Chapman v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 307

s 211, s 545

Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 31

Kim v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] ICQ 14

Wang v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] ICQ 20

Workers' Compensation Regulator v Scofield [2018] ICQ 3

Mr A.N. Tayler of Turner Freeman Lawyers on behalf of the Appellant

Ms L. Willson, Counsel, directly instructed by the Workers' Compensation Regulator

• [1] The Regulator has applied, within a workers' compensation appeal proceeding, for interlocutory relief with respect to the Commission's jurisdiction to consider matters in this appeal that the Regulator argues go beyond those dealt with in the Regulator's review decision.

• [2] The Regulator contends that the terms of its' review decision define the scope of the issues to be considered in the appeal. The Regulator further contends that the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions go beyond the matters determined in the Regulator's review decision, and consequently, fall outside the Commission's jurisdiction to determine those matters in this appeal.

• [3] On appeal, the Appellant claims, inter alia, that he is "entitled to weekly benefits from 16 May to 18 September 2022" as a consequence of having time off following surgery connected to his work-related injury and requests that the Commission make an order that any leave he took over the period of 16 May 2022 to 18 September 2022 (following the surgery) be compensated by way of reimbursement of his leave and payment of weekly compensation for the period.

• [4] The Regulator argues that the review decision did not make any determination with respect to the Appellant's entitlement to weekly benefits from 16 May to 18 September 2022, and therefore, those matters cannot be considered within the scope of this appeal.

• [5] The issues to be determined in the context of this application are as follows:

(a) What is the nature and scope of the appeal and are there any restrictions as to the subject matter of the appeal? ('Issue One')

(b) What was the case before the Regulator and what were the matters to be determined? ('Issue Two')

(c) Does the Commission have jurisdiction to decide whether the Appellant should be reimbursed his leave and be back paid weekly compensation for the period from 16 May 2022 to 18 September 2022? ('Issue Three')

• [6] These issues will be considered further below.

Preliminary matter resulting in the adjournment of the determination of the application

• [7] A preliminary matter was raised by the Regulator at the hearing with respect to a concurrent and related appeal before the Industrial Magistrates Court. That appeal involves the Appellant and WorkCover Queensland ('WorkCover') as parties and is an appeal by the Appellant of WorkCover's decision to not accept liability for, and associated costs of, the Appellant's surgery.

• [8] As noted above, for reasons known only to the Appellant and WorkCover, the Industrial Magistrates Court appeal was stayed pending determination of this application.

• [9] This appeal, in part, relates to the cessation of the payment of weekly entitlements as a result of the Appellant's alleged incapacity and time off following the surgery.

• [10] The Regulator contended that if the Appellant was successful before this Commission, then such a decision might be rendered otiose if the Industrial Magistrate determined the appeal relating to the surgery in WorkCover's favour. The Regulator's submissions in this regard were compelling.

• [11] At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties agreed to an adjournment of this appeal on the basis that the Appellant's legal representatives would approach WorkCover's representatives, together with a copy of the transcript of the hearing, and consult with WorkCover regarding the matters raised during the hearing and the Commission's concerns with respect to the utility of this appeal proceeding before the appeal in the Industrial Magistrates Court is determined. The Appellant's legal representatives were requested to advise the Commission and the Regulator of the outcome of those discussions.

• [12] The Commission was subsequently provided with copies of the correspondence between the Appellant's legal representatives and WorkCover following the adjournment. It appears that in or around September 2024, WorkCover acceded for the appeal in the Industrial Magistrates Court to proceed and be determined before the appeal proceedings in the Commission.

• [13] Despite this, on 6 February 2025, it was conveyed to the Commission, during a mention of the matter, that the Appellant now sought that the interlocutory application be determined before the determination of the appeal in the Industrial Magistrates Court. The Regulator did not object to the Appellant's request, nor did it seek a further adjournment of this appeal. Consequently, this application will now be considered by the Commission. It was not explained why this course was sought, despite the obvious practical and compelling reasons as to why it would be in the interests of each of the appeals for the Industrial Magistrates Court appeal to proceed before the hearing of this appeal.

