1. Ms Robson is the general manager of a private investigation firm. She gave evidence upon transport options available to the applicant had she remained resident in Bushy Park. She said there was one taxi operator in New Norfolk who had four vehicles. It provided a seven day a week service. The return fare to Bushy Park was about $100 and the return fare to Hobart was about $260. No extra fee was charged for waiting time for the Hobart return trip. She could not comment on the reliability of the service. She said that the New Norfolk District Hospital provided a government-funded transport service for disabled persons. She said too that a community nurse was available to attend patients resident in Bushy Park. However, I note that it was Ms Polites' [sic] evidence that when the applicant was initially discharged from the RHH she required the attendance of two nurse practitioners each second day. The evidence of Ms Robson did not explain whether the nursing service available to Bushy Park residents extended to the provision of two nurse practitioners. Ms Robson did report that physiotherapy and general practitioner services were available in New Norfolk.
2. Of crucial significance to the appellant's case was the evidence of her rehabilitation consultant, Dr Slatyer. Dr Slatyer's evidence consisted of a report placed into evidence during his evidence-in-chief, together with some supplementary oral evidence. That evidence was summarised by the learned Tribunal member as follows:

"13 Dr Slayter [sic] gave evidence for the applicant. He provided a report dated 29 July 2015 which included these statements:

'... it is completely unsuitable that (the applicant) live at Bushy Park given the level of rehabilitation appointments she has to attend. I am not sure whether its [sic] 6 days a week, but it is certainly a heavy schedule of appointments she must attend, as well as Acacia.

I strongly support (the applicant) being able to access her medical and therapy appointments by living in the Hobart area. She should have accommodation which does not involve long travelling time, and does not have a lot of steep steps and is suited to disabled requirements. (The applicant) particularly has poor balance and going up and down steps is difficult for her.

(The applicant) is a single mother of four children and is doing her very best to rehabilitate herself and Acacia and not surprisingly keep her family together. She has been stressed terribly at the situation she finds herself in and must be accommodated with financial support and decent living arrangements to maximise her and Acacia's recovery'.

1. Dr Slatyer described the applicant's balance as 'very poor' and that she has an in creased fall risk. He explained that her C2 fracture has not yet recovered its full strength and that a life threatening catastrophe could occur if the applicant had a fall and suffered another fracture at or near the same level. He said that whilst the applicant was in her acute rehabilitation phase the services she required included occupational therapy, physiotherapy, neurosurgery and psychology. He predicted that the applicant would have a need for acute rehabilitation services through to mid-2016 as a 'rough guide'. He confirmed that her restricted neck movement, limited sight and some cognition issues made her unfit to drive. In his view Hobart, as a place of residence for the applicant, was preferable to Bushy Park because it enabled easier access to medical services and involved reduced travelling time. He said that it had not been suggested to him that any of the services currently being provided to the applicant were not warranted, beneficial to the applicant and curative of her injury."
2. Although Dr Slatyer was cross-examined, he was not challenged with respect to the propositions contained in his evidence as summarised above. In particular, he was not challenged about his support for the appellant to live in Hobart, and that she should have accommodation which does not involve "long travelling time". The appellant was not challenged about her claim in evidence that Dr Slatyer had told her "not to think about" returning to her home at Bushy Park.

