(i) Copy of email from Applicant to the Tribunal dated 1 October 2025;

(ii) Copy of the Applicant's application for second review, submitted on 14 December 2025;

(iii) First review decision and notice of first review decision, dated 19 December 2024; and

(iv) Extension of time submissions prepared by the Respondent dated 20 January 2026 with Attachments A to E.

1. Subsections 131D(1) and (3) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act) provide that a person whose interests are affected by an ART social services decision may apply to the Tribunal for a second review of the decision and that this includes eligible social services decision that have been affirmed, and have been set aside, by the Tribunal.
2. An eligible social services decision is defined at section 131C of the ART Act to include a reviewable decision made under the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (the Administration Act), other than a child care provider decision within the meaning of that Act.
3. The first review decision, to raise and recover family tax benefit debts, is a reviewable decision made under the Administration Act.
4. Subsection 131J(1) of the ART Act states that, despite a contrary intention in any other law, an application for second review must be made within the time prescribed under section 18. Section 18 of the ART Act states that an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision must be made within the period prescribed by the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 (the Rules) and that the Rules must not prescribe a period ending before the day that is 28 days after the day the decision is made. Subsection 5(3) of the Rules provides for a 28-day period after the day an applicant is given notice of a decision. The effect of these provisions is that an applicant has a 28-day period after being given notice of a first review decision to make an application for second review to the Tribunal.
5. The Tribunal accepted that the first review decision was provided to the Applicant by email on 19 December 2024. The Applicant is taken to have received notice of the decision on that date pursuant to section 14A of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). The Applicant's application for a second review was made on 14 December 2025. The Respondent has calculated, and the Tribunal accepts, that the application was made 332 days - or 10 months and 28 days - outside of the 28-day time period.[1]
6. Subsections 19(1) and (2) of the ART Act allow an applicant to apply to the Tribunal to extend the period during which they may apply to the Tribunal for review of a decision and for the Tribunal to extend the period if it considers it is "reasonable in all the circumstances to do so".
7. The Courts have considered a range of consistent principles to be used when considering the discretion to allow for an extension of time. These include:

(a) The length of the delay (Ralkon v Aboriginal Development Commission [1982] FCA 153);

(b) The reasons for the delay and whether an applicant has shown an acceptable explanation for the delay (Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Cohen [1984] FCA 176 (Cohen));

(c) Any prejudice to the Respondent (Cohen);

(d) The public interest (Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541); and

(e) Whether the substantive application has reasonable prospects of success (Cohen).

1. The Applicant's written reasons for seeking an extension of time in this matter were that:

Because I have continued to be extremely financially hindered by this decision. My mental health was and is still immensely effected.

1. At the extension of time hearing on 28 January 2026, the Applicant gave evidence that she had had an amount of $2,100 intercepted ("garnisheed") from an amount owing to her, to repay the debt. She stated that it has been very difficult to sustain her week-to-week living; she is a single mother and the debt has taken a big toll on her over the past year.
2. The Applicant agreed she had received a cover letter with the first review decision, which set out the 28-day time limit for seeking a second review. The Applicant told the Tribunal she had read the letter and understood there were time limits for seeking a second review. She stated that after the money was taken from her, she emailed the Tribunal to ask if there was anything she could do (the Tribunal accepted this was the email of 1 October 2025 that was provided to the Tribunal for the hearing). She then followed the prompts and replies and lodged an application. She stated she did know about the 28 day limit, but was also trying to convince herself that two thirds of the debts had been waived. She had been in survival mode over the past three to four years, and is only now healing from her relationship separation. Now she's had time to process things, she doesn't feel as though justice was done.
3. The Respondent provided written submissions to the Tribunal, which observed that the Applicant had a 28-day period to lodge a second review application which had ended on 16 January 2025. The Applicant's application on 14 December 2025 was 332 days out of time (10 months and 28 days). The Respondent submitted that the length of the delay is significant and weighs against granting an extension of time.
4. The Respondent noted in written submissions that it is expected that an Applicant seeking an extension of time would normally provide an acceptable explanation for a delay (Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 444). [2] The Respondent further noted the comments of the Federal Court in Englezos v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] FCA 31 (at [38]-[39]) that:[3]

...Whilst the Court may have sympathy for a litigant in person, a failure to abide by any stipulated timeframe in the filing of an appeal by virtue of a professed ignorance of the relevant rules is not an adequate reason for delay...