• [14] The parties confirmed to the Commission that they each respectively did not wish to place any further submissions or material before the Commission with respect to the interlocutory application. Accordingly, the Commission has had regard to the oral and written submissions previously made by the parties in this matter.

• [15] The Appellant, at the relevant time, was employed by Patrick Stevedore Holdings Pty Ltd Limited, specifically, as a waterside worker at Brisbane Port.

• [16] On 3 July 2021,[1] the Appellant slipped while at work and fell causing his right shoulder to become caught on a railing which pulled the Appellant's right arm upwards injuring his right shoulder, although no claim for workers' compensation was made at this juncture.

• [17] The Appellant continued to work following the injury and did not suffer any incapacity until a medical certificate was issued by Dr Yaqub dated 29 June 2022, which certified incapacity for work from 16 May 2022 to 11 July 2022.

• [18] The medical certificate was the document initiating the Appellant's application for compensation.

• [19] On 16 May 2022, the Appellant had surgery to his right shoulder which he contends was as a result of injuring it on 3 July 2021.

• [20] On 30 June 2022, the Appellant made a claim for workers' compensation which was accepted on 29 August 2022 by WorkCover as a "work-related aggravation (worsening) of a pre-existing condition".

• [21] The Appellant's employer disputed WorkCover's decision to accept the application on two grounds, firstly, that the time for filing the application under s 131(5) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('WCR Act') should not have been waived by the insurer, and secondly, about the overall acceptance of the injury under

s 32 of WCR Act was disputed.

• [22] The Regulator subsequently issued two decisions rejecting the employer's applications for review on each ground.

• [23] Despite accepting the claim, WorkCover has never paid any compensation to the Appellant, notably on the material before the Commission there is no evidence that the Appellant was receiving a weekly payment of compensation under Pt 9 of the WCR Act or the payment of medical expenses pursuant to Ch 4 of the WCR Act.

• [24] On 6 December 2022, WorkCover issued a letter and reasons for its' decision determining that, pursuant to ss 144A and 144B of the WCR Act, the Appellant's entitlement to weekly payments and his entitlement to medical expenses respectively stopped from

• [25] The Appellant applied to the Regulator to review WorkCover's decision.

• [26] On 29 May 2023, the Regulator issued a review decision purportedly confirming WorkCover's decision.

• [27] The Appellant filed an appeal in this Commission with respect to the Regulator's review decision.

• [28] The Appellant also filed an appeal in the Industrial Magistrates Court with respect to the Regulator's review decision insofar as it relates to WorkCover's purported decision not to accept liability for the surgery.

• [29] As will become apparent, the case requiring determination before the Regulator is a key consideration in this application. Accordingly, regard must also be had to the WorkCover decision which was the subject of the Regulator's review decision.

• [30] On 6 December, WorkCover issued a letter to the Appellant which had attached to it a Claim Decision.[2] The letter relevantly stated:

Your claim has been accepted as a work-related aggravation (worsening) of a

pre-existing condition. Recent medical evidence confirms the aggravation will not improve with further treatment, and no longer prevents you from working, which means payments must stop.

This decision is made after careful consideration of available information and using legislation. I encourage you to read the attached decision, which includes detailed reasons.

Every decision is reviewed and confirmed by a manager. You may also request an external review. Any request for an independent review of this decision must be made within three months of receiving this letter. I've attached information to help with this choice

The last day that wages (known as 'weekly payments'), medical or rehabilitation expenses will be paid is 18 November 2022.

If treatment for a pre-existing or non-work-related condition is required, unfortunately WorkCover Queensland is unable to pay for this treatment.

• [31] It is clear by the terms of this letter that it had been assumed (erroneously) by WorkCover that the Appellant had been receiving weekly payments and payment for medical expenses.

• [32] The Claim Decision includes the following information with respect to providing a summary of the decision and by identifying what was assessed as well as providing reasons for the decision.

