Criminal law - Sentence appeal - Aggravated burglary, aggravated armed robbery, dangerous driving - Whether fact that offences committed whilst on an ISO was properly treated as an aggravating factor - Whether total effective sentence of 6 years infringed totality principle

Chadd v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 99

Colangelo v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 294

Forkin v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 51

Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9

Hawkins v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 68

Hill v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 150

McConkey v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 45

Mejtska v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 80

Moreton v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 258

Pop v The Queen [2000] WASCA 283; (2000) 116 A Crim R 398

Than-Htay v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 68

The State of Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148; (2009) 197 A Crim R 119

The State of Western Australia v Drew [2012] WASCA 86

The State of Western Australia v Wynne [2008] WASCA 195; (2008) 188 A Crim R 502

Ugle v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 104; (2012) 223 A Crim R 115

Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465

Wroth v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 155

2 HALL J: This is an application for leave to appeal against sentence.

3 On 4 July 2014 the appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment with eligibility for parole. That sentence was imposed for six offences on an indictment, including aggravated burglary and aggravated armed robbery and a further 18 offences on a list under s 32 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).

4 There are two grounds of appeal. The first is that the sentencing judge erred in identifying the fact that the appellant was subject to an intensive supervision order at the time of the offending as an aggravating factor. The second is that the total effective sentence is disproportionate to the overall criminality, in particular having regard to the appellant's youth, early pleas of guilty and cooperation with the police.

5 The appeal notice was filed three days late and an extension of time is required. An affidavit in support of the application for an extension states that the reason for the delay was difficulty in a solicitor seeing the appellant in prison for the purpose of obtaining instructions. Instructions were finally obtained by telephone on 28 July 2014 and the notice was filed the same day. The delay is very short and I would grant the extension of time.

6 At about 3.50 am on 17 December 2013 the appellant went to a house in Yangebup in company with a co-offender. He forced open the garage door and then used an internal door to access the kitchen. He removed a car key from the kitchen bench and returned to the garage where he used the keys to steal a black Holden Commodore. These events relate to counts 1 and 2 on the indictment, offences of aggravated burglary and stealing a motor vehicle.

7 Approximately an hour later, still in the early hours of the morning of 17 December 2013, the appellant and the same co-offender were driving along Frobisher Street, Osborne Park in the stolen Holden Commodore. The appellant saw a woman walking along the street and formed an intention with his co-offender to snatch her handbag. The appellant, who was driving, pulled alongside the woman and his co-offender got out and threatened the woman with a screwdriver. The co-offender pushed the tip of the screwdriver into the woman's cheek as he demanded her handbag. The woman handed her handbag to the

co-offender who then returned to the car which left the scene. The handbag contained a purse with about $330 in cash, bank cards and other miscellaneous items. These acts relate to the offence of aggravated armed robbery which was count 3 on the indictment.

8 At about 3.30 pm on the same day the appellant was driving the stolen Holden Commodore in Girrawheen. A different co-offender was in the car with him. Unknown to the appellant, the co-offender decided to steal the handbag of a passing shopper. The appellant stopped the vehicle across a pedestrian crossing in a shopping centre carpark as a woman crossed the road. The woman was forced to walk around the rear of the vehicle. The co-offender, who was seated in a rear seat, got out and grabbed the woman's handbag. There was a struggle until the co-offender raised a box cutter knife above the woman's head causing her to let go. The co-offender then got back into the car with the stolen handbag. Knowing what had occurred the appellant then drove the co-offender away in order to help him escape. This act constitutes count 4 on the indictment, an offence of being an accessory after the fact to armed robbery by assisting the co-offender to escape.

9 About half an hour later on the same day the appellant and the co-offender from counts 1 and 2 drove in the stolen Holden Commodore to the Warwick Grove Shopping Centre. They formed an intention to steal the handbag of a shopper. The appellant stopped the stolen car behind a woman who was seated in her own parked vehicle. The co-offender then opened the woman's car door and demanded her handbag, brandishing a large screwdriver as he did so. The woman struggled with the co-offender and attempted to wrestle the screwdriver out of his hand but was unsuccessful. The woman handed her handbag to the co-offender out of fear that she would be injured. The bag contained a wallet with $60 in cash, various cards and a mobile telephone. The co-offender returned to the Holden Commodore and the appellant then drove away. These acts constitute count 5 on the indictment, an offence of aggravated armed robbery.