1. Before a determination can be made as to whether the expense in question was reasonably and necessarily incurred for the provision of treatment, it is necessary to determine, as a question of fact, the treatment which is required by the injured person. As Mr Read SC correctly submits, the injured person is not entitled to a scheduled benefit for the purpose of providing treatment of a nature or at a level which exceeds the treatment "required by ... her within the Commonwealth as a result of the injury".
2. In this case, the Board did not contest that the treatment described by the appellant, in terms of its nature, was other than treatment which was required by her as a result of the injury. However, Mr Read submits that this concession does not mean that she is required to have the treatment in Hobart, nor from a practitioner of her choice. In other words, he raises the issue as to whether, given the practical considerations in this case, the provision of treatment in Hobart was required by the appellant or, alternatively, whether that treatment, or most of it, could be provided to her in New Norfolk, a short distance from her home in Bushy Park, with the balance of the treatment provided in Hobart by way of an acceptable amount of travel to and from Bushy Park.
3. As noted in the extracts summarised by the Tribunal member, there was evidence from Ms Robson that the services of a general practitioner, physiotherapist and community nurse were available in New Norfolk. However, it is a reasonable characterisation of that evidence that it was acquired by the investigator, who was not a medical practitioner or a person with any form of expertise in relation to medical treatment, by simply making telephone enquiries of the local hospital. It is clear that there were some impediments to such treatment, and in any event, that evidence provided no information as to the extent, reliability or quality of the services, nor of their capacity to meet the specific needs of the appellant arising from her injuries. The Board presented no other evidence to address these questions or which contradict the opinions of Dr Slatyer.
4. It seems to me that the evidence of Dr Slatyer was quite specific. In the report placed into evidence, he said that "it is completely unsuitable that Ms Bricknell live at Bushy Park given the level of rehabilitation appointments she has to attend". Further, he strongly supported her "being able to access medical and therapy appointments by living in the Hobart area", and that she should have accommodation which does not involve "long travelling time". As the rehabilitation specialist responsible for the co-ordination of her rehabilitation and treatment, he was in an ideal position to provide specific evidence as to her needs in this respect. In oral evidence, he noted that the acute rehabilitative services she required included physiotherapy, occupational therapy, psychology, neuropsychology and medical treatment. He expected that the services would last until "... probably half way through 2016". The evidence he gave about these questions was not challenged, and, as I have already noted, there was no expert evidence presented to contradict same.
5. On the basis of this evidence, I am satisfied that the treatment required by the appellant was the diverse treatment described by both her and Dr Slatyer which was being provided to her in the Hobart area, and required her daily attendance at treatment sources in Hobart. I am satisfied that the treatment required by her as a result of the injuries could not have been reasonably provided to her anywhere else, and certainly not close to her home in Bushy Park.

Is the rent an expense "reasonably and necessarily incurred" for the provision of that treatment?

1. As I noted in my earlier reasons, the question of whether an expense is reasonably and necessarily incurred for the provision of treatment required by the injured person, is a question of fact, to be determined by reference to the simple words of the provision. Both counsel made submissions as to the meaning of "reasonably" and "necessarily" in respect of the clause. There would seem to be little authority addressing that question in respect of this or analogous legislation. To the extent that counsel were able to present cases in respect of legislation loosely analogous to that under consideration in this case, it seems to me that the relevant judicial pronouncements simply reflect the ordinary meaning, in common usage, with respect to those words. They are simple English words in common use. They mean what they say. Ultimately, the question of whether or not an expense answers to that description will be a question of fact.
2. I am satisfied that the evidence of Dr Slatyer, in particular, compels a finding that it was both reasonable and necessary for the appellant to live in Hobart during the course of provision of the acute rehabilitation treatment, which, at the time of the hearing, was expected to continue until the middle of 2016. At the time that the appellant entered into the rental agreement, she had possession of the home in Bushy Park, which she and her family were perfectly happy with. The only reason she was required to take on the extra expense of rental accommodation in Hobart was because of the provision of the above described treatment to her. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the rental expense, which was legally incurred by her when she entered into the residential tenancy agreement, was "reasonably and necessarily incurred by [her] for the provision of the treatment required by ... her within the Commonwealth as a result of the injury". As the learned Tribunal member accepted, correctly in my view, the property which was actually rented was suitable to provide the appellant with a base for treatment, close to the source of such treatment. There was no suggestion that the rent was exorbitant or unreasonable, and, in fact, the evidence would support the proposition that the property was modest, particularly having regard to the need for the appellant to accommodate herself and five children.
3. A considerable amount of evidence and consideration was given during the course of the hearing to the question of whether the Bushy Park home would have been appropriate for the appellant's residence during the course of her rehabilitation, without modification. This was a completely different question to the question of whether she could access treatment from there. There was evidence which related to the nature of access to the home, the steepness of steps, and other evidence as to the physical features of the home which might endanger the appellant, given the nature of her injuries. Evidence was called by the respondent concerning the potential for those matters to be ameliorated by modification, with the cost to be met by the Board.
4. With respect to the parties, it seems to me that this issue is irrelevant to the question that is required to be determined under cl 1(1). The appellant was required to live in Hobart in order to enable the treatment required by her to be provided to her. She could not return to Bushy Park in any event and, accordingly, whether or not the house could be modified is not a relevant consideration. If the appellant had not been required to live in Hobart and could return to Bushy Park, then it may well be that the Board would have been required to meet the cost of some modifications, with that liability arising as a separate category of scheduled benefit. However, the reality is that even if the modifications were able to be made in a way that adequately ameliorated the problems arising in respect of the features of the house, the appellant needed accommodation in Hobart in any event. Accordingly, I do not intend to address that issue further.