• [33] Relevantly, the summary of decision was in the following terms:

To receive compensation payments, the requirements of the Act must be met. It's my decision that:

Your ongoing incapacity and requirement for treatment is no longer attributable to the work related injury sustained on 4 July 2021 [3].

I conclude that the work-related aggravation no longer prevents you from working, and will not improve with further treatment. Therefore, you have no ongoing entitlements.

This means that weekly payments, and payment for treatment must stop.

• [34] Further, the Claim Decision identified the matters that were assessed as follows:

To reach a decision, I consider the information available and the requirements of the Act. Compensation under this claim covers an aggravation only and not the

pre-existing condition (sections 32(4) and 108(2)). Sections 144A and 144B outline when:

• weekly payments of compensation stop
• payment of medical treatment. hospitalisation and expenses stop.

• [35] The Claim Decision also provides detailed reasons for the decision. The final two paragraphs of the reasons are relevant to this application, as it forms the basis as to why the Appellant contends the matter of weekly payments and the payment of medical expenses during the period claimed by the Appellant is in issue. It states:

WorkCover Queensland has reviewed the medical information on [your] claim. Despite Dr Andrews supporting your surgery was required as a result of the work related event on 4 July 2021, as both Dr Tamba-Lebbie and Dr Holt agree the surgery undertaken was not required as a result of the work related injury sustained on 4 July 2021, WorkCover Queensland has accepted the surgery you have undertaken is not work related. It is reasonable to conclude that as WorkCover Queensland has not accepted liability for your surgery, any associated incapacity and requirement for treatment is also therefore not funded by WorkCover Queensland. Dr Holt has further confirmed there is no ongoing incapacity or requirement for treatment as result of the work related aggravation sustained on 4 July 2021.

After a careful review, I confirm your work-related aggravation no longer prevents you from working and will not improve with further treatment.

• [36] The decision also advises that an external review of the decision may be requested.

• [37] The Regulator agrees that there is no dispute that WorkCover accepted a claim from

20 April 2022 for a work-related aggravation of a pre-existing right shoulder injury that occurred on 3 July 2021 and that WorkCover determined in a decision dated 6 December 2022, that ongoing incapacity and requirement for treatment was no longer attributable to the work-related injury from 18 November 2022.[4]

• [38] The Regulator's review decision ('Review Decision') purports to identify the decision being reviewed as follows:

WorkCover issued reasons for decision dated 6 December 2022 and advised

Mr Chapman that his claim had been accepted as a work-related aggravation (worsening) of a pre-existing condition. WorkCover also advised they considered the medical evidence indicated Mr Chapman no longer had an incapacity for work or requirement for treatment for the aggravation of right shoulder cuff tear sustained on 4 July 2021, beyond 18 November 2022. WorkCover made the decision to terminate

Mr Chapman's entitlement to compensation in accordance with sections 144A and 144B of the Act.

It is this decision Mr Chapman seeks to be reviewed.

• [39] The Review Decision states that the issue for determination is as follows:

Section 144A of the Act states that a worker's entitlement to weekly payments of compensation stops when the incapacity because of the work-related injury stops. Section 144B of the Act states that a worker's entitlement to payment of medical treatment, hospitalisation and other expenses stops when the worker's entitlement to weekly payments stops, and the injury is not likely to improve with further medical treatment or hospitalisation so that medical treatment is no longer required to manage the injury.

• [40] The Review Decision poses and responds to the following questions:

(a) Does Mr Chapman have a total or partial incapacity for work because of the work-related injury (beyond 18 November 2022)?

(b) Does Mr Chapman require further medical treatment or hospitalisation for the management of the work-related injury (beyond 18 November 2022)?

• [41] The Review Decision ultimately determined the review as follows:

I have confirmed the decision of WorkCover to terminate Mr Chapman's entitlement to compensation from 18 November 2022, in accordance with sections 144A and 144B of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the Act).[5]

• [42] The Regulator's decision makes no determination with respect to the payment of the Appellant's weekly compensation or medical expenses incurred for the period claimed by the Appellant. Indeed, the decision focuses on whether the relevant entitlements are ongoing or whether they should stop from 18 November.