Without good reason, a litigant in person is not inherently exempt from the rules. The time limits prescribed by the Federal Court Rules and AAT Act are not "mere aspirational guidelines" and the applicant must provide a good reason to explain the delay, particularly when that delay is lengthy: BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400 at [3]; BJT19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 870 at [40].

1. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant had not provided a reason for the delay and had been able to contact the Agency on several occasion between the time the first review decision was issued and her application for an extension of time.
2. At the extension of time hearing, the Respondent's representative submitted that the garnishee from the Applicant had been made towards other debts that were not the subject of the instant decision. The Respondent's representative submitted that the full amount of the remaining debt, being $5,830.38, remained outstanding. In response to these submissions, the Applicant expressed some confusion and indicated she would need to check her account.
3. The Tribunal accepted that the length of the delay is significant in this particular matter. The Applicant gave evidence of having read the letter sent to her enclosing the first review decision and of having been aware that she had a 28-day time limit to seek a further review of the decision. The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant's separation from her partner prevented, or caused a significant hindrance, to her ability to seek a second review of the decision, in circumstances where the separation had occurred some time before the first review hearing. Nor did the Tribunal accept the Applicant's explanation that she is seeking a second review due to the debt taking a toll on her, given two of the three debts were waived at first review and the Applicant has not made any repayments towards the remaining debt. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that the Applicant has not provided a compelling explanation for the lengthy delay in seeking a second review of the decision. These factors weigh against granting an extension of time in this matter.

1. The Respondent accepted, in written submissions provided to the Tribunal, that minimal prejudice would be suffered by the Respondent if an extension of time is granted, although noted its ability to defend the application and to obtain information and elicit evidence may be affected by the passage of time. The Respondent further submitted that it would be prejudiced by litigation costs in circumstances where the Respondent submits there are limited prospects of success in the substantive application.
2. The Applicant did not seek to make extensive submissions on this at the hearing, but noted that the debts had been raised three years, two years and 12 months after the fact.
3. The Tribunal found that there would be minimal prejudice to the Respondent if an extension of time is granted and that this neither weighs for or against granting an extension of time to the Applicant.

