Carrington v TAFE Queensland [2025] QIRC 340

Code of Conduct for Queensland Public Service 2011

Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280

Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Goodchild v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 046

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203

O'Hearn v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 283

Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252

Palomino v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

Politis v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1988) 16 ALD 707

• [1] Ms Jennifer Carrington ('the Appellant') has been employed as a Teacher at TAFE Queensland ('the Respondent') since April 2022.

• [2] On 21 October 2025, the Appellant filed an Appeal Notice in the Industrial Registry appealing a decision of Mr Gareth Hewson, Acting General Manager ('the Decision-Maker') dated 1 October 2025 ('the Decision Letter') to substantiate one allegation against Ms Carrington.

• [3] The Allegation which was substantiated in the Decision Letter is as follows:

During Term 3, 2025, you made several comments of an inappropriate and/or sexual nature towards students in the Certificate IV Mental Health Peer Work group.

• [4] The Respondent received three formal student complaints in relation to the Appellant's conduct on 20 August 2025 and a further two complaints on 22 August 2025. Another seven verbal complaints were received throughout the month of August 2025.

• [5] The matter was referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission on 1 September 2025 who flagged that there was potential corrupt conduct and returned the matter to the Respondent for local action.

• [6] By later dated 4 September 2024, the Appellant was provided with an opportunity to show cause as to why Allegation 1 should not be substantiated.

• [7] The Appellant provided her show cause response on 17 September 2025.

• [8] In the decision letter dated 1 October 2025 the Decision-Maker found the sole allegation to be substantiated.

• [9] As a consequence of the substantiated allegation, the Decision-Maker requested that the Appellant show cause with regard to the proposed disciplinary action of a reprimand.

• [10] No decision has been made with respect to the imposition of the proposed disciplinary action.

• [11] These reasons will only address the disciplinary findings and will not touch upon the proposed disciplinary penalty of a reprimand.

• [12] The issue for my determination is whether the decision to substantiate the allegation was fair and reasonable.

• [13] For the reasons that follow I am not satisfied that the decision to find the allegation to be substantiated was fair and reasonable. I have set aside the decision and returned the matter to the Decision-Maker with a copy of these reasons for decision.

• [14] A disciplinary finding decision that allegations have been substantiated is not a disciplinary decision as defined in s 129 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act'). In the present case disciplinary action has not yet been taken against the Appellant.

• [15] Pursuant to s 132(4)(b) of the PS Act a fair treatment appeal is available regarding a finding made pursuant to s 91 of the PS Act that a disciplinary ground exists for the person.[1]

• [16] Section 131 of the PS Act lists the types of decisions against which an appeal may be made. Section 131(1)(d) of the PS Act outlines that a fair treatment decision may be appealed.

• [17] Fair treatment decisions are defined within s 129 of the PS Act, which relevantly states:

fair treatment decision means a decision a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable.

• [18] The Appellant has been an employee of the Respondent at all times relevant to this appeal.

• [19] I am satisfied that the Disciplinary Finding Decision is one that can be appealed pursuant to s 131 of the PS Act, and further, that the Appellant is entitled to appeal.

• [20] Section 564(3) of the IR Act requires an appeal to be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given.

• [21] The Appellant received the decision letter on 1 October 2025 and the Appeal Notice was filed in the Industrial Registry on 21 October 2025. I am satisfied that the appeal has been brought within the required time.

• [22] Section 562B (3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') provides that a public sector appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against and 'the purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable'.[2]

• [23] The IR Act provides that for an appeal against a disciplinary decision, the commission:[3]

(a) must decide the appeal having regard to the evidence available to the decision maker when the decision was made; but

(b) may allow other evidence to be taken into account if the commission considers it appropriate.

• [24] A public sector appeal is not a fresh hearing, but rather, a review of the decision arrived at by the Decision-Maker.[4]

• [25] The issue for my determination is whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[5]

• [26] Section 562C (1) of the IR Act prescribes that the Commission may determine to either:

• set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate; or

• set the decision aside and substitute another decision.

• [27] The Decision Letter which was issued to the Appellant on 1 October 2025 contains a number of sub-headings, however, for the purposes of this decision, the most important is that titled My Findings. I have reproduced the entirety of this section of the letter below:

In reviewing your Response, I acknowledge your attempts to provide context for the comments made during Term 3, 2025. However, the explanations offered do not sufficiently demonstrate an understanding of the seriousness of your conduct or its impact on students - particularly those with lived experience of mental health challenges.

As a Teacher within the Faculty of Nursing and Community Services, you are entrusted with educating and supporting students who may be especially vulnerable. This role demands a heightened level of professionalism, emotional intelligence, and adherence to ethical standards. The comments attributed to you - whether intended humorously or otherwise - are not appropriate in any professional setting, and especially not within an educational environment where trust, safety, and respect are paramount.

The nature of the remarks, including references of a sexual nature, dismissive language, and inappropriate examples involving self-harm, reflect a concerning disregard for professional boundaries. These behaviours are inconsistent with the expectations of an educator and undermine the respectful and inclusive learning environment that TAFE Queensland is committed to providing.

Furthermore, your response does not adequately acknowledge the potential consequences of such conduct, including the erosion of public trust and reputational harm to both yourself and the organisation. As an educator, you are expected to uphold TAFE Queensland's policies and procedures, including those relating to professional conduct, student engagement, and record­keeping responsibilities. These standards exist to protect students and ensure the integrity of the learning experience.

