Barry v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 175

Dedman v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 135

Herbert v The Queen [2003] WASCA 61; (2003) 27 WAR 330

Mejtska v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 80

Nicolaides v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 199

Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246

Satonick v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 145

Sein-Thet v The Queen [1999] WASCA 186

The State of Western Australia v Chadd [2011] WASCSR 143

Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82

Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196

The parity principle is based upon the norm of equality before the law which requires, so far as the law permits, that like cases be treated alike and that there be different outcomes where there are relevant differences: Green v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; (2011) 244 CLR 462 [28] (French CJ, Crennan & Kiefel JJ).

Whether the parity principle has been infringed does not depend upon a finding that the sentence in question is manifestly excessive. It depends upon whether, objectively speaking, the disparity (or lack of it) gives rise to a justifiable sense of grievance: Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606, 609 - 610 (Gibbs CJ).

What is required is a comparison of the sentence imposed on each offender and an evaluation of their involvement in the commission of the offence and their antecedents: MGM v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 24 [43] (Mazza JA, McLure P & Buss JA agreeing) [55] - [57].

The appellant relies on the totality principle which comprises two limbs. The first limb is that the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally: Woods v The Queen (1994) 14 WAR 341.

The second limb is that the court should not impose a 'crushing' sentence. The word crushing in this context connotes the destruction of any reasonable expectation of a useful life after release: Martino v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 78 [16]. An aggregate sentence may be inappropriately long under the first limb even if it cannot be described as crushing: Jarvis v The Queen (1998) 20 WAR 201, 216 (Anderson J).

The practical effect of the totality principle is ordinarily to arrive at an aggregate sentence that is less than that which would be arrived at by simply adding up all the terms appropriate for the individual offences: R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245, 260 (Street CJ). A rationale for the totality principle is that there is assumed rehabilitation and reduced demand for retribution after the initial sentences have been served. Where the principle of totality comes into effect, it is of little importance how the ultimate aggregate is made up: R v Holder (260) [24] - [26].

(2003) 27 WAR 330

(2011) 244 CLR 462

(1984) 154 CLR 606

(1994) 14 WAR 341

(1998) 20 WAR 201