[2017] VCAT 1295
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2017-08-21
Croft J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Taxation - Land Tax Act 2005 (Vic), section 54(1) - Principal place of residence exemption - Failure to satisfy onus of proof - Denial of application for leave to raise additional ground at conclusion of hearing.
Carvalho v Commissioner of State Revenue (Review and Regulation) [2017] VCAT 1295
The 2016 land tax assessment of the respondent is confirmed.
The Commissioner is, as observed in the Commissioner's submissions, at an evidentiary disadvantage inasmuch as those who are seeking an exemption have within their control almost all of the evidence in relation to what is occurring on the Land and why things were or were not done on the Land. The Commissioner can only really point to objective circumstances with a view to determining the position. Consequently, I accept that, when the Court is faced with a case of this nature, and particularly where, as in this case, the Court is faced with very uncertain evidence, a focus must be maintained on whether the onus has been met.[7]
(2) Subject to section 55, subsection (1)(a) or (b) only applies if the land has been used and occupied as the principal place of residence of the owner or vested beneficiary -
- (a) since 1 July in the year preceding the tax year;
'Firstly, the words "principal place of residence" should be given their ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear...
Secondly, consideration of whether a person has been residing or occupying premises as their principal place of residence is to be assessed objectively, in the light of the circumstances relating to the actual occupation of the dwelling...
Thirdly, the intention of the person concerned, gauged objectively, is relevant but not determinative of the issue...
Fourthly, to occupy a home as his or her place of principal residence a person's occupation must have a degree of permanence to it: a connection to a place of residence of a transient, temporary, contingent or passing nature is not sufficient, nor is occupation for some other purpose...
Fifthly, the short length of a person's residence, while relevant, is not determinative of the issue...
Sixthly, the reason for a person's departure from the home must be both reasonable and adequately explained when considered objectively in the light of their personal circumstances...' [13]
In my view Principles 1 to 3 of the Ferrington principles are general commentaries as to how the inquiry should be approached. I am cognisant of them and I believe that I am approaching this enquiry in accordance with their terms. Principle 4 is the first substantive one I believe. This is the principle which requires a degree of permanence in connection to a place rejecting as adequate for the purposes an occupancy which is transient, temporary, contingent or of a passing nature.
Background as to ownership and use of properties
Application for leave to add further ground of review
land is taken to be used and occupied as the principal place of residence of a person despite the person's absence from the land if the Commissioner is satisfied --
(a) that the absence is temporary in nature; and
(b) that the person intends to resume use or occupation of the land as his or her principal residence after the absence; and
(c) that, in respect of the period of absence, no other land is exempt land under this Division or under a law of another jurisdiction ... as the principal place of residence of the owner...
In any event, s.109 of the TAA limits the taxpayer's case to his ground of objection. In this particular instance there was no issue about the clearance certificate in the taxpayer's ground of objection. In any event, even if Mr Love had requested leave to argue such ground, bearing in mind that Mr Love only raised it in his reply, in a hearing where evidence had been called and submissions were basically finished, I do not believe it would have been appropriate to grant leave in those circumstances, even for a self-represented person.[25]
[2] By emails dated 21 February and 16 May 2016.
[3] Originally Mr and Mrs Carvalho also sought review of assessments for the 2011 to 2014 land tax years, but the proceedings relating to those assessments were struck out by the Tribunal by order dated 3 February 2017 as a result of their failure to pay the filing fees.
[5] Rainn Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax [2016] VCAT 402 [8].
[13] Ibid para [42] (references omitted).
[14] See, for example, Ward v Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] VCAT 1307.
[17] Luxon v Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] VCAT 1466 [55].
[18] Respondent's Legal Submissions [37].
[19] Similar conclusions have been drawn in other cases, see Patel v Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] VCAT 913 [13], Fallaw v Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] VCAT 199 [19] and Woff v Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] VCAT 477 [9].
[20] See Shields v Deliopolous [2016] VSC 500.
[22] Ibid [30], citing Northop J in McLean v Commissioner of Taxation [1996] FCA 1459; (1996) 66 FCR 106.
Carvalho
Commissioner of State Revenue
(1996) 66 FCR 106