Given the evidence available, the nature of the complaints received and your admissions to some of the comments made, I find that your conduct has been inappropriate in your capacity as an Educator and has reflected seriously and adversely on TAFE Queensland.

Therefore, I find that Allegation 1 is, on the balance of probabilities, capable of substantiation.

• [28] In the Appeal Notice filed on 21 October 2025 the Appellant set out the following grounds of appeal:

In responding to the show cause on 18 September I responded to every aspect of the allegations.

On 7 October I attended a meeting with Faculty Director Sean Dewar and HR manager Nicole Wilson and received the notice to show cause - disciplinary action.

There are several errors in this letter which cause distress and uncertainty.

In addition, from the detailed allegations reported in the initial show cause there is no clarity in what the second show cause is stating is found to be substantiated. This makes it difficult to accept that a fair and reasonable decision has been made.

• [29] Section 91 of the PS Act sets out the grounds for discipline and disciplinary action generally as follows:

(1) A public service employee's chief executive may discipline the employee if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee has -

(a) engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee's duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or

(c) been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or

(d) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the employee as a public sector employee by a responsible person; or

(e) used, without reasonable excuse, a substance to an extent that has adversely affected the competent performance of the employee's duties; or

(f) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a requirement of the chief executive under section 71 in relation to the employee's employment or secondment by, in response to the requirement -

(i) failing to disclose a serious disciplinary action; or

(g) contravened, without reasonable excuse, a provision of -

(i) this Act, other than section 39 or 40; or

(ii) another Act that applies to the employee in relation to the employee's employment; or

• [30] Directive 05/23: Discipline ('Discipline Directive') relevantly provides:

4.2 Chief executives are required to act in a way that is compatible with the main purpose of the Act and how the main purpose is achieved, including fair treatment of public sector employees.

4.3 Under the Human Rights Act 2019 decision makers have an obligation to:

a. act and make decisions in a way that is compatible with human rights, and

b. give proper consideration to human rights when making a decision under the Act and Public Sector Commissioner (Commissioner) directives.

4.7 A disciplinary process is not a substitute for management action and the need for managers to undertake early intervention to address unacceptable conduct. Early intervention, even in the context of a likely disciplinary process, provides the best opportunity for:

d. avoiding an unnecessary and disproportionately protracted dispute

4.8 Discipline is not appropriate for matters that may be dealt with through management action, which may include use of alternative dispute resolution, use of warnings, or other management action that is reasonable in the circumstances.

4.9 A chief executive must not take disciplinary action against an employee for a matter relating

to the employee's performance until they have complied with the positive performance

a. be conducted in in a timely way, to the extent that is within the control of the chief executive, and without any unreasonable unexplained delay, and

b. be fair, appropriate and proportionate to the seriousness of the work performance matter, and

c. comply with the requirements of the Act, the provisions of this directive and the

1. Requirements to commence a discipline process

7.1 Section 91 of the Act provides that a chief executive may discipline an employee if they are reasonably satisfied a ground for discipline arises. A disciplinary ground does not arise in relation to a public sector employee only because the employee's work performance or personal conduct fails to satisfy the work performance and personal conduct principles, or the public sector principles as set out in section 91(4) of the Act. An act or omission that is not compatible with a principle on its own, does not give rise to a disciplinary ground if the act or omission does not meet the threshold of the disciplinary grounds at section 91.

7.2 Where a work performance matter arises that may constitute a ground for discipline under section 93 of the Act, a chief executive must determine whether to commence a disciplinary process. In making this determination, the chief executive must assess:

a. the seriousness of the employee's personal conduct and/or work performance, and

b. whether the matter should be resolved through management action instead, and

c. whether the matter is a Public Interest Disclosure under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and/or whether the matter must first be referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission, Queensland Police Service or other regulatory agency for assessment, and

d. whether management action would alleviate or mitigate the impact of the alleged conduct on the employee, their colleagues, the workplace, the complainant, and the reputation of the public sector, and

e. whether management action has recently been taken for previous similar instance/s of inappropriate conduct, and the management action did not result in sustained correction of the employee's conduct, and

f. if the contravention is of a more serious nature, but is a single and/or isolated incident of poor conduct (that is, not a pattern of unreasonable behaviours), whether the chief executive has reasonable concerns about the employee's potential for modified behaviour through management action that clarifies the expected standards of conduct and provides the opportunity and support for the employee to demonstrate sustained correction of their conduct, and

g. whether further information is required to make a decision to commence a disciplinary process, and

h. for a breach of relevant standard of conduct under section 91(1)(h) , that it is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action because the chief executive forms a view that management action is not likely to adequately address and/or resolve the work performance matter.

7.3 Section 86 of the Act provides that a chief executive must not take disciplinary action against an employee for a matter relating to the employee's performance until the chief executive has complied with the directive about positive performance management.

a. the chief executive is to provide the employee with written details of each allegation and invite the employee to show cause why a disciplinary finding should not be made in relation to each allegation (a show cause notice on disciplinary finding)

b. written details of each allegation in clause 9.3(a) must include:

ii. the particulars of the facts considered by the chief executive for the allegation

iii. the disciplinary ground under section 91 of the Act that applies to the allegation

c. when providing the written details required at clause 9.3, a chief executive should not include more than two possible disciplinary grounds for the same allegation. In making a disciplinary finding at clause 9.4, a chief executive must choose the most suitable ground for discipline as no more than one disciplinary ground is to apply to an individual substantiated allegation

d. a copy of all evidence relevant to the facts considered by the chief executive for each allegation in clause 9.3(a) must be provided to the employee, including, where relevant, specific reference to page or paragraph numbers that comprise the relevant evidence

e. the chief executive must provide the employee with a minimum of 14 days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice on disciplinary finding to consider and respond to the notice, having regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter. The chief executive may grant, and must consider any request for, an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice on disciplinary finding if there are reasonable grounds for extension

f. if the employee does not respond to a show cause notice on disciplinary finding, or does not respond within the nominated timeframe in clause 9.3(e) and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the chief executive may make a decision on grounds based on the information available to them.

