncomprehending of criticism of his allegation of impropriety against M as fanciful. It elicited from him an allegation that M was mentally ill. In the abstract, that allegation might be thought to compound the unreality of the first; but there are passing references in the evidence to the possibility that M may have suffered ill-health at some time, and there is insufficient evidence before the Court to assess the plaintiff's allegation on its merits. 12. The plaintiff's determination to proceed towards an ultimate goal of vindication, whatever barriers might be encountered, and his persistence in apparently extravagant claims, suggests an incapacity to think dispassionately about prospects and to contemplate proposals for compromise. 13. The medical evidence demonstrates a clear risk that the stress and pressure of the present proceedings might harm both the physical, and the mental, health of the plaintiff. This is no mirage. During the course of pre-trial preparations he was hospitalised for a time, the stress of the proceedings cited as a factor operating to the detriment of his health.
Drawing the threads of these findings together, and viewing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that, although the plaintiff is capable of managing the ordinary, everyday affairs of life, he is not (without the intervention of a tutor or the like) capable of managing his own affairs insofar as they are defined by reference to the subject proceedings.
Accordingly, the first limb of the common, separate question stated for the court's determination should be answered as follows: The plaintiff is a person who is not capable of managing his affairs (within the meaning of both section 41 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 NSW and rule 7.13 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW) insofar as those affairs concern the conduct of these proceedings.
The practical effect of this finding is that, unless and until the Court otherwise orders, the principal proceedings are (implicitly) stayed. It is not necessary that there be a finding of incapacity attending all aspects of the plaintiff's life. It is sufficient that he is incapable of managing his affairs insofar as they concern the proceedings. That want of capacity is coterminous with the operation of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. It is consistent with the operation of sections 40-41 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act. The plaintiff is a "person under legal incapacity" within the meaning of UCPR rule 7.13. Such a person may not commence or carry on proceedings except by a tutor: UCPR rule 7.14(1).
The Court is empowered to dispense with that rule (Civil Procedure Act 2005) NSW, section 14) and to give directions with respect to any aspect of practice or procedure for which rules of court do not provide (CPA section 16). These powers are generally enlisted to allow a person found lacking in capacity to participate in the process of locating a person willing, able and suitable to act as tutor, or to challenge a finding of incapacity.
The current proceedings should be listed for further consideration after allowing the parties an opportunity to consider these reasons for judgment, potential consequential orders and the availability of a person suitable for appointment as a tutor.
In the context of the current proceedings, the function of a tutor (appropriately advised) will be to assess the evidence objectively; to consider with equal objectivity the availability, or otherwise, of any reasonable cause of action that might reside in the plaintiff associated with the allegations he makes in the principal proceedings; and to make informed forensic decisions about the future conduct, or settlement, of the proceedings.
The fact that the defendants have on foot applications for summary disposal of the proceedings (in whole or part) should not, of itself, determine the future course of the proceedings. Any tutor appointed to represent the plaintiff can reasonably expect to be allowed a fair opportunity (after due investigation) to form an independent judgement about what is to be done with the proceedings.
The nature of the office of a tutor lends itself to characterisation as that of a fiduciary, liable to supervision by the Court. The Court is specifically empowered to give directions with respect to a tutor's conduct of proceedings: Civil Procedure Act 2005 NSW, section 80. A tutor can apply to the Court for directions in the nature of a trustee's application for judicial advice. Such an application might be appropriate, for example, if a tutor were to seek the protection of an order that he, she or it would be justified in acceptance of an offer of settlement.
In any event, because the plaintiff is under legal incapacity any settlement of the proceedings (or any other claim made) on his behalf would require the Court's approval: Civil Procedure Act 2005, sections 75-76; Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v Mills (2007) 71 NSWLR 1 at 4-5.

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Cases Cited (16)

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