1. On 23 September 2022, the Applicant applied to the Respondent to be registered as a service provider for the NDIS under section 73E of the NDIS Act.[1]
2. Between January 2023 and July 2024, the Applicant provided additional documents and information in support of the application, including in response to various notices issued by the respondent under section 73C(4) of the NDIS Act.[2]
3. On 27 September 2024, the Respondent refused the application under section 73E(4) of the NDIS Act and provided the applicant with written notice of the decision and reasons (the original decision).[3]
4. On 27 December 2024, the Applicant requested an internal review of the original decision. On 8 January 2025, the Respondent invited the applicant to make submissions by 22 January 2025. The Applicant provided submissions on 3 February 2025.[4]
5. On 24 March 2025, the Respondent confirmed the original decision on internal review under section 100(6) of the NDIS Act and issued a statement of reasons.[5]
6. On 5 August 2025, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review under section 103 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act), together with an application for an extension of time under s 19 of the ART Act.[6]
7. On 21 October 2025, the Respondent filed a notice of objection to the application for an extension of time.[7]

1. The issue for determination is whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the Tribunal to exercise the discretion under section 19 of the ART Act to extend the time for the Applicant to make an application for review of the decision.

1. Part 3A of the NDIS Act establishes the framework for the registration of NDIS service providers and requires registration for the provision of certain classes of supports.
2. An application for registration must be made under section 73C of the NDIS Act and assessed in accordance with the criteria in section 73E(1), including whether the applicant and any key personnel are suitable to provide supports to people with disability, having regard to matters prescribed by the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Provider Registration and Practice Standards) Rules 2018 (NDIS Registration Rules).
3. The NDIS Registration Rules prescribe matters relevant to assessing suitability, including registration history, adverse regulatory findings, criminal history, insolvency, and any other matter considered relevant.

1. Section 18 of the ART Act establishes the general rule that an application for review must be made within the period prescribed by the rules. Rule 5 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 prescribes that period as 28 days. Section 19(2) of the ART Act provides an exception to that general rule, empowering the Tribunal to extend the period if it considers it reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
2. Section 19(2) of the ART Act is expressed in terms similar to section 29(7) of the now repealed Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). As a matter of statutory construction, where words that have been judicially considered are re‑enacted in substantially similar terms, they are presumed to carry the same meaning.[8] That conclusion is supported by the Explanatory Memorandum, which states that section 19(2) is equivalent to section 29(7) of the AAT Act.[9]

1. The considerations relevant to the exercise of the discretion under section 29(7) of the AAT Act have been examined in detail in decisions of the Tribunal and courts. Matters that may be relevant in assessing whether it is reasonable, in all the circumstances, to extend time in this case include:

(a) the length of, and explanation for, the delay > > (b) whether the Applicant has rested on their rights > > (c) any prejudice to the Respondent or other person affected by the decision > > (d) considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a similar position > > (e) strength of the Applicant's case and the significance of the issue to be determined, and > > (f) the availability of alternative remedies for the Applicant.

2. The Tribunal and the Court have consistently stated that no single factor is determinative. No consideration is a condition precedent to the exercise of the discretion, and all matters relevant to the case must be weighed together[10]. Further, the applicant bears the onus of establishing that, having regard to all the circumstances, the justice of the case requires an extension of time.[11]

1. There is no dispute as to the facts that the Applicant's application was lodged outside of the 28-day period prescribed by section 18 of the ART Act and rule 5 of the ART Rules.
2. The reason provided in the Applicant's extension of time application is that:

I am requesting an extension of time due to personal circumstances that affected my ability to submit the application within the original timeframe. Around the time the decision was made, my sister became critically unwell and was hospitalised. I was her primary carer and needed to prioritise her care during that period. This placed significant emotional and practical strain on me and made it difficult to meet the deadline. > > As soon as her condition stabilised, I turned my attention back to the matter and have been working to prepare everything properly. I understand the importance of timelines, and I didn't intentionally delay the process.

