Decision: The Tribunal refuses the Applicant's application under s 19 Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) to extend the period during which he could lodge his application to the Tribunal.

Extension of time - PPSR - personal properties and securities register - deregistered company which was the holder of any interest - motor vehicle sale - no reasonable prospects for success

Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) - s 19, s 23

Personal Properties Securities Act 2009 (Cth) - s 156, s 180

Motor Dealers and Repairers Act 2013 (No 7) NSW - s 45(1)(g)

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; 139 ALR 1; [1996] HCA 25

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344; 58 ALR 305; 7 ALD 315

SS Group (Aus) Pty Ltd v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Mutlicultural Affairs [2022] FedFamC2G 788

Sugardaddy Productions Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 880

1. This statement explains my reasons for refusing an application for an extension of time for the Applicant (Mr Yau) to bring an application for review of a decision of the Respondent (the Registrar) to remove his registration of a security interest.

1. On 16 October 2025, an application was lodged with the Tribunal for review of the Respondent's decision to end registration 202412240003464 which registered an interest against Alto Pennant Hills (Alto) and Fong Xie Leow (Mr Fong).[1]
2. The Tribunal application was lodged one day late.[2] This requires the Tribunal to consider whether in all the circumstances, it should extend that statutory timeframe to permit the Tribunal application to be made.[3] I shall refer to the hearing of this application as the extension of time (EOT) hearing.
3. The Tribunal application and request for extension of time was lodged in the name of Trefle but the person who lodged registration 202412240003464 and the recipient of the Respondent's decision was Tony Yau. Mr Yau is unrepresented in these proceedings.
4. The Respondent informed Mr Yau ahead of the EOT hearing that it objected to an application in the name of Trefle because the company was deregistered.[4] Mr Yau sought leave to amend the name of the Applicant. The Respondent did not object to that amendment.
5. In the circumstances, I ordered amendment of the name of the Applicant to Mr Yau before proceeding to hear the request for extension of time.

1. Mr Yau is a former director of Trefle, which operated a car dealership. Trefle was deregistered on 8 December 2024 after the Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) took disciplinary action against Trefle as a motor dealer (License MDO89042).[5]
2. Mr Yau no longer buys and sells cars. He has a new company and is involved in car rentals. He told the Tribunal his accountant has told him Trefle's accounts are all dealt with. I accept that evidence.
3. Mr Yau argues that he is personally in dispute with Fong Xie Leow (Mr Fong) and is owed money by Mr Fong. This dispute concerns an Audi vehicle Mr Yau claims to have bought and sold to Mr Fong in 2023.
4. Mr Yau's evidence lodged in support of his application, suggests he has no such claim. It disclosed:

(a) Trefle bought the vehicle on or around 3 October 2023 from a third party[6] and sold it to Mr Fong on or around 13 October 2023. Mr Fong paid a $1,000 deposit for the vehicle;[7] > > (b) Trefle extended finance to Mr Fong for the balance of the price of the vehicle and a written loan agreement was executed between Trefle and Mr Fong.[8] That loan agreement was signed by both Mr Fong and Hai Huang in his capacity as director of Trefle; > > (c) Clause 5 of the loan agreement required Mr Fong to make payment to Trefle via a Westpac bank account which was stated to be in the name of Trefle.[9]

5. In light of this evidence, I am satisfied and find that the vehicle was purchased and sold by Trefle (not Mr Yau) and that it was Trefle (not Mr Yau) which extended finance to Mr Fong via the loan agreement.
6. There was no evidence explaining how the vehicle subsequently came to be in the possession of Alto. What is known is that a few weeks after Trefle sold the vehicle to Mr Fong,[10] Alto reported it as stolen. The Tribunal was told that Alto registered a security interest in the vehicle on the personal properties securities register (PPSR) on 4 November 2023. That registration is not the subject of these proceedings and the circumstances surrounding the registration are not known to the Tribunal. The Respondent informed the Tribunal it has been removed (date unknown).
7. On 8 December Trefle was and remains deregistered.[11]
8. On 24 December 2024, Mr Yau lodged the relevant security interest on the PPSR (registration 202412240003464).[12]
9. On 17 June 2025, Alto sent an Amendment Demand to Mr Yau seeking removal of registration 202412240003464. On 25 June 2025, Alto lodged an Amendment Statement with the Respondent seeking removal of registration 202412240003464.[13]
10. The Respondent told the Tribunal it issued an Amendment notice to Mr Yau on 26 June 2025 and sought submissions from Mr Yau[14] before deciding on 15 September 2025 to remove registration 202412240003464.[15]

EVALUATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

1. The way in which the Tribunal should approach its consideration of applications for extension of time has often been discussed but regard is most often had to the grounds referred to by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment.[16] These include:

(a) whether in the circumstances it is proper and fair to grant the extension; > > (b) the applicant's explanation for any delay and length of the delay in commencing the proceeding; > > (c) other action taken by the applicant; > > (d) any prejudice to the respondent; > > (e) the merits of the application; and > > (f) considerations of fairness as between the applicant in this case and other cases.

