Brown v Insurance Australia Group Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance Ltd - [2020] NSWSC 1597 - NSWSC 2020 case summary — Zoe

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Brown v Insurance Australia Group Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance Ltd

[2020] NSWSC 1597

Supreme Court of NSW|2020-11-11|Before: Adamson J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2020-11-11

Before

Adamson J

Catchwords

[2018] NSWCA 22 Bradley v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2015] NSWSC 950 Frost v Kourouche (2014) 86 NSWLR 214
[2010] NSWCA 253 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
[1986] HCA 40 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
[1996] HCA 6 Motor Accidents Authority of New South Wales v Mills (2010) 78 NSWLR 125

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[2018] NSWCA 22 Bradley v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2015] NSWSC 950 Frost v Kourouche (2014) 86 NSWLR 214[2010] NSWCA 253 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24[1986] HCA 40 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259[1996] HCA 6 Motor Accidents Authority of New South Wales v Mills (2010) 78 NSWLR 125[2010] NSWCA 82 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous AffairsEx parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1

Judgment (24 paragraphs)

[1]

idelines (11 July 2008), cll 9.10, 9.12 11.1, 11.15, 16.21 State Insurance Regulatory Authority, Motor Accident Permanent Impairment Guidelines (1 June 2018), cll 1.5, 1.17, 1.21, 1.24, 1.40, 1.50 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Christie Brown (Plaintiff) Insurance Australia Group Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance Ltd (First Defendant) State Insurance Regulatory Authority (Second Defendant) The Motor Accidents Medical Assessment Service Review Panel constituted under s 63 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), as appointed by SIRA (Assessor Ian Cameron, Assessor Robin Fitzsimons, Assessor Geoffrey Stubbs) (Third Defendant) Representation: Counsel: C Hart (Plaintiff) J Gumbert / M J Jones (First Defendant) Submitting appearances (Second and Third Defendants)

[4]

The Act

Section 44 of the Act relevantly provides: "44 Medical Guidelines of Authority (1) The Authority may issue guidelines (Motor Accidents Medical Guidelines) with respect to the following: … (c) the assessment of the degree of permanent impairment of an injured person as a result of an injury caused by a motor accident, (d) the procedures for the referral of disputes for assessment or review of assessments, and the procedure for assessment and review of assessments, under Part 3.4. …"
Part 3.4 of the Act provides for medical assessments. The term "medical assessment matters" is defined by s 57 as being any of the matters referred to in s 58. Of present relevance, s 58(1) provides in part: "58 Application (1) This Part applies to a disagreement between a claimant and an insurer about any of the following matters (referred to in this Part as "medical assessment matters"): … (d) whether the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident is greater than 10%."
Section 61, which provides for medical assessments, requires a medical assessor or panel to give a certificate as to the matters referred for assessment and the reasons, which is to be conclusive.
Section 63, which provides for review of medical assessments, relevantly provides: "63 Review of medical assessment by review panel (1) A party to a medical dispute may apply to the proper officer of the Authority to refer a medical assessment under this Part by a single medical assessor to a review panel of medical assessors for review. (2) An application for the referral of a medical assessment to a review panel may only be made on the grounds that the assessment was incorrect in a material respect. … (3) The proper officer of the Authority is to arrange for any such application to be referred to a panel of at least 3 medical assessors, but only if the proper officer is satisfied that there is reasonable cause to suspect that the medical assessment was incorrect in a material respect having regard to the particulars set out in the application. (3A) The review of a medical assessment is not limited to a review only of that aspect of the assessment that is alleged to be incorrect and is to be by way of a new assessment of all the matters with which the medical assessment is concerned. (4) The review panel may confirm the certificate of assessment of the single medical assessor, or revoke that certificate and issue a new certificate as to the matters concerned. … (6) Section 61 applies to any new certificate or new combined certificate issued under this section. …"
Section 65(1) provides: "65 Authority monitoring and oversight (1) Medical assessments under this Part are subject to relevant provisions of Motor Accidents Medical Guidelines relating to the procedures for the referral of disputes for assessment or review of assessments and the procedure for assessment."
Section 65(2) provides that SIRA may arrange for the provision of training and information to medical assessors to promote accurate and consistent medical assessments under this Part (Part 3.4).
Section 81 imposes a duty on an insurer to inform the claimant in writing as expeditiously as possible whether it admits or denies liability for the claim.
Section 131 provides that no damages may be awarded for non-economic loss unless the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident is greater than 10%.
Section 133 relevantly provides: "133 Method of assessing degree of impairment (1) The assessment of the degree of permanent impairment of an injured person as a result of the injury caused by a motor accident is to be expressed as a percentage in accordance with this Part. (2) The assessment of the degree of permanent impairment is to be made in accordance with: (a) Motor Accidents Medical Guidelines issued for that purpose…. …"

