austlii:nsw/NSWPIC/2025/231
General information, not legal advice.
NSWPIC
2025-05-28
Original judgment source is linked above.
BRY v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2025] NSWPIC 231
MOTOR ACCIDENTS - Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAI Act); (MAC Act); claimant was travelling on a government bus; public transport accident within the meaning of of the ; damages to be assessed under the MAC Act; applied; contributory negligence alleged in circumstances of a no fault accident; correct test for contributory negligence in a no fault accident claim; considered and applied; physical injuries and psychiatric/psychological injuries; long history of pre-existing conditions to the same body systems injured in the motor accident; no entitlement to non-economic loss; assessment of claim for past and future economic loss; consideration and application of section 126 of the MAC Act; , , , , , and considered; - claimant had not departed from the standard of care she was required to observe; insurer failed to discharge its onus of proving contributory negligence on the part of the claimant; claimant is entitled to damages for past and future economic loss.
In accordance with Division 7.6 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017, the Commission's assessment is:
A statement setting out the Commission's reasons for the assessment is included with this certificate.
(a) any contributory negligence on the part of the claimant;
(b) the nature and extent of the claimant's injuries and incapacity;
(c) the claimant's entitlement to damages for past loss of earnings or past loss of earning capacity, including superannuation, and
(d) the claimant's entitlement to damages for future loss of earnings or future loss of earning capacity, including superannuation.
(a) settlement negotiations had been exhausted;
(b) the claimant had no entitlement to damages for non-economic loss;
(c) the deduction to be made under s 3.40(1)(b) of the MAI Act (statutory payments of weekly benefits) amounts to $460,155.10;
(d) payments made by the insurer under s 4.5(1)(d) of the MAI Act (Fox v Wood damages) amount to $70,837;
(e) there were no advance payments made to the claimant by the insurer, and
(f) neither party required me to issue my decision in draft.
(a) the claimant's final tender bundle of documents relied on in her case lodged with the Commission on 12 November 2024 (claimant's documents);
(b) the insurer's final tender bundle of documents relied on in its case lodged with the Commission on 28 October 2024 (insurer's documents);
(c) the claimant's written submissions in reply lodged with the Commission on 21 November 2024 (claimant's submissions in reply), and
(d) the insurer's supplementary tender bundle of documents relied on in its case lodged with the Commission on 21 November 2024 (insurer's supplementary documents).
"I got on the M 30 bus at stand T at approximately 6.07pm on 2 July to travel home. As the bus was full I moved to the back of the bus & stood holding one of the straps which was attached to a metal bar near the ceiling. As the bus approached the Falcon Street exit it began to excellerate [sic] so that at the time it took the corner off the Warringah Freeway onto Falcon Street it would have been travelling at 80 to 90 km per hour (this being a very common thing for buses to do at this corner to beat the lights). Unfortunately I lost my footing & twisted my back as the bus took the corner. Once the bus straightened up the pain in my lower back & right leg was a 10/10. I got off the bus at the first stop & managed to ring my partner, ... , who took [me: sic] straight to Emergency at RNSH. He had to get a wheelchair to move me from the car to Emergency."[7]
The claimant's statement to SureFact Australia Pty Limited dated 23 February 2020
The claimant's statement dated 11 November 2024
(a) she was standing sideways right at the back of the articulated bus holding onto a strap made out of thick material;
(b) the bus came off the Warringah Freeway at high speed causing the back of the bus to swerve towards the gutter out of its lane;
(c) she was thrown violently as the bus went towards the gutter;
(d) the bus swerved back and she was thrown violently in the opposite direction;
(e) she was unable to get her left hand out of the strap and she ended up dangling from it;
(f) passengers around her screamed as the bus swerved one way and then the other;
(g) the incident occurred quickly;
(h) she had never experienced being thrown as violently on an M30 bus;
(i) she never expected the back of the bus to swing, and
(j) she was in absolute agony from pain in her back and legs, especially the right leg, immediately after the incident.
(a) she used to get the M30 bus and observed that bus drivers would regularly speed up to beat the traffic lights at the end of the Warringah Freeway off ramp and Falcon Street;
(b) the bus was a double articulated bus;
(c) the speed of the bus at about the time of the incident referred to in her evidentiary statement was only an estimate but she knew that it was going fast, faster than 50kmph;
(d) there is a sweeping right hand turn from the Warringah Freeway off ramp into Falcon Street;
(e) she was standing sideways at the time;
(f) the bus swung towards the gutter on the Neutral Bay side and then swung back into the other lane;
(g) she had never experienced the back of the bus swing out before;
(h) she did not know if anyone else stumbled or fell at the time of the incident;
(i) she was not sure what she was doing with her right hand and conceded that it was possible that she was holding a mobile telephone, and
(j) she denied not being prudent at the time of the incident and disagreed that, if she had been holding her mobile telephone in her right hand, it would have been prudent to put it down.
"83. I would accept the respondent's submission that the exercise called for in Podrebersek can have no application to a case such as the present. Part 1.2 of the Act proceeds upon the assumption that the defendant driver is not at fault. Accordingly, comparisons of culpability and of the relevant importance of the acts of the parties in causing the first appellant's injuries is inappropriate.
(a) failed to maintain a proper hold;
(b) failed to monitor and pay attention to the bus's movements;
(c) failed to ensure that she was standing safely on a moving bus;
(d) failed to ensure that she maintained a safe stance on a moving bus, and
(e) failed to exercise reasonable care and safety.
Part 1.2 of the MAI Act by reason of contributory negligence, will be determined by assessing the extent to which a claimant departed from that standard. 13. The insurer's allegations of contributory negligence completely ignored the claimant's unchallenged evidence that she was holding onto a strap. 14. Therefore, the insurer's sole basis for alleging contributory negligence was unsupported and directly contradicted by the only evidence that can go to that issue. The onus of establishing a departure from a reasonable standard of care was not discharged. 15. Further, the insurer had adduced no evidence to establish that anything the claimant was alleged to have failed to do made any difference to the injuries she sustained. 16. The allegations of contributory negligence should be dismissed.