1. the chief executive must review all relevant material, including any submissions from the employee, and make a decision on the disciplinary finding on the balance of probabilities
2. the chief executive must advise the employee of the chief executive's finding in relation to each allegation included in the show cause notice on disciplinary finding
3. for each finding in clause 9.4(a) the chief executive must clearly explain their finding of fact on the balance of probabilities, including the evidence relied on to reach the finding, and state if the disciplinary ground to which the allegation was applied has been established
4. the employee is to be informed of the finding and explanation of the finding in writing, including information that the employee may appeal the disciplinary finding. The employee should also be informed of the time limits for starting an appeal provided for in the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) and the directive relating to appeals
5. if the chief executive determines that discipline ground/s have been established, the chief executive may consider whether disciplinary action should be proposed (clause 9.5) and/or management action implemented, or to take no further action. No more than one disciplinary ground is to apply to an individual substantiated allegation
6. if the chief executive determines that no ground/s for discipline have been established, the chief executive may consider whether any management action is required and advise the employee in writing.

• [31] The Discipline Directive includes a definition section at the end of the Directive where the following relevant terms are defined:

Balance of probabilities refers to the civil standard of proof. For an allegation to be substantiated on the balance of probabilities, the evidence must establish that it is more probable than not that the alleged conduct occurred. The strength of evidence necessary to establish an allegation on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the:

• inherent likelihood or improbability of a particular thing or event occurring

• gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding.

Management action is independent of the disciplinary process and should be considered as the first response and/or alternative to the disciplinary process in managing unacceptable conduct or performance. Following a disciplinary finding (refer to section 90), management action can accompany or substitute for disciplinary action. If appropriate, management action can replace an ongoing disciplinary process at any stage. While not limited, management action is predominantly focused on corrective action. (emphasis added)

Procedural fairness is a concept used interchangeably with natural justice and is a right recognised and defined by law that involves two key elements-the hearing rule (the parties shall be given adequate notice of the case against them, and a right to respond) and the bias rule (everyone is entitled to a decision by a disinterested and unbiased adjudicator). (emphasis added)

• [32] The TAFE Queensland Discipline Procedure ('the Discipline Procedure') relevantly provides:

This procedure provides TAFE Queensland with an equitable and consistent process when addressing concerns relating to unsatisfactory workplace performance or conduct, which cannot be resolved by advice and encouragement, training or increased support.

Discipline must be timely, fair, appropriate and proportionate to the seriousness of the work performance matter, in accordance with legislative requirements and the principles of natural justice.

4.1 The provisions of the Public Sector Act 2022 applies to TAFE Queensland as a public sector entity.

4.2 The Public Sector Commission (PSC) Directive 05123: Discipline applies to TAFE Queensland employees.

4.5 A discipline process is not a substitute for management action and the need for managers to undertake early intervention to address unsatisfactory work performance or unacceptable conduct. Early intervention, even in the context of a likely disciplinary process, provides the best opportunity for:

(a) The cessation of unacceptable conduct;

(b) Early resolution;

(c) Preserving working relationships; and

(d) Avoiding an unnecessary and disproportionately protracted dispute.

4.9 The Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) may discipline an employee if the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) is reasonably satisfied the employee has:

(a) Engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee's duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently;

(b) Been guilty of misconduct;

(c) Been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse;

(d) Contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the employee by a responsible person;

(e) Used, without reasonable excuse, a substance to an extent that has adversely affected the competent performance of the employee's duties;

(f) Failed to disclose, without reasonable excuse, a serious disciplinary action taken against the employee or provided false or misleading information in relation to the employee's appointment, secondment or employment;

(g) Contravened, without reasonable excuse a provision of the Public Sector Act 2022 or applicable industrial instrument; or

(h) Contravened, without reasonable excuse, a relevant standard of conduct in a way that is sufficiently serious lo warrant disciplinary action.

4.10 The Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) may discipline a former employee in accordance with the Public Sector Act 2022.

4.15 In disciplining an employee or a former employee, the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) must comply with the authorising legislation and this procedure, and the principles of natural justice. (Emphasis added)

4.17 The Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) must provide the employee with written details of each allegation and invite the employee to show cause why a disciplinary finding should not be made in relation to each allegation (a show cause notice on disciplinary finding).

4.18 A written show cause notice on disciplinary finding must include:

(a) The allegation/s against the employee;

(b) the particulars of the facts considered by the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) for each allegation; and

(c) The disciplinary ground as outlined in clause 4.9 that applies to the allegation.

4.19 When providing the written details required, the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) should not include more than two (2) possible disciplinary grounds for the same allegation.

4.20 A copy of all evidence relevant to the facts considered by the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) for each allegation in clause 4.18(a) must be provided to the employee, including, where relevant, specific reference to page or paragraph numbers that comprise the relevant evidence.

4.21 The Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) must provide the employee with a minimum of 14 calendar days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice on disciplinary finding to consider and respond to the notice, having regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter.

4.22 The Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) must consider, and may grant, any request for an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice on disciplinary finding if there are reasonable grounds for extension.