[6]

The PI Guidelines

Clause 1.5 of the PI Guidelines provides: "An assessment of the degree of permanent impairment is a medical assessment matter under Section 58 (1)(d) of the Act. The assessment must determine the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident. A determination as to whether the injured person's impairment is related to the accident in question is therefore implied in all such assessments. Medical assessors must be aware of the relevant provisions of the AMA4 Guides, as well as the common law principles that would be applied by a court (or claims assessor) in considering such issues."
Clause 1.17 of the PI Guidelines relevantly provides: "The medical assessor must evaluate the available evidence and be satisfied that any impairment: 1.17.1 is an impairment arising from an injury caused by the accident… …"
Clause 1.21 of the PI Guidelines provides: "The evaluation [of permanent impairment] should only consider the impairment as it is at the time of the assessment."
Clause 1.24 of the PI Guidelines provides: "A condition may present that is not covered in these Guidelines or the AMA4 Guides. If objective clinical findings of such a condition are present, indicating the presence of an impairment, then assessment by analogy to a similar condition is appropriate. The medical assessor must include the rationale for the methodology chosen in the impairment evaluation report."
Clause 1.40, entitled "Consistency", provides: "Tests of consistency, such as using a goniometer to measure range of motion, are good but imperfect indicators of the injured person's efforts. The medical assessor must use the entire gamut of clinical skill and judgement in assessing whether or not the results of measurements or tests are plausible and relate to the impairment being evaluated. If, in spite of an observation or test result, the medical evidence appears not to verify that an impairment of a certain magnitude exists, the medical assessor should modify the impairment estimate accordingly, describe the modification and outline the reasons in the impairment evaluation report."
Clause 1.50, which appears under the heading "Assessment of the upper extremity", provides: "Although range of motion appears to be a suitable method for evaluating impairment, it can be subject to variation because of pain during motion at different times of examination and/or a possible lack of cooperation by the person being assessed. Range of motion is assessed as follows: 1.50.1 A goniometer should be used where clinically indicated. 1.50.2 Passive range of motion may form part of the clinical examination to ascertain clinical status of the joint, but impairment should only be calculated using active range of motion measurements. 1.50.3 If the medical assessor is not satisfied that the results of a measurement are reliable, active range of motion should be measured with at least three consistent repetitions. 1.50.4 If there is inconsistency in range of motion, then it should not be used as a valid parameter of impairment evaluation. Refer to clause 1.40 of these Guidelines. 1.50.5 If range of motion measurements at examination cannot be used as a valid parameter of impairment evaluation, the medical assessor should then use discretion in considering what weight to give other available evidence to determine if an impairment is present."

[8]

Other material

Mr Hart placed significant reliance in support of grounds 5 and 6 on the Motor Accidents Authority Medical Assessment Service Review Panel Practice Note 3/2005 which was issued by the Motor Accidents Authority in 2005 and last updated on 1 October 2008 (the Practice Note). The cover page of the Practice Note said: "This Practice Note is provided to Review Panellists in accordance with section 65(2) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 'to promote accurate and consistent [reviews of] medical assessments.'"
Mr Hart particularly relied on clause 8 of the Practice Note which said: "8. Procedural fairness check: Before coming to a final decision on the issues before them, the Review Panel should consider whether the parties have had opportunity to address the issues that are being decided. The Review Panel should adjourn and invite submissions from the parties if: a. the Review Panel is inclined to revoke a certificate issued by the previous medical Assessor when that certificate and/or that aspect of the assessment was not disputed in the review application or reply, or b. the Review Panel is inclined to find that a conclusion of the original medical Assessor is incorrect, when that aspect of the assessment was not disputed in the review application or reply, or c. the Review Panel is of the view that the party that may be disadvantaged by their decision has not addressed a critical issue In such cases the Review Panel should generally: a) formulate a letter to the parties explaining the aspect/s of the assessment that are under consideration b) where applicable, indicate the preliminary views of the Panel on that issue c) seek submissions on the specified issue/s from the parties, to be provided within a specified time frame which will be no less than 10 working days, and d) make arrangements for the time and date on which the Review Panel will reconvene to consider the submissions. The Secretary of the Review Panel will: e) forward the letter to both parties, and f) forward copies of any submissions received to the other party and to all Review Panel members."