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INJURIES AND INCAPACITY
"Once the bus straightened up the pain in my lower back & right leg was a 10/10. I got off the bus at the first stop & managed to ring my partner, ... who took [sic: me] straight to Emergency at RNSH. He had to get a wheelchair to move me from the car to Emergency."[13]
"Acute lower back pain radiating predominantly down right leg to my foot & also radiating intermittently down my right leg. Initially I couldn't walk. Now I can slowly & painfully with a walking stick. I am also prone to falls."[14]
full-time work and was able to cope with her workload. 7. The claimant stated that, in March 2017, she joined another legal firm as a managing partner. She was promised a fast-track to equity in the practice within 12-18 months. The employment of a lawyer in the firm was terminated in April 2017 which resulted in her "workload being astronomical" [20]and she was regularly working 60-70 hour weeks. She also experienced difficulties with a director and partner in the business and became aware that there were financial difficulties. Further, she learnt that she had been the fifth managing partner of the firm within six months. At short notice, she was informed that an experienced commercial lawyer was taking four weeks leave at the end of July 2017. All of these matters led to her feeling that she had "hit a wall."[21] In August 2017, she again attempted suicide and overdosed on her antidepressant medication and alcohol. She was admitted to Royal North Shore Hospital for about four to five days. 8. The claimant stated that, following her discharge from Royal North Shore Hospital, she returned to full-time work but was given one month's notice of her termination in September 2017 because she was not getting on with clients. She ascertained that the commercial lawyer referred to above was to take over her role as managing partner. She and her father attended the firm's office and packed up her files and belongings. She then admitted herself to Northside Clinic where she was prescribed antidepressant medication, which she has remained on ever since. 9. The claimant stated that she incorporated her own legal practice and returned to work in October 2017 "without a hitch."[22] In March 2018, she joined Lawyers on Demand and in April 2019, she joined Dovetail Legal Solutions, where she worked part time and was sent to various in-house roles. At this time, she was not experiencing any significant psychological issues and managed to work 70 hour weeks sometimes. 10. The claimant stated that, on 21 March 2018, she consulted her general practitioner complaining of annoying back pain. She was issued with a prescription for gabapentin and referred to Dr Taylor. The following day her period started and the back pain resolved within a day or two, much to her embarrassment. 11. The claimant stated that she woke up with a locked neck on Boxing Day 2018. In late December 2018 and in 2019, she was prescribed Panadeine Forte. Whilst it took "a couple of months" to fully recover, her neck did not "hold her back."[23] 12. The claimant stated that, on 27 March 2019, Dr Mark Cross, psychiatrist, arranged her short admission to Northside Clinic. She explained that:
"My partner, ... and my daughter had been arguing relentlessly and I had been forced to cancel the sale campaign for my home after the real estate agency sent a text to all potential buyers and myself indicating that the sale price had been reduced [sic: to] $1.85 million when I had an agency agreement that stated the sale price was $2.2 million. This was done without any discussion with me."[24]
"In the absence of injuries I sustained in the motor accident, it had been my intention to work full-time until I reached the age of 70 years, and then to work part-time for a further 5 to 10 years."[28]
"If I did have back pain from time to time (after 21 March 2018), at best, I would describe it as being annoying."
"In my view [the claimant] has been suffering from a Major Depressive Disorder with Associated Anxiety. She has a very strong family history for depression indicating a key biological vulnerability to developing the same. [The claimant] has had a complicated relationship with her father and has sustained severe bullying as a young child both of which I feel I [sic] has contributed to a hindrance in her psychological development and affected the development of her self-worth. She also experienced pronounced interpersonal difficulties in her first marriage that appeared to play on her insecurities. [The claimant] has experienced a great deal of stress in recent years in her career; with workplace bullying, a redundancy and ongoing intense workplace stress that appear to be the major precipitants to this episode of depression. I feel she has prominent Cluster C personality features."[66]
"[The claimant] suffered a work-related injury whilst lifting luggage into an aeroplane overhead locker in 2005, developing marked lumbar back pain which did not respond to extensive nonoperative treatment and Dr Kam subsequently performed posterior interbody fusion with disc replacement. There was some improvement in symptoms, but she had chronic ongoing back and leg pain through to 2015, with intermittent use of significant analgesia and centrally-acting drugs, under the care of Consultant Pain Physician, Dr Taylor.
There were increased symptoms after a twisting incident as she was standing on a bus going home on the second day of her employment on 2 July 2019. She attended Royal North Shore Hospital with marked back and right leg pain, a recurrence of her previous complaint, and since then has had recurrent, ongoing and increasing symptoms."[168]
pre-existing back condition but also the recent diagnosis of a Parkinsonian type condition and other serious health issues. He also opined that she was unfit for any other positions. 4. Dr Burrow opined that the relative contribution of the motor accident would be one quarter, given the significant past medical history.
pre-existing condition of isolated lumbar fusion is the development of more proximal disease as has been reported in her radiological studies.
"[The claimant] is a chronic low back and right leg pain sufferer. Her pain could date back to at least 2006 [sic: 2005] when she underwent an L5/S1 fusion for her L5/S1 isthmic spondylolisthesis. She continued to suffer from considerable residual pain requiring treatment with a pain specialist, Dr Taylor. She was noted by Dr Taylor to have responded very well to radiofrequency treatment.
Her symptoms then increased after the index incident in 2019. She then underwent further percutaneous treatment and eventually placement of a spinal cord stimulator, which failed to provide her sustained relief.
In addition to severe chronic low back pain, [the claimant's] condition is also characterised by very marked right lower limb pain. This is non-radicular unrelated to any lumbar stenosis.
The cause of [the claimant's] persistent low back and right leg pain remains unclear. There is no converging evidence to pinpoint a specific underlying structural pain generator.
