b If you are ordered not to do something, you must not do it yourself or through directors, officers, partners, employees, agents or others acting on your behalf or on your instructions or with your encouragement or in any other way.

1. a The first respondent must not remove from Australia or in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of her assets in Australia ('Australian assets') up to the unencumbered value of AUD$350,000. ('Relevant Amount');
   1. If the unencumbered value of your Australian assets exceeds the Relevant Amount, you may remove any of those assets from Australia or dispose of or deal with them or diminish their value, so long as the total unencumbered value of your Australian assets still exceeds the Relevant Amount.

1. Within three business days the applicant serve the first and third respondents with:
   1. writ and statement of claim in this proceeding filed 5 March 2026;
   2. affidavit of Bruce William Canniford affirmed 5 March 2026;
   3. affidavit of David Laurence Pickett Ovens affirmed 5 March 2026;
   4. affidavit of David Laurence Pickett Ovens affirmed 6 March 2026;
   5. letter of urgency dated 5 March 2026;
   6. list of authorities filed 6 March 2026;
   7. outline of submissions filed 6 March 2026;
   8. interlocutory application filed 5 March 2026;
   9. form of further amended interlocutory application dated 6 March 2026;
   10. email of Zac Sabapathy of 6 March 2026, 1:07pm;
   11. orders of the Court made on 6 March 2026; and
   12. these orders.
2. NMC Tas Pty Ltd t/as EB Conveyancing must advise the practitioners for the plaintiff, Dobson Mitchell Allport, within 2 hours of these orders coming to their attention within business hours (or by 11am the next business day if the orders come to their attention outside of business hours), of:
   1. the payee or intended payee of each cheque or electronic funds transfer representing some or all of the sale proceeds of the property; and
   2. the name of each bank or financial institution (if any) with whom the defendant has advised it she banks or deposits moneys.
3. Within two days of the service of these orders, the first respondent provide to the practitioners for the plaintiff a copy of any bank statement available to or accessible by her which shows:
   1. the deposit of the sale proceeds of the property; and
   2. any expenditure, transfer or dissipation of the sale proceeds of the property.
4. This order does not prohibit the first respondent from:
   1. paying up to $1,000.00 a week on your ordinary living expenses;
   2. paying $10,000.00 on your reasonable legal expenses;
   3. dealing with or disposing of any of your assets in the ordinary and proper course of your business, including paying business expenses bona fide and properly incurred; and
   4. in relation to matters not falling within a, b or c, dealing with or disposing of any of your assets in discharging obligations bona fide and properly incurred under a contract entered into before this order was made, provided that before doing so you give the applicant, if possible, at least two working days written notice of the particulars of the obligation.
5. The first respondent and the applicant may agree in writing that the exceptions in the preceding paragraph are to be varied. In that case the applicant or the first respondent must as soon as practicable file with the Court and serve on the other a minute of a proposed consent order recording the variation signed by or on behalf of the applicant and the first respondent, and the Court may order that the exceptions are varied accordingly.

1. a This order will cease to have effect if the first respondent: 1. pays the sum of $350,000 into Court; or 2. pays that sum into a joint bank account in the name of the first respondent's solicitor and the solicitor for the applicant as agreed in writing between them; or 3. provides security in that sum by a method agreed in writing with the applicant to be held subject to the order of the Court.

1. Any such payment and any such security will not provide the applicant with any priority over your other creditors in the event of your insolvency. 2. If this order ceases to have effect pursuant [to] a, the first respondent must as soon as practicable file with the Court and serve on the applicant notice of that fact.

1. The costs of this application are reserved to the judge hearing the application on the Return Date.

PERSONS OTHER THAN THE APPLICANT AND FIRST RESPONDENT

This order does not prevent any bank from exercising any right of set off it has in respect of any facility which it gave the first respondent before it was notified of this order.

No bank need inquire as to the application or proposed application of any money withdrawn by the first respondent if the withdrawal appears to be permitted by this order.

1. On 6 March 2026, I heard an urgent application for freezing orders, brought by the plaintiff in the principal proceedings, with the assistance of her guardian Mr Bruce William Canniford. The interlocutory application is brought against the defendant in the principal proceedings, Annette Maree Boles (the defendant). The application also seeks ancillary orders against two firms of conveyancers and the banks who were involved in the defendant's sale of one residential property and her purchase of another. The evidence tendered on the application is set out at order 7, above.
2. I made an order that the interlocutory application be returnable immediately and on an ex parte basis. Upon the applicant giving an undertaking as to damages in accordance with the court's Practice Direction No 3 of 2012, I made an interim freezing order and adjourned the further hearing of the interlocutory application until another date. The interim freezing order will continue in force until the final determination of the interlocutory application. On the return date (11 March 2026), there will be a further hearing before me. The costs of the urgent ex parte stage of the proceeding are reserved.