[14]

Procedural matters

In an email sent on 15 November 2019, SIRA informed the parties that the Proper Officer had considered the application for review and was satisfied that there was reasonable cause to suspect that the assessment was incorrect in a material particular. On this basis it was referred to the Review Panel, which was constituted by Drs Fitzsimons, Cameron and Stubbs, each of whom was an assessor. The email included the following: "Referral to a Review Panel The Review Panel will conduct a new assessment of all the matters with which the medical assessment is concerned. The Panel will confirm or revoke the certificate issued by the Assessor whose assessment is under review. … Initial teleconference of the Review Panel An initial teleconference has been scheduled for 5.00PM on 26 November 2019. At this teleconference the Panel may: • reach a decision • decide that an examination of the claimant is required in order to make a decision • decide that additional information is required in order to make a decision and/or • decide that a further conference of the Panel is required in order to make a decision. … If either party objects to the Review Panel being conducted without an examination of the claimant please advise immediately in writing, providing reasons why it is believed an examination of the Claimant is required. If no objections are received by the initial conference date, the Panel will assume that there is no objection to the review being conducted on the documentary material provided. If an examination is required, the Review Panel may determine that only part of the Panel will conduct the examination. If either party objects, please advise in writing within 14 days of the date of this letter, providing reasons. If no objection is received from either party by the initial teleconference date, it will be assumed that the parties consent to only part of the Panel conducting the examination. …"
By email from SIRA sent on 27 November 2019, the parties were informed that an examination of the claimant was required and that it would be conducted by two out of three of the assessors on 25 February 2020.

[15]

Examination of the claimant on 25 February 2020

According to its reasons, the Panel formed the preliminary view, on the basis of the written material and prior to the examination, that causation had not been established for the right shoulder injury. Two of the assessors, Drs Fitzsimons and Cameron, conducted an examination of the claimant.
In the course of the examination, the claimant gave a history which was referred to in the reasons as follows: "[The claimant] said that the right shoulder pain was present from the time of the accident and she mentioned it to the hospital and the general practitioner. It worsened over time. It was not established why the documentation with reference to the right shoulder was not included in the hospital records."
According to the reasons, the assessors made the following findings on examination with respect to the claimant's right shoulder: "At the right shoulder anterior and posterior tenderness was reported. There was no visible muscle wasting around either shoulder. At the shoulders there was variable movement. That was more apparent at the right shoulder and Ms Brown said that she had pain from that shoulder and this caused variable limitation of movement. At the right shoulder the maximum observed movements were flexion 135 degrees, extension 40 degrees, abduction 105 degrees, adduction 30 degrees, external rotation 80 degrees and internal rotation 40 degrees. At the left shoulder the maximum observed movements were flexion 170 degrees, extension 50 degrees, abduction 175 degrees, adduction 50 degrees, external rotation 90 degrees and internal rotation 80 degrees. No neurological abnormalities were present in the upper extremities. There were no sensory or motor abnormalities in radicular distribution, and deep tendon reflexes were symmetrical. Circumferences of the upper extremities were above elbow 30cm on the right and 29cm on the left and below elbow 23.5cm on the right and 21.5cm on the left."
Mr Hart, who appeared for the claimant, tendered a statutory declaration made by the claimant on 23 June 2020 in which she described what had occurred in the course of the examination as follows: "5. The female Assessor carried out measurements on my right shoulder. She did this twice, once at the beginning and once again closer to the end of the appointment. The Assessor used a device that looked like a moveable protractor on the two occasions she measured the range of motion of my right shoulder. 6. The second measurement of my right shoulder movements was carried out about 20 minutes before the assessment was completed. After that assessment the female Assessor asked me words to the effect: 'Was the varying degree of movement of your shoulder due to pain?' I said: 'Yes, it is sore after being asked to perform the multiple different movements the first time'. I recall the female Assessor said to the male Assessor: 'Did you see that?' 7. The movement in my right shoulder was limited during the second physical assessment due to pain and fatigue of the activities performed by me prior to that measurement."
Ms Gumbert, who appeared with Mr Jones for the insurer, objected to the statutory declaration on the grounds of relevance. The relevance of the statutory declaration and therefore its admissibility will be addressed below.