4.23 If the employee does not respond to a show cause notice on disciplinary finding, or does not respond with in the nominated time frame and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) may make a decision on grounds based on the information available to them.

4.24 The Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) must review all relevant material, including any submissions from the employee, and make a decision on the disciplinary finding on the balance of probabilities.

4.25 The employee must be advised, in writing, by the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) of:

(a) The finding in relation to each allegation included in the show cause notice on disciplinary finding;

(b) An explanation of the evidence relied on and how the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) reached the finding in relation to each allegation;

(c) Whether the disciplinary ground to which the allegation was applied has been established; and

(d) The employee's right to appeal the disciplinary finding.

4.26 In making a disciplinary finding, a Chief Executive Officer (or delegate), must choose the most suitable ground for discipline as no more than one disciplinary ground is to apply to an individual substantiated allegation.

4.27 If the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) determines that discipline ground/s have been established, the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) may consider whether:

(a) Disciplinary action should be proposed (show cause process for proposed disciplinary action); and/or

(b) Management action should be implemented; or

(c) To take no further action.

4.28 If the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) determines that no grounds for discipline have been established, the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) may consider whether any management action is required and advise the employee in writing.

• [33] In accordance with the Directions Order issued in this matter on 22 October 2025, the parties have filed written submissions.

• [34] I have carefully considered all submissions and materials provided by both parties. I do not intend to summarise the submissions of the parties in detail, however, I will instead refer to the parties' key positions in my consideration of each of the issues to be decided.

• [35] Neither of the parties requested an oral hearing and therefore, pursuant to s 451(1) of the IR Act, this matter will be determined on the papers.

• [36] I am required to decide this appeal by assessing whether or not the decision appealed against is fair and reasonable. This involves a review of the decision-making process that has been utilised, and the decision arrived at.

• [37] Deputy President Merrell in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2)[6] ('Colebourne') considered the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and concluded that it should be construed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase as used in the context of s 562B of the IR Act.[7]

• [38] In Colebourne his Honour further noted that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' is not an assessment of whether the decision was unreasonable only by reference to the legal standard.[8] His Honour concluded that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' permitted a review of both the factual merits and legal reasonableness of both the decision itself and the process of making that decision.[9]

• [39] If the decision is flawed by conclusions that were not fairly and reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, then that decision is prone to being overturned on appeal.[10]

• [40] The Appellant, in her submissions relies upon five separate grounds to support her appeal of the decision to substantiate Allegation 1 against her.

Ground 1 - No findings of fact have been made or reasons for decision been given

• [41] The Appellant contends that in both the Notice to Show Cause letter and the Decision Letter, Allegation 1 includes a number of particulars, setting out specific events and phrases that the Appellant is alleged to have stated.

• [42] The Appellant contends that combining the particulars to Allegation 1 with those contained in Attachment 1 (to the Notice to Show Cause), there were in total approximately 18 separate potential allegations for the Appellant to address.

• [43] The Appellant notes that in the Decision Letter, the Decision-Maker repeated Allegation 1 and particulars, summarised the Appellant's responses and then, under the heading of "My Findings" asserted:

... the explanations offered do not sufficiently demonstrate an understanding of the seriousness of your conduct or its impact on students.

the comments attributed to you ... are not appropriate

your response does not adequately acknowledge the potential consequences of such conduct

Given the evidence available, the nature of the complaints received and your admissions to some of the comments made, I find that your conduct has been inappropriate.

• [44] When concluding, the Decision Maker states that "I find Allegation 1 is, on the balance of probabilities, capable of substantiation". The Appellant submits that at no point within the Decision Letter is a conclusion reached in relation to any of the 18 particulars.

• [45] The Appellant submits that assessing whether alleged conduct is inappropriate is a necessary element of a Decision Maker's task which cannot be completed until a determination has been made, in reliance of the evidence available, as to whether the conduct occurred as alleged.

• [46] It is the Appellant's position that no decision has been made, or can be made, in relation to Allegation 1 without the Decision Maker first assessing and determining conclusions as to each individual element of the allegation with adequate reasons provided. The Appellant further contends that at no point did the Decision-Maker address the competing evidence in relation to any one of the particularised allegations and reach a decision about whether the alleged conduct occurred.

• [47] Under the heading "My Findings" the Appellant submits that the Decision-Maker did not make any findings at all about any of the alleged conduct but instead merely provided commentary assessing the appropriateness of the Appellant's conduct without having previously determined which of the 18 allegations had been proven.

• [48] Clauses 4.25(a) and (b) of the Discipline Procedure require a Decision Maker to provide an explanation of the evidence relied on and how they reached the finding in relation to each allegation.

• [49] The Appellant contends that the obligation has to be understood in its context of providing a fair and consistent process in relation to the initial fact finding process and as the basis for the next step in the process of determining disciplinary outcomes. The Appellant contends that 'allegation' in this context cannot simply be the singular allegation but rather must include the distinct particulars which cover different alleged incidents.

• [50] In relation to the Appellant's alleged "admissions", the submission notes that a number of the particularised allegations reflected statements she had made either in part or in a different context to that alleged. Even in relation to those matters, however, the Appellant contends that the Decision-Maker has not:

1. identified "which admissions to some of the comments" he is referring to in "My Findings";

1. identified which one he accepts or rejects were made in the manner or context alleged; or

1. provided any reasons for rejecting any elements of the Appellant's versions of the "admissions".