Collectively the mainstay of treatment for her condition is non-operative."[175]
(a) the claimant did have an extensive history of chronic low back and leg pain with extensive treatment prior to the motor accident;
(b) the claimant does not suffer from radiculopathy;
(c) the motor accident caused an aggravation of the claimant's pre-existing condition and she will require continued non-operative management;
(d) the claimant's prognosis is very guarded given her chronic pain status and history of extensive treatment compounded by a significant psychiatric history and,
(e) the claimant is permanently unfit for work including office work.
clear-cut pain generator identified. He also agreed that the claimant was unfit for work, that her current symptoms were stable and that her impairment was unlikely to change. 3. Dr Siu disagreed with Dr O'Neill, in that, it was evident that the claimant had suffered from marked deterioration of her lumbar spine condition following the motor accident and that, therefore, an impairment had arisen from the motor accident.
"[The claimant] clearly has a major depressive episode in progress at present with severely reduced mood every day, reduced enjoyment of life, reduced concentration and mental drive and poor sleep. Her depression is largely related to her pain and fluctuates with this. In the past, she has been diagnosed with dysthymia, which is now called in DSM-5 Persistent Depressive Disorder. Anxiety features have been noted along with this. Some prior reports suggest that she may have had dysthymia or persistent depressive disorder dating back as far as 2004 or 2005 but from her account today, she has had significant periods of time in the decade prior to 2015 when life was going well for her and she would not have met criteria for dysthymia. Since then, she has had some symptoms of depression most days and would qualify for dysthymia or persistent depressive disorder. In addition, she has had several episodes of Major Depression where she has had consistent episodes of depression on a daily basis and of a more severe nature including attempts to end her life."[177]
"If her accident had not occurred and she had retained mobility and a lower level of pain, she would very likely have been able to continue working and this would have been a significant strength to her and she would, in all likelihood, have recovered from the loss of relationship that she suffered in 2019. It is probable that she would have continued with some level of dysthymia for a year or two but may well have been able to make a full recovery from this though remaining vulnerable to future episodes of major depression, if future stressors arrived."[178]
part-time, she had actually not worked since the motor accident for more than a few days. The extent to which her impairment will continue rested predominately with her pain rather than with her psychological impairment which is to a large extent in reaction to the pain.
(a) the claimant's opioid usage had significantly reduced over the past almost 18 months;
(b) the claimant remains in severe pain;
(c) Dr Bidencope felt that there was a lack of congruence in the management of the claimant's pain;
(d) Dr Bidencope was not receiving regular correspondence from Dr Taylor which may have been negatively impacting the continuity of care;
(e) the use of opioids, gabapentin, topiramate and baclofen may all have been contributing to the claimant's mental obfuscation;
(f) baclofen and gabapentin may, in theory, exacerbate the claimant's tremor;
(g) the indication of topiramate was unclear;
(h) query whether Lasix was related to the claimable injury, and
(i) symmetrel is not related to the claimable injury.
"1. For either Temgesic or Palexia IR be prescribed, not both for now. Immediate release should be reviewed and ceased if possible because as per best practice guidelines, it has no place in the management of chronic non-cancer pain.
Associate Professor David Champion: 28 February 2023
"It is appropriate to state that there was a high probability that [BRY] would have been subject to recurring lumbosacral and spinal and referred pain, potentially including radiculopathy throughout the remainder of her potential working life and remainder of her life generally, such was the degree of vulnerability. The fact is however that the accident in the bus induced acute severe back and radicular pain leading to severe pain-related disability and the need for a concerning array of requirements for procedural interventions for pain relief. The prognosis, already somewhat concerning, was substantially worsened by the subject incident/injury."[184]
"[The claimant's] primary diagnosis is chronic lumbosacral spinal pain syndrome with deep somatic referred pain and nociplastic extensions into the right lower limb (also a probable contribution from right trochanteric bursitis) and sensorimotor signs of radiculopathy involving right L5 and probable S1 nerve roots. I refer you to my examination findings on page 10 including the distribution of sensory impairment and responses to straight leg raising. It is difficult to know to what extent the motor deficits are the result of radiculopathy or are centrally mediated. The underlying spinal pathology includes the previous L5/S1 decompression and posterior fusion with L5/S1 discectomy (stable) and some degenerative changes which have probably gradually progressed in recent years. The L5 nerve roots are contacted by prominent disc osteophytes at L5/S1. None of this pathology has been a direct consequence of the subject bus injury but the injury certainly induced hyperexcitability and reduced sensory processing of right L5 and probably S1 nerve roots.
Secondary diagnoses include aggravation of previous impaired sleep, and of mental health, particularly depression of mood. One might also reasonably add requirement for drug therapy, major increase in disability, reduced income and social isolation.
The prognosis is very concerning. She will not and cannot recover effectively from her present condition which includes substantial exacerbation and progression caused by the subject injury. Life will be forever complicated while she maintains a spinal cord stimulator. I do not expect substantial improvement although there is potential for some maintenance of the recent improvement by the ketamine infusion, and prospect for future infusions."[185]
"I cannot imagine that, in the natural history without such causal influence as the bus injury, your client would have required such extensive pain management including multiple interventions leading up to the extreme intervention of the spinal cord stimulator. On that basis, I consider it reasonable to conclude that the proportion (percentage of symptoms, disability and impairments) related to the bus incident would be of the order of two-thirds (66%) to three-quarters (75%). I will make a cautious conclusion at two-thirds (66%)."[186]
(a) the severity of the claimant's exacerbated back and right leg pain has been such as to require continual medical management at a high level of expertise and that will continue;
(b) the claimant will continue to be impaired into the future throughout her potential working life and beyond;
(c) the claimant experiences distressing chronic pain, major mental health problems, seriously impaired sleep, physical disability, effects of medications, social isolation and the need to continue multiple medical appointments and treatments; all of which are unlikely to resolve in the foreseeable future and so, she has long term restrictions with respect to the nature of required duties and work hours which will continue through her potential work life and beyond.
"[The claimant] did have pre-existing lumbosacral spine disease. Indeed she had low grade L5/S1 spondylolisthesis requiring spinal fusion in November 2005 because of ongoing pain. This was partially effective. Then there was a recurrence of pain leading to radiofrequency ablation by Dr Turner in 2014 which led to significant improvement. However, she was still having intermittent minor pain in the back prior to the accident.