10 At about 9.30 am on Thursday 19 December 2013 the appellant and a different co-offender drove to the Whitford City Shopping Centre in the stolen Holden Commodore. The appellant was again the driver of the vehicle. He and the co-offender formed a common intention to steal the handbag of a shopper. The appellant stopped the car in close proximity to a woman who was pushing a shopping trolley. The co-offender got out of the car and pushed the woman from behind causing her to stumble. The co-offender then attempted to steal the woman's handbag dragging her as he did so. After a struggle the co-offender obtained possession of the bag and ran to the car which was then driven away from the scene. The handbag contained a purse with miscellaneous cards, keys and $150 in cash. This relates to count 6 on the indictment, an offence of aggravated robbery.

11 Later the same day police saw the stolen Holden Commodore parked in Innaloo. The appellant was observed to drive away in the vehicle and was pursued by police. After a chase the appellant crashed the vehicle on West Coast Highway and ran from the scene. He was arrested a short distance away and a search of the car resulted in the locating of some items stolen during the earlier offences. When interviewed the appellant made admissions to the offences, although he denied entering the house which was the subject of the burglary offence in count 1 saying that the keys to the car had been located in the ignition.

12 The offences on the s 32 list related to matters that had occurred between August 2012 and 20 December 2013. The facts in relation to those offences are as follows.

13 In the early hours of the morning of 8 August 2012 the appellant in company with two other men broke into a liquor shop at the Warwick Grove Shopping Centre. The three men kicked and pulled the front doors eventually prising the door away enough to squeeze inside. The three men then filled bags that they had brought with them with bottles of alcohol. They stole bottles of spirits with a total value of $1,605. On entering the store a burglar alarm had been activated. Police attended and the two co-offenders were apprehended at the scene. The appellant escaped but was arrested on 30 August 2012. He made full admissions, was charged with aggravated burglary (JO 9392/13) and was then granted bail to appear at the Joondalup Magistrates Court.

14 The appellant was bailed to appear at the Joondalup Magistrates Court on 12 September 2012. He failed to appear and a warrant for his arrest was issued. He was charged with breaching his bail undertaking (JO 9394/13).

15 At 9.50 am on Wednesday 30 January 2013 police attended at an address in Clarkson to speak to the appellant. He fled from police over the rear fence of the property. A chase on foot over fences and through several residential properties ensued. At the time of his apprehension the appellant was attempting to escape by kicking a hole in the fence. He was charged with wilful and unlawful damage and trespass (JO 9396/13 & JO 9397/13).

16 The appellant appeared in the Joondalup Magistrates Court on 8 March 2013 and was released on bail to appear again on 19 April 2013. He failed to appear on that day and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was charged with breaching a bail undertaking (JO 9393/13).

17 On 10 July 2013 the appellant was sentenced to an 18 month intensive supervision order (ISO) for the offences of aggravated burglary, stealing, breach of bail, trespass and criminal damage (JO 9392 - 9397/13). The ISO contained supervision, programme and community work requirements. The appellant reported to Community Corrections on 11 July 2013, where his obligations under the order were explained to him. He then reported on four occasions before failing to report as directed on 11 September 2013. By committing further offences during the term of the ISO the appellant was liable to be resentenced for the original offences.