[16]

The decision of the Review Panel

In its reasons the Review Panel confirmed that it had received and considered all the material which was before Dr Harrington, his certificate, the application for review and attached documents, the reply and attached documents and the determination by the Proper Officer. The Review Panel described the dispute identified by the parties as "assessment of the right shoulder impairment".
The Review Panel's reasons for its assessment of WPI for the right shoulder were as follows: "The Panel proceeded to discuss the issues at a further teleconference. After review of all materials, and the re-assessment of Ms Brown, the Panel concluded that there were injuries sustained to the cervical spine and right shoulder. The Panel accepted Ms Brown's statements that there had been symptoms from the right shoulder soon after the subject motor vehicle crash. She seemed a straightforward witness, and there was no general evidence of dissembling. The documentation shows symptoms from the cervical spine. The Panel interpreted Ms Brown's explanation as indicating injuries to both the cervical spine and the right shoulder. … Right shoulder - soft tissue injury Due to pain, movements of this shoulder were inconsistent. In this regard the Motor Accident Permanent Impairment Guidelines, section 1.40, page 12 are noted: 'Tests of consistency, such as using a goniometer to measure range of motion, are good but imperfect indicators of claimants' efforts. The Assessor must utilise the entire gamut of clinical skill and judgment in assessing whether or not the results of measurements or tests are plausible and relate to the impairment being evaluated. If, in spite of an observation or test result, the medical evidence appears not to verify that an impairment of a certain magnitude exists, the Assessor should modify the impairment estimate accordingly, describing the modification and outline the reasons in the impairment evaluation report'. It is, in the judgment of the Panel, not appropriate to rely on the measured range of motion in this case. The clinical information does not show that there are major significant pathological changes present in this shoulder. Therefore the assessment of permanent impairment is made by analogy and it is determined that the impairment would be equivalent to mild crepitation ((Section 6.24, page 96 of the Motor Accidents Permanent Impairment Guidelines) and see Table 19 page 59 AMA4 Guides) at the acromioclavicular joints (see Table 18, page 58 AMA4 Guides) and therefore would be 10% of 25% UEI, which rounds to 3% UEI and converts to 2% WPI. There is no other available method of analogy applicable in this situation."

[18]