• [51] The Appellant concludes by submitting that the decision is not fair and reasonable because the Decision-Maker has not made any conclusions about any of the particular allegations of conduct directed to the Appellant, and, correspondingly, failed to identify any reasons for the decision. The Appellant contends that the Respondent is obliged by the Discipline Procedure (clause 4.15) to apply the principles of natural justice, which includes an obligation to provide reasons for its decision.[11]

• [52] In response to the Appellant's contentions in relation to Ground 1, the Respondent submits that under clause 9.4(b) of the Discipline Directive, the chief executive (or delegate) is required to make a finding in relation to each allegation, not a separate determination for every particular.[12]

• [53] The Respondent contends that the Decision-Maker's obligation is to review all relevant material, including any response provided by the employee, and make a decision on the disciplinary finding, on the balance of probabilities.

• [54] The Respondent contends that they have satisfied the Discipline Directive and Discipline Procedure as the delegate in the Decision Letter, found the Allegation substantiated on the balance of probabilities, noting the sexual and dismissive nature of remarks, the Appellant's admission that three comments were inappropriate and that these admissions supported a finding of a breach of professional standards. The Respondent contends this satisfies both clause 9.4(b) of the Discipline Directive and clause 4.25(b) of the Discipline Procedure.

• [55] In the Appellant's reply submissions[13] the Appellant responds that the obligation under clause 9.4(b) of the Discipline Directive is not satisfied by a general statement: it requires clear findings and reasons on the allegation and its particulars. In relation to the finding of the Decision-Maker that the allegation was substantiated noting the "sexual and dismissive nature of remarks", the Appellant questions which remarks are being referred to?

• [56] The Appellant notes the Respondent's concession at paragraph 34 of its submission that the findings could have been clearer. The Appellant submits that the absence of clarity materially affected the Appellant's ability to respond to the proposed penalty and to make informed submissions on proportionality or mitigation.

• [57] The authorities confirm that care is to be taken in assessing the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang,[14] Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ said:

"... the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not be scrutinized upon by over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed."

• [58] In making that observation, their Honours cited with approval a passage from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd[15] to the effect that, when dealing with the reasons of an administrative decision-maker, these were:

"...not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error".[16]

• [59] In Ansett Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith,[17]Woodward J cites with approval the decision in Re Palmer and states, in relation to s. 13(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("ADJR Act"), that it:

"... requires the decision-maker to explain his decision in a way which will enable a person aggrieved to say in effect:

'Even though I may not agree with it, I now understand why the decision went against me. I am now in a position to decide whether that decision has involved an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law, which is worth challenging.'

This requires that the decision maker should set out his understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend (especially if those facts have been in dispute), and the reasoning processes which led him to those conclusions. He should do so in clear and unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or the formal language of legislation."[18]

• [60] In Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)[19] Deputy President Merrell provided the following observations at paragraphs 48 and 49 regarding the obligation on an administrative decision-maker to provide reasons:

[48] The adequacy of reasons of an administrative decision maker is to be tested by reference to the nature of the task which the decision maker had to undertake. The more significant the decision, the clearer the reasons should be.

[49] Further, while it is not necessary for the decision maker to deal with every matter which was, or which may have been raised, it is enough that the findings and reasons deal with the substantial issues upon which the decision turned, such that a person aggrieved by the decision can understand why the decision went against him or her. This requires the decision maker to set out his or her understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact upon which his or her conclusions depend, especially if those facts have been in dispute, and the reasoning processes which led him or her to those conclusions; and this should be done in clear and unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or the formal language of legislation.[20] (Emphasis added and citations omitted)

• [61] Similar observations were repeated by His Honour in Palomino v State of Queensland (Department of Education).[21]

• [62] In noting the guidance provided by those authorities, and in particular noting the caution against an overly zealous approach to seeking out an error in the reasons of an administrative decision-maker, or adopting an approach of going through the reasons with a fine tooth comb, I am of the view that the Decision Letter in this matter is problematic.

• [63] I accept the contention made by the Appellant that in effect Allegation 1 contained 18 particulars.

• [64] The approach apparently taken by the Decision-Maker was on a broad basis to find Allegation 1 to be substantiated without making any specific finding on any of the particulars. This approach is particularly problematic in circumstances where the Appellant has either outright disputed some of the particularised conversations occurring, or in others, provided a different context in which the conversations occurred.

• [65] Section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ('the AI Act') is in the following terms:

27B Content of statement of reasons for decision

If an Act requires a tribunal, authority, body or person making a decision to give written reasons for the decision (whether the expression 'reasons', 'grounds' or another expression is used), the instrument giving the reasons must also -

(a) set out the findings on material questions of fact; and

(b) refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

• [66] To similar effect are the requirements of clause 9.4 of the Discipline Directive. Clause 9.4(b) of the Discipline Directive requires the Chief Executive to advise the employee in relation to each allegation included in the show cause notice on disciplinary finding. Clause 9.4(c) of the Discipline Directive then requires the Chief Executive for each finding in clause 9.4(a) to clearly explain their finding on the balance of probabilities, including the evidence relied on to reach the finding.

• [67] Clause 4.25 of the Respondent's own Discipline Procedure requires the Chief Executive Officer (or delegate) to advise the employee in writing of:

(a) The finding in relation to each allegation in the show cause notice on disciplinary finding;

(b) An explanation of the evidence relied on and how the Chief Executive or delegate reached the finding in relation to each allegation;

(c) Whether the disciplinary ground to which the allegation was applied has been established.

• [68] In my view, for the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the Decision-Maker has complied with any of the requirements set out in the preceding paragraphs.

