Chief Executive, Department of Justice v Wise and Wise Real Estate Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QCAT 324

• [10] The legal principles in relation to bias, apprehension of bias and recusals has been thoroughly articulated in the previous recusal decisions in this matter of Department of Justice v Wise and Wise Real Estate Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QCAT 93 ("first decision")[1] and Chief Executive, Department of Justice v Wise and Wise Real Estate Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QCAT 222[2] ("second decision"). The tribunal does not seek to repeat the law here, other than to reiterate that the onus is on the person bringing the application for recusal, in this case Ms Wise, to demonstrate the actual bias or apprehension of bias. This must be firmly established by adducing evidence which establishes, or from which a reasonable inference may be drawn, that the decision-maker did not or may not, in fact, bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the decision-maker is required to decide. Therefore, Ms Wise must demonstrate:

(a) the fact, circumstances or event which constitutes the source of the bias or prejudice;

(b) a feared deviation as a result of the bias or prejudice; and

(c) a logical connection between the source of the bias or prejudice and the feared deviation as a result of the bias or prejudice.[3]

• [11] The bare assertion that a decision-maker appeared to be biased through prejudgment would be of no assistance without articulation of the connection between the events giving rise to the apprehension of bias through prejudgment and the possibility of departure from impartial decision making.[4] The fact that a party has their claim dismissed is not evidence of apprehended bias. The fact that errors may have occurred in reaching a decision is also not evidence of apprehended bias.[5]
• [12] The test is objective not subjective. The fact that Ms Wise asserts that she has lost faith in fairness, neutrality and legality of the proceeding, is not sufficient and does not demonstrate actual or perceived bias. It is not about whether Ms Wise has reasonable perceived bias, but whether a fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the decision-maker is required to decide.[6]
• [13] A party's objection to a particular decision-maker sitting or continuing to sit should not prevail unless it is based upon persuasive substantive evidence demonstrating that the decision-maker should be disqualified from hearing or deciding the case. As noted in Ebner:[7]

Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked, and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.

... if the mere making of an insubstantial objection were sufficient to lead a judge to decline to hear or decide a case, the system would soon reach a stage where, for practical purposes, individual parties could influence the composition of the bench. That would be intolerable.[8]

• [14] Ms Wise has filed five previous applications for recusal on 2 December 2024, 19 January 2025, 6 February 2025, 7 May 2025 and 18 June 2025. All applications largely raise the same issues. The prior applications for recusal were considered and refused. Written reasons were provided to the parties on 26 February 2025,[9] 13 May 2025[10] and 18 June 2025.[11]
• [15] The assertion made that "Members Brown and Rinaudo have refused to recuse themselves, provided no reasons, and exercised judicial power unlawfully"[12] is rejected by the tribunal and plainly false. There are two publicly available published decisions and one unpublished written reasons provided to the parties in relation to the prior recusal applications. Ms Wise's position that the tribunal determining an application about their own recusal is evidence of bias, has already been addressed in the second decision.[13] Ms Wise's position is rejected and is legally wrong.
• [16] Ms Wise's assertion that decisions have been made in the applicant's favour on every material issue, is not only false, noting numerous decisions adjourning the proceedings and extending filing dates have been made in the respondent's favour, despite strong opposition by the DOJ, but is also insufficient to demonstrate actual bias or that a reasonable person might reasonably apprehend that a tribunal member might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the application. Multiple applications may be refused from one party for multiple different reasons including the applications being misguided or lacking in evidence. It is not about in whose favour a decision was made, but how the tribunal considered the matter and came to its decision, and whether that was based on a consideration of the facts and relevant law.
• [17] Many of the issues raised by Ms Wise in her application for recusal have already been considered and determined in prior recusal applications. The concerns in relation to the refusal to compel disclosure/discovery,[14] jurisdictional issues and s 36(2) of the Property Occupations Act 2014 (Qld) ("POA");[15] dismissal of the respondent's application/suppression of evidence and requests including for cross examination,[16] denial of procedural fairness and use of medical certificates[17] and collusion and reliance's on incorrect facts and law,[18] have all been previously determined by the tribunal.
• [18] It is an abuse of process for a party to seek to relitigate issues already determined. Ms Wise has not provided any new evidence on these issues to enliven then. Accordingly, as the tribunal has already determined these issues, these are not further addressed in this decision.
• [19] In the unsigned written document Ms Wise purports to "object to directions issued on 14 August 2025". This objection has no legal standing. The tribunal may give a direction at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of proceedings,[19] and a party must comply with a direction within the statement period.[20] If a party is unhappy with a direction issued by the tribunal and believes a legal error has occurred, the party needs to seek leave to appeal, not just complain to the tribunal and state they object.
• [20] Disagreement with a ruling made by a judge or tribunal member does not establish bias or apprehended bias.[21] There are other avenues for a party who consider they have not been afforded procedural justice or who believe a decision reveals error, but a party's grievances with respect to procedural matters is quite different to the question of judicial bias. A claim of breach of procedural fairness does not in and of itself demonstrate bias.[22]
• [21] The only new grounds raised in the application for recusal is Ms Wise's assertion that there has been "a failure to provide written reasons" and "a failure to require clarity or proper particularisation of the Applicant's application." These are addressed below.