Grounds 1, 3 and 4: alleged non-compliance with the Guidelines

In substance, grounds 1, 3 and 4 allege that the Review Panel was in error in that it failed to conduct the review in accordance with the Guidelines. Mr Hart contended that the Review Panel was obliged by cl 1.50 of the PI Guidelines to measure a claimant's active range of motion with at least three consistent repetitions. He relied on the claimant's statutory declaration in support of the submission that the Review Panel had only measured her active range of motion twice. He argued that as the Review Panel had not conducted three measurements, it had failed to comply with the PI Guidelines and that its assessment was erroneous at law and ought be set aside. Mr Hart also relied on the circumstances that the doctors whose reports had been forwarded to Dr Harrington and the Review Panel had used the range of motion method to assess permanent impairment and that Dr Harrington had also used that method.
The number of times which the Review Panel measured the claimant's active range of motion of her right arm is not evident from its reasons. However, the Review Panel was not obliged to use the range of motion method for evaluating any permanent impairment to the claimant's right shoulder. Indeed, cl 1.50.4 provides that if there is inconsistency in range of motion, the range of motion method ought not be used as a valid parameter to evaluate impairment. In the present case, the Review Panel, having conducted some testing of the claimant's range of motion, decided that it was not an appropriate method for evaluating permanent impairment because of the inconsistency in her presentation: cf. Wellman v CIC Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1353 at [63]-[74] (Harrison AsJ), where the range of motion method was used. It is apparent from the reasons, that the Review Panel accepted that the inconsistency was the result of pain. Accordingly, the Panel's rejection of that method as inappropriate did not imply any criticism of the claimant. It was pre-eminently a matter for the Review Panel to decide on the appropriate method for assessing permanent impairment. Having found inconsistency in range of motion due to pain, the Panel was prohibited by cl 1.50.4 from using it to assess permanent impairment.
The determination of inconsistency, too, was a matter for the Review Panel. Clause 1.40 of the PI Guidelines required the Panel to "use the entire gamut of clinical skill and judgment" to assess whether the results of measurements or tests are "plausible". The Review Panel can be taken to have applied cl 1.40, having extracted it in its reasons.
The word "plausible" has several related meanings. It is often used as a synonym for "credible" because it has the connotation of believability. However, the context in which the word is used in cl 1.40 of the PI Guidelines is sufficient to indicate that the determination of the plausibility of the measurements is not to be measured by the credibility of the claimant. Thus Mr Hart's submission that there was any illogicality in the Review Panel believing the claimant and finding inconsistency in the range of motion must be rejected. It was open to the Review Panel to find both that the claimant was a reliable historian and that the range of motion of her right shoulder was variable due to pain, as she herself reported to the two assessors who conducted the examination on behalf of the Review Panel.
In cl 1.40 "plausibility" is used as a synonym for consistency, apparent reasonableness, scientific explicability or replicability. Once the Review Panel appreciated that there was an inconsistency in the range of motion of the claimant's right upper limb, it was entitled to reject the range of motion method as appropriate for determining the claimant's permanent impairment. This was so irrespective of whether the inconsistency became evident to the Review Panel from the material provided to it which recorded various measurements of range of movement made by clinicians; from the claimant's history that pain "caused variable limitation of movement"; or emerged for the first time on examination. No error has been shown in the Review Panel's rejection of the range of motion method.
When cl 1.50 is read as a whole, it becomes apparent that cl 1.50.3 is intended to ensure that an accurate range of motion is used if and only if range of motion is to be the method used for assessment of permanent impairment. I reject Mr Hart's submission that what is required for consistency is the method, not the result. This construction would be at odds with the purpose of the provision. It would also be inconsistent with cl 1.50.4 which makes it clear that the range of motion method is inapposite where there is inconsistency in range of motion. Clause 1.40 is also an important indicator of the meaning of cl 1.50 since it makes it clear that there are difficulties in testing consistency and clinical judgment is required in such an assessment.
The wording of cl 1.50 does not support the interpretation for which Mr Hart contended. The PI Guidelines do not give primacy to the range of motion method. Nor did cl 1.50 require the Review Panel to test the claimant's range of motion three times before deciding that the ranges exhibited were inconsistent.
Accordingly, none of grounds 1, 3 and 4 has been made out.
The Review Panel accepted that the variability of movements in the claimant's right shoulder was due to pain and, on this basis, decided not to use the range of movement method to assess WPI of the claimant's right shoulder. On this basis, the claimant's statutory declaration to the effect that her range of motion was measured only twice is irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible on an application for judicial review: s 55 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). It is not necessary to address the limited circumstances in which evidence of what occurred in an examination would be admissible in an application for judicial review. It is sufficient to observe that such a statutory declaration does not form part of the record within the meaning of s 69 of the Supreme Court Act. Although it is possible that what has occurred in an examination could constitute jurisdictional error, this is not such a case.

[20]

