Exercise of the discretion
22 In considering how to exercise the discretion, it is appropriate to start by identifying the oppressive conduct. As reiterated at [6] above, the oppressive conduct constituted the conversion of loans owed by Laava to Mr Michel and Mr Surtees into equity issued to Wilemich and MCA respectively in circumstances where no equivalent opportunity was afforded to the Minority Interests to convert the loan owed by Laava to Mr McDonald into equity issued to CDO. There were no other findings of oppression.
23 In the form of orders provided to the Court by the Minority Interests subsequent to the publication of CDO No 3, the relief sought by the Minority Interests with respect to the oppression was a declaration, the buy-out order and orders consequent upon the making of the buy-out order. No other relief was sought, whether in the alternative, or otherwise. The proposed orders provided by the Minority Interests also proposed the dismissal of all of the prayers for relief in the Amended Originating Process save for prayer 21 ("Costs, including indemnity costs") and prayer 22 ("Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court thinks fit").
24 Having considered the further submissions, I remain of the view, expressed tentatively in CDO No 3 at [329], that a buy-out order is not appropriate because a less drastic remedy is available; and because a buyout order would go considerably further than is necessary to alleviate the oppressive conduct and would improve the position of the Minority Interests over and above that which would have prevailed but for the oppressive conduct (see Re North Coast Transit at [24]).
25 Put another way, I consider a buy-out order to be a disproportionate response to the oppression as found. The scope of the oppression found was quite narrow and, as discussed previously, limited to two conversions of debt into equity in circumstances where the opportunity taken by the Majority Interests was not made available to the Minority Interests. Had the opportunity been offered to the Minority Interests (at the same rate of conversion of approximately $70.90 per share, derived from 249,959/3,524 and 250,000/3,527; or at $72 per share, derived from $180,000/2,500 and $36,000/500) and had that offer been accepted, then CDO would have held an additional 626 shares ($44,431/$70.90) or 617 shares ($44,431/$72) in Laava. That is, its shareholding would have increased from 31,287 shares to 31,913 or 31,904 shares, an increase of approximately two per cent. In contrast, the buy-out order sought would require the Majority Interests to purchase all of CDO's 31,287 shares, at a price of $2,203,416. Such an order would be a disproportionate response and would be contrary to the principles discussed at [14] to [20] above.
26 For the reasons set out below, I do not accept the submissions made by the Minority Interests that a buy-out order is the appropriate remedy.
27 The first such submission is to the effect that Laava had advocated, prior to the delivery of CDO No 3, for a buy-out order as the most appropriate remedy on bases including that there had been a breakdown in the relationship between the Majority Interests and the Minority Interests; and that the Majority Interests had not advocated for a different view. I do not regard this as a matter of significance, when those submissions were made at a global level, prior to the delivery of CDO No 3. In this regard, it may be noted that the Minority Interests, prior to the delivery of CDO No 3, had as their primary position, not that there should be a buy-out order, but instead that the Court should make orders which adjusted the shareholdings of the Majority Interests and the Minority Interests with the result that they each remained as shareholders in Laava, but with the Minority Interests having an increased shareholding (at the expense of the Majority Interests). Thus, the position taken by each of the Minority Interests and the Majority Interests has changed following the delivery of CDO No 3 and I do not regard their prior positions as binding upon them. The very purpose of inviting further submissions was to enable the parties to make more focussed submissions taking into account the actual findings made in CDO No 3: see CDO No 3 at [330].
28 The second submission made by the Minority Interests, in essence, is that: the relationship between the Minority Interests and the Majority Interests has broken down irretrievably; it should be inferred that the cause of the conduct which produced the contravening share issues was that irretrievable breakdown; and to end the oppression, or to "put the company back on the rails and avoid the causes of conflict oppression" (emphasis in original), a buy-out order should be made so as to separate the oppressors and the oppressed. I do not accept that submission for the following reasons:
(1) it may be accepted that such a breakdown, whilst insufficient of itself to establish oppression, may be one of several factors that together lead to a conclusion that oppression is made out: see Campbell JA in Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corp Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104; (2011) 288 ALR 310 at 358 [199]. However, the submission is in substance a submission founded on a case not previously run, namely that there has been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship between the Minority Interests and the Majority Interests;
(2) no finding was made that the relationship had broken down irretrievably. It is also difficult to reconcile the proposition that there has been an irretrievable breakdown with the absence of such a claim previously and with the fact that until very recently the Minority Interests sought orders for an increase in CDO's shareholding in Laava in circumstances where Wilemich and MCA are shareholders and Mr Michel and Mr Surtees are directors;
(3) similarly, there has been no determination that the cause of the contravening conduct was a breakdown of the relationship between the Minority Interests and the Majority Interests. Nor has there been a determination that one set of interests was more responsible than the other for such a breakdown; and
(4) in any event, Laava appears to be capable of operating absent a cordial relationship between the Founders. In this regard, the importance of the relationship between the Minority Interests and the Majority Interests is of considerably less significance now than when Laava commenced. At Laava's commencement, the Founders were the only directors and the Founder Shareholders (CDO, Wilemich and MCA) were the only shareholders and the relationship between them was integral to the venture they were pursuing through Laava. Presently, three years have passed since Mr McDonald's resignation as a director of Laava in early January 2020 (CDO No 3 at [6], [164], [185]); CDO has chosen not to replace him (CDO No 3 at [188]); and there are a number of other shareholders of Laava.