• [69] The Decision-Maker has chosen to frame the Show Cause Notice in such a way that there is one broad allegation of conduct over the course of a period of time (Term 3, 2025) which is directed at a class of people (students in the Certificate IV Mental Health Peer Work group).

• [70] That one allegation is then particularised by seven particulars in the Show Cause Notice and an eighth particular which makes reference to further allegations contained in Attachment 1. In relation to those particulars, no reference points are provided in terms of timeframes in which it is alleged the conversations occurred, or any background context regarding the comments alleged to have been made by the Appellant.

• [71] Attachment 1 then provides a series of redacted emails/complaint forms apparently from either students (or staff members of the Respondent who had spoken to students). By way of example, the first email includes 9 dot points with allegations, two or three of which overlap with those specifically in the Show Cause Notice, others reflect new allegations.

• [72] The Respondent contends that it is sufficient compliance with the requirements of s 27B of the AI Act and the Discipline Directive and Discipline Procedure to simply make a finding in relation to the broad allegation on the basis of a finding that the remarks were sexual and dismissive in nature, and the Appellant's admission that three comments were inappropriate.

• [73] I cannot accept that submission. In my view to comply with the obligations cast upon the Decision-Maker by the above provisions, in circumstances where the Appellant disputed a number of the particulars and provided either contextual evidence or an explanation for the comments which differed from the complainants it was necessary for the Decision-Maker:

• To make a finding in relation to the particulars that were relied upon by the Decision-Maker in concluding that the allegation had been substantiated.

• In relation to the making of that factual finding, this would require the Decision-Maker to discuss the evidence, including the evidence of the Appellant.

• Further, the Decision-Maker should provide the reasoning as to why evidence was accepted or rejected and how the accepted evidence supported the substantiation of the allegation.

• [74] I accept the submission of the Appellant that where there are 18 separate elements to the allegation, which deal with multiple alleged interactions with multiple students on multiple occasions, substantiation of the allegation cannot be made in the absence of the Decision-Maker separately assessing, determining and identifying conclusions about the particulars and providing adequate reasons for the Decision-Maker's conclusions. The Decision-Maker in this matter has not undertaken the task identified in the preceding paragraph.

• [75] The difficulty for the Appellant is that the Appellant is left uncertain as to:

• Which of the particulars has been accepted by the Decision-Maker and the basis for reaching this determination.

• Which of the particulars have been significant in the Decision-Maker forming the view that the allegation is substantiated.

• How those accepted particulars support the establishment of a disciplinary ground.

• [76] Given the authorities cited above, the findings made in the preceding paragraph establish the inadequacy of the Decision Letter.

• [77] Given that the appeal involves a disciplinary process with a likely outcome of some disciplinary penalty to be imposed on the Appellant, this is a significant decision. Echoing the observations of Deputy President Merrell in Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women),[22] the more significant the decision, the clearer the reasons should be.

• [78] The Respondent itself in its submissions concedes that the Decision Letter could be clearer.[23]

• [79] I am satisfied that the reasons for decision in finding Allegation 1 to be substantiated are inadequate. I am therefore satisfied that the decision is, as a consequence, not fair and reasonable.

Ground 2 - The Decision Maker has relied upon unidentified allegations

• [80] The Appellant submits that one of the particulars which was included as part of Allegation 1 asserted "you made remarks to a student and/or group of students including but not limited to, the following...". The Appellant contends that this language identifies that the Decision Maker was aware of multiple remarks which form part of Allegation 1 but which were not disclosed to the Appellant. Further, no confirmation is provided in the Decision Letter that confirms that the delegate had excluded those undisclosed remarks from his consideration.

• [81] The Appellant contends that the decision was not fair and reasonable as she was not provided with an opportunity to respond to the undisclosed remarks. She further submits that the failure to disclose is a breach of the Procedure and the Respondent's obligation to provide natural justice.

• [82] In relation to Ground 2, the Respondent confirms that the Decision-Maker relied only on the particulars listed in the Show Cause on Disciplinary Findings and the Appellant's own submissions.

• [83] The Respondent further submits that the wording reflects the nature of the complaints received but does not indicate reliance on the undisclosed material.

• [84] In her reply submissions, the Appellant submits that the Respondent's submissions make specific reference to seven verbal complaints made by students throughout August 2025.[24]

• [85] The Appellant contends that these verbal complaints were said to contribute to the matter being referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission.

• [86] The Appellant contends these complaints were never raised with her. Where the Decision Maker was aware of the shadow allegations and no evidence has been provided that the matters did not influence the Decision Maker, the Appellant submits that Commission cannot be satisfied by the assertion made by the Respondent.

• [87] The Appellant concludes that the Respondent's submissions merely highlight the fundamental error in the Decision Letter, that is, the Decision-Maker in fact made no findings about any of the particulars.

• [88] The difficulty for the Respondent's submission that the Decision-Maker placed no reliance upon the unparticularised oral complaints is that this is not made clear at any stage in the Decision Letter.

• [89] In my view it is necessary that allegations in disciplinary proceedings are drafted with some degree of precision. This is part of the obligation of an employer in ensuring that procedural fairness is afforded to an employee being subjected to a disciplinary process.

• [90] In the present matter, the Respondent in framing the particulars to Allegation 1 in the Notice to Show Cause on Disciplinary Findings, stated:

You made remarks to a student and/or group of students including, but not limited to, the following:

• [91] What then immediately followed were the seven specific particulars and the generic particular making reference to Attachment 1. In my view, the only sensible construction that can be given to the phrase 'but not limited to', is that the Allegation referred to other alleged conduct of the Appellant other than those nominated particulars. If this was not the intended outcome, there was no reason why the phrase 'but not limited to' was added to the particulars. The inclusion of the phrase introduces an unnecessary ambiguity into the allegation.