Grounds 5, 6 and 7: alleged denial of procedural fairness

Mr Hart submitted that the Review Panel should not have re-examined the plaintiff and that, by re-examining the plaintiff, the Review Panel had denied her procedural fairness. He contended that as the issue for determination was confined to causation, no examination could have rationally assisted the Review Panel to resolve it. He relied on Siddik v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 116 (Siddik) in which the Court of Appeal (McColl JA, Mason P agreeing) held at [101] that prima facie, an Appeal Panel under s 328 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) was confined to the grounds of appeal the Registrar permitted to proceed, although it could consider other grounds which fall within one of the s 327(3) grounds of appeal if it complied with the requirements of procedural fairness.
He also contended that it was a denial of procedural fairness for two members of the Review Panel to examine the claimant without the third being present. Mr Hart argued that it would be unreasonable to expect the claimant to make submissions on why an examination would not be appropriate and why all three members of the Review Panel should be present at any such examination before the claimant was even aware that the Review Panel was considering such an examination. I understand him to rely on the part of the Review Panel's reasons where they said, in the context of the examination of the claimant: "An explanation of the reason for the review was provided. It was noted that there was a delay in recording of the symptoms related to the right shoulder."
Further, he submitted that no warning had been given by the Review Panel of what it proposed to do (conduct a re-examination of the claimant with only two out of the three assessors present) in sufficient time to allow for a response from the claimant's solicitors. Mr Hart also relied on cl 8 of the Practice Note which he contended was "mandatory".
The status of the Practice Note, and whether it is still current, was not established. However, on the assumption that it is still current, it has no legal effect since it was made pursuant to s 65(2) and does not constitute a Guideline. As Basten JA said in Boyce v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (2018) 96 NSWLR 356; [2018] NSWCA 22 at [26], "such documents are not likely to give rise to controls which are legally enforceable by way of judicial review". His Honour however accepted that "such provisions may provide a basis for demonstrating unfairness resulting from breach of a procedural requirement": [26]. Accordingly, it is necessary to address what procedural fairness requires, as a matter of "practical justice" in the context of the statutory regime: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; [2003] HCA 6 at [37] (Gleeson CJ), which was cited in an analogous context to the present in Frost v Kourouche (2014) 86 NSWLR 214; [2014] NSWCA 39 at [41] (Leeming JA, Beazley P and Basten JA agreeing).
The wording of s 63(3A) provides the starting point for an assessment by a Review Panel. First, it expressly provides that the review is not limited to a review of that aspect of the assessment that is alleged to be incorrect. Secondly, it also provides that the assessment is to be by way of a new assessment of all of the matters with which the medical assessment is concerned. Thus the applicable statutory regime is to be distinguished from that which applied in Siddik, where the Appeal Panel was limited to the grounds on the basis of which the matter was referred to it. Accordingly, Siddik is of no assistance in the present case, except by way of contrast. If Siddik were relevant, it would be necessary to consider whether it remains good law in light of Wingfoot which was decided subsequently.
Section 65(1) provides that medical assessments are to be conducted in accordance with the Medical Guidelines. The Medical Guidelines include Chapter 16, which makes provision for assessments by a Review Panel.
It follows from the statutory regime, which includes the Guidelines, that once the Proper Officer referred the matter to the Review Panel for review of an assessment, the parties (the claimant and the insurer) can be taken to have been on notice that: 1. the assessment was not limited to material error relied on by the insurer in its application for review; 2. the Review Panel would conduct its own assessment as a new assessment, which might include a re-examination of the claimant; and 3. the Review Panel was obliged to assess permanent impairment as at the date of its assessment (cl 1.21 of the PI Guidelines).
The matter to be assessed by the Review Panel was, as it correctly stated, the matter referred to in s 58(1)(d) of the Act: namely, whether the degree of permanent impairment of the claimant as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident is greater than 10%. It follows from the statutory regime outlined above that it was not open to the Review Panel to quarantine a particular issue, such as causation, and decide that issue without complying with its mandate of determining whether the degree of permanent impairment as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident was greater than 10%: Motor Accidents Authority of New South Wales v Mills (2010) 78 NSWLR 125; [2010] NSWCA 82 at [72] (Giles JA, Tobias JA and Handley AJA agreeing); Meeuwissen v Boden (2010) 78 NSWLR 143; [2010] NSWCA 253 at [24] (Basten JA, Beazley JA and Sackville AJA agreeing); Boyce v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (2018) 96 NSWLR 356; [2018] NSWCA 22, at [57] (Basten JA, Macfarlan JA agreeing) and Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Rutland [2015] NSWCA 328 at [30], [31] and [33] (McColl and Meagher JJA; Macfarlan JA agreeing).
