Calabro v Need [2026] NTSC 12

LexisNexis, Halsbury's Laws of Australia (at 2 February 2026), [250], [250 -3015], [250-3040].

Calabro v Need [2026] NTSC 12

[1] The Plaintiff makes application by summons, filed 20 December 2025, seeking orders that the law firm acting for the Defendant be restrained from continuing to act for the Defendant in these proceedings.

[2] Proceedings were commenced on 21 October 2025 by the Plaintiff, who is self-represented. They were commenced in the personal name of the Plaintiff, although the statement of claim makes reference to two other corporate entities[1] which may or may not need to be joined to the proceeding. The Defendant is a natural person, although the statement of claim also notes the Defendant is a real estate agent and sole director of Carol Need Real Estate.[2] Another corporate entity, as another defendant, may or may not need to be joined. The confusion as to the parties, and their responsibilities vis-à-vie, is possibly the substance of a pending interlocutory application for summary dismissal (or possible stay) by the Defendant,[3] which has been adjourned pending the determination of this application.

[3] For the purposes of this application, notwithstanding potential issues with the statement of claim, it will be sufficient to refer to the general claims made by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff claims that he was in a de facto relationship with the Defendant from January 2007 to about January 2019. During that period, it is alleged that the Defendant assumed control of the Plaintiff's financial, banking and accounting records without proper authority. Since 2019, the Plaintiff alleges that he did not have full control of his finances and as a result, his business debts continued to increase because the Defendant, for example, had control of or was named as the contact person with banks and the Australian Taxation Office.[4] The Plaintiff alleges that, between 2009 and 2019, the Defendant engaged in a course of conduct damaging to his business for her own benefit, including: in 2014, procuring a loan to Zara Investments NT Pty Ltd to purchase a residential unit in the Defendant's name;[5] in 2016, arranged an "irregular" loan to the Plaintiff using his parents' property as security but somehow "arranged" that through Zara Investments NT Pty Ltd;[6] is responsible for discrepancies in builders' accounts and directing certain clients to pay monies into other accounts;[7] opening a fraudulent superannuation account in the Plaintiff's name;[8] and benefiting or causing certain "inflated operating costs".[9] The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's conduct constituted the following causes of action: fraud and deceit, conversion and misappropriation of funds, breach of fiduciary duties and trust, unconscionable conduct and identity misuse, and interference with business reputation. Few to no particulars are provided, and it is therefore difficult to ascertain the precise nature of the claims. Substantial damages are sought as well as certain declarations.

[4] In respect to the present application, the Plaintiff alleges that during the period 2009 to 2015/2016, the firm of solicitors currently acting for the Defendant acted for him in his business and financial affairs, and in doing so, became privy to confidential information. This application is brought on the basis of a claim that the confidential information received by the Defendant's lawyers may be relevant to, or capable of being used, in this proceeding to the Plaintiff's detriment such that the Court should intervene to restrain the Defendant's lawyers from continuing to act.

[5] A conditional notice of appearance was filed by the Defendant, followed by an application for summary dismissal. That application has since been adjourned pending the resolution of this application.

Restraint of a legal practitioner acting against a former client

[6] The Court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrain a legal practitioner from acting against a former client, particularly in circumstances where there are allegations of potential misuse of information confidential to the former client.[10] The inherent jurisdiction is aimed at preserving the proper administration of justice.

[7] The relevant principles were recently re-stated in Porter v Dyer & Anor:[11]

(a) The Court has an inherent jurisdiction to ensure the due administration of justice, to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to restrain legal practitioners from acting in a particular case as part of its supervisory jurisdiction.[12]

(b) The test to be applied is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public might conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a solicitor be prevented from acting in the interests of the protection of the integrity of the judicial process and the appearance of justice.[13]

(c) Due weight must be given to the public interest in a client not being deprived of the legal practitioner of its choice. However, this important value can be over-ridden in an appropriate case.[14]

(d) This basis for disqualification is not discharged by it simply being demonstrated that there is no risk of the misuse of confidential information.[15]

(e) This basis for disqualification is an "exceptional one" and is "to be exercised with appropriate caution".[16]

(f) A legal practitioner may be restrained from acting in a matter not only where the practitioner has a conflict of interest vis-à-vie a former client, but also vis-à-vie a person who is "as good as" a client.[17]

[8] In respect to the potential use of confidential information, the key considerations are:

(a) there is proof of a communication of confidential information;

(b) the misuse of that confidential information must be "a real possibility" from the perspective of the reasonable observer; and

(c) the misuse must be to the detriment of the former client.