1. Having determined that, as a question of fact, the rental expense has been reasonably and necessarily incurred within the ambit of cl 1(1), it is still necessary to consider the applicability of cl 1(4). As noted earlier, if either limb of that clause is applicable, then irrespective of whether or not the expense falls within the ambit of cl 1(1), it will be deemed to be either unreasonably and/or unnecessarily incurred, as the case may be.
2. In my earlier reasons, I dealt with the question of cl 1(4)(b), noting that the focus of that provision is on the treatment for which the expense has been incurred, not the expense itself. There is no issue raised in this case by the Board, that treatment of the nature described by the appellant and Dr Slatyer was not "warranted, beneficial to the appellant or curative of her injury". Mr Read has raised the issue as to whether that treatment needed to be provided in Hobart, but, having regard to the findings expressed above, I am satisfied that the provisions of cl 1(4)(b) are not applicable in the circumstances of this case.
3. Mr Read argues that, irrespective of Dr Slatyer's evidence concerning the need for the treatment to be provided in Hobart, and for the appellant to avoid long travelling time, I should find that the expense of renting accommodation in Hobart should be taken to be unreasonably incurred, having regard to the provisions of cl 1(4)(a), on the basis that the cost of renting the accommodation exceeds the expense of providing treatment in the most economical manner practicable in the circumstances, ie by travel between Hobart and Bushy Park on a daily basis. He relies on evidence presented by the Board that asserts a comparative cost analysis.
4. This is a factual question which was specifically considered by the learned Tribunal member. I set out his consideration and finding as follows:

"29 Dealing first with whether the applicant's rental is an expense which has been reasonably incurred. This is a question which, according to the respondent, should be largely determined by arithmetic. It has provided an analysis, which, as I have said, purports to show that the services required by the applicant to advance her rehabilitation would have been more cheaply provided if she had remained resident at Bushy park, accessed the available medical and physiotherapy services in New Norfolk and utilised either taxis or the Community Transport Services to meet her transportation needs. However, the analysis is flawed. This is so because it makes no provision for the cost of modifying the applicant's Bushy Park home to the degree required by her injuries. Ms Polita did provide some brief evidence upon some possible modifications but they were uncosted and were advanced without any in-depth consideration of the applicant's needs and whether those needs could be safely met by the modest modifications she mentioned. It's pertinent for me to note that Dr Slatyer's opinion upon the appropriateness and adequacy of the proposed modifications was not sought. In the end I have come to the view that the comparative cost analysis provided by the respondent falls well short of satisfying me that it would have been more economic for the applicant to receive her treatment whilst remaining resident in her home at Bushy Park rather that [sic] living in her rental accommodation at Glenorchy."