• [92] The Notice to Show Cause on Disciplinary Findings makes no mention in the particularised allegations of oral complaints made by students throughout August 2025. Attachment 1 to that letter, as noted above, makes no mention in the redacted emails or complaint notice, of oral complaints by students.

• [93] As a consequence, the Appellant was not on notice about the alleged oral complaints and therefore the Appellant did not have the opportunity to respond to the alleged complaints.

• [94] Those seven verbal complaints were not mentioned in the Decision Letter.

• [95] It is therefore concerning that the first mention of the seven verbal student complaints arises in the Respondent's submissions, with those complaints being linked to the three written complaints.

• [96] It is then of further concern that those "complaints" compendiously appeared to be referred to in paragraph 13 of the Respondent's submissions as the basis of a referral of the alleged matters to the Crime and Corruption Commission.

• [97] It therefore remains very unclear as to whether the Decision-Maker has in fact relied upon those oral complaints in any way in reaching a determination that Allegation 1 was substantiated, and further, whether any aspect of those oral complaints give rise to a disciplinary ground. This concern is exacerbated by the imprecise manner in which the allegation has been drafted.

• [98] I am satisfied that the Appellant has made out this ground of appeal, and it is a further basis supporting a finding that the Decision Letter is not fair and reasonable.

Ground 3 - The Decision does not identify the case the Appellant is required to address

Ground 4 - The Decision does not reach any decision at all

• [99] To a large extent, these grounds overlap Ground 1 (as well as each other). I will deal with Grounds 3 and 4 together.

• [100] In relation to Ground 3, the Appellant contends that in circumstances where no findings have been made in relation to any of the 18 particulars, she is unable to respond to the invitation to address proposed disciplinary action. This is maintained as the Appellant submits she is unable to be sure what conduct she is alleged to have engaged in.

• [101] The Appellant contends that the Decision Letter is not fair and reasonable because it deprives the Appellant of a fair and reasonable opportunity to respond to the proposed disciplinary outcome.

• [102] In relation to Ground 4, the Appellant submits that within the Decision Letter, the Decision Maker states, "I find that Allegation 1 is, on the balance of probabilities, capable of substantiation".

• [103] The Appellant contends that this is not a finding that Allegation 1 is substantiated. Despite this, the Decision Maker goes on to conclude that the Appellant contravened the TAFE Disciplinary Procedure by engaging in misconduct. As a consequence, the Appellant contends that the decision is not fair and reasonable.

• [104] When addressing Grounds 3 and 4, the Respondent concedes that the structure and clarity of the Decision Letter and findings could have been improved to make the determination more explicit. Despite this, the Respondent contends that when read as a whole, the Decision Letter is unambiguous and clearly conveys that Allegation 1 was substantiated.

• [105] The Respondent contends that this is sufficient to satisfy the relevant clauses in the Discipline Directive and the Discipline Procedure.

• [106] In her reply submissions, the Appellant acknowledges the Respondent's concession that the Decision Letter could have been clearer and more explicit. The Appellant, however, contends that the Decision Letter is clear that Allegation 1 was substantiated and that the real issue is that the crystal-clear determination is a house built on sand because not one single finding of fact has been made that identifies why Allegation 1 was said to have been substantiated.

• [107] In my view, the outcome of Ground 1 predicates the outcome of Grounds 3 and 4.

• [108] My finding that the Decision-Maker has failed to make appropriate findings of fact and that the reasons as contained in the Decision Letter are inadequate, almost inevitably lead to a conclusion that the Appellant also makes out Grounds 3 and 4.

• [109] In relation to Ground 3, I repeat and rely on the observations I have made in paragraph [75] above.

• [110] I accept that the Appellant has been left with some difficulty in making submissions to respond to the proposed disciplinary action.

• [111] It may be the case that with knowledge of what conduct has been accepted by the Decision-Maker as being accepted, and the basis of that acceptance (for example, whether the Appellant's explanation as to the context in which some of the comments were made has been accepted), it may be open for the Appellant to develop a submission that instead of taking any form of disciplinary action, the appropriate course of action is to address her conduct by management action.

• [112] I am satisfied that both of these grounds of appeal have been established by the Appellant and this is a further basis for concluding that the decision is not fair and reasonable.

Ground 5 - The Decision has relied on the Appellant's assessment of consequences

• [113] The Decision Maker in the Decision found that the Appellant was "guilty of misconduct within the meaning of inappropriate or improper conduct" which the Appellant contends is a process that requires findings of fact to determine.

• [114] Under the heading My Findings in the Decision Letter, it states:

[your] explanations offered do not sufficiently demonstrate an understanding of the seriousness of your conduct or its impact on students... your response does not adequately acknowledge the potential consequences of such conduct...

• [115] The Appellant submits that rather than making an objective determination, the Respondent has instead relied upon the Appellant's understanding of the consequences of her alleged conduct and made a subjective assessment about the adequacy of that understanding.

• [116] The Appellant contends that the Decision Maker has relied upon irrelevant considerations and considerations that the Appellant had not been informed would be relied on.

• [117] In its submissions, the Respondent contends that the Appellant's contention that the Decision improperly relied on her understanding of the consequences of her conduct mischaracterises the decision.