18 On 5 October 2013 at about 10.00 pm the appellant went to a house in Quinns Rocks with four other men. After consuming alcohol the appellant asked one of the men to drive him to Clarkson Train Station. The man was in possession of a car which had been loaned to him by the appellant's mother. The appellant threatened to bash the man unless he complied. After an argument the man agreed to drive the appellant to the train station. On the way the appellant directed the man to stop the car and two other men got in. He then directed the man to give him the keys and get in the passenger seat. The man complied and the appellant then drove to the Merriwa Tavern. The man got out of the car saying he was going to buy alcohol. As he approached a security guard the appellant drove off in the car. The car was recovered on 17 October 2013 in Rivervale. It had sustained extensive internal and external damage which was unable to be repaired. The appellant was charged with stealing the motor vehicle (JO 9252/13). The appellant did not have a driver's licence and was also charged with driving without authority (JO 9253/13).

19 On 11 November 2013 at about 1.50 pm the appellant and two other men went to an IGA liquor shop in Butler. The appellant stole three bottles of spirits. When pursued by the owner of the store he threw the bottles away. He was charged with stealing (JO 9251/13).

20 After being charged with stealing the appellant was released on a bail undertaking to appear in the Joondalup Magistrates Court on 29 November 2013. He failed to appear in court on that day and an arrest warrant issued. He was charged with breaching a bail undertaking (PE 64535/13).

21 At 1.55 pm on Thursday 19 December 2013 the appellant drove the stolen black Holden Commodore that is the subject of count 2 on the indictment on Odin Road, Innaloo. He was followed by police and, when they activated emergency lights and sirens, he took off at high speed. A chase ensued on residential streets at high speeds, along a pedestrian walkway, through red lights, on the wrong side of the road and over central median islands. After losing control and crashing into a fence the appellant fled on foot and was later apprehended by police. He was charged with dangerous driving to escape pursuit by police and aggravated failing to stop (PE 64536 - 65437/13).

22 Police searched the stolen car and found a glass smoking pipe with detectible traces of methylamphetamine. They also located a number of items that were believed to be stolen, including cash and jewellery. The appellant was charged with possessing drug paraphernalia (PE 65346/13), possessing stolen or unlawfully obtained property (PE 65347/13), driving without authority (PE 65348/13), failing to stop at the scene where the car crashed (PE 65349/13) and failing to report an incident involving property damage (PE 65350/13).

23 After being arrested the appellant was taken to the Mirrabooka Police Station. When subjected to a strip search police located a plastic clipseal bag containing approximately 0.1 g of methylamphetamine and he was charged with possessing a prohibited drug (PE 65711/13).

24 When interviewed the appellant made admissions to the offences contained on the s 32 list.

25 Sentences were imposed in accordance with the following table:

Accessory after the fact to aggravated armed robbery

1 year 1 month imprisonment and 4 years' motor driver's licence disqualification

9 months' imprisonment and 3 years' motor driver's licence disqualification

4 months' imprisonment and 18 months' disqualification

26 The sentencing judge made orders that had the effect of making the sentences on count 3 and charges 9392, 9393, 9394, 9396, 9252, 9251, 64535, 65346 and 65711 cumulative and all other sentences of imprisonment concurrent. This produced a total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment. That sentence was backdated to the date when the appellant first went into custody, 19 December 2013. An order was made that he be eligible for parole.

27 The sentencing judge identified the aggravating factors in respect of each of the offences. For all the offences that occurred between 5 October 2013 and 20 December 2013 his Honour referred to an aggravating factor being that they were committed whilst the appellant was subject to the ISO imposed on 10 July 2013. This represented all of the offences other than the first six on the s 32 list.

28 His Honour then turned to the relevant personal circumstances. He noted that the appellant was born on 30 September 1993 and was 20 years of age at the time of most of the offending. He said that the appellant was entitled to significant credit on account of his youth. However the nature of the offending made the dominant sentencing considerations punishment and general deterrence. He also noted that the appellant had a significant criminal record.

29 His Honour referred to the fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty to all offences and it was appropriate to allow the maximum discount in that regard pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act of 25%. His Honour then referred to the appellant's cooperation with the authorities and said:

In addition, I note what I was told as to your having made admissions in whole or in part to almost all of your offences. You should receive credit for that measure of cooperation with the authorities and your prosecution. However, it is less for indictment offence 1 for which your admission on the face of it was partial. In addition, I take the admissions I have described as your early acceptance of responsibility

Further, I note the reference for indictment offences 1, 3, 4 5 and 6 to [be] a further form of cooperation with the authorities in the form of your naming a co-offender. You should receive further credit for that form of cooperation [76] - [77].