• [43] In making the application, the Regulator seeks the following orders, that:

(a) the Commission does not have jurisdictional power to make a decision on matters outside of the Workers' Compensation Regulator review decision "to terminate

Mr Chapman's entitlement to compensation from 18 November 2022, in accordance with section 144A and 144B of the WCR Act";

(b) the Commission will not be able to consider whether the Appellant is entitled to weekly benefits from 16 May to 18 September 2022; and

• [44] The effect of the orders sought by the Regulator is to limit the scope of this appeal to the matters contained and determined by the Regulator in the Review Decision of 29 May 2023.

• [45] Relevantly, the Regulator submits that the components of the Appellant's appeal as they appear in paragraphs 17 and 19 of the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions cannot be determined as they fall outside of the scope of the jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal because they did not form part of the determination in the Review Decision.

• [46] Paragraphs 17 and 19 of the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions are set out as follows:

1. During the pay period 30 May 2022 to 12 June 2022, 27 June 2022 to 10 July 2022, 16 May 2022 to 29 May 2022, 13 June 2022 to 26 June 2022, 11 July 2022 to 24 July 2022, 25 July 2022 to 7 August 2022, 8 August 2022 to

21 August 2022, 22 August 2022 to 4 September 2022, 5 September 2022 to 18 September 2022, the appellant was paid a mixture of personal, annual and long service leave whilst he was off work as a result of the injury.[6]

1. The appellant seeks reimbursement of his leave taken during the period 16 May 2022 to 18 September 2022 and payment of any outstanding weekly benefits in that period.[7]

• [47] Accordingly, by their respective terms, paragraphs 17 and 19 of the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions seek reimbursement of the leave taken by the Appellant and identified in paragraph 17 and payment of any outstanding weekly benefits for that same period.

• [48] The Regulator contends that the "appeal issues" are restricted to those in the "review decision" pursuant to s 545 of the WCR Act and that paragraphs 17 and 19 go beyond the matters determined in the Review Decision. Despite this and given the Regulator's position that it is the terms and content of the review decision that define the scope of the appeal, it is necessary to consider the relevant authorities.

Issue One - What is the nature and scope of the appeal?

• [49] It is well established that the nature of an appeal of a review decision by the Regulator is a hearing de novo. A line of authorities in the Industrial Court establish that the scope of such an appeal is determined having regard to the relevant statutory provisions and the case that was before the Regulator.

• [50] In Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator)[8] ('Church'), his Honour, Martin J referred to the nature of a workers' compensation appeal as follows:

• [28] The nature of a hearing de novo was discussed by Dawson J in Harris v Caladine where he said:

"An order made by a Registrar is reviewable by way of a hearing

de novo. That means that the court reviewing the order begins afresh and exercises for itself any discretion exercised below by the Registrar. The parties commence the application again, subject to any restrictions in the rules upon the calling of evidence or provisions relating to the use before the court of evidence called before the Registrar. A hearing de novo involves the exercise of the original jurisdiction and 'the informant or complainant starts again and has to make out his case and call his witnesses': Builders Licensing Board v. Sperway Constructions (Syd.) Pty. Ltd.; see also Reg. v. Pilgrim; Campbell, 'Judicial Review and Appeals as Alternative Remedies', Monash University Law Review.

