Fair Work Commission|2025-08-18

Brooke Ploughman v The Trustee For VHSWQ Unit Trust [2025] FWC 2423 (18 August 2025)

s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal - jurisdictional objection - whether Applicant was dismissed within the meaning of section 386(1) of the Fair Work Act - no dismissal - jurisdictional objection upheld - application dismissed.

[1] Ms Brooke Ploughman (the Applicant) was engaged by the Trustee for VHSWQ Unit Trust trading as Vital Health Qld (the Respondent) from 13 January 2025 until she resigned from employment, effective of 18 April 2025. Ms Ploughman was engaged as a speech therapist to deliver services to remote communities in and around Roma, located approximately six hours drive inland from Brisbane.

[2] Ms Ploughman argues that her resignation was either at the initiative of the Respondent or was forced, as a result of the Respondent's failure to address a number of issues related to her employment, including safety concerns. Ms Ploughman argues that the failures of the Respondent left her "with no practical or reasonable option to continue in employment."[1] She commenced a period of sick leave for work-related stress on 27 March 2025, and did not return to work, providing a written resignation by email on 11 April 2025 and taking a further period of sick leave until her resignation took effect on 18 April 2025. The Applicant filed her application on 24 April 2025, alleging that she had been dismissed from employment and that the dismissal was motivated by her mental disability and temporary absence because of illness and injury.[2]

[3] The Respondent submits that they "had no intention of ceasing [the] employment" of the Applicant and that their intention was to "work to achieve an agreement and a workable situation that enabled us to meet [Ms Ploughman's] expectations that she had quite clearly stated."[3] The Respondent denies it left Ms Ploughman with no option to resign, but rather that management had engaged with and responded to the complaints raised by Ms Ploughman with the intention of addressing her concerns.

[4] The Respondent argues that this matter is not within the jurisdiction of the Commission because Ms Ploughman was not dismissed but rather resigned, in circumstances where "[t]here was no internal [m]anagement process or instruction to finish work or any expectation to resign."[4]

[5] The matter proceeded to hearing on 22 July 2025. Ms Ploughman represented herself and gave evidence on her own behalf. Ms Jean Benham, Director and Clinical Manager of the Respondent, represented the Respondent and gave evidence in the proceeding.

[6] For the reasons set out in this decision, I find that Ms Ploughman was not dismissed. Ms Ploughman resigned from her employment. The termination of Ms Ploughman's employment was not at the initiative of the Respondent nor was she forced to resign by the conduct of the Respondent.

[7] Ms Ploughman relocated to Roma in regional Queensland to take up her role as a Speech Pathologist with the Respondent, commencing work on 13 January 2025. She was engaged on an ongoing basis, for 76 hours per fortnight, subject to a three-month probationary period that concluded on 13 April 2025.

[8] The Respondent undertakes allied health work with communities in remote areas of Western Queensland. The Respondent says, and I accept, that there are significant difficulties in performing the work in these areas that include distance, isolation and limited resourcing for the work performed.

[9] Ms Ploughman expressed concerns to her employer during her employment about the safety of travelling in adverse weather conditions to undertake outreach work, the calculation of her leave entitlements, a perceived lack of policies, procedures and risk assessments for the work required, the conduct of Ms Benham as the Director towards her, the Respondent contacting her when she was on sick leave and the extension of her probationary period, including the manner in which she was informed of the extension.

[10] It appeared on the evidence before me that the Respondent listened and made some response to Ms Ploughman's complaints. However, it was also evident that the Respondent was concerned that Ms Ploughman may have had expectations about the structures, policies and procedures required to perform her role that were unrealistic or misguided considering the challenges of working in rural and remote areas. Further, the Respondent appeared to harbour concerns that Ms Ploughman's expectations were beyond what the organisation could deliver given the nature and location of the work and the resourcing available to it.

[11] Part of the Applicant's role was to provide outreach services to Cunnamulla, a regional area a further five hours inland from Roma. Ms Ploughman's contract provided flexi-time hours for travelling to Cunnamulla in order to provide the outreach services and made clear that her "role will include monthly outreach is an (sic) In-Community service to Cunnamulla and has telehealth ... as an expected part of the total outreach delivery."[5]

[12] Ms Benham gave evidence that she attended the first two outreach visits to Cunnamulla with Ms Ploughman, to assist with her induction into the role and to introduce her to the outreach work.