30 His Honour noted that the pre-sentence report indicated that the appellant had limited insight into his offending or appreciation of the effects upon the victims. However he noted that the appellant had expressed remorse and an appreciation of the impact of the offending in a letter that he had subsequently written. His Honour said that in the circumstances he would give the appellant credit for remorse and victim empathy, although it would not be as high as it would have been if that remorse and victim empathy had been expressed consistently from the outset.

31 His Honour noted that the appellant had had a difficult upbringing. He had attended numerous different schools and had never had significant employment. He had no serious psychological or psychiatric illnesses. He did report a significant substance abuse problem, both in respect of alcohol and methylamphetamine. He has a significant criminal history which includes offences of stealing, burglary, breaches of bail, stealing motor vehicles and common assault. Whilst he had been ordered to serve periods of detention as a juvenile, he had not been previously imprisoned as an adult.

I should particularly note, as regards your criminal history, that an offence is not aggravated by a criminal record, or by the fact that a previous sentence has not achieved the purpose for which it was imposed. However, a criminal record might go to reduce the weight to be given to mitigating factors. Here, to some extent, it reduces the weight that I might otherwise give to you, in view of your experience of the criminal justice system. Otherwise, it does not play a large role in my sentencing [91].

33 It is submitted by the appellant that to treat a breach of an ISO as an aggravating factor and then also sentence an offender for the breaches of that order results in double punishment of the same conduct. Reference is also made to s 7(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act which provides that the fact that the offender has previously committed offences does not aggravate an offence. The appellant submits that to increase a penalty in consequence of a criminal record would be to impose a fresh penalty for past offences and that this is inappropriate: Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477.

34 It has long been recognised that the commission of offences whilst on bail on charges of a similar nature is an aggravating factor: Pop v The Queen [2000] WASCA 283; (2000) 116 A Crim R 398. The reasons for that are that it shows that the person has little regard for the law and is prepared to offend notwithstanding that he or she has been granted liberty upon a condition of being of good behaviour pending trial. That principle has been consistently applied in this court: Colangelo v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 294 [25]; The State of Western Australia v Wynne [2008] WASCA 195; (2008) 188 A Crim R 502 [95]; The State of Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148; (2009) 197 A Crim R 119 [165]; Moreton v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 258 [47]; and Ugle v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 104; (2012) 223 A Crim R 115 [70]. The principle has also been applied in the analogous context of an offender who commits offences whilst on parole: see for example Than-Htay v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 68 [38].

35 The rationale for treating offending whilst on bail or parole as being an aggravating factor applies equally where a person commits offences whilst on some other form of conditional release, such as an intensive supervision order. An ISO permits the release of an offender into the community on conditions and subject to a proviso that if the offender commits another offence he or she can be sentenced again for the offence for which the ISO was imposed: s 69(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act. The commission of an offence whilst on an ISO not only exposes the offender to resentencing for the original offence, it is a factor relevant to the sentencing for the breaching offences. This is not to impose double punishment or to treat the prior offence as an aggravating factor. What is aggravating is not the fact that the offender has committed a prior offence. Rather it is aggravating that the offender committed the offence whilst subject to a court order that placed upon him a particular obligation to be of good behaviour. To commit an offence in those circumstances displays contempt for the law. This is relevant in itself and also because it enhances the need for personal deterrence.

36 Whilst the appellant did not refer to any cases where the principle had been applied where an offender had committed offences whilst on an ISO, there is no reason why it should not apply in those circumstances. I also note that in Hawkins v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 68 the appellant committed offences whilst on an ISO and a suspended sentence. This was treated as an aggravating factor by the sentencing judge. Although the appeal against sentence was focused on whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and there was no specific error alleged in regard to treating the fact of being on an ISO and a suspended sentence as aggravating, Steytler P said that there was no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offending.