A hearing de novo may be contrasted with an appeal stricto sensu and an appeal by way of rehearing. In an appeal stricto sensu the question is whether, upon the material before the tribunal below, the conclusion which was reached was correct. An appeal by way of rehearing involves the rehearing of the matter as at the date of the appeal, but upon the evidence called before the tribunal below, subject to a power to receive further evidence. On an appeal by way of rehearing the rights of the parties must be determined by reference to the circumstances, including the law, as they exist at the time of the rehearing. But an appeal by way of rehearing does not call for a fresh hearing as does a hearing de novo; the appeal court does not hear the witnesses again: see Builders Licensing Board v. Sperway Constructions (Syd.) Pty. Ltd.; Quilter v. Mapleson; and Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd. and Meakes v. Dignan ." (citations omitted, emphasis added)

• [29] In describing the nature of a hearing de novo, Dawson J refers to the parties commencing "the application again". In order to understand what is before the Commission it is necessary, then, to determine what the "application" is. It was put in another way by Lush J in R v Pilgrim where he said:

"Generally speaking, on appeal to the quarter sessions the justices are not limited to the evidence before the petty sessions, but they have to hear the whole matter de novo, and the issue is the same, and the justices are put in the same position as the justices in the court below." (emphasis added)

• [30] While it is correct to say that the parties start again, it is necessary to determine what it is that the parties are starting again. As Dawson J said in Harris v Caladine the "complainant starts again and has to make out his case and call his witnesses". What is the "case" to be made out? If, as Lush J put it: "the issue is the same", what is the "issue"?[9]

• [51] Further, with respect to the relevant statutory provision, his Honour relevantly stated:

• [37] Further, the appeal to the Commission is with respect to the "review decision". As set out above, a "review decision" is defined in s 545 in the following way:

"(1) The Regulator must, within 25 business days after receiving the application, review the decision and decide (the review decision) to -

(c) set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or

(d) set aside the decision and return the matter to the decision-maker with the directions the Regulator considers appropriate."

• [38] That definition provides the boundaries of the hearing before the Commission on appeal. The sections of the Act which deal with an appeal to the Commission apply to "review decisions". The review decision in this case was to affirm the decision of WorkCover that Mr Church had not sustained an injury within the meaning of the Act. The provisions of the Act which deal with appeals do not contemplate that another issue, removed in time and effect from the review decision, would be able to be considered.

• [39] The Commission did not, in the circumstances of this case, have the power to consider and then to vary the decision of the Regulator to waive the time limit.[10]

• [52] In a recent appeal,[11] in the Industrial Court of Queensland, his Honour, Davis J referred to the ambit of the appeal as follows:

• [64] On appeal, Martin P observed that on a hearing de novo the Commission sat in the position of the Regulator and decided the case afresh. There can be no doubt about that proposition. His Honour held "The ambit of such a hearing is determined by the case which was before the Regulator. It is also determined by any specific statutory provision which impinges upon the boundaries of the issue to be determined".

• [65] The decision by the Regulator to waive the time limit, Martin P observed, became a decision of WorkCover and while, by s 549, a claimant may appeal that decision, an insurer cannot. His Honour went on to find then that the "issue" taken on appeal to the Commission did not include any issue arising under s 131(1).

• [66] Church may not be authority for the proposition that a claimant who only relied upon s 131(6) before the Regulator cannot rely upon ss 131(5) and 36A on appeal to the Commission. It is unnecessary to decide that issue now. I will, when considering the admission of further evidence on appeal, assume that

Mr Wang could, both before the Commission and this Court, rely upon

• [53] In Kim v Workers' Compensation Regulator,[13] his Honour, Martin J referred to the ambit of the hearing as follows:

... The ambit of a Commission hearing is determined by the case which was before the Regulator. However, the Regulator's actual decision is irrelevant. The parties start the case again and the appellant must make out their case anew ...[14]

• [54] Accordingly, in reliance on these authorities it can be concluded that:

(a) the nature of the hearing is a hearing de novo;

(b) a hearing de novo requires the parties to start the case again; and

(c) the scope of the appeal is determined by reference to the case or issue that was before the Regulator and any specific statutory provision which impinges on the boundaries of the case or issue to be determined.

• [55] It follows that, the Regulator's position that the scope of the appeal is determined by the content of the review decision must be rejected as a statement of principle.