This conclusion is consistent with what the High Court said in Wingfoot at [47] about the nature of the function of a panel such as the Review Panel: "… The function of the [Review Panel] is neither arbitral nor adjudicative: it is neither to choose between competing arguments, nor to opine on the correctness of other opinions on that medical question. The function is in every case to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred to it by applying its own medical experience and its own medical expertise."
The parties were informed by the email sent by SIRA on 15 November 2019 that the Review Panel would have a teleconference on 26 November 2019 at which time it might reach a decision on the assessment of WPI or it might decide to examine the claimant, to obtain further information or to meet again to make a decision. The parties were told that if they objected to the Review Panel's assessment being conducted without an examination they should inform SIRA immediately and that if no objection was made by 26 November 2019, the Review Panel would assume that there was no objection to the assessment being conducted on the papers. The parties were also expressly informed that, if there was to be another examination, the Panel might decide that only part of the Panel would conduct it. They were given an opportunity to object within 14 days (that is, by 29 November), although, somewhat inconsistently, they were told that if they had not told SIRA by 26 November 2019, it would be assumed that the parties consent to only part of the Review Panel conducting the re-examination.
Further, the claimant was advised by email sent on 27 November 2019 that she would be examined by two out of three of the assessors on 25 February 2020. The claimant took no objection whatsoever to this course in the intervening three months. It would have been open to the claimant to refuse to attend the assessment and have the review determined on the papers: cll 9.10.2, 9.12 and 11.15 of the Medical Guidelines.
In the face of these invitations, the claimant did nothing to object to anything proposed by SIRA. The Review Panel was entitled to conduct an examination of her with two out of its three members. I am not persuaded that the Review Panel, in referring to the reason for the review and the delay in recording of symptoms related to the right shoulder, ought be taken to have misled the claimant into thinking that causation was the only issue which they were addressing. The reasons of the Review Panel are entitled to be given a fair and beneficial reading: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); [1996] HCA 6.
I am not persuaded that there was any denial of procedural fairness.
Further, the claimant has failed to identify anything she could have said which would have made a difference to the Review Panel's deliberations. The Review Panel accepted the claimant as a reliable historian. It also accepted the history she gave that her range of movement was variable because of pain. This accorded with the Review Panel's own findings. Mr Hart submitted that, had the claimant been aware that the Review Panel was going to go beyond the issue of causation, her solicitors could have put to the Review Panel that that was the only issue between the parties. However, in light of the authorities referred to above, the Review Panel would have been led into error had it been influenced by such a submission since it was not entitled to carve up the medical assessment matter which had been referred to it. Therefore the allegation of denial of procedural fairness has not been made out: see, for a similar case, Frost v Kourouche at [41]-[43].
It is also of significance that it was plainly to the claimant's benefit that she was re-examined. As the Review Panel's reasons indicate, it was of the preliminary view, before examining the claimant, that causation had not been established for the right shoulder injury. The Review Panel appears to have been influenced in coming to its preliminary view by the absence of reference to complaints of right shoulder pain in the contemporaneous clinical records following the accident. However, when the two assessors took a history from the claimant, they were plainly impressed by her demeanour and accepted her version, which established causation, notwithstanding the absence of any reference in the contemporaneous documents. The claimant not only acquiesced in the examination taking place (by failing to object or put forward any submissions as to why she ought not be re-examined) but she benefited from it by being accorded a further opportunity to establish causation by giving an apparently reliable history. Thus, even had the grounds been made out, the relief ought to have been refused on discretionary grounds: see, in a similar context, AAI Ltd trading as GIO v Cooley [2016] NSWSC 434 at [85] (Fullerton J).
Further, I reject the submission that there was a denial of procedural fairness in having two out of three members of the Review Panel conduct the examination. Several decisions of this Court establish that it is not legally erroneous for fewer than all assessors who together constitute a Review Panel to examine the claimant: Bradley v Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance [2015] NSWSC 950; Mackenzie v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (No. 2) [2015] NSWSC 1320; Gwyther v Insurance Australia t/as NRMA Insurance & Ors [2018] NSWSC 1441; IAG Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance v Tarabay [2018] NSWSC 1836; Lu v AAI Ltd t/as AAMI [2019] NSWSC 368 at [59]-[89], [84]-[89].
For these reasons, neither ground 5 nor ground 6 has been made out.

Brown v Insurance Australia Group Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance Ltd

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Judgment (24 paragraphs)

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