1. The principal proceedings were commenced by writ and statement of claim filed 5 March 2026 alleging that the defendant Annette Maree Boles, in her capacity as attorney for the plaintiff Marien Jessie Canniford, breached the duties arising under the enduring power of attorney granted by the plaintiff in Queensland, in December 2015. The statement of claim alleges that the defendant thereafter owed the plaintiff certain statutory duties arising under the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld). Relevantly, those duties included the duty to act honestly and diligently and to avoid conflicting transactions. It is alleged that the defendant breached her fiduciary duties to the plaintiff, including by failing to act in good faith, failing to avoid conflicts of interest and profiting from her appointment by not keeping the donor's funds separate from her own and breaching her duty of loyalty: see par [4] of the statement of claim.
2. The specific breaches alleged in the statement of claim include that the defendant transferred money from the plaintiff's account to her own personal account resulting in the plaintiff being deprived of funds. Further, it is alleged that the defendant intermingled her own assets with the plaintiff's and that she withdrew funds from the plaintiff's account for her own personal use. It is alleged that the defendant made limited reimbursements and that she retained or expended the plaintiff's funds for her own benefit, see par [6] of the statement of claim. It is further claimed that the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff's debts as they fell due which resulted in loss and damage to the plaintiff: see pars [9-10] of the statement of claim.
3. The plaintiff seeks various forms of relief, including the taking of accounts, equitable compensation pursuant to the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 106, damages, an account of profits, interest paid at a rate reflecting the conduct of a defaulting fiduciary, and costs on an indemnity basis.

1. In support of the interlocutory application, the plaintiff tendered the material listed in order 7, above. Mr Canniford is the plaintiff's son. He deposes that his mother is aged 88 and lives in an aged care home in Bundaberg, Queensland - 'Gracehaven'. On 8 December 2015, the plaintiff appointed her daughter, the defendant, as her attorney under an enduring power of attorney. Mr Canniford deposes that in March 2019, his mother was hospitalised after a fall and was diagnosed with dementia and she was subsequently unable to live independently. Mr Canniford deposes that the enduring power of attorney was "activated" thereafter. He says that the plaintiff remains at Gracehaven and that her dementia has considerably worsened. Mr Canniford states that the defendant has unrestricted access to the defendant's bank accounts.
2. Mr Canniford deposes that in 2021, he visited the defendant's home in Walkervale, Queensland and saw that she had done significant renovations to her home including a new shed, which the defendant said she funded from her gambling winnings. In 2023, the defendant moved to Tasmania, stating she would return to Bundaberg regularly to care for her mother, but she never returned. Within a month of moving to Tasmania, the defendant purchased a property in Bridgewater, Tasmania, being 6 Merino Place, Bridgewater.
3. Mr Canniford deposes that in February 2024, he was informed by the plaintiff's chemist and Gracehaven staff that the plaintiff's invoices were unpaid. He suspected financial mismanagement by the defendant. On 8 December 2025, Mr Canniford was appointed as the plaintiff's guardian and administrator by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Upon reviewing the plaintiff's bank account statements, Mr Canniford identified transactions which indicated the plaintiff's funds had been misappropriated for the defendant's personal use, which includes gambling. In 2025, the defendant's former boyfriend informed Mr Canniford that the defendant was a habitual gambler and Mr Canniford now believes the defendant has misappropriated a substantial amount of the plaintiff's money, while purporting to act as her attorney.
4. In February 2026 Mr Canniford confronted the defendant with his suspicions and requested repayment. In reply to that demand, on 14 February 2026 the defendant said that she was selling the Bridgewater property and had received an offer. Mr Canniford says the defendant asked if she could respond to his offer after the completion of the sale of her property on 10 March 2026. Mr Canniford says he grew concerned that the defendant would sell the property and deplete the proceeds, leaving no funds to pay the plaintiff's bills and to reimburse her. He sought legal advice and learned from a solicitor that the property was subject to a contract for sale and a title search confirmed that a priority notice had been lodged on the title contemplating the transfer. Mr Canniford was concerned that notifying the defendant of the application for a freezing order may prompt the defendant to settle the sale early, justifying the ex parte nature of the application for the freezing order. As outlined above, it now appears that the sale of the property completed on 26 February 2026.
5. At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant sought to restrain the defendant from disposing of, diminishing or dealing with the proceeds of the expected imminent sale of her residential property at 6 Merino Place, Bridgewater in Tasmania. Upon determining to make the order sought, I pronounced the ancillary order relating to Ms Claxton, whereupon the applicant's solicitors immediately contacted her by telephone. Ms informed the plaintiff that the sale of the defendant's property had completed on 26 February 2026. Leave was then granted to amend the interlocutory application to include the third respondent, the defendant's conveyancer who acted in the sale of her property. After that ancillary order was pronounced relating to the third respondent, the plaintiff's solicitors contacted its office and the third respondent informed them that the defendant had applied the sale proceeds to the purchase of another residential property.