Given that she was only complaining of minor pain in the back prior to the accident and was not disabled in any way, I consider the impact, according to the Motor Accident Guidelines, to be minimal at best and for practical purposes, given that there was no impact on her function and the pain was intermittent and minor, I do not consider a deduction for pre-existing injury (according to the Guidelines) to be appropriate.
To be clear, this is based on the fact that there were no particular symptoms related to her back prior to the accident, save for intermittent minor back pain. There was certainly pre-existing disease in the back, but this was not in any way significant prior to the accident and, indeed, did not lead to physical impairment."[189]
long-term. There was evidence of this on the claimant's imaging and it was unrelated to the motor accident. The proximal disease only related to the natural history of the previous fusion surgery and condition. 5. Dr Burrow opined that the claimant required ongoing chronic pain management to some extent due to the motor accident. Potentially, she may require further lumbar surgery for more proximal disease as a result of the previous lumbar fusion surgery. There was no evidence that the motor accident had accelerated that process or contributed to that disease. It was pre-existent as evidenced by the degenerative changes demonstrated on the imaging studies immediately after the motor accident. 6. In respect of the claimant's earning capacity, Dr Burrow opined that the aggravation of pain she sustained in the motor accident had not precluded her from resumption of part-time office type work. He was of the opinion that the claimant is fit for part-time work, five hours a day, five days per week. Following the motor accident, she would have been unfit for work for two months as there was an aggravation of pre-existing chronic pain but no significant or acute new structural injury. Thereafter, she was fit to resume part-time restricted duties until the normal retirement age. With increased symptoms and disability over time as the more proximal disease develops and the potential for more proximal surgery approaches, such increased symptoms and disability may have an effect on her ability to work until the normal retirement age. Such a circumstance would not be influenced by the aggravation of pain caused by the motor accident. 7. Dr Burrow then proceeded to comment on the findings made by Dr Bodel, Dr Siu, Professor Brew and Dr O'Neill.
pre-accident work duties until normal retirement age. 7. Dr Newlyn made the following concluding comment:
"[The claimant] asserts she worked full-time in the period before the accident despite her difficulties with her partner, alcohol and her psychiatric admissions. The documents support her assertion of full-time work in the year before the accident but show there had been mental health difficulties in her life beginning in 2005 that interfered with her ability to work."[193]
pre-existing psychological/psychiatric condition had been made worse by the motor accident. I find such proposition supported by the claimant's evidence and the preponderance of the medical evidence for the reasons set out below.
(a) the mechanism of the incident, that is, the bus unexpectedly swinging one way and then the other way causing the claimant to be thrown violently one way and then violently back the other way, leaving her dangling from the strap she was holding onto and twisting her back;
(b) the acute and immediate onset of symptoms with the injury;
(c) the absence of any significant lower back or lower limb symptoms since about 2014, acknowledging the two flare-ups referred to above in 2018 which were of short duration and relieved by medication, and
(d) an unbroken chain of causation, with continuous pain since the onset.
The claimant's psychological/psychiatric injuries
(a) a severe aggravation of a pre-existing condition in the lumbosacral spine with referred pain into both lower limbs, especially on the right that is ongoing and has become chronic, and
(b) aggravation of a pre-existing psychological/psychiatric condition that is ongoing.
(a) back pain;
(b) bilateral leg pain, particularly in the right leg;
(c) unsteadiness when walking, resulting in having to use a walking stick;
(d) frequent falls;
(e) difficulty standing for more than 10 minutes;
(f) difficulty sitting for more than 30 minutes;
(g) difficulty walking for more than 200m;
(h) difficulty driving for more than 20 minutes;
(i) difficulty with household tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, washing, gardening, shopping and caring for her two dogs and two cats;
(j) loss of earning capacity;
(k) depressed mood;
(l) anxiety;
(m) irritability;
(n) memory issues;
(o) difficulty concentrating;
(p) bouts of confusion;
(q) insomnia;
(r) fatigue;
(s) nausea;
(t) isolation from family and friends, and
(u) loneliness.
DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE LOSS OF EARNINGS OR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
"Chapter 5 (Award of damages) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 applies to and in respect of an award of damages which relates to the death of or bodily injury to a person caused by or arising out of a public transport accident, not being an award of damages to which that Chapter applies. That Chapter so applies even though the public transport accident occurred after the commencement of the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017."
"126 Future economic loss - claimant's prospects and adjustments
(1) A court cannot make an award of damages for future economic loss unless the claimant first satisfies the court that the assumptions about future earning capacity or other events on which the award is to be based accord with the claimant's most likely future circumstances but for the injury.
(2) When a court determines the amount of any such award of damages it is required to adjust the amount of damages for future economic loss that would have been sustained on those assumptions by reference to the percentage possibility that the events concerned might have occurred but for the injury.
(3) If the court makes an award for future economic loss, it is required to state the assumptions on which the award was based and the relevant percentage by which damages were adjusted."
the future economic loss is to be qualified by adopting the prescribed discount rate. Section 127(2) of the MAC Act prescribes a discount rate of 5%. 2. Section 126 of the MAC Act does not preclude the awarding of a buffer for future economic loss. The occasion for a buffer in accordance with the principles enunciated in Penrith City Council v Parks (Parks)[206] is when the impact of the injury on the economic benefit from exercising earning capacity after injury is difficult to determine. The use of a buffer to assess economic loss in this matter is not appropriate.