[13] On 26 March 2025, Ms Ploughman was scheduled to travel to Cunnamulla on her own for the first time. Ms Ploughman raised safety concerns about undertaking the trip on the morning she was scheduled to travel to Cunnamulla. She had already travelled to Charleville, a regional town on the way to Cunnamulla. Ms Ploughman was concerned about wet weather alerts and road conditions for the region in which she was to travel. Ms Ploughman was primarily concerned about flooding in the area and raised these concerns with Ms King, the Respondent's Logistics Manager and the Centre Co-ordinator in Charleville, on the morning she was scheduled to undertake the outreach visit.

[14] Ms Ploughman particularised her concerns in an email the following day, 27 March 2025, to Ms Lindholm, the Respondent's People and Innovation Manager as:

the lack of an accessible wet weather policy or disaster management protocol;
not having a satellite phone or emergency equipment in the vehicle;
not having a clear plan for travel from St George to Roma, a town approximately 2 hours from Roma that Ms Ploughman said was not included in the original plan for the trip but added later; and
a risk assessment for the trip not having been undertaken.

[15] In response to the concerns raised by Ms Ploughman on the morning of 26 March 2025, Ms Benham, in conjunction with Ms King, made a decision to cancel the trip on account of Ms Ploughman's concerns. Ms Ploughman made clear that despite her concerns she was willing to go on the outreach visit and it was not her decision to cancel the trip.

[16] Ms Benham's evidence was that the organisation, in particular Ms King in her role as Logistics Manager, takes an active role in monitoring the conditions of roads and weather events in an effort to deliver services wherever possible and ensure the safety of their employees. The Respondent is informed about road closures and other risks through regular contact with the Charleville based team that draws on information from Government Departments including Health, Transport and Police and contact with Local Government Agencies who are "responsible in Queensland for local disaster response and up to date information."[6] Ms King had been briefed the evening prior to the scheduled outreach visit and been advised that the roads were safe and open.[7]

[17] Ms Ploughman understood from a telephone conversation with Ms Benham on 26 March 2025 that after the trip was cancelled that she had been directed to take unpaid leave. Ms Ploughman said this made her feel as if she was being "penalised for raising reasonable safety concerns, which I had hoped would be supported by our workplace systems."[8] She said that she was "not offered alternative duties or clarity around next steps - only that I would not be working the rest of the day."[9]

[18] Ms Benham's view was that it was a practical necessity for Ms Ploughman to have the afternoon off as she would have no work to do with the trip cancelled. However, in her evidence, Ms Benham acknowledged that the Applicant did work on the day of the cancelled trip and in fact "worked very hard that day and got quite a few clients moved across to telehealth and did some other work."[10]

[19] In the email of 27 March 2025, setting out her concerns about the Cunnamulla visit, Ms Ploughman asked the Respondent for:

"Confirmation that raising safety concerns will not lead to punitive action, including unpaid time off.
Clarity around how travel decisions are to be made and communicated during wet weather or other adverse conditions.
A copy of, or access to, any existing WHS protocols or risk management plans relevant to outreach travel.
Assurance that future feedback or concerns will be addressed with procedural fairness and psychological safety in mind."

[20] In her evidence, Ms Ploughman said that in resigning from her employment "the main issue was in regards to the safety concerns and the reactions that occurred following that safety concern and that trip."[11] It was this significant event that led Ms Ploughman to form a view that the Respondent could not ensure her safety, and that this was a significant factor, but not the only factor, in her decision to resign.

[21] Ms Ploughman commenced sick leave, on account of what she says was work-related stress, the day after the trip to Cunnamulla was cancelled.

[22] Ms Lindholm, on behalf of the Respondent, responded to Ms Ploughman's complaint of 27 March 2025 by email on 4 April 2025. The email set out that the Respondent had formed a view that "[t]here was no perceived or measured risk by Vital Health for road travel to Cunnamulla" on 26 March 2025. "Official information to enable monitoring within Vital Health, of roads from Charleville to Cunnamulla did not indicate closure or risk. We met our policies, contractual and registration requirements for service delivery, and importantly also met our responsibility to be a safe workplace."

[23] The Respondent's submission is that, despite not sharing Ms Ploughman's concerns, it still cancelled the trip in response to the complaints raised by her.