37 In Veen v The Queen (No 2) the distinction between not imposing additional punishment for a past offence and taking into account the circumstances in which subsequent offences were committed was recognised. Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ said:

[T]he antecedent criminal history of an offender is a factor which may be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed, but it cannot be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence. To do so would be to impose a fresh penalty for past offences: Director of Public Prosecutions v Ottewell [1970] AC 642 at 650. The antecedent criminal history is relevant, however, to show whether the instant offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law. In the latter case, retribution, deterrence and protection of society may all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted. It is legitimate to take account of the antecedent criminal history when it illuminates the moral culpability of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity or shows a need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other offenders from committing further offences of a like kind (477).

38 In the present case the commission of a series of offences whilst the appellant was subject to an ISO for offending of a similar nature indicated a marked lack of respect for the law and a willingness to offend notwithstanding his conditional release into the community. This obviously heightened the need for the punishment to contain a significant element of personal deterrence. The sentencing judge was not in error in treating the fact that many of the offences had occurred during the term of the ISO as an aggravating factor. This ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success and leave in respect of it should be refused.

39 The appellant submits that the total effective sentence of 6 years' imprisonment was disproportionate to the overall criminality having regard to the appellant's youth, early pleas of guilty and cooperation with the police.

40 In regard to youth the appellant was 20 at the time of the commission of the offences. Although he had a prior criminal record there was only one prior offence of violence, a common assault, which resulted in a relatively modest fine. It is also submitted that the level of criminality of the appellant's conduct is less than that of his co-offenders as it was the co-offenders, rather than the appellant, who were responsible for taking the items that were stolen in the robberies.

41 Whilst it is recognised that the utility of referring to comparable cases is limited, it is submitted that the appellant's case is similar to that of The State of Western Australia v Drew [2012] WASCA 86. In that case the offender pleaded guilty to five counts of armed robbery and one count of aggravated armed robbery. He was also convicted of breaching a community based order imposed for offences of burglary and stealing. A total effective sentence of 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment was imposed. The robbery offences occurred over an eight month period between June 2010 and February 2011 and involved holding up pharmacies at night and with use of a knife in order to obtain prescription drugs. The offender in that case was aged 19 years when he committed the offences and was 20 at the time of sentencing. He had a very substantial drug addiction and a minor criminal record. The total effective sentence was described as lenient and merciful. However Buss JA, with whom McLure P and Newnes JA agreed, was not persuaded that the outcome was outside the range of sentences open to the sentencing judge in a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. In this regard it was noted that there were substantial mitigating factors, notably the offender's pleas of guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, his remorse, his youth, his cooperation with the police and his mental health issues. Also of some significance was that the offender's prior criminal offences were relatively minor; he had never previously been sentenced to imprisonment and had never served a term of juvenile detention. A psychological report indicated that the offender had longstanding anxiety and depression, that he had an unstable lifestyle, often living on the streets, and that he had resorted to significant substance abuse to alleviate emotional distress and his undiagnosed mental health issues.

42 The appellant submits that, like Drew, he was relatively youthful at the time of the offending and had not previously been imprisoned, although he had served a period of juvenile detention. That detention was ordered for breaching a youth intensive supervision order which was imposed for offences of stealing motor vehicles and other property. Like Drew the appellant had entered early pleas of guilty, made admissions to the police and expressed his remorse for the offending.

43 The appellant submits that the offending on the indictment occurred over a relatively short three day period from 17 - 19 December 2013. In sentencing submissions the appellant's counsel said that this offending occurred shortly after the appellant's young daughters were taken into care by the Department of Child Protection and shortly following his first exposure to methylamphetamine.

44 As regards cooperation, it is submitted that it was a matter of significant mitigation that the appellant provided the names of the co-offenders when interviewed by the police. In sentencing submissions it was confirmed that this was the extent of the appellant's cooperation. He had not provided an undertaking to give evidence against the co-offenders. The prosecutor said that whilst the information had been received it had not led to any further charges being preferred.