Damages for past loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity
in-house senior legal counsel roles with various companies who required assistance from a senior lawyer for short periods of time. 6. The claimant's evidence was that, from August 2018, she recommenced looking for senior roles in law firms with a fast track to equity partner. She engaged a number of recruiters, including Ms Belinda Fisher of Burgess Paluch to help her find roles. In late 2018, she began to consider other senior roles in law firms that did not have a fast track to partnership so that she could refinance the mortgage on her home. She received two job offers, the first of which fell through (February 2019) and the second, she did not accept because she did not believe it was the right fit for her (April 2019). 7. Between January and April 2019, the claimant was psychologically unwell. Dr Cross noted that he was focusing on stress management in the context of her work stressors. He also noted that a work contract had ended early and that she had nothing to go to in its place despite having attended many interviews without success. Further, her house was on the market and there was tension at home. The claimant was admitted to Northside Clinic at the referral of Dr Cross on 28 March 2019 and discharged on 5 April 2019. 8. On 12 May 2019, the claimant presented to Royal North Shore Hospital with suicidal ideation and increased anxiety in the context of alcohol intoxication. On 21 May 2019, she was admitted to Northside Clinic with increasing anxiety over the past month and almost daily panic attacks. She was discharged on 7 June 2019. 9. The unchallenged evidence is that, on 1 July 2019, the claimant commenced employment with Bell Partners as head of commercial law at a salary of $210,000 per annum plus superannuation.[218] The motor accident occurred the following day. 10. On 15 July 2019, the claimant returned to work at Bell Partners with difficulty as she was significantly affected by lower back and leg pain. She struggled with work performance because of her pain. On 1 August 2019, her employment was terminated. She then started to take steps to start up her own firm again, which took about one week to 10 days. She still had some clients and was trying to retain others. She found herself struggling to get through the work and was taking too long to perform the work. She was making more mistakes than usual. She ultimately realised that she was not going to be able to continue. 11. In December 2019, the claimant worked on a casual basis for a period of five weeks at two days per week with Aspect Legal. 12. On 24 February 2020 the claimant had a spinal cord stimulator implanted and started to feel physically better. On 23 March 2020, she commenced a casual contract organised by recruiter with Onsite Rental Group as a senior lawyer. The contract finished in about early May 2020. The claimant's evidence was that by mid-April 2020, her back and leg pain was slowly getting worse, leaving her constantly fatigued. 13. In January 2022, the claimant worked in a call centre for six days and has not worked since that time. 14. Despite experiencing flare-ups of her long-standing pre-accident lower back and leg, psychiatric conditions and other comorbidities, the claimant managed to continue working as a lawyer until the time of the motor accident. Thereafter, came the limited unsuccessful attempts to return to her pre-injury work referred to above. 15. The claimant's evidence was that, but for the injuries sustained in the motor accident, she would have worked full-time until the age of 70 years and thereafter, worked part-time for another 5 to 10 years. There was no corroborative evidence in this regard. 16. Dr Bodel opined that the claimant had suffered a significant reduction in her earning capacity from both a physical and psychological point of view but deferred to formal assessments by a psychiatrist and possibly, an occupational physician to determine her earning capacity in the future. I give little weight to Dr Bodel's opinion in this regard for the reasons already expressed. 17. Dr Burrow opined that the aggravation of pain the claimant sustained in the motor accident had not precluded her from resumption of part time office type work five hours per day, five days per week until normal retirement age following an initial post-accident two month period of total incapacity for work. I give little weight to Dr Burrow's opinion in this regard for the reasons already expressed. 18. Dr O'Neill opined that he could not see anything that could be done to help the claimant with her chronic low back pain and right leg pain. He further opined that she was clearly not fit to return to work in any capacity in her current state but opined that the aggravated low back and right leg pain was now playing only a minor role in her inability to return to work. 19. Dr Siu opined that the claimant was permanently unfit for work, including office work. 20. Associate Professor Champion opined that the claimant's inability to work as a solicitor or in any other capacity was likely to be permanent and provided his reasons as set out in [361] above. 21. Professor Brew opined that, due to her chronic lower back and leg pain and related restrictions, the claimant is not able to work in any capacity and that such impairment is likely to be indefinite. 22. I prefer the opinions of Dr Siu, Associate Professor Champion and Professor Brew over the opinions of Dr Burrow and Dr O'Neill in respect of the claimant's work capacity. In accordance with the findings I have made in respect of the claimant's motor accident-related injuries, I do not accept the minor role the aggravation to the claimant's low back and leg pain that Dr Burrow and Dr O'Neill attributed to the motor accident. They failed to adequately explain their paths of reasoning. Their opinions in this regard appear to be mere assertions without proof. 23. Dr Argyle opined that the extent to which the claimant's work impairment would continue rested predominantly with her pain rather than with her psychological impairment which was, to a large extent, in reaction to the pain. 24. Dr Newlyn opined that, from a mental health viewpoint, the claimant would be fit to undertake full pre-accident work duties until normal retirement age. In this regard, he observed that the claimant asserted she worked full-time in the period before the motor accident despite difficulties with her partner, alcohol and psychiatric admissions. He also observed that the documents supported her assertion of full-time work in the year before the motor accident but showed that there had been mental health difficulties in life beginning in 2005 that interfered with her ability to work. 25. The opinions of Dr Argyle and Dr Newlyn were not greatly inconsistent, except that, the latter did not take into account that part of the claimant's psychological impairment that was related to the chronic low back and leg pain that had developed and continued following the motor accident. Accordingly, I prefer the opinion of Dr Argyle in respect of the claimant's work capacity. 26. I reject the insurer's submission that the mechanism of injury in the motor accident was a relatively minor event for reasons I have already stated. 27. I am satisfied that, as a result of the injuries and restrictions I have found were caused by the motor accident, the claimant has sustained a loss or diminution in her earning capacity and that such loss or diminution has resulted in economic loss. 28. I find that, as a result of the injuries I have found caused by the motor accident, the claimant does not have the capacity to return to her pre-injury work of a solicitor or in any other capacity. The combination of her motor accident-related injuries and increased restrictions result in her having no realistic residual earning capacity on the open labour market in the future. 29. I now turn to the calculation of the claimant's economic loss. 30. In evidence, is the Furzer Crestani report.[219] The Furzer Crestani report purported to assess the claimant's economic loss following the motor accident. It assessed the claimant's past and future income loss and superannuation loss due to her inability to work following the motor accident. 31. The Furzer Crestani report noted by way of background that the claimant was a qualified solicitor with extensive experience in legal practice, including roles as a principal solicitor and managing partner. On 1 July 2019, she began employment with Bell Partners on a salary of $210,000 plus superannuation. The claimant viewed this role as an interim one whilst seeking equity partnership opportunities within the legal profession elsewhere. The motor accident caused injuries to the claimant's lumbar spine and caused a persistent depressive disorder that rendered her unable to work in any capacity. 32. In respect of the claimant's pre-accident career, the Furzer Crestani report noted that she had consistently worked full-time despite pre-existing health issues, including migraines, psychological challenges and a history of back injury. It noted that she intended to work