• [118] The Respondent submits that the Appellant's failure to demonstrate an understanding of the seriousness of her conduct were not relied upon as the basis for substantiating the allegation. The observations were made in the context of assessing the Appellant's response and considering the impact of the conduct, which the Respondent submits is relevant to the disciplinary process and future management of risk. The Respondent concludes that the reference to the Appellant's understanding of the consequences was ancillary and did not replace the required factual findings.

• [119] In reply, the Appellant submits the entire section on "My Findings" in the Decision Letter commences with those assessments about her "understanding" of the seriousness of her comments, continues with further assessments about "the remarks" and her failure to acknowledge the "potential consequences of such conduct".

• [120] The Appellant repeats the submission that there are no "factual findings" for those assessments to be ancillary to, and the commentary on her "understanding" is the only reason "relied upon as the basis for substantiating the allegation.

• [121] The "My Findings" section of the Decision Letter is a further example in my view of a lack of clarity around the basis upon which Allegation 1 has been substantiated and the basis of that finding.

• [122] A fair reading of that section of the Decision Letter is largely supportive of the concerns raised by the Appellant in Ground 5 and the Appellant's interpretation of the Decision Letter.

• [123] The reasons for the finding that the allegation has been substantiated require far greater clarity that what has been provided by the Decision-Maker.

• [124] I am satisfied that this ground also supports a finding that the decision is not fair and reasonable.

• [125] The Appellant (or her agent, the Queensland Teachers' Union), in her reply submissions provided references and a short summary of case authorities she relied upon in relation to her reply submissions on each ground of appeal.

• [126] In relation to Ground 1, the Appellant referred to Coleman v State of Queensland [2021] QIRC 243 as authority for the Commission holding that a failure to provide clear findings on particulars undermines fairness and reasonableness.

• [127] There is a decision of the Commission in Coleman v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2020] QIRC 032, a decision of Deputy President Merrell which involved a re-instatement application. It will immediately be apparent that the citation for that decision is different to the one cited by the Appellant. In His Honour's decision in Coleman I have not been able to locate a finding as maintained by the Appellant.

• [128] For completeness, I note that the citation [2021] QIRC 243 is a reference to the decision of the Commission in Chan & Ors v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 243 in which Industrial Commissioner McLennan dealt with a public sector appeal regarding conversion to permanent employment.

• [129] Similarly, in relation to Ground 2, in her reply submissions the Appellant cites McLennan v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 123 as authority for the proposition that ambiguity in findings was held to breach procedural fairness. My searches have failed to reveal a decision of the Commission that has a McLennan as a party.

• [130] The citation '[2022] QIRC 123' refers to a decision of Industrial Commissioner Hartigan (as Her Honour then was) in a decision of Da Silva Rocha v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 123, once again an appeal from a conversion decision.

• [131] As a consequence, I have placed no reliance on those authorities in determining the present appeal.

• [132] It appears that the citation of those matters may result from the use of an Artificial Intelligence search engine. I repeat the warning for litigants I provided in Goodchild v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[25] of the danger in relying on artificial intelligence search engines when preparing submissions to be filed in a Court or Tribunal.

• [133] If parties intend to rely upon such sources of information, it is important that they verify that the case authorities provided by the search engine are actually genuine decisions prior to filing their submissions.

• [134] For the reasons detailed above, I am satisfied that the Appellant has established that the Decision Letter is not fair and reasonable and should be set aside.

• [135] I am satisfied that the Appellant has established each of the grounds she relies upon and that the reasons for decision as contained in the Decision Letter were inadequate and failed to comply with the requirements set out in s 27B of the AI Act, clause 9.4 of the Discipline Directive and clause 4.25 of the Respondent's Discipline Procedure.

• [136] I will set aside the decision of Mr Hewson dated 1 October 2025 and return the matter to the decision-maker with a copy of these reasons for decision.

• [137] I also direct that a fresh decision letter be prepared which complies with the requirements contained in s 27B of the Acts Interpretations Act 1954 (Qld), the Discipline Directive and the Discipline Procedure within 21-days of the release of this decision.

1. Pursuant to s 562C(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against, being the letter from Mr Hewson dated 1 October 2025 be set aside.

1. The matter be returned to the decision-maker with a copy of these reasons for decision.

1. The Respondent is to provide the Appellant with a fresh decision letter which complies with the requirements contained in s 27B of the Acts Interpretations Act 1954 (Qld), the Discipline Directive and the Discipline Procedure within 21-days of the release of this decision.

[1] Section 32(4)(b) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld); see also O'Hearn v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 283, [31] (Industrial Commissioner Power).

[2] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B (3).

[4] Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld).

[5] Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, [60]-[61] (Byrne SJA).

[6] [2022] QIRC 16.

[7] Ibid, at [25], citing Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446.

[8] Colebourne (n 12) at [21]-[22] and [25].

[9] Ibid, at [23] citing Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008.

[10] Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97, [195]-[200].

[11] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321.

[12] Respondent's submissions filed 19 November 2025, [26]-[29].

[13] Appellant's Reply Submissions filed 26 November 2025.

[14] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.

[15] [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280, 286-287.

[16] Ibid at 287. See also Politis v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1988) 16 ALD 707 at 708 (Lockhart J).

[17] Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500.

[19] [2020] QIRC 203.

[20] Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203, [48] - [49], per Merrell DP.

[21] [2021] QIRC 129, 9 per Merrell DP.

[22] [2020] QIRC 203, [48] per Merrell DP.

[23] Respondent's submissions (n 12), [31], [34].

[24] Respondent's submissions (n 12), [12].

[25] [2025] QIRC 046, [39].