[9] The confidential information must be such that it was originally communicated in confidence, remains confidential and remains capable of being recalled and relevant to the subject matter of the subsequently proposed retainer.[18]

[10] The onus is on the Plaintiff applicant to establish a real and sensible possibility of the misuse of the confidential information.[19] In Bolkiah, the Court stated:[20]

Accordingly, it is incumbent on a plaintiff who seeks to restrain his former solicitor from acting in a matter for another client to establish (i) that the solicitor is in possession of information which is confidential to him and to the disclosure of which he has not consented and (ii) that the information is or may be relevant to the new matter in which the interest of the other client is or may be adverse to his own. Although the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, it is not a heavy one. The former may readily be inferred; the latter will often be obvious. I do not think that it is necessary to introduce any presumptions, rebuttable or otherwise, in relation to these two matters. But given the basis on which the jurisdiction is exercised, there is no cause to impute or attribute the knowledge of one partner to his fellow partners. Whether a particular individual is in possession of confidential information is a question of fact which must be proved or inferred from the circumstances of the case...

[11] In Osferatu v Osferatu, the Court adopted the above approach and stated:[21]

It follows from the above discussion that the law requires that an applicant seeking to restrain a solicitor from acting must adduce evidence that establishes the confidential information and the risk of the misuse of that information in the circumstances. The weight and persuasiveness of any evidence adduced depends, of course, on the precision of the evidence called, the nature of the confidential information and the nature of the risk of disclosure.

[12] Halsbury's Laws of Australia succinctly summarises the relevant burden in the following passage, along with a reference to relevant authority:[22]

Discharging this burden requires the applicant to identify with precision, not merely in global terms, nor merely by reference to it being related in some way to the previous retainer, the confidential information allegedly (likely to be) misused even though it may necessitate disclosing to the court the very information the confidentiality of which it is sought to preserve by the action. On this approach, where the identification of any definable relevant information is left to conjecture, the court will not accede to the application to disqualify. The reasons for this are that in such cases it is difficult for the court to satisfy itself that that information was imparted, received or retained by the lawyer in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence, and to frame a clear injunction should the relief prayed for be granted.

[13] The Plaintiff relies on the affidavit of Tindaro Calabro made 30 December 2025, which was taken as read. His evidence can be summarised as follows:

(a) The Defendant's lawyers, AFL Withnalls Lawyers, previously acted for him in matters involving his business and financial affairs during the period approximately 2009 to 2015/16 ('the period').

(b) During the period, he provided confidential information to AFL Withnalls relating to his business structures, financial position, contractual matters and related commercial affairs.[23]

(c) The present proceedings involve allegations concerning financial misconduct, accounting irregularities and identity misuse arising from the same or substantially overlapping financial affairs.

(d) He did not consent to AFL Withnalls acting against him in these proceedings and is concerned that confidential information provided during the prior retainer may be relevant to, or capable of being used in, the present proceedings.

[14] The Plaintiff also provided brief written submissions in support and to the same effect.

[15] No specific evidence was filed in response by the Defendant. Rather, the Defendant relied on certain paragraphs of her affidavit filed in support of her summary dismissal application. Namely, the affidavit of Carol Need made 14 November 2025.[24] Those paragraphs recount a brief background to a proceeding in another jurisdiction ('the other proceeding'), which, for the present purposes, does not need to be identified, and a related complaint to the Law Society and appeal to the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal ('the Tribunal'). The appeal to the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Law Society, which had dismissed a complaint by the Plaintiff made against the Defendant's solicitor.[25]

[16] Ms Farmer (and her firm) had represented the Defendant against the Plaintiff in the other proceeding, in which the Plaintiff raised a potential conflict of interest. The Plaintiff had sought Court orders restraining the Defendant's solicitors from acting. That application was dismissed by the Court. The Tribunal's reasons made reference to that decision:[26]

... on the basis that the confidential information was not particularised by the Appellant, the Judge finding 'it may well be the case that a conflict exists however, that is not able to be determined in the absence of the confidential information being identified'.

[17] The complaint to the Law Society (and appeal to the Tribunal) related to an alleged breach of the professional conduct rules to avoid a conflict of interest[27] in the context of the other proceeding.

[18] It was submitted that the Tribunal's reasons were useful for two reasons. First, the Tribunal's decision recounts relevant facts in respect to the past instances of legal representation by the Defendant's solicitor (or her firm) for the Plaintiff, which were:

(a) In 2014, the Plaintiff twice instructed the Defendant's solicitor's firm (not the current solicitor directly) in respect of two separate building disputes involving his business.

(b) In 2016, the Plaintiff and Defendant instructed the Defendant's solicitor's firm in respect of two personal violence restraining orders.

(c) In 2017 and 2018, the Plaintiff instructed the Defendant's solicitor's firm firstly seeking advice on a credit report naming his business and secondly seeking advice concerning a visit to the Darwin Correctional Centre.

(d) The current solicitor, although working for the same firm, did not have personal carriage of any of those matters.

[19] The above were said to be, by the Defendant, the only occasions where the Defendant's solicitor's firm acted for the Plaintiff.

[20] Secondly, it was submitted that at least in two fora, in the other proceeding and before the Tribunal (via the Law Society complaint), there were two instances where an alleged conflict of interest (one seeking restraint of a practitioner as a result) have been dismissed. It was submitted that I should find the same here.