full-time until the age of 70 years, followed by part-time work for 5 to 10 years. 33. In respect of the claimant's post-accident career, the Furzer Crestani report noted that the claimant returned to work briefly at Bell Partners. However, she remained in considerable pain and her employment was terminated on 1 August 2019. The report noted that subsequent employment included initially operating her own practice in a limited capacity, casual roles (Aspect Legal and Onsite Rental Group) and call centre work. However, the claimant was unable to sustain consistent employment and was unable to return to work in any capacity. 34. The Furzer Crestani report provided a schedule of the sources that were reviewed and relied on in preparing the assessment of the claimant's economic loss.[220] 35. The Furzer Crestani report provided an assessment of the claimant's economic loss into two scenarios. Scenario 1: where the claimant continued to work as a solicitor for Bell Partners from 2 July 2019 until she was able to attain a partner's position on 1 July 2020 with either a small sized legal firm as option A or alternatively, a mid-sized legal firm as option B. Scenario 2: where the claimant continued to work as a solicitor for Bell Partners until her retirement on attaining the age of 70 years and thereafter, part-time until either 75 years of age or, alternatively, 80 years of age. All calculations assumed that the claimant had no residual earning capacity. 36. Table 2 of the Furzer Crestani report set out calculations of what was referred to as the claimant's "true earnings" for the financial years 2014 to 2021 inclusive. It did not include the claimant's six days work in a call centre in early 2022 as that information was not available at the time of the preparation of the report. In respect of the claimant's true earnings in the four years prior to the motor accident, the authors of the Furzer Crestani report calculated that her average true earnings were $195,920 per annum. 37. The calculations of the claimant's past and future economic loss in the two case scenarios and the options therein were set out in schedules D to L of the Furzer Crestani report.[221] 38. In evidence, there is a report from Burgess Paluch Legal Recruitment by Ms Belinda Fisher, legal recruiter, dated 16 September 2024.[222] 39. Ms Fisher set out her employment history and her qualifications as an expert. She is a partner in a national legal recruitment agency, Burgess Paluch, and undertakes legal recruitment for lawyers in both private practice and in-house, including general counsel roles. She has been involved in legal recruitment on a full-time basis since April 2006. 40. At the beginning of her report, Ms Fisher provided a brief summary of her opinion. Ms Fisher opined that it would be improbable for the claimant, but for her injury, to have obtained and sustained a role as a partner in a small law firm or in a mid-tier law firm by 1 July 2020. She further opined that the career opportunities available to the claimant would now include
part-time contract in-house roles similar to the roles she had obtained prior to the motor accident. 41. Ms Fisher listed the documentation she had reviewed in preparing her report. She also listed what she referred to as the relevant facts, matters and assumptions in respect of the claimant. She listed the claimant's employment history.[223] 42. Ms Fisher provided her opinion on the claimant's prospects of obtaining and sustaining a role as a partner in a small law firm and in a mid-tier law firm by 1 July 2020 and her reasons for concluding that it would be improbable for her, but for her injury, to have obtained and sustained such roles. Such reasons included the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on the legal industry; the claimant's failure in starting her own business in about April 2015; the long hours and stress involved in being a salaried partner in a law firm due to the claimant's response to stress and pressure; the claimant's attempts at suicide and psychiatric admissions; the claimant's history of part-time and contract work prior to the motor accident; and the claimant's history of terminations and redundancies from employment prior to the motor accident. 43. Ms Fisher opined that the claimant's likely career trajectory until retirement was very limited due to her experience including lengthy broken periods of time in her father's niche legal practice and having worked part-time and in contract roles prior to the motor accident. Further, many of her roles had ended due to the employment periods being terminated or being made redundant. 44. Ms Fisher opined that it was doubtful that the claimant would have many opportunities to continue her career other than in contract roles for the reasons already stated. She opined that the claimant's work history had been drastically affected by her mental health. She referred to the reports of Dr Burrow. 45. Ms Fisher also referred to the "current economic slowdown"[224] as a further consideration in the conclusions she had reached. She also opined that the claimant would have difficulty obtaining references given her recent work history, namely, redundancies and numerous terminations, and that a reference from her father would be considered to be biased. 46. I find that Ms Fisher strayed outside her area of expertise when she opined that the claimant's work history had been drastically affected by her mental health and I have taken this into consideration when considering her expert opinion. Further, the evidence is that the claimant, to her credit, did not cease working for any significant periods of time as a result of intermittent flare-ups of her psychological condition, her lower back condition or other comorbidities. 47. I reject the insurer's methodology in calculating the claimant's past loss of earnings and suggesting that it should form the basis for her most likely future earnings but for the motor accident. It is misconceived. I agree with the claimant's submission that "cherry picking" the claimant's 39 weeks employment with Lawyers On Demand and ignoring her earnings in the four years leading up to the motor accident was inappropriate. 48. I now turn to a consideration of the claimant's most likely future circumstances but for her injuries sustained in the motor accident and her level of earnings. 49. Whilst I accept that the claimant may have had a desire to become an equity partner in a small to mid-tier legal firm, the pattern and nature of her work history in the legal profession in the 23 years prior to the motor accident does not satisfy me that such desire would have been her most likely future circumstance but for her injuries. 50. I find that the claimant's most likely future circumstances but for the injuries and resultant restrictions caused by the motor accident, would have seen her continue as either an employed solicitor, a sole practitioner, an in-house lawyer or a contractor or, as evidenced in the past, a combination of some of these. 51. The claimant's employment with Bell Partners on a salary of $210,000 per annum was short lived due to the motor accident and as such, was not the perfect measuring stick in respect of an annual salary or whether that type of employment suited her. However, there was evidence in the four years preceding the motor accident that the claimant was averaging close to $200,000 gross per annum as an employed solicitor, a sole practitioner, an in-house lawyer and a contractor. In such circumstances, I find the figure of $210,000 gross plus superannuation per annum as an appropriate starting point when calculating her past loss of earnings. 52. I assess the claimant's entitlement to past loss of earnings from 3 July 2019 to 28 May 2025 as follows:
$210,000 gross per annum = $4,038.46, rounded down to $4,038 gross per week being $138,191 net per annum = $2,657.52, rounded up to $2,658 net per week.