• [22] This issue has previously been addressed in part, in the second decisions.[23] While Ms Wise asserts that the tribunal has acted unlawfully and in error by refusing to provide written reasons, she does not however provide any evidence to support this claim and there is limited information as to the specifics of which decision she asserts reasons have been requested and not provided. The tribunal has not on any occasion in this matter refused to provide written reasons and there does not appear to have been any such requests made in these proceedings.
• [23] A party is not entitled to reasons in writing for decisions made during the proceedings, as a right. In accordance with s 122(2) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ("QCAT Act"), a party to a proceeding may, within 14 days after the tribunal's decision takes effect, request reasons for certain decision. The tribunal then generally has 45 days to provide the decision. The process for requesting reasons for a decision are clearly explained on the QCAT website[24] and the registry have previously provided a link to this page to the parties in these proceedings. Despite this, Ms Wise has not made any formal request for reasons.

• [24] Ms Wise asserts that "Notices for Particulars" were ignored or dismissed and there has been a failure to require property particularisation of the applicant's case, causing her disadvantage. It is assumed this relates to an application for miscellaneous matters made by Ms Wise on 11 August 2025, which was considered by the tribunal and refused. The decision was provided to the parties on 21 August 2025. It was also noted in directions issued on 14 August 2025 that the tribunal did not agree that Ms Wise required the applicant to further particularise their claim before she could respond. This was to ensure Ms Wise was not under the misapprehension that she did not have to comply with the filing directions.
• [25] In relation to the request for further particulars, the crux of Ms Wise's application was that she wanted the tribunal to order that the DOJ file an amended application and a sworn affidavit addressing 59 questions she wanted answered. Ms Wise asserts this is necessary for her to understand the case against her, prepare a defence and file her affidavit. The tribunal rejects this position and does not consider it either necessary or appropriate at this stage in the proceedings to make the orders sought.
• [26] The three grounds the DOJ are relying on to start the disciplinary proceedings are clearly set out in the application filed back in December 2021. The application states that the grounds are under section 172(1)(b)(i) of the POA, that the respondents have contravened or breached the POA, section 172(1)(g)(i) of the POA, that the respondents are not suitable people to hold a licence and section 172(1)(g)(iii), that the respondents have in carrying on a business or performing an activity, been incompetent or acted in an unprofessional way.
• [27] The application provides further particulars of the breaches of the POA relied upon in ground one, which are section 212(1) - false representation about property, section 221(1) - false and misleading documents and section 109(2) - failing to give a signed copy of the appointment to the client. In addition to the application and signed statements from multiple witnesses, the DOJ provided a document entitled "Annexure B" which sets out the relevant parts of the witness statements the DOJ rely upon. The application also references which paragraphs in Annexure B, are relied upon for which ground.
• [28] Amended copies of the application and Annexure B were provided by the DOJ in February 2025, to remove details of statements withdrawn and no longer relied upon. In addition, due to Ms Wise raising concerns that she did not understand the relevance of three additional statements filed by the DOJ, with leave of the tribunal in August 2024, the tribunal directed that the DOJ file a further document entitled "Annexure C' to identify in those three statements the relevant paragraphs relied upon.
• [29] This information was sufficiently clear enough for Ms Wise to be able to file a 119-page affidavit with 802 paragraphs in response in August 2024 and to file a further 456-page unsigned statement on 3 July 2025. In addition, all witnesses relied upon by the DOJ have been made available for cross examination and have been cross examined under oath/affirmation by Ms Wise and her support person Ms Curran.
• [30] The tribunal does not accept that it is possible for Ms Wise to not be sufficiently clear on the case against her. In addition, as the DOJ have closed their case, it would be improper for the tribunal to direct them to file further material and an amended application. To do so would also cause unnecessary delays in a matter which has already been on foot for over three and a half years. The refusal of this application, in these circumstances, would not lead a reasonable person to believe the tribunal members predetermined the matter or would not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the application.