• [56] The reason for this is that it is the case before the Regulator that determines the scope of the appeal, in conjunction with the relevant statutory provisions which act to define the boundaries of the case or issue to be determined. If, for example, the Regulator's review decision misstates or mischaracterises or simply does not deal with the case before it then such a decision could not properly define the scope of the appeal on the basis that the decision erroneously dealt with the case before it.

Issue Two - What was the case or issue before the Regulator and what were the matters to be determined?

• [57] The Appellant submits that the case before the Regulator is "Mr Chapman's application which was initiated by the medical certificate dated 29 June 2022 and those matters traversed by the decision of WorkCover dated 6 December 2022."[15]

• [58] The Appellant, therefore, argues that "the scope of the case before the Regulator is first evidenced by the workers compensation medical certificate of Dr Yaqub dated 29 June 2022 which confirms incapacity for work from 16 May 2022 to 11 July 2022 and a requirement for treatment in the form of analgesics, physiotherapy and orthopaedic surgeon review."[16]

• [59] The Appellant submits that as a result of the medical certificate, the Appellant made a claim for the following:

(a) weekly benefits for total incapacity for the period (at that stage) from 16 May 2022 to 11 July 2022 under s 150 of the WCR Act (Ch 3); and

(b) treatment in the form of analgesics, physiotherapy and orthopaedic surgeon review under s 211 of the WCR Act (Ch 4).[17]

• [60] The Appellant submits that the case before the Regulator was "significantly more than whether Mr Chapman was entitled to weekly benefits after 18 November 2022".[18]

• [61] The Appellant further submits "it does not matter that the Regulator has restricted its decision to only one of the issues arising from the case before it, namely any ongoing incapacity beyond 18 November 2022, because the scope of the case before it was much wider than that."[19]

• [62] The Appellant states that "until 6 December 2022, the insurer had not determined what actual compensation was payable as a result of the 'acceptance' of the injury"[20] and that WorkCover "never paid any weekly benefits to Mr Chapman".[21]

• [63] It is apparent that the Appellant seeks the Commission to determine whether the Appellant should receive weekly payment arising out of the time off following the surgery.

• [64] The Regulator contends that the Appellant's claim that he be reimbursed his leave taken and paid his weekly compensation payments for the relevant period goes beyond the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction.

• [65] As noted in the background above, WorkCover's decision was made on 6 December 2022, well after the Appellant had returned to work on his usual duties since 24 October 2022. A consequence of this is that a number of matters had arisen in the context of the Appellant's claim prior to WorkCover's decision.

• [66] This included a decision being made to accept the Appellant's application for compensation.

• [67] Chapter 3, Part 9 of the WCR Act deals with the weekly payment of compensation and applies if a worker is totally or partially incapacitated because of an injury for which compensation is payable.[22]

• [68] By paragraphs 17 and 19 of the Appellant's Statement of Facts and Contentions, the Appellant contends that he was not in receipt of, inter alia, weekly compensation payments following the acceptance of the claim.

• [69] That does not appear to be in dispute. The dispute arises because it is argued that the issue surrounding the payment of weekly compensation entitlements and the payment of medical expenses for the period now claimed was not in issue with respect to the matters being determined.

• [70] As noted above, it is the Appellant's argument that the scope of the case before the Regulator is informed by the workers compensation medical certificate issued on 29 June 2022, and conversations had between the Appellant and WorkCover wherein the Appellant advised that he had been off work since 16 May 2022 and that recovery of wages will be dependent upon the determination of liability for the surgery.

• [71] Whilst the reasons for WorkCover's decision touch upon these matters, these issues were not determined by either WorkCover's decision nor the Regulator's decision.

• [72] It is apparent that by the terms of WorkCover's decision and the Regulator's decision that the relevant issue being determined was whether the Appellant's entitlement to compensation in accordance with ss 144A and 144B of the WCR Act should stop from 18 November 2022. It is this issue that defines the scope of the appeal.

Issue Three - Does the Commission have jurisdiction to decide whether the Appellant should be reimbursed his leave and be back paid weekly compensation for the period 16 May 2022 to 18 September 2022?