Whether the substantive application has reasonable prospects of success

1. The decision the Applicant is seeking be considered at second review relates to the raising and recovery of family tax benefit debts over a three-financial year period. The Tribunal at first review found that there were debts for each of the 2021/22, 2022/23 and 2023/24 financial years, based on the Applicant having been paid based on 100% care of her children but having had only 60% care of her children.
2. The Tribunal at first review decided that the debts for the 2021/22 and 2022/23 were to be waived under section 97 of the Administration Act. In so deciding, the Tribunal found that the Applicant had notified the Child Support Agency that she had 60% care of the children from August 2021 and from September 2021 had received correspondence from the Child Support Agency reflecting that level of care. While noting that the Applicant had advised the Respondent on 30 August 2021 that she had 80% care of the children, the Tribunal had placed weight on the Applicant's advice to the Child Support Agency about the correct care arrangements, findings made by the authorised review officer that a proportion of the debt was caused by administrative error and the delay by Centrelink in implementing information from the Child Support Agency until 24 July 2024.
3. The Tribunal at first review noted that the Applicant had been sent numerous letters by Centrelink advising that the percentage of care being maintained for her children was 100%. The Applicant had given evidence at the first review hearing of believing the notices had related to her child care subsidy, for which she was entitled to 100%. The first review Tribunal found that the information in the notices sent to the Applicant was not sufficiently clear as it referred to "family assistance" which could reasonably constitute both family tax benefit and child care subsidy. The first review Tribunal found that the debts arose due to sole administrative error by the Commonwealth. The first review Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant had received the payments in good faith, on the basis that she had a positive belief she was entitled to the payments she received. As the 2021/22 and 2022/23 debts were raised after the end of the following financial year, the first review Tribunal found they were to be waived under section 97 of the Administration Act.
4. As the 2023/24 debt was not raised after the end of the following financial year and the first review Tribunal was not satisfied that repayment of the debt would cause the Applicant to suffer severe financial hardship, it found the debt was unable to be waived under section 97 of the Administration Act. The first review Tribunal heard from the Applicant about her relationship separation and poor mental health for a period of time, but was not otherwise satisfied that there were special circumstances that would make it appropriate to waive the debt under section 101 of the Administration Act. The first review Tribunal found that the 2023/24 debt was recoverable by the Commonwealth.
5. At the extension of time hearing, the Applicant stated she had had no idea she was being overpaid. She had spent a lot of time on the phone to Centrelink and was unable to understand why her payments decreased when her care increased. She was under the impression that the 100% referred to in the letters related to child care subsidy, which she was receiving at a rate of 100%. She had received seven letters from the Child Support Agency confirming she had 60% care reflected for the children and there were reviews over three years to update her care arrangements. She had had a previous Centrelink debt and did everything in her power to not get a debt again.
6. The Applicant was asked about the information she had provided at first review about her financial circumstances, on which the Tribunal had made findings about financial hardship (for the purposes of waiver of the remaining debt). The Applicant told the Tribunal that she is probably receiving less now, as she is now studying to obtain a better job. She has had to borrow money from people and is trying to pay rent on a house she can't afford.
7. The Applicant was also asked about the circumstances she had described at the first review hearing, about her relationship separation and attendance at a psychologist. She stated in response that she was severely distressed at the time, she had been separated from friends and family during COVID-19 lockdowns and her children were only three and four years of age when she and her partner separated.
8. In written submissions provided to the Tribunal, the Respondent submitted that, while not appropriate for the Tribunal to embark on a trial of the merits of a case, the stronger the apparent merits the more likely an extension of time would be appropriate (Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 4516, [29], [38] per Hill J).[4] The Respondent noted that the Applicant's reasons for having sought a second review (in her written application for second review) had been that she is unhappy with Centrelink's error, she did everything right in updating her details, she is a single mother working and studying, and that she is having difficulty paying her bills. The Respondent submitted that, while it could not be said the Applicant's appeal had no prospects of success, on the face of the first review decision the proposed appeal did not disclose a particularly strong case.
9. The Respondent submitted that it would be open to the Tribunal at second review to find that the notices sent to the Applicant, setting out 100% care of the children, meant that good faith was not established, because the Applicant knew or ought to have known that she was being paid based on an incorrect care percentage for the children. The Respondent noted the Applicant has not provided any additional evidence that repayment of the remaining debt would cause financial hardship if not waived and had not provided evidence of special circumstances that would justify waiver. The Respondent noted that the Applicant received money she was not entitled to and there was no injustice in requiring her to repay the money. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant's prospects of success weigh against granting an extension of time.
10. At the extension of time hearing, the Respondent's representative drew the Tribunal's attention to notices that had been sent to the Applicant, in particular to a notice dated 18 June 2021 and headed "Your family assistance".[5] The notice advised of the rate of payment to the Applicant, including amounts for "Family Tax Benefit Part A" and "Family Tax Benefit Part B". The letter also noted under "Information used for calculating your payment" that the Applicant was being paid for two children, with the care percentage for each child reflected as 100%. The Respondent's representative submitted that the notices did include the care percentages used to specifically calculate the Applicant's family tax benefit.
11. The Tribunal accepted that the Child Support Agency had been advised of the correct percentage of care that the Applicant was providing to her children and that there had been a breakdown in communication between the two agencies that contributed to the debts. However, the Applicant had the benefit, at first review, of a generous interpretation of the sole administrative error waiver provisions, in circumstances where letters had been sent to the Applicant advising her that her rate of family tax benefit Parts A and B were being calculated based on her having 100% care of her children. The questions of severe financial hardship and special circumstances were considered in some detail by the Tribunal at first review and the Applicant did not raise further clear evidence that her circumstances had changed since the time of the first review findings. The Tribunal is mindful that it is not conducting a full review of the raising and recovery of the debts, in considering the question of an extension of time. It is, however, satisfied that the Applicant has not demonstrated clear merit in the substantive application in the matters she has raised at the extension of time hearing. This weighs against granting an extension of time to the Applicant in this matter.