• [31] Ms Wise has relied upon numerous High Court authorities which provide legal principles about procedural fairness and bias. While the principles in these cases are largely not in dispute, the tribunal does not accept that there has been any failure to follow these decisions and Ms Wise had failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate the relevance of these authorities to this case and how they evidence biased/apprehension of bias in relation to this matter.
• [32] Ms Wise seeks to rely upon the well-known authority of Briginshaw v Briginshaw.[25] While the tribunal accepts that given the significance of the allegations, there needs to be clear, cogent, and reliable evidence before adverse findings are made, this authority is not relevant to this application for recusal and Ms Wise's reliance on this case is misguided and does not support an application for recusal.
• [33] No findings in relation to the application for disciplinary action have been made. It may be as Ms Wise asserts that after consideration of the weight of the evidence some or all of the claims may be dismissed, if the evidence is insufficient to support a finding. However, it is inappropriate for the tribunal to make any determination of the evidence at this time, until all the evidence, including the cross examination of Ms Wise, has been heard.
• [34] Ms Wise's reliance on the principal of issue estoppel and the case of Blair v Curran,[26] is also misguided. Not only does it not evidence bias/apprehension of bias, but the statements made by Ms Wise are legally incorrect. In line with section 126(2) of the QCAT Act, a final decision in a proceeding for a minor civil dispute does not prevent the tribunal making a decision in a different proceeding about an issue considered (whether or not decided) by the tribunal in the minor dispute matter. This section has been previously identified to the parties both in written decisions and orally during the proceedings.[27]
• [35] Amongst the numerous case authorities Ms Wise seeks to rely upon is two purported cases of Re Bowen [2010] QCAT 246, which she states references the right to fair hearing and health accommodation and Brock v Medical Board [2020] QCAT 223, which she asserts states the rejection of medical evidence is a denial of fairness. These are false references as these cases do not exist. Ms Wise has been advised that these citations belong to different cases and there appears to be no such cases with these names, on three occasions in written decisions, the most recent on 12 August 2025 and on at least two other occasions orally during directions hearings. These citations being non-existent cases has also been noted in a media article which Ms Wise took exception to and raised an application about with the tribunal. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that Ms Wise is aware that these cases do not exist.
• [36] Ms Wise was warned in written reasons dated 12 August 2025 that the ongoing reliance on non-existent cases in her submission is concerning and the only conclusion which can be reached from Ms Wise's ongoing reliance on false case references is either that Ms Wise is seeking to mislead the tribunal, or that she has such little respect for the tribunal that she disbelieves the tribunal when it states the case does not exist and has taken no steps of her own to verify the accuracy of this citation. Notwithstanding this warning, Ms Wise continues to rely upon non-existent cases.
• [37] Ms Wise's ongoing use of false cases in particular the false citations of Re Bowen and Brock v Medical Board which she has been warned on multiple occasions do not exist, is bordering on contemptuous. Ms Wise now runs a real risk of adverse findings of credit in relation to her ongoing use of the false citations.

• [38] Ms Wise's arguments do not establish a logical connection between the alleged deviation and the source of the bias. She has raised numerous legal principles about procedural fairness and bias and relies on numerous sections of the QCAT Act and other Acts that she believes are relevant to this matter but has failed to apply those principles or provisions to the facts of this case to evidence how Member D Brown or Judicial Member Rinaudo's conduct falls short of the expectation of a tribunal member or why a fair-minded observer would have any apprehension that either member might not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the matter.
• [39] The fact that a party has their claim dismissed is not evidence of apprehended bias. The fact that errors may have occurred in reaching a decision is also not evidence of apprehended bias.[28] Ms Wise's perception or belief about the tribunal or her assertion that she has lost confidence in the tribunal is not evidence of bias. It is not about what Ms Wise feels but about what a fair-minded observer would consider.
• [40] Ms Wise has provided no cogent evidence which supports a finding of actual bias, or which would lead a fair-minded observer to have an apprehension of bias. Ms Wise has not established any basis upon which a fair-minded observer would consider Judicial Member Rinaudo or Member D Brown has formed any fixed views about the disciplinary proceedings or Ms Wise that are incapable of alteration or that the Members might not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the disciplinary proceedings.
• [41] A member has a duty to hear cases for which they are scheduled and should recognise that disqualification places a burden on the tribunal and other members and may cause significant delay to the parties. In the circumstances of this matter, given the proceedings have been on foot for three and a half years and all evidence but for the cross examination of Ms Wise have already been heard, ongoing delays are not in the interest of justice and need to be avoid, unless absolutely necessary.
• [42] Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for Judicial Member Rinaudo or Member D Brown to recuse themselves or stand down from hearing the matter. The application for recusal is refused and the panel constituted of Judicial Member Rinaudo and Member D Brown will continue to hear the matter as scheduled at the Tribunal Hearing on 17 and 18 September 2025.

[3] Maffey v Mueller [2016] QCATA 19, [49].

[4] Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48, [63].

[5] Craven & Ors v Kataria & Ors [2024] QCATA 127, [65].

[6] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 ('Ebner'); Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289; _QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affair_s [2023] HCA 15.

[9] These reasons can be found at Department of Justice v Wise and Wise Real Estate Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QCAT 93 ("first decision").

[10] These reasons can be found at Chief Executive, Department of Justice v Wise and Wise Real Estate Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QCAT 222 ("second decision").

[11] This is an unpublished decision ("third decision").

[12] Applicant's submissions filed 19 August 2025, [6.3].

[16] First decision [90]-[100]; Second decision [35]-[36], [38]-[39].

[21] Sayed v National Disability Insurance Agency (No 2) [2022] FCA 1591, [27].

[22] Dural (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 82, [33].

[24] 'Request reasons for a decision', Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Web Page, 14 May 2025) .

[25] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336.

[26] [1939] HCA 23; (1939) 62 CLR 464.

[27] Written Reasons - Strike out application, delivered on 17 March 2025, [35]-[36].

[28] Craven & Ors v Kataria & Ors [2024] QCATA 127, [65].