3. The Respondent submits that an extension of time should not be granted because:

(a) The length of the delay is significant. The statement of reasons was provided to the applicant on 24 March 2025. The application for review was not lodged until 5 August 2025. This represents a delay of 134 days, being almost five times the 28‑day period prescribed by the ART Rules. > > (b) The explanation for the delay is not supported by the evidence. The Applicant has provided the same reason for the delay as was given in relation to the delay in providing submissions for the internal review.[12]

4. At the hearing, the Respondent expressed sympathy for the applicant's circumstances, including her responsibility for caring for her unwell sister. However, the Respondent noted that the Applicant had not provided specific details explaining why she was unable to communicate with the Commissioner or the Tribunal during the relevant period. While the Commissioner had previously accepted the Applicant's explanation without requiring supporting evidence, the Applicant has relied on the same explanation in support of the present delay. In those circumstances, the Respondent contends that evidence is now required in order for the Tribunal to determine, consistently with the applicable case law, whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay.
5. The Applicant was invited to explain the circumstances that made it difficult to lodge the application within time. The evidence that emerged was that, at the time the decision was issued, Ms Abu Haish was outside Australia in preparation for her marriage and had not returned. During that period, she was also providing emotional support to her sister through telephone calls and text messages and was engaged in making arrangements for her wedding and in seeking to obtain a visa for her future husband. Ms Abu Haish also said that she did not have access to her ADHD medication so was not in a stable mental or practical state to prepare a review application.
6. The Tribunal and the courts have consistently held that an acceptable explanation for the delay is not a precondition to the exercise of the discretion to extend time.[13] However, although such an explanation is not mandatory, it is ordinarily expected and remains a relevant consideration in determining whether it is reasonable, in all the circumstances, to grant an extension.[14]
7. It has also been recognised that the length of an extension sought is not determinative of the outcome. A short delay does not, of itself, justify the grant of an extension, just as a lengthy delay does not automatically warrant refusal.[15]
8. The courts have further observed that, while some sympathy may exist for applicants who are unfamiliar with statutory time limits, ignorance of those limits, without more, is generally not regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay.[16]
9. In the present case, I am satisfied that the Applicant was aware of the applicable time limits. Although I acknowledge the existence of certain extenuating personal circumstances which provide a compelling explanation, I am not persuaded that all of the circumstances relied upon fall into that category.
10. I also find that the explanation for the delay lacks evidence. It was only through questioning at the hearing that it became apparent that Ms Abu Haish had been outside Australia since January 2025 and there was an issue regarding her mental health.
11. In the absence of evidence substantiating the Applicant's explanation for the delay, I find the explanation to be unsatisfactory. This factor therefore weighs in favour of the respondent.

1. The Respondent's representative confirmed at the hearing that there was no indication to the Commissioner, at any stage between the issuance of the internal review decision and receipt of the present application, that the decision remained contested.
2. At the hearing, the Applicant clarified that she did not consider further communication with the Respondent to be an available option and believed that the appropriate next step was to apply to the Tribunal. While the Tribunal acknowledges that this was the Applicant's understanding, consistent with the findings above, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant nevertheless failed to take available steps and thereby rested on her rights. This factor therefore weighs in favour of the Respondent.

Prejudice to the Respondent or other person affected by the decision

3. The Respondent submits that there is some limited prejudice to the respondent, as it will be required to defend proceedings that have been brought significantly outside of the statutory timeframe.[17]
4. I note that the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the granting of an extension of time.[18]
5. The Tribunal accepts the Respondent's submission that it is in the interests of the Commissioner and the wider public that prescribed statutory time limits are observed.[19] Adherence to those limits promotes finality, predictability, and the orderly administration of decision‑making. It is important that decisions achieve finality and that disputes, where they arise, are resolved as efficiently as possible.
6. The Tribunal also accepts the Respondent's submission that there is a strong public interest in regulatory certainty and in applications for review being brought promptly.[20] It finds that people with disability, and those who interact with the NDIS, are entitled to rely on the stability, integrity, and predictability of the regulatory framework.

Consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a similar position

7. The Tribunal also takes into account considerations of procedural fairness, including fairness to other applicants. The consistent application of statutory time limits supports confidence in the integrity of the review process and ensures that like cases are treated alike.
8. The Tribunal considers that it would be unfair to permit out‑of‑time applicants to make use of the Tribunal's limited resources in circumstances where no unusual or exceptional circumstances justify an extension of time, particularly where an alternative mechanism exists by which registration may be obtained.
9. Also pertinent to this consideration is whether the Applicant's application has any real prospect of being successful on review to which I will now turn.

Strength of the Applicant's case and the significance of the issue to be determined

1. In Brown v Commissioner of Taxation,[21] Hill J observed that where an applicant's case is strong, the discretion to extend time is more likely to be exercised in the applicant's favour, even where the explanation for the delay is not compelling. Conversely, his Honour stated that it would be futile to grant an extension of time for a case that is frivolous, bound to fail as a matter of law, or otherwise lacking any arguable merit. [22]
2. The Tribunal has previously held that, although it should not conduct a merits review of the reviewable decision at this stage, it is nonetheless necessary to determine whether an applicant's case discloses any arguable merit or reasonable prospects of success. [23]

1. In their application for review, the Applicant submits that the application has been made to the Tribunal on the basis that the NDIS Commission's decision to refuse their registration was based on a misunderstanding of the Applicant's intentions and did not fully take into account the clarifications and additional evidence provided during the internal review process. In particular, the Applicant claims in the review application:

The Commission raised concerns about the similarity of responses in my application to other applicants. I explained that I engaged a consultant to assist with the registration process, as many providers do. I had no knowledge that the consultant had used the same content elsewhere. My intention was never to mislead, and I personally reviewed and understood all content before submitting it. The auditor also directly interviewed me, assessed my understanding of the NDIS Practice Standards, and made a recommendation for registration, which I believe should have carried weight in the decision-making process.

2. Immediate action regarding the banned contractor:

When I was notified about the banning order of a listed contractor, I immediately ceased engagement and removed the relevant support category from my application. This demonstrates my compliance and willingness to rectify issues promptly and responsibly.

The concerns raised relate to documentation and process, not to any actual delivery of services. No supports had commenced, and no participant was ever placed at risk. I have acted in good faith throughout and have continued to improve my processes and

documentation based on the Commission's feedback.

I have taken steps to ensure that any earlier oversights have been addressed, including the removal of outdated contractors, updating policies, and further training on NDIS requirements. I am fully committed to ongoing compliance and to providing safe, high-quality services to NDIS participants'

1. The Respondent considers that the Applicant has low prospects of success in the substantive application. The Respondent states that the application for registration was refused because the Respondent was not satisfied as to the suitability of the Applicant's key personnel to provide NDIS supports or services and held concerns regarding the Applicant's integrity.[24] Those concerns arose because the Applicant:

(b) was associated with a contractor permanently prohibited from involvement in the provision of NDIS supports and services

(c) submitted registration responses that were identical to those contained in a significant number of other applications received at around the same time, and

(d) failed, during the internal review process, to accept responsibility for or provide adequate explanations in respect of those matters.