3 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 = say, 52 weeks x $2,658 net per week = $138,216.
Less actual income after tax as calculated by Furzer Crestani Forensic Chartered Accountants on the claimant's records of $63,718 = $74,498.
Sydney consumer price index (CPI) percentage = 0%. $210,000 gross per annum = $4,038.46, rounded down to $4,038 gross per week being $140,621 net per annum = $2,704.25, rounded down to $2,704 net per week.
1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 = say, 52 weeks x $2,704 net per week = $140,608.
Less actual income after tax as calculated by Furzer Crestani Forensic Chartered Accountants on the claimant's records of $8,814 = $131,794.
$210,000 gross per annum and add CPI percentage increase 3.02% = $6,342 = $216,342 gross per annum = $4,160.42, rounded down to $4,160 gross per week being $143,983 net per annum = $2,768.90, rounded up to $2,769 net per week.
1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 = say, 52 weeks x $2,769 net per week = $143,988.
Less actual income after tax as calculated by Furzer Crestani Forensic Chartered Accountants on the claimant's records of $8,814 = $135,174.
$216,342 gross per annum and add Sydney CPI percentage increase 5.28% = $11,422.86, rounded up to $11,423 = $227,765 gross per annum = $4,380.10, rounded down to $4,380 gross per week being $150,046 net per annum = $2,885.50, rounded up to $2,886 net per week.
1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023 = say, 52 weeks x $2,886 net per week = $150,072.
$227,765 gross per annum and add Sydney CPI percentage increase 3.8% = $8,655.07, rounded down to $8,655 = $236,420 gross per annum = $4,546.54, rounded up to $4,547 gross per week being $154,046 net per annum = $2,962.42, rounded down to $2,962 net per week.
1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 = say, 52 weeks x $2,962 net per week = $154,024.
$236,420 gross per annum and add Sydney CPI percentage increase 2.3% = $5,437.66, rounded up to $5,438 = $241,858 gross per annum = $4,651.12, rounded down to $4,651 gross per week being $162,044 net per annum = $3,116.23, rounded down to $3,116 net per week.
1 July 2024 to 28 May 2025 = say, 47 weeks x $3,116 net per week = $146,452.
Superannuation guarantee percentage (SGP) for 3 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 = 9.5% on gross of $210,000 per annum = $19,950.
SGP for 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 = 9.5% on gross of $210,000 per annum = $19,950.
SGP for 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 = 10% on gross of $216,342 per annum = $21,634.20, rounded down to $21,634.
SGP for 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023 = 10.5% on gross of $227,765 per annum = $23,915.33, rounded down to $23,915.
SGP for 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 = 11% on gross of $236,420 per annum = $26,006.20, rounded down to $26,006.
SGP for 1 July 2024 to 28 May 2025 = 11.5%. Gross of $241,858 per annum = $4,651 gross per week x 11.5% = $534.87 superannuation per week x 47 weeks =$591.78 = $27,813.66, rounded down to $27,813.
Damages for future loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity
pre-existing lower back condition in its natural progression would have produced similar symptoms as those that have continued since the motor accident for the reasons I have already stated in the review of the medical evidence. The insurer relied on Dr Burrow in this regard whose evidence I did not prefer over the evidence of Dr Siu, Professor Brew and Associate Professor Champion. 5. The insurer also submitted that a similar daily event as the mechanism of injury that occurred in the subject bus incident could have resulted in the same outcome. However, Associate Professor Champion, whose evidence I have preferred, opined that it would have taken another event of a similar kind of stress and severity to that which occurred to the claimant on the bus to have induced the experience that had in fact occurred. It was nothing more than a possibility which is ordinarily covered by the vicissitudes allowed in the ordinary case. 6. I have found that the loss of the claimant's earning capacity as a result of her motor accident related injuries and restrictions is currently $3,116 net per week. I find that such loss will continue until her retirement at the age of 67, that is, another, say 15 years. 7. I assess the claimant's entitlement to future loss of earnings as follows:
$3,116 net per week x 555.0 (Multiplier for 15 years): $1,729,380
total future net loss of earnings: **$**1,469,973
$1,469,973 future net loss of earnings x 14.63% (15 years) =
Total of economic losses and non-economic loss: $2,687,149
The claimant's economic loss is to be reduced by, and the insurer is to have credit for, the following payments:
(a) Personal Injury Commission Act 2020;
(b) Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021;
(c) the MAI Act;
(d) the MAC Act, and
(e) Motor Accidents Injuries Regulation 2017.
[1] Chang v McTye [2024] NSWDC 218.
[2] McTye v Ching Yu Chang by his tutor Leo Alexander Birch [2025] NSWCA 3.
[3] Claimant's documents at pages 243-258.
[5] Claimant's submissions in reply at pages 1-7.
[8] Insurer's documents at pages 94-102.
[9] Insurer's documents at page 98 at [32].
[11] Insurer's documents at pages 103-117.
[12] Axiak v Ingram [2012] NSWCA 311; 82 NSWLR 36 at [83]- [85].
[16] Insurer's documents at pages 94-102.
[17] Claimant's documents at pages 25-47.
[18] Claimant's documents at pages 25-26 at [5]-[12].
[19] Claimant's documents at page 27 at [27].
[20] Claimant's documents at page 28 at [48].
[21] Claimant's documents at page 29 at [56].
[22] Claimant's documents at page 30 at [66].
[23] Claimant's documents at page 31 at [70].
[24] Claimant's documents at page 31 at [71].
[25] Claimant's documents at pages 31-38 at [76]-[141].
[26] Claimant's documents at pages 39-40 at [156].
[27] Claimant's documents at page 41 at [171].
[28] Claimant's documents at page 46 at [247].