1. The Respondent submitted that there is public interest in an end to the appeal process and that time limits are imposed to ensure a predictable and orderly conclusion. The Respondent referred to the AAT's comments in Mason and John Holland Pty Ltd [2018] AATA 415 (at [31]) that:[6]

(t)he Applicant fails to address at all the public interest prejudice that is caused in the administration of justice by parties such as the Applicant simply ignoring legislative timeframes. In this regard the Tribunal notes the obvious and accepted public interest in the finality of decision-making, and the need to prevent disruption to established practices (see Re Veronica Lesley Johnson and Commonwealth of Australia; Commission of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation of the Commonwealth Employees [1990] AATA 1).

1. The Respondent also noted the AAT's comments that had been made in Chouman and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] AATA 222 at [30]- [31] that:[7]

...to grant an extension of time in this matter would be unfair to other applicants in similar situations who have not submitted late applications.

The grant of an extension of time in this matter would set an unwelcome example and cause inconvenience to Centrelink and the Tribunal in having to deal with large numbers of such applications. There is a general public interest in ensuring finality in decision-making.

1. The Respondent submitted that the prejudice to the general public weighs against an extension of time being granted.
2. The Applicant did not seek to respond to the Respondent's submissions about public interest considerations.
3. The Tribunal accepted the Respondent's submissions that there is some prejudice to the public if an extension of time is granted, on the basis that the public expects an end to the appeal process. This weighs moderately against granting an extension of time.

1. The Respondent also submitted, in written submissions, that the Applicant is able to approach the Agency and request a fresh decision at any time regarding waiver, "particularly if her circumstances change and she provides supporting evidence". When asked to respond to the Respondent's submissions on this point, the Applicant stated that she would have assumed the Tribunal appeal was the correct way to have the matter looked at, as every time she had tried to speak to Centrelink they had blamed the Child Support Agency. She had spent significant time on the phone with them and didn't have the strength to go through that process again.
2. The Tribunal notes the alternative avenue available to the Applicant, although considers that it does not weigh significantly for or against granting an extension of time in this matter.

1. The Applicant in this matter had a lengthy delay in making a second review application, in circumstances where she was aware of the 28-day time limit and has not provided a clear or satisfactory explanation for the delay. She did not identify any clear errors in the first review decision, which had been favourable to her despite correspondence sent to her clearly identifying an error in the way her family tax benefit payments were being calculated. She did not agitate special circumstances or severe financial hardship that would otherwise suggest the Tribunal at second review would make a more favourable decision. Taking into account all of these factors, the Tribunal has decided it is not reasonable in all of the circumstances of this particular matter to grant an extension of time to the Applicant. The extension of time is refused by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal refuses to extend the time for the making of an application for review of the decision.

[1] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 33.

[2] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 35.

[3] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 36.

[4] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 48.

[5] Appendix E to Secretary's Outline of Submissions.

[6] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 44.

[7] Secretary's Outline of Submissions, paragraph 45.