1. This finding was not challenged by the Board on appeal. It has only been raised by the Board in submissions consequent upon earlier reasons. It brings back into consideration the costs of modification of the Bushy Park home in a different context. This may be relevant in this limited way, but for the reasons given below, it is not necessary for me to determine this question.
2. Clause 1(4)(a) requires a cost comparison with a manner of providing the required treatment which is "practicable in the circumstances". Having regard to the evidence of Dr Slatyer referred to above, it would be impossible for me to find that provision of treatment by daily trips between Bushy Park and Hobart would be "practicable in the circumstances". In particular, his reference to the need to avoid "long travelling time", his preference expressed in evidence for residence in Hobart for this reason, and his statement to her that she should not "think about" returning to Bushy Park exclude the alternative proposed by the Board as a manner of providing treatment in Hobart which is "practicable in the circumstances".
3. Accordingly, the provisions of cl 1(4) are not relevant to the assessment of the fundamental question contained in cl 1(1). I am satisfied, therefore, that the cost of rental of the property is properly payable as a medical benefit pursuant to that clause.

1. The final question which arises is the nature of the orders that should be made pursuant to my power under s 28(6)(2) "to confirm, vary or rescind the determination". The appellant, in particular, seeks an order that the Board be ordered to pay rent on the property between 13 April 2015 and 5 May 2016. This is opposed by the Board, which says that the extent of the order that can be made in respect of this reference is the payment of rent, from the first payment made on 8 May 2015, until the determination of the Board on 10 July 2015.
2. This submission of the Board presumably relies on the type of reasoning employed by Zeeman J in R v Southee; ex parte Motor Accidents Insurance Board [1991] TASSC 71 and Underwood J (as he then was) in Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Koragzl [1993] TASSC 159. In those cases, it was held that an order for payment made upon a referral to the Tribunal from a determination of the Board can only relate to the period up to the determination, having regard to the fact that, thereafter, there was no evidence available to the Tribunal (or the Court on appeal) that would support an ongoing statutory entitlement. The entitlements in those case depended on ongoing periodic qualification for the relevant benefit.
3. However, in this case, the matter which was referred to the Tribunal was the decision of the Board, not just to refuse payment, but concerning the right of the appellant to payment of the scheduled benefit in respect of the particular expense. The evidence presented demonstrates that the expense was that incurred by her by entering into the residential tenancy agreement, that is, renting the premises for a period of one year. That expense, incurred for that period, is supported by the evidence of Dr Slatyer, who noted that the period during which acute rehabilitation services in Hobart would be necessary would be until the middle of 2016. The agreement creates a legal obligation for the payment of rent at the rate of $290 per week between 8 May 2015 and 5 May 2016. Irrespective of the fact that it is payable periodically under the agreement, the aggregate expense was incurred when the agreement was made. This case, therefore, can be clearly distinguished from the cases referred to above, because it does not relate to an ongoing periodic payment which depends on an ongoing statutory entitlement. I am satisfied, therefore, that the order should specify the right of the appellant to payment of that expense as a scheduled benefit, although it is common ground between the parties that the amount so payable should be reduced by the Commonwealth benefit of $70 per week which is received, and expected to be received by the appellant as rental assistance.
4. In respect of costs, the Board seeks a certificate pursuant to the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968 in respect of this appeal. I think that the grant of such a certificate is appropriate.
5. Accordingly, the orders which I make in this matter are as follows:
   1. That the Board's determination made on 10 July 2015 be varied by quashing same and substituting for it a determination that the appellant has the right to be paid rent incurred by her in respect of the rental property referred to in the residential tenancy agreement dated 30 April 2015, between 8 May 2015 and 5 May 2016, at the rate of $290 per week, less the Commonwealth benefit of $70 per week. The total cost so calculated is $11,440.
   2. That the respondent pay to the appellant her costs of the reference to the Tribunal in a sum to be agreed, or failing agreement, as may be fixed by the Tribunal.
   3. That the respondent pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to this appeal to be taxed.
   4. That pursuant to s 8 of the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, an indemnity certificate is granted to the respondent in respect of this appeal.