45 The appellant accepts that the individual sentences imposed were not excessive but it is said that the accumulation of so many of the sentences resulted in a total of inappropriate severity. Whilst it was accepted that the offences on the indictment were of a serious nature, cumulative sentences were imposed for a number of offences on the s 32 list that were significantly less serious, including breaches of bail, possession of drug paraphernalia and drugs and criminal damage.

46 Whilst it is true that the offences on the indictment occurred over a three day period, the total offending conduct, including that on the s 32 list, covered a much longer period. When seen in that context the offences on the indictment could not be seen as an aberration triggered by a personal crisis.

47 Whilst the appellant was comparatively youthful, he did not come before the court with an unblemished record. Youth is a significant factor to be taken into account but it cannot justify the imposition of a sentence that is inappropriately lenient having regard to the seriousness of the offending conduct. A substantial custodial sentence may be required in an appropriate case, despite the offender's youth, in order to properly reflect the need to protect the public and the need for personal and general deterrence: Ugle [71]. Unlike Drew the appellant had committed some offences of a similar nature before and had been sentenced to a period of juvenile detention. The sentencing judge referred to the appellant's youth and there is no reason to think that he did not take it into account or failed to give it appropriate weight.

48 As to cooperation, it is well established that substantial discounts may be allowed to recognise the value of an offender's cooperation with the police. The information does not have to have been effective in the law enforcement process although the greater the utility the larger the discount. In the present case the appellant's cooperation was limited to providing the names of two of his co-offenders. He did not agree to give evidence against those co-offenders. In those circumstances whilst the information may have had some utility it was clearly less useful than information that results in the charging of others. The sentencing judge referred to the cooperation and there is no suggestion that he mischaracterised it. The sentence imposed is not inconsistent with that cooperation being recognised and being given appropriate weight.

49 Similarly with the pleas of guilty, they were referred to by the sentencing judge who accorded them the maximum discount available pursuant to s 9AA. The sentences imposed are not inconsistent with that discount being given.

50 As to the appellant's suggestion that it was inappropriate to impose cumulative sentences of some of the minor offences contained in the s 32 list, this needs to be seen in the overall context. The offences contained on the indictment were serious offences of their type. Whilst the appellant was not the one who actually threatened the victims and stole their property, it was apparent, and admitted, that those offences of robbery of which he was convicted had been conducted pursuant to a common plan. He was culpable for what occurred by being a party to that plan and by driving the vehicle.

51 The seriousness of the offences on the indictment would have justified some cumulation or partial cumulation of the sentences for those offences. When considering the appropriateness of the orders of accumulation in respect of some of the minor offences on the s 32 list it is necessary to consider whether the total effective sentence is proportional to the total criminality. In Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9, Owen JA, with whom McLure P & Pullin JA agreed said:

[G]enerally speaking where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count will usually fall to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence. A heavy individual sentence, for example, may be softened by an order that it be served concurrently with sentences imposed in relation to the other counts. On the other hand, a relatively light sentence may, as a practical matter, have increased severity if it is ordered to be served cumulatively. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is excessive [40].

52 Consistency in sentencing is an important consideration. This requires more than reference to one other case. Furthermore, Drew was a State appeal against sentence and the dismissal of that appeal cannot indicate that the sentence imposed marked the limits of discretion; in fact to the contrary, the sentence in that case was described as lenient and merciful. I have considered a number of other cases, in addition to Drew, which involve multiple offences of armed robbery and are comparable to that of the appellant. They are: Hill v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 150, Wroth v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 155, Chadd v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 99, Forkin v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 51, McConkey v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 45 and Mejtska v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 80. Whilst there will always be points of difference and similarity when comparing cases, these cases do not suggest that the total sentence imposed on the appellant was in error.

53 Having regard to cases involving multiple offences of armed robbery, and also the fact that in this case the appellant committed a number of other serious offences including burglary and aggravated dangerous driving, the total effective sentence is not disproportionate to the total offending. In my view this ground has no reasonable prospect of success and leave in respect of it should be refused.

1. Application for an extension of time granted.
2. Leave to appeal refused.
3. Appeal dismissed.