[29] Insurer's documents at pages 385-386.
[32] Insurer's documents at pages 386-387.
[33] Insurer's documents at pages 387-393.
[34] Insurer's documents at pages 393-394.
[38] Insurer's documents at pages 702-703.
[42] Insurer's documents at pages 694-695.
[48] Insurer's documents at pages 679-680.
[51] Insurer's documents at pages 685-690.
[54] Insurer's documents at pages 705-706.
[55] Insurer's documents at pages 708-709.
[57] Insurer's documents at pages 439-470.
[58] Insurer's documents at pages 471-483.
[59] Insurer's documents at pages 484-674.
[60] Insurer's documents at pages 575-576.
[63] Insurer's documents at pages 807-810.
[65] Insurer's documents at pages 825-827.
[67] Insurer's documents at pages 828-829.
[68] Insurer's documents at pages 811-814.
[72] Insurer's documents at pages 815-819.
[75] Insurer's documents at pages 820-824.
[76] Insurer's supplementary documents at pages 877-879.
[84] Insurer's documents at pages 52-53.
[85] Insurer's documents at pages 586-587.
[89] Insurer's documents at pages 53-54.
[92] Insurer's documents at pages 731-732.
[97] Insurer's documents at pages 710-711.
[101] Insurer's documents at pages 596-597.
[103] Insurer's documents at pages 57-58.
[104] Insurer's documents at page 597.
[106] Insurer's documents at pages 58-59.
[108] Insurer's documents at pages 59-60.
[113] Insurer's documents at page 599.
[114] Insurer's documents at page 600.
[115] Insurer's documents at page 874.
[117] Insurer's documents at page 875.
[118] Insurer's documents at page 876.
[121] Insurer's documents at pages 64-65
[122] Insurer's documents at pages 65.
[123] Insurer's documents at pages 748-749.
[126] Insurer's documents at page 728.
[127] Insurer's documents at page 736.
[128] Insurer's documents at page 726.
[129] Insurer's documents at page 733.
[132] Insurer's documents at pages 751-752.
[134] Insurer's documents at page 727.
[136] Insurer's documents at pages 74-75.
[137] Insurer's documents at page 735.
[139] Insurer's documents at page 745.
[142] Insurer's documents at pages 77-78.
[143] Insurer's documents at pages 78-79.
[147] Insurer's documents at pages 81-82.
[155] Insurer's documents at pages 87-88.
[157] Insurer's documents at pages 88-89.
[162] Insurer's documents at page 658.
[163] Insurer's documents at page 660.
[164] Insurer's documents at page 663.
[165] Insurer's documents at page 664.
[166] Insurer's documents at page 670.
[167] Insurer's documents at pages 118-134.
[168] Insurer's documents at page 127.
[169] Insurer's documents at page 129 at [2.2].
[170] Insurer's documents at pages 151-158.
[171] Insurer's documents at pages 165-189.
[172] Insurer's documents at pages 135-137.
[173] Claimant's documents at pages 48-55.
[174] Claimant's documents at pages 75-80.
[175] Claimant's documents at page 78.
[176] Claimant's documents at pages 56-74.
[177] Claimant's documents at page 62.
[178] Claimant's documents at page 63.
[179] Insurer's documents at pages 211-231.
[180] Insurer's documents at pages 230-231.
[181] Claimant's documents at pages 81-88.
[182] Claimant's documents at pages 89-126.
[183] Claimant's documents at pages 105-106 at [9].
[184] Claimant's documents at page 104 at [3].
[185] Claimant's documents at pages 104-105 at [6].
[186] Claimant's documents at page 105 at [8].
[187] Claimant's documents at pages 127-136.
[188] Claimant's documents at pages 137-140.
[189] Claimant's documents at page 139 at [1].
[190] Insurer's documents at pages 138-150.
[191] Insurer's documents at pages 159-164.
[192] Insurer's documents at pages 190-210.
[193] Claimant's documents at page 209 at [6.2].
[194] Insurer's documents at pages 3-4 at [31]-[44].
[195] Insurer's documents at pages 4-5 at [45]-[51].
[196] Insurer's documents at page 5 at {52]-[56].
[197] Insurer's documents at pages 5-6 at [57]-[70].
[198] Insurer's documents at pages 6-7 at [71]-73].
[199] Claimant's documents at pages 244-245 at [3]-[26].
[200] Claimant's submissions in reply at pages 2-4 at [13]-[21].
[201] Claimant's documents at pages 246-247 at [46]-[51]
[202] Claimant's documents at page 248 at [1]-[10].
[203] McTye v Ching Yu Chang by his Tutor Leo Alexander Birch [2025] NSWCA 3.
[204] Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5.
[205] Husher v Husher [1999] HCA 47.
[206] Penrith City Council v Parks [2004] NSWCA 201.
[207] Insurer's documents at page 7 at [75].
[208] Fifth edition, 2021 at [1.11.20].
[209] Watts v Rake [1960] HCA 58; (1960) 108 CLR 158.
[210] Purkiss v Crittenden [1965] HCA 34; (1965) 114 CLR 164.
[211] Wilson v Peisley (1975) 7 ALR 571.
[212] Malec v Hutton Pty Ltd [1989] HCA 30; (1990) 169 CLR 1.
[213] Claimant's documents at pages 256-257.
[214] Claimant's documents at pages 31-38.
[215] Claimant's documents at page 36 at [114].
[216] Claimant's documents at page 36 at [115].
[217] Claimant's documents at pages 28-30.
[218] Insurer's documents at pages 278-297.
[219] Claimant's documents at pages 141-242.
[220] Claimant's documents at page 158.
[221] Claimant's documents at pages 165-173.
[222] Insurer's documents at pages 232-249.
[223] Insurer's documents at pages 233-235.
[224] Insurer's documents at pages 238 and 239.
[225] Claimant's documents at pages 259-260.
[226] Insurer's documents at pages 12-13.
BRY
Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2025] NSWPIC 231
(1975) 7 ALR 571
(1990) 169 CLR 1
(1960) 108 CLR 158
(1965) 114 CLR 164