[24] Ms Benham said in her evidence that the Respondent intended to work with Ms Ploughman to address the matters she raised about safety on outreach visits, but Ms Ploughman commenced sick leave and ultimately, never returned to work after 27 March 2025. In fact, the email of the Respondent to the Applicant of 4 April 2025 said: "We would like to work together to review our Risk Management Procedure, with context of your experience, and make suggestions for improvement to better support our staff in these extraordinary events."

[25] Ms Ploughman also said that she raised a complaint with Ms Lindholm on 5 March 2025 about conduct of Ms Benham that had made her feel uncomfortable, including what the Applicant viewed as inappropriate comments made about other staff members in January and February 2025. Ms Ploughman had a further concern that her complaint was made with a promise of confidentiality for all but one other senior leader and that the complaint was ultimately shared amongst the leadership team and with Ms Benham.[12]

[26] The Respondent made a decision to extend the Applicant's probationary period and advised her of the extension on 11 April 2025. Ms Ploughman says that this probation extension was another factor that undermined her psychological safety in her employment because the Respondent was not acting in good faith and made her feel as if the Respondent did not want her there.[13]

[27] After receiving the notification of the extension of her probation, the Applicant felt that this was evidence that she "was getting pushed out"[14] of the Respondent's organisation and emailed her resignation approximately two hours later. She said in her evidence that there was no communication about why her probation had been extended and the swift acceptance of her resignation whilst she was on stress leave, "solidified my concerns that essentially I was being told to leave."[15]

[28] Ms Benham gave evidence that after the Applicant commenced sick leave, it came to her attention that the Applicant's probationary period concluded on 13 April 2025, which was a Sunday, and that as the Applicant had been on sick leave for two weeks at the end of her probationary period, there had been insufficient time in the three month probationary period to consider whether Ms Ploughman was suited to the work performed by the Respondent and for the usual discussion that occurs at the end of probation to take place.

[29] Ms Benham also said that the Applicant's sick leave had prevented the Respondent from being able to address the "reasonable concerns" raised by Ms Ploughman about the Cunnamulla trip as her sick leave commenced the following day. Ms Benham inferred in her evidence that the concerns raised by Ms Ploughman gave her a basis to question whether Ms Ploughman wanted to continue outreach work, central to the role for which she had been employed. The Respondent submitted that these considerations prompted the decision to extend Ms Ploughman's probation.[16]

[30] Ms Benham made clear in her evidence that there were no concerns about the Applicant's abilities or performance as a speech pathologist. But rather, Ms Benham expressed reservations that Ms Ploughman may not be suited to performing work in a regional area and then undertaking outreach in remote areas. Those reservations were based on the nature of the concerns raised by Ms Ploughman in travelling to undertake outreach work. Further, Ms Benham intimated in her evidence that the Respondent may not, for the reasons outlined, be able to meet the expectations of the Applicant with respect to the structure, resourcing and support for her to undertake her role because of the particular challenges presented by work in rural and remote areas.

[31] The Applicant gave evidence that she felt that she was trying to do her job to the best of her ability but was undermined by the Respondent, and concerns she raised were not addressed appropriately. The Applicant said: "I had lost faith in the company's ability to protect my personal rights and personal information".[17]

[32] Ms Ploughman has brought an application pursuant to section 365 of the Act:

365 Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute

(b) the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part;

the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.

[33] It is a jurisdictional pre-requisite for this application that the Applicant has been dismissed in order for her claim to proceed.

[34] Section 386 of the Act sets out the meaning of dismissed:[18]

(a) the person's employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer's initiative; or

(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.

[35] The Applicant argued in submissions that her employment was terminated within the meaning of either or both sections 386(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. I note the comment of the Full Bench in Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Tavassoli (Tavassoli)[19] that it is necessary for an applicant whose employment has terminated after the employer has acted on a communication of resignation from the employee to articulate whether they were dismissed within the meaning of section 386(1)(a) or (b), but noting that it may be possible for both sections to be applicable in a particular fact situation.[20]

[36] Ms Ploughman argues that both sections apply to her circumstances, however I note that her submissions as to whether the termination of her employment fell within section 386(1)(a) were limited in her written submissions and were not addressed in her oral submissions at the hearing. Ms Ploughman focused her submissions on the application of section 386(1)(b) to the circumstances of her termination from employment.