2. This list is not exhaustive but it provides a starting point for the Tribunal's considerations. I have had regard to these factors.
3. Mr Yau argued, the Respondent has conceded and I accept that Mr Yau's delay in filing his application was short and was due to a miscalculation of the filing date. I also accept this is a factor in favour of his application for extension of time. It also means I do not need to consider further the reasons for the delay and other action Mr Yau has taken and it reduces the likelihood of prejudice to the Respondent arising from any delay.
4. Against this, I have weighed the question of prospects for the substantive application if the extension were granted. Mr Yau told the Tribunal that his ultimate goal is to recover the vehicle/compensation for the vehicle from Mr Fong and/or Alto. He submitted that the facts around this case are suspicious and this means his application has merit.
5. I do not agree. This application concerns review of the Respondent's decision to cancel registration 202412240003464. I have considered the evidence Mr Yau lodged in support of his application. I assess Mr Yau's prospects on this application as unarguable for two reasons. First, that evidence conclusively negates any suggestion that he personally holds or ever held a personal interest in the vehicle or the loan agreement with Mr Fong. Second, even if Mr Yau could be said to hold some personal interest in the vehicle or the loan to Mr Fong, there is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest any contractual relationship exists or ever existed between him and Alto.
6. I am also mindful that a grant of extension of time would not only require the Respondent to engage in future steps in a proceeding and incur legal costs, but may also cause an application/s to be made by Alto and/or Mr Fong to be joined as parties, given their interests would be affected by the Tribunal's ultimate decision.[17] In that sense, the granting of an extension of time could have potentially adverse consequences for up to three parties in circumstances where I have assessed Mr Yau's prospects as poor.
7. I have applied significant weight to these factors. In such circumstances, and despite the short delay in filing the application, I am satisfied it would not be fair and proper to grant the extension of time sought.[18]
8. I wish to add that my concerns about Mr Yau's prospects were further diminished given the quality of his responses to questions from the Tribunal at the EOT hearing. Throughout the EOT hearing, Mr Yau attempted by his submissions to convince the Tribunal that he did not to understand the distinction between his personal interests and that of Trefle despite conceding he had been a director of Trefle and was now running a different company. In the circumstances, I did not find these submissions plausible or credible.
9. When it was pointed out to Mr Yau that the documents he had lodged directly contradicted his claim of personal interest in the vehicle, Mr Yau then tried to undermine those records by submitting they did not reflect the 'true' nature of the agreement between him and Mr Fong. Despite this, Mr Yau did not lodge any other evidence to support his submissions. Once again, I did not find these submissions plausible or credible in the face of the contemporaneous records.
10. Even more concerning was Mr Yau's claim that he not to know how Trefle's accountant had accounted on the company's books for the vehicle (an asset) and the unpaid loan (a debt owed to the company). I found his answers to questions evasive. I find it difficult to accept that Mr Yau as director and shareholder of Trefle would not have been aware of these matters.
11. Mr Yau complained to the Tribunal about the delay between the date of his submissions and the Respondent's decision to remove registration 202412240003464. That issue is not relevant to the Tribunal's decision to extend time but I note the delay (if any) would have been to Mr Yau's benefit because it prolonged registration 202412240003464.
12. I am aware that Mr Yau's delay in bringing his application was short but in all the circumstances, I am not persuaded the Tribunal should extend time for this application given the poor prospects and the adverse consequences for the Respondent, the potential joinder parties and the Tribunal.
13. The application for extension of time is refused.

• - Application for review
• - National warranty
• - NSW Photo ID card front and back
• - Seller rego paper
• - Trefle Holding Pty Ltd Dealer licence
• - Tax invoice audi Q2 rego
• - Loan agreement Audi Q2
• - Contract of sale Audi Q2
• - Respondent decision letter dated 15 September 2025

• - Motor licence history extract
• - ASIC Company extract Trefle Holdings Pty Ltd (9 December 2025)
• - Verification statement for registration 2020412240003464
• - ASIC Company extract Trefle Holdings Pty Ltd (6 January 2026)
• - Verification statement for registration 202412240003464
• - ABN history details 19656461586
• - Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 6 January 2026

[1] Personal Properties Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSR Act), s 156.

[2] Exhibit bundle 1, application for review. Respondent decision letter dated 15 September 2025.

[3] Administrative Review Act 2024 (Cth) (Tribunal Act), s 19.

[4] Exhibit bundle 2, letter from Respondent to Applicant. The Respondent also referred the Tribunal to Sugardaddy Productions Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2025] ARTA 880 and SS Group (Aus) Pty Ltf v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Mutlicultural Affairs [2022] FedFamC2G 788 in support of its contention that a proceeding cannot be brought in the name of a deregistered entity.

[5] Motor Dealers and Repairers Act 2013 (No 7) NSW, s 45(1)(g). Exhibit bundle 1.

[7] Ibid, invoice issued by Trefle to Mr Fong.

[9] Mr Yau told the Tribunal that the account was actually in his name. There was no evidence of that fact before the Tribunal.

[12] Exhibit bundle 2, verification statement for registration 202412240003464.

[14] PPS Act, s 180(1). Mr Yau provided his submissions to the Respondent on 21 July 2025.

[15] Exhibit bundle 2, verification statement for registration 202412240003464.

[16] [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344, 348-9; [1984] FCA 176; 58 ALR 305; 7 ALD 315.

[18] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553-4; 139 ALR 1 at 9-10; [1996] HCA 25 per Mc Hugh J