[21] I am not overly assisted by what may have transpired in the other proceeding or before the Tribunal, as those proceedings related to the specific factual matters arising in a different context. What considerations the Court or Tribunal needed to consider, what information the lawyers had, how it could have been used, whether such potential use put the lawyers for the Defendant into a potential conflict of interest or breach of confidentiality, would have turned on the specifics of the proceeding. This is a different proceeding entirely, alleging multiple causes of action. It is not sufficient for the Defendant to point to other findings in other proceedings, even though there may be a common factual thread.

[22] Conversely, and more importantly, it is not sufficient for the Plaintiff to generally allege that the Defendant's solicitor (or her firm) is in possession of confidential information, procured through a previous retainer, which puts them into a relevant conflict in these proceedings. More than that is required on the basis of the legal principles discussed above.

[23] In the circumstances, the Plaintiff is required to identify with precision what confidential information the Defendant's solicitors have in their possession (or were at least provided with so it might be assumed they still possess that information), and the reason why that information is or may be relevant to issues in dispute and that there is a real risk of misuse.

[24] Given the serious consequences which flow from an order restraining a solicitor from acting for a party, there must be more than just a global reference in an affidavit that confidential information was provided over a period of 2009 to 2016, and an expressed concern that that the present proceedings encompass such information which will be misused. The state of the evidence is such that the former cannot be inferred nor is the latter obvious.

[25] In my view, the Plaintiff has not identified the alleged confidential information with sufficient precision to warrant the relief sought. I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has made out his application.

1. The Plaintiff's application is dismissed.
2. Costs will be costs in the cause, unless either party wishes to make submissions otherwise, in which case written submissions are to be filed and served within 14 days of the date of the publication of these reasons and costs will be determined on the papers.

[1] Namely, Calabro Airelec Pty Ltd and Zara Investments NT Pty Ltd.

[2] Which may in fact be Need Real Estate Pty Ltd.

[3] By summons filed 14 November 2025.

[4] This is where the important distinction between the Plaintiff's personal circumstances and the circumstances of any corporate entities is important.

[5] Statement of Claim, 'Key Transactional irregularities', at [1].

[10] See: Porter v Dyer & Anor [2022] FCAFC 116 at [113]. Although, there is some authority to suggest that confidentiality may not necessarily need be the sole or only ground. See: McVeigh & Anor v Linen House Pty Ltd & Rugs Galore Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] VSCA 138 at [23].

[11] (2022) 402 ALR 659 at [113], citing Mumbin v Northern Territory of Australia (No 1) [2020] FCA 475 at [39]. See also: Dundee Beach Pty Ltd v Maher [2006] NTSC 96 at [11].

[12] See, for example: Grimwade v Meagher & Ors [1995] VicRp 28; [1995] 1 VR 446 at 452 per Mandie J and Dealer Support Services Pty Ltd v Motor Trades Association of Australia Ltd [2014] FCA 1065 at [37] per Beach J ('Dealer Support Services').

[13] See: Nash v Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 957 at [62] per Anderson J and the cases cited therein, as opposed to the different formulation adopted by Beach J in Dealer Support Services.

[14] Dealer Support Services at [95] per Beach J.

[15] Dealer Support Services at [96] per Beach J.

[16] Geelong School Supplies Pty Ltd v Dean [2006] FCA 1404 at [35] per Young J.

[17] Macquarie Bank Ltd v Myer [1994] VicRp 22; [1994] 1 VR 350 at 359 per J D Phillips J.

[18] In re a firm of Solicitors [1997] 3 All ER 482 at 489.

[19] Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1998] UKHL 52; [1999] 1 All ER 517 ('Bolkiah'); Mitchell v Pattern Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1015 at [40].

[21] [2015] FamCAFC 177; (2015) 301 FLR 295 at [40].

[22] LexisNexis, Halsbury's Laws of Australia (at 2 February 2026) [250] - Legal Practitioners II Lawyer-Client Relationship - Acting Against Former Clients - [250-3015] Focus on protecting confidentiality [250-3040]. See also: The Law Society of New South Wales v Holt [2003] NSWSC 629 at [28-30]; Nasr v Vihervaara [2005] SASC 83 at [19-20]; Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd v Reilly & Ors [2004] WASC 269 at [80]; Mumbin v Northern Territory of Australia (No 1) [2020] FCA 475 at [38].

[23] The affidavit states exactly those words only, no further detail is given.

[24] Affidavit of Carol Need made 14 November 2025 at paragraphs [25]-[26], [28], [35], [37] and [42].

[25] Calabro v Law Society NT and Farmer (2023-00440-SC) See: https://agd.nt.gov.au/media/docs/legal-practitioners-disciplinary-tribunal/lpdt-decisions/calabro-v-law-society-nt-and-farmer.pdf.

[27] Namely, Rule 3 "Restraint on Acting Against a Former Client" (as the rules formerly stood).