[37] I must determine, considering the facts of this matter, if there has been a dismissal within the meaning of section 386 of the Act, either on the employer's initiative or because the Applicant was forced to resign because of conduct of the Respondent.

Section 386(1)(a) - termination at the initiative of the employer

[38] With respect to the Applicant's assertion that the termination of her employment is in fact a dismissal in accordance with the definition in section 386(1)(a) of the Act, the Applicant argues alternatively, she was dismissed at the Respondent's initiative when she was notified of the extension of her probation when she was on "certified stress leave."[21] Ms Ploughman understood that in extending her probationary period the Respondent was asking her to leave, such that the resulting termination was at its initiative.

[39] In the matter of Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No. 2)[22], the Full Court of the Federal Court found:

"[A] termination of employment at the initiative of the employer may be treated as a termination in which the action of the employer is the principal contributing factor which leads to the termination of the employment relationship ... [I]t is unnecessary and undesirable to endeavour to formulate an exhaustive description of what is termination at the initiative of the employer but plainly an important feature is that the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of employment and the employment is not voluntarily left by the employee."[23]

[40] Ms Ploughman maintains that the extension of her probationary period, and its communication while she was on sick leave, evidenced the Respondent's view that it no longer wanted to employ her. She submits that, on one hand, the action of extending her probation on 11 April 2025 was the principal contributing factor leading to the termination of the employment relationship.

[41] I accept Ms Benham's evidence regarding the reasons the probationary period was extended and that the Respondent was still concerned to understand if the employment was suitable to both parties. I accept that there was no intention on the part of the Respondent to bring the employment to an end by extending the probationary period.

[42] I also understand that communicating the probationary period extension to Ms Ploughman whilst she was on sick leave was distressing to her. However, I also accept that Ms Benham saw little alternative as the Applicant had been away from work for two weeks at the point she decided it was necessary to extend the probationary period and that it was necessary to communicate the extension to Ms Ploughman before the probationary period ended with the passage of time.

[43] I do not accept that the extension of the probationary period was the principal contributing factor leading to the termination of the employment relationship. Rather, in my view it demonstrated an interest in continuing to consider whether Ms Ploughman was suitable for the role she had been engaged to perform and was intended to allow Ms Ploughman a further opportunity when she returned to work to come to a view herself about whether the organisation and the work she was performing was suitable for her.

[44] Ms Ploughman also appears to assert that the other conduct she complained of, considered collectively, would lead a 'reasonable person' to understand they had been dismissed on the Respondent's initiative. I do not accept this proposition, articulated by Ms Ploughman as: "each of those situations [about which she complained] individually are concerning but collectively together they are significant, and that ultimately what I believe would meet the threshold that would cause any reasonable person to understand that their employment was ending."[24] Even considering the events complained of collectively, I am not persuaded that they evidence a dismissal at the initiative of the Respondent.

[45] There is evidence that the Respondent engaged in writing with the Applicant's complaints, in particular about the travel to Cunnamulla in difficult weather conditions and the calculation of her leave, in an effort to resolve her complaints and amend their policies and procedures in light of the Applicant's concerns. The Respondent's efforts to engage with the Applicant's complaints, even though not to her satisfaction, are not, on an objective view, consistent with an assertion that the Respondent initiated the termination of Ms Ploughman's employment.

[46] The Applicant formed a view that the Respondent did not want her to continue working for them in the absence of this being clearly put to her and it was the Applicant that made the deliberate decision to bring her employment to an end when she provided her resignation in writing, albeit while she was on leave for work-related stress.

[47] In her written submissions the Applicant briefly noted that "The employer did not clarify or confirm my resignation, instead treating it as final. Given the timing, the health context, and the employer's actions, my resignation may alternatively be characterised as a termination at the initiative of the employer under s.386(1)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009."[25] I take the Applicant's reference to "health context" to be her absence from work on stress leave. The Applicant did not press this submission at the hearing.

[48] The evidence before the Commission shows that Ms Lindholm, just less than three hours after the resignation email was sent, replied by email: "your email has been received and your resignation accepted." The Respondent did accept the resignation when the Applicant was on leave that she had advised the Respondent was due to work-related stress. There was also evidence given by both parties that at the time of her resignation, Ms Ploughman had also lodged a workers compensation claim, that was later withdrawn.