1. The Court has general power to grant a freezing order under the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932, s 11(12) and Part 36, Div 1A of the Supreme Court Rules 2000, where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient that such order should be made, upon such terms and conditions as the Court sees fit. The principles applicable to circumstances in which a freezing order will be made are well established. These may be summarised as follows:

a) The language of Part 36, Div 1A of the Supreme Court Rules reflects the Court's general power to grant a freezing order, also known as a Mareva injunction, after Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA (The Mareva) [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509: See Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; 162 CLR 612 at 622-623 per Deane J. > > b) A freezing order may be issued where (a) the applicant establishes a prima facie or good arguable case for final relief, and (b) where the circumstances disclose a real risk that the respondent may dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of their assets in a manner that could frustrate or inhibit the enforcement of any eventual judgment. The Mareva jurisdiction is a limited exception to the general principle that a plaintiff must first obtain judgment before seeking to enforce it. > > c) The risk of frustration or inhibition of enforcement must be real or substantial as opposed to remote, speculative or theoretical. The applicant must prove facts from which the Court can infer the existence of a real or substantial risk on the balance of probabilities. > > d) Whether to make a freezing order is an evaluative task for the Court, turning on whether the degree of risk is sufficient to justify the relief sought. In undertaking that assessment, the Court will remain mindful that such an order is a stringent remedy, significantly restricting a respondent's ability to deal with their assets, and that its purpose is not to furnish the applicant with security for a hoped‑for judgment.

2. The principles applicable to the grant of an interlocutory injunction pending resolution of principal proceedings are also well established and were summarised recently by Porter AJ in Douglas v Strata Corporation No 15944 [2024] TASSC 25 at [13]. To obtain interlocutory injunctive relief, the applicant must first demonstrate a prima facie case, in the sense of showing a sufficient likelihood of success to justify preserving the status quo. The strength of that case will depend upon the rights asserted and the practical consequences of the interim order. The Court must then assess the balance of convenience, weighing the harm the applicant is likely to suffer if relief is refused against the prejudice to the respondent if it is granted, bearing in mind that the applicant must show a risk of harm not adequately compensable by damages. These considerations - particularly the respective risks of harm and the adequacy of damages - lie at the centre of the discretionary assessment. Moreover, the existence of a serious question to be tried is not to be examined in isolation, but in conjunction with the balance of convenience.

1. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has a good arguable case for relief. The material relied upon by the plaintiff in support of the freezing order provides a good arguable case that the defendant misappropriated funds while acting as the plaintiff's attorney. There is evidence which, if accepted at trial, would establish that the defendant used the plaintiff's bank card for personal expenses, including gambling and home improvements, and made large, unexplained withdrawals and transfers from the plaintiff's accounts; and the Court could be satisfied that these actions breached the defendant's fiduciary and statutory duties.

1. In light of the plaintiff's history of gambling, there is risk that any equity she may have in the recently purchased property may be diminished. The plaintiff is not required to prove the defendant's intent to frustrate a judgment but must demonstrate a real risk of dissipation, which, I accept is evident from the transactions on the plaintiff's bank account and the nature of the allegations.

1. I find that the balance of convenience favours granting the freezing order. If the application is refused, the prejudice to the plaintiff outweighs the prejudice to the defendant if the order is made. It was difficult to assess a maximum amount of her potential liability to the plaintiff, especially due to the urgency of the application and the need for further investigation into the transactions and potential losses. I have regard to the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages. However, at the conclusion of the proceedings on 6 March 2026, given the estimate as to the extent of the amount misappropriated from the plaintiff's account, I accepted the sum of $350,000 as the relevant amount.

1. I accepted that the application should be made ex parte under r 937B of the rules on the basis of the information known at the time of the hearing. At that stage, there was a valid concern that notifying the defendant may lead to the diversion of the proceeds of the sale of the defendant's property. The plaintiff disclosed an allegation made by the defendant against the plaintiff's guardian, which is denied and argued to be inconsistent with the evidence.

1. The plaintiff sought ancillary orders under r 937C in order to support the freezing order, including an order requiring the defendant to provide an affidavit detailing her use of the plaintiff's funds, identifying the lawyers or conveyancer handling the property sale, and disclosing the sale price and payee of the proceeds. I determined that those orders were premature and declined to make them as part of the urgent ex parte orders.

1. For these reasons, I was satisfied that the balance of convenience and interests of justice favoured the making of the orders, above, to preserve the status quo in circumstances where there is a danger that assets belonging to the defendant, or under her control, might be dissipated in the absence of such an order. On the plaintiff giving the usual undertaking, the application was adjourned to 11 March 2026 at 3:00pm for the inter partes hearing of the interlocutory application. The orders set out at the start of these reasons are subject to some grammatical and typographical corrections.