• [73] The Regulator's decision accurately reflects the case that came before it by way of external review. Further, the Review Decision does not attempt to deal with the matters raised in the penultimate paragraph of WorkCover's decision. Just as the appeal to the Commission is from the Regulator's decision, not from its reasons[23] so too is the appeal to the Regulator from WorkCover's decision.

• [74] The decision made by the Regulator is a decision regarding whether the entitlement to weekly payments stop and when the entitlement to medical expenses is ongoing or should stop, from 18 November 2022, pursuant to ss 144A and 144B of the WCR Act respectively.

• [75] Each of ss 144A and 144B are premised on there being an existing entitlement that is to be stopped if certain things occur.[24] With respect to s 144A, the relevant entitlement is to weekly payments of compensation under Pt 9. With respect to s 144B, the relevant entitlement is to medical treatment, hospitalisation and expenses under Ch 4 of the WCR Act.

• [76] Sections 144A and 144B respectively would have no work to do if there was no existing entitlement to stop. The decision does not attempt to determine the Appellant's entitlement during the period claimed by the Appellant, but rather determining when the entitlement is ongoing or should be stopped.

• [77] Accordingly, it would not be necessary to make a decision pursuant to ss 144A or 144B of the WCR Act if it was contended by the Regulator that no relevant entitlement existed. Whilst it is accepted that the penultimate paragraph of WorkCover's reasons purport to deal with the issue of whether the entitlement existed, those reasons do not accord with the decision issued. As already stated, it is the decision, which is the subject of the review, not the reasons.

• [78] Accordingly, the relief sought by the Appellant in paragraph 19 of his Statement of Facts and Contentions, read together with paragraph 17, falls outside the scope of this appeal.

• [79] On this basis, the application is granted.

1. The application in existing proceedings filed by the Regulator on 20 March 2024 is granted.

1. The parties are directed to jointly provide draft orders that reflect these reasons to the Industrial Registry within seven (7) days.

[2] Workers' Compensation Regulator, 'Affidavit of Renee Matheson', Affidavit in Chapman v Workers' Compensation Regulator, WC/2023/84, 20 March 2024, Attachment RM1 ('WorkCover's Decision letter dated

[3] The Appellant's legal representative confirmed at the hearing on 27 May 2024 that the actual date of the injury was 3 July 2021, and not 4 July 2021, although throughout the documents in the review decisions, the injury date was noted as 4 July 2021; T1-18 ll 42-6.

[4] Workers' Compensation Regulator, 'Submissions on behalf of the Regulator', Submission in Chapman v Workers' Compensation Regulator, WC/2023/84, 13 May 2024, [3].

[5] Workers' Compensation Regulator, 'Affidavit of Renee Matheson', Affidavit in Chapman v Workers' Compensation Regulator, WC/2023/84, 20 March 2024, Attachment RM2, 1 ('Review decision dated 29 May 2023').

[6] Russell Chapman, 'Appellant's statement of facts and contentions physical and/or psychiatric/psychological secondary injuries', Form 9B in Chapman v Workers' Compensation Regulator, WC/2023/84, 24 August 2023, [17].

[8] [2015] ICQ 31 ('Church').

[9] Church (n 8) [28]-[30] (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

[11] Wang v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] ICQ 20 ('Wang').

[12] Wang (n 11) [64]-[66] (citations omitted).

[13] [2019] ICQ 14.

[15] Russell Chapman, 'Amended Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Russell Chapman', Submission in Chapman v Workers' Compensation Regulator, WC/2023/84, 23 May 2024, [26]. Appellant's amended submissions, [26] ('Appellant's Amended Submissions filed 23 May 2024').

[17] Appellant's Amended Submissions filed 23 May 2024 (n 15) [28].

[22] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 145(1) ('WCR Act').

[23] Workers' Compensation Regulator v Scofield [2018] ICQ 3, [5].

[24] WCR Act (n 22) s 144A(1)(a)-(c); WCR Act (n 22) s 144B(1)(a)-(b).