[49] In Tavassoli, the Full Bench noted that there may be a dismissal of the kind addressed by section 386(1)(a) of the Act in circumstances where:

"[A]lthough the employee has given an ostensible communication of a resignation, the resignation is not legally effective because it was expressed in the "heat of the moment" or when the employee was in a state of emotional stress or mental confusion such that the employee could not reasonably be understood to be conveying a real intention to resign. ... In this situation if the employer simply treats the ostensible resignation as terminating the employment rather than clarifying or confirming with the employee after a reasonable time that the employee genuinely intended to resign, this may be characterised as a termination of the employment at the initiative of the employer."[26]

[50] In my view, it is unlikely that the Applicant's resignation was given 'in the heat of the moment'. Although it is the Applicant's evidence that she sent the resignation two hours after she received notification of the extension of her probationary period, it was not offered without the opportunity for any consideration or during a heated exchange with an employee of the Respondent. But is likely, on the evidence of the Applicant that I accept, Ms Ploughman was in a state of emotional distress at the time she resigned. She told the Commission that after receiving the notification of the extension that she had a scheduled doctor's appointment and at the appointment was given a medical certificate certifying her unfit for work for a further four weeks, given her level of distress.

[51] Distinguishable from the facts in the matters of Tavassoli and Rutter v Anglogold Ashanti Australia Ltd[27] (Rutter), Ms Ploughman did not seek at any time to withdraw her resignation. In the matter of Rutter, the Deputy President found that the nature of the contact the Applicant had with her employer after her dismissal and her request to withdraw her resignation was "evidence that, at the very least, the Applicant was not absolute in her intention to resign."[28]

[52] The Respondent in this case was hindered in clarifying or confirming the resignation with the Applicant, as Ms Ploughman had made clear the Respondent was not to contact her during her sick leave, which was due to continue until her notice period concluded. I have already addressed the reasons the Respondent contacted the Applicant about the extension of her probationary period during her sick leave, contrary to Ms Ploughman's direction.

[53] The provision of a detailed, written letter of resignation on 11 April 2025, the absence of a request to withdraw her resignation at any time, and the filing of this claim six days after the resignation was given, considered together, reveals Ms Ploughman's real intention to resign. The resignation was also given in a context of Ms Ploughman's relatively short period of employment, during which she had raised a number of complaints that suggested a dissatisfaction with the Respondent. For legitimate reasons related to her health, Ms Ploughman also restricted the Respondent from clarifying or confirming her genuine intention to resign.

[54] The absence of action on the part of the Respondent to clarify whether the Applicant genuinely intended to resign does not in these circumstances give rise to a finding that the termination was at the initiative of the Respondent.

[55] Ms Ploughman's employment was not terminated at the initiative of the Respondent within the meaning of section 386(1)(a) of the Act.

Section 386(1)(b) - forced resignation

[56] In support of her alternative claim that she was forced to resign because of conduct or a course of conduct engaged in by the Respondent within the meaning of section 386(1)(b) of the Act, Ms Ploughman submits:

"My resignation was a direct response to the employer's actions, which left me with no practical or reasonable alternative but to end my employment. I had made multiple good faith attempts to seek clarity and resolution through the appropriate internal channels. However, the employer's failure to respond adequately, and in some cases, its active contribution to the breakdown of the employment relationship, resulted in a termination at the employer's initiative within the meaning of section 386(1)(b) of the Fair Work Act."[29]

[57] Section 386(1)(b) requires for it to be a dismissal, the Applicant's resignation must be forced. For this high bar to be met, the resignation must be regarded as a probable result of the employer's actions and further that the employer's conduct left the applicant 'no reasonable choice but to resign'.[30] The test to be applied to assessing whether a resignation was forced was set out by the Full Bench of the Commission in Tavassoli:

"The test to be applied here is whether the employer engaged in the conduct with the intention of bringing the employment to an end or whether termination of the employment was the probably [sic] result of the employer's conduct such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to resign."[31]

The conduct of the employer is the essential element.

[58] In my view, despite Ms Ploughman having strong views about the supports that ought to be in place for her to undertake her work safely, in an organised and professional manner, and about how the Respondent ought to have managed the concerns she raised regarding her employment, the conduct of the Respondent described in the evidence of Ms Ploughman did not leave her with no effective or real choice other than to resign from her employment. Termination of Ms Ploughman's employment was not the probable result of the Respondent's conduct, complained about by the Applicant.