1. The Respondent considers that these are serious matters bearing directly on the quality and safety of NDIS supports and services.[25] The Respondent submits that as the Applicant has not provided material that adequately addresses those concerns it does not see how the Tribunal could reach a different conclusion as to the Applicant's suitability for registration.[26]
2. The Tribunal notes that the NDIS regulatory scheme is premised upon the registration of suitable providers. There is no general entitlement to registration as an NDIS provider; rather, registration depends upon the Commissioner being satisfied of an applicant's suitability.
3. In Sunshine Disability Care Services Pty Ltd and Commissioner of the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission (Sunshine Disability), I examined the scope of the discretion conferred on the Commissioner to mitigate the risk of people with disability being provided with poor or unsafe supports and services. That analysis applied orthodox principles of statutory interpretation, having regard to the text of the relevant provisions and to the legislative context and purpose.[27]
4. In Sunshine Disability, I concluded that the discretion is broad. It extends to consideration of an applicant's qualifications, skills and experience, as well as those of their key personnel, and includes an assessment of their capacity to act with integrity, honesty and transparency when determining whether they are 'suitable' to be registered NDIS providers.[28]
5. Having regard to the breadth of the discretion, the seriousness of the concerns raised by the Respondent, and the ongoing deficiencies in the Applicant's explanation as to how those concerns would be addressed, the Tribunal considers that the Applicant's prospects of success are low. This factor therefore weighs in favour of the Respondent.

1. The Tribunal is satisfied that an alternative course remains available to the Applicant, namely the making of a fresh application upon her return to Australia. The Tribunal notes that, at the hearing, the Respondent submitted that this would be the most appropriate course of action, given that the Applicant has been informed by the Commissioner of the defects identified in the original application and that those defects may be addressed in a further application.
2. At the hearing, the Applicant indicated that she would be prepared to submit a new application and address the suitability issues again but expressed concern regarding the cost associated with any further audit process. In response, the Respondent indicated that it may not be necessary for an entirely new audit report to be undertaken.

1. Having considered all matters relevant to the delay, and applying the principles established in the authorities referred to above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that it is reasonable, in all the circumstances, to extend the time for lodging the application. The delay is substantial, extending well beyond the prescribed statutory period, and the explanation advanced does not adequately account for that delay. Critically, the explanation is unsupported by evidence, notwithstanding that the onus rests squarely on the applicant to demonstrate that an extension is justified.
2. While the respondent accepts that it would not suffer significant prejudice in responding to the application if time were extended, that consideration is not determinative. The discretion must be exercised weighing all matters of the case together. Permitting a lengthy extension in circumstances where the delay is significant and inadequately explained would undermine the purpose of statutory time limits, weaken the finality of administrative decision‑making, and risk disadvantaging other applicants who have complied with those limits.
3. The Tribunal will not extend the time for lodging the application.

Representative for the Applicant: Self-represented

Solicitor for the Respondent**: Self-represented, Aidan Turland**

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Esther Faine-Vallantin, Victorian Bar Association

[1] Respondent's outline of submissions at [1].

[8] See RPPL Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCA 1126 at [70] where Cheeseman J found in that case the presumption 'applies with force' in relation to s 172(1) of the ART Act and s 44(1) of the AAT Act.

[9] Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024 at [307].

[10] Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 444; Dix v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1993] VicRp 21; [1993] 1 VR 297; Zizza v Federal Commission of Taxation [1999] FCA 0037 at [42]- [44].

[11] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor 1996 [HCA] 25.

[12] Respondent's outline of submissions at [13].

[13] Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441; 119 ALR 85; Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2011] AATA 280; (2011) 121 ALD 184.

[15] Re Dolan and Comcare (1993) 29 ALD 887.

[16] SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319 at [38].

[17] Respondent's outline of submissions at [13c].

[18] Hutchinson and Comcare [2018] AATA 4600 at [14] applying Lucic v Nolan [1982] FCA 217; (1982) 45 ALR 411.

[19] Respondent's outline of submissions at [13d].

[21] [1999] FCA 563 at [58].

[23] Re Spencer and Commissioner of Taxation [2007] AATA 1194; (2007) 100 ALD 389 at [48]; Re Rothsay and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2011] AATA 280; (2011) 121 ALD 184 at [24].

[24] Respondent's outline of submissions at [13e].