29 The third submission made by the Minority Interests is that a buy-out order is just in circumstances where Mr McDonald is a founder of Laava; the relationship between Mr McDonald and the other Founders has broken down without fault on the part of Mr McDonald and where oppression has been established. The Minority Interests submit that such an approach is consistent with equitable principle, citing as an example the analysis of Deane J in Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 618-619 as to what is to occur after the breakdown of a contractual joint venture for the pursuit of a commercial advantage. I do not accept these submissions, for the following reasons:
(1) as noted above, there is no finding that the relationship has broken down irretrievably and the case was not run on such a basis;
(2) there is also no finding that any such breakdown occurred without fault on the part of Mr McDonald and I would not be prepared to make such a finding;
(3) whilst Mr McDonald is a founder of Laava, as noted above, he resigned his position as a director and his Founder Shareholder (CDO) chose not to appoint a replacement. Further, the shareholding of Laava has changed considerably since its inception; and
(4) the present circumstances are far removed from those which obtained in Muschinski. For instance in that case, but not in the present case, the Court was satisfied that the relationship had broken down without fault on the part of the party claiming relief, and that the venture had failed. In the present case there are no such findings and the venture continues.
30 The fourth submission made by the Minority Interests is that because they have been oppressed, they should be released from Laava by means of a buy-out order. This submission was founded upon general statements taken from various authorities, without consideration of the particular facts of those authorities nor, more importantly, the particular facts in the present case. I reject the general submission that a finding of oppression is of itself sufficient to make a buy-out order the appropriate remedy. In each case the exercise of the discretion turns upon the particular circumstances of the case, including the nature and extent of the oppression found and the principle that relief should not go beyond what is necessary to cure the oppression (see [14] to [20] above).
31 The final submission made by the Minority Interests was that the remedies tentatively suggested at CDO No 3 [329] were not appropriate. The first such remedy was an order setting aside the contravening share issues and allotments (with or without reinstatement of the loans owed by Laava to Mr Michel and Mr Surtees). The Minority Interests submitted that such an order was not appropriate, adopting submissions previously made by the Majority Interests to the effect that having the loans to Mr Michel and Mr Surtees on Laava's balance sheet would detrimentally affect Laava's ability to raise capital. However, that submission assumes that a consequence of setting aside the contravening share issues would be reinstatement of the loan and does not address the possibility - raised expressly in CDO No 3 at [329] - that the contravening share issues could be set aside without reinstatement of the loans.
32 The second suggested remedy was an order for the conversion of the loan owed by Laava to Mr McDonald into shares issued to CDO. That is, an order producing the result that would have obtained if the Majority Interests had acted fairly towards the Minority Interests and offered them the same opportunity to convert a loan into shares, and the Minority Interests had availed themselves of such an opportunity. A variation on this remedy is an order that Laava offer such a conversion opportunity.
33 However, the Minority Interests have indicated that they do not wish an order for a conversion (and, I infer, do not wish an order for an offer of such a conversion) to be made. So much is clear from their 17 November 2022 correspondence (see [10] and [11] above). Further, in their submissions, the Minority Interests expressly rejected the notion that the loan owed to Mr McDonald be converted to equity. They submitted: "Mr McDonald has never sought such an order in these proceedings and, respectfully, does not seek that this occur now".
34 The Minority Interests submitted that such an order was inappropriate because the number of shares that CDO would receive would be a tiny percentage of the total number of shares in Laava, whereas had the conversion occurred in June 2020, then the shares would have represented a greater percentage. This difference is due to various share issues which have occurred in the intervening period. However, this submission proceeds from the flawed premise that CDO's relative shareholding in Laava should have remained static from June 2020 and been unaffected by the subsequent share issues. As noted above and in CDO No 3, the only conduct which was contrary to s 232(e) of the Act was the contravening share issues. That is, there is otherwise no finding that the dilution of CDO's shareholding was the consequence of unlawful conduct.
35 The Minority Interests submitted that they "did not contribute their sweat equity on this basis and should not be required to be locked into such an arrangement". The basis on which their "sweat equity" was contributed is not explained. To the extent that it is suggested that this basis was the Foundational Understanding, such a proposition was rejected in CDO No 3.
36 The Minority Interests also submitted that CDO has lost is ability to participate in the management of Laava since June 2020. However, this submission overlooks the findings in CDO No 3 that Mr McDonald resigned as a director in early January 2020; that Mr McDonald was not forced to resign as a director of Laava; and that CDO chose not to replace him in that position, despite its entitlement to do so.
37 Thus, I am not satisfied that the remedies suggested at CDO No 3 [329] would be inappropriate.
38 The Minority Interests also seek a declaration that the affairs of Laava have been conducted in a manner that was unfairly prejudicial to, or discriminatory against, CDO, within the meaning of s 232 of the Act, by dint of the contravening share issues. It is appropriate to make the declaration sought. I do not accept the submission of the Majority Interests that declaratory relief should be refused because the Minority Interests do not seek, and have refused an offer for, the conversion of Mr McDonald's loan into equity. This does not provide a sufficient basis to decline the relief sought, particularly when the Minority Interests and the Majority Interests have an ongoing relationship in Laava and thus the declaration has utility.
39 It is open to the Court to impose a remedy other than a remedy that a party or parties have sought. In the present case, other available remedies appear to include those tentatively suggested in CDO No 3 at [329]. However, the Minority Interests have expressly opposed such remedies. In these circumstances, I will make the declaration sought, but will not make any other order under s 233 of the Act with respect to the contravening share issues.
40 The Minority Interests failed entirely in their claims against the sixth, seventh and ninth defendants. As noted in CDO No 3 at [10], their claim against the eighth defendant was dismissed during the course of the hearing.
41 It follows that the Amended Originating Process should be otherwise dismissed.