[59] I accept Ms Benham's evidence that the work performed in remote communities is inherently unpredictable, given the challenging nature of the work itself, the pressures brought to bear from inconsistent attendance from other organisations in remote communities, resourcing and environmental factors. I also note that the Respondent was concerned that they were unlikely to be able to meet Ms Ploughman's expectations with respect to the certainty she sought from the implementation of policies and procedures to mitigate risks associated with work in rural and remote areas. But relevantly, the Respondent demonstrated to the Applicant that they were willing to listen, engage with and act upon her concerns.

[60] The Respondent appeared to act on the concerns raised by Ms Ploughman by cancelling the outreach visit and responding to her complaints by email, offering her an opportunity to discuss the organisation's risk management strategies. I understand that the responses that followed the cancellation of the outreach visit and the offer to engage in developing suitable policy were not to Ms Ploughman's satisfaction. I recognise that the Respondent made the offer to work with Ms Ploughman on risk management strategies after she had commenced sick leave but also note that she commenced that leave the day after the outreach visit was cancelled. Rather than dismissing or ignoring Ms Ploughman's concerns, the Respondent took steps to engage with the complaints and expressed an intention to address the substance of Ms Ploughman's concerns.

[61] This is inconsistent with an assertion that the Applicant had no option but to resign. The Applicant could have used her sick leave to recover from her work-related stress, or pursued her workers compensation claim, returned to work and engaged with the Respondent in an effort to improve systems at her workplace to reach a level where she felt comfortable and safe. Whilst on one view it could be said that developing safe systems of work is primarily the responsibility of the Respondent, the approach suggested by the Respondent that Ms Ploughman participate in creating the systems she complained were lacking, provided Ms Ploughman with a legitimate alternative to resigning from her employment. In any event, a consideration of the conduct of the Respondent in cancelling the outreach visit, extending the probationary period and expressing an intention to act on Ms Ploughman's concerns, does not lead me to a view that termination was a probable result.

[62] The complaints raised by Ms Ploughman regarding the extension of her probation and the handling of her complaint about Ms Benham may not have been managed in the most ideal way by the Respondent, but are not of themselves, or in conjunction with the other complaints, sufficient to establish that the resignation from her employment was Ms Ploughman's only real or effective choice.

[63] It appears to me that Ms Ploughman's expectations of the Respondent as her employer did not align with the way the Respondent was able to conduct its service considering its location and resourcing. However, there is no evidence in this matter that demonstrates that any conduct of the Respondent was engaged in with the intention of bringing Ms Ploughman's employment to an end. To the contrary, an objective view of the evidence reveals the Respondent's intent to continue Ms Ploughman's employment in an extended period of probation, whilst engaging in and responding to the concerns she raised about her employment.

[64] Ms Ploughman was not dismissed within the meaning of section 386(1)(a) or (b) of the Act. The Respondent's jurisdictional objection is upheld.

[65] Ms Ploughman's application to the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute pursuant to section 365 of the Act is dismissed.

J Benham on behalf of the Respondent, the Trustee for VHSWQ Unit Trust.

[1] Submissions of the Applicant at section 1.

[2] In contravention of sections 351 and 352 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).

[3] Audio recording of hearing at 2:52:56.

[4] Respondent's Form F8A at section 1.2.

[5] Employment Agreement of the Applicant with the Respondent at page 4.

[6] Email of Respondent to the Applicant on 4 April 2025.

[7] Audio recording of hearing at 2:00:46.

[8] Email of the Applicant to Respondent on 27 March 2025.

[10] Audio recording of hearing at 2:03:30.

[18] See Varichak v COG Regional Team Pty Ltd [2022] FWCFB 37 at [30] where it is noted 'the provisions of s.386 have been applied by the Courts to s.365 General Protections matters'.

[21] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph section 1.

[24] Audio recording of hearing at 51:28.

[25] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph section 3.

[29] Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph section 3.

[30] Davidson v Commonwealth [2011] FWAFB 6265; (2011) 213 IR 120 at [14].

[31] Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Moman v Tavassoli [2017] FWCFB 3941 at [47].

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Brooke Ploughman v The Trustee For VHSWQ Unit Trust [2025] FWC 2423

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (106 paragraphs)

Brooke Ploughman v The Trustee For VHSWQ Unit Trust [2025] FWC 2423 (18 August 2025)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (3)