Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v Rigby Cooke Lawyers [2022] VSCA 118

Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v Rigby Cooke Lawyers [2022] VSCA 118 | Case summary | Zoe

[26]

(a) A fax dated 12 April 2000 from Graeme Jacobs (Ambridge's general manager) on Ambridge letterhead to Headland that referred to the 'joint venture' and expenditure to be paid by Ambridge to AXIA. AXIA was an architectural company that was assisting with the refurbishment of the Property.

(b) A fax dated 13 September 2001 from Jacobs on Ambridge letterhead to a property investment broker, Ashe Morgan Winthrop. The fax attached the 'draft management accounts for the above named joint venture for the year ended 30th June 2001'. The accounts referred to C&O Voukidis, Ambridge, McGrouther and Careerpath under the heading 'Partners' Equity'.

(c) A fax dated 23 August 2002 from Jacobs on Ambridge letterhead to Voukidis attaching Break Fast's draft financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2002. The accounts referred to C&O Voukidis, Ambridge, McGrouther and Careerpath under the heading 'Partners' Equity'.

(d) A fax dated 8 October 2002 from Stanley on Ambridge letterhead to Powerlan Technologies Ltd (Baker's company) attaching an undated joint venture agreement that had been signed by Stanley ostensibly on behalf of Break Fast and Ambridge. The agreement referred to Voukidis', Baker's and McGrouther's corporate nominees (C&O Voukidis, Careerpath and IMF, respectively) and Ambridge as the 'Joint Venturers', and Break Fast as the 'Venture Manager'. It stated that Ambridge would hold a 25 per cent interest in the joint venture as a tenant in common and that the other joint venturers would hold a combined 75 per cent interest as tenants in common. It also stated that the venture manager would 'manage the Joint Venture and ... hold the Property on behalf of the Joint Venturers as nominee'.

(e) A fax dated 6 February 2003 from John Esquivel (an accountant at the accounting firm Mason Voukidis) to Jacobs attaching some of Break Fast's account transactions which described Break Fast 'as manager for Wellington [P]arade Joint Venture'.

(f) A fax dated 1 May 2003 from Voukidis to Taylor attaching 'copies of draft accounts for Break Fast'. The accounts stated that they were for Break Fast 'as manager of The Wellington Pde, East Melbourne Joint Venture' and referred to Ambridge, Careerpath, C&O Voukidis and IMF under the heading of 'Joint Venture Capital Accounts'.

(g) Ambridge's financial statements prepared by Stannards Accountants and Advisers, which referred to 'Equity in Joint Venture' and listed 'Wellington Parade Joint Venture' and 'P'ship (Break Fast Inv)'.

(h) An email dated 21 July 2003 from Voukidis to Stanley copying (amongst others) Baker, Taylor and Jacobs, which implied that Ambridge was part of the ownership structure of the Property.

[41]

[WHELAN J]: [Break Fast] maintains it is the owner of the property, and you say [its] trustee. If it transpires that it is a trustee then it might have difficulty justifying to the beneficiaries the costs it's spent in trying to prove it wasn't one, but until I decide that, how can I stop [Break Fast] that wants to contend that it is the owner, from running the case that it is that?

...

[COUNSEL]: The numerous cases ... propound the general principle that the company's funds should only be used for proper corporate purposes and the like.

[WHELAN J]: And when it really is a fight between shareholders, yes, that's - even then companies are typically not restrained from using funds to conduct the case. Typically the minority then allege another active oppression, namely using the company's funds to defend the case.

[COUNSEL]: Yes.

[WHELAN J]: Though they could perhaps get an injunction in a circumstance like that, but here it does seem to me to be different, but if there's a case that says no, this is the sort of case where you could - well, I'll change my mind - but it does seem different, and I mean, if at the end of the day as I say, it transpires that Break Fast is a trustee and it has been defending, it's been expending trust money seeking to establish incorrectly that it is the beneficial owner, then it would have trouble justifying that as an expense, I would have thought. Of course your point is by then it will all be too late, it has no assets except the trust assets, so - but I'm sure that can all be dealt with. If it's a joint venture I'm sure that can all be taken into account one way or another in your relief.

...

[COUNSEL]: [We seek] an order restraining [Break Fast] from making any further payments [on] account of legal costs.

[WHELAN J]: Right. Well, I'm not going to do that ... If there was some authority for it I would consider it, but it amounts to an order that [Break Fast] cease defending itself, and I'm not prepared to do that in the current circumstances.[9]

[67]

Issue 1 (breach of fiduciary duty): the judge held that while the interests of Break Fast and the Voukidis Defendants in the outcome of the Ambridge Proceeding were different, they were not adverse or opposed in any sense relevant for the determination of a conflict of duty and duty for the lawyer representing them both.[20] The judge held that Break Fast had a real and substantial interest in defending the proceeding rather than being a passive participant.[21] The judge held that Break Fast had not established that [RC] faced any real or sensible possibility of having conflicting duties by acting concurrently for Break Fast and the Voukidis Defendants in the Ambridge Proceeding.[22] Accordingly, [the] judge held that Break Fast failed on its claim that [RC] breached a fiduciary duty.[23]

Issue 2 (informed consent): the judge held that, assuming a conflict was found and Break Fast had no real interest in defending the Ambridge Proceeding, he would not have concluded that Break Fast gave fully informed consent to [RC] in acting in such a conflict.[24]

Issue 3 (knowing receipt): the judge was not persuaded that Break Fast had established that [RC] had sufficient knowledge of the fact that Break Fast was a trustee of the Property to impose recipient liability under the first limb of Barnes v Addy. The judge held that [RC] did not know any fact that would put an honest and reasonable person on notice that Break Fast was the trustee of the Property and that the outcome of the question whether Break Fast was a trustee was uncertain and therefore unknowable.[25] The judge was not satisfied that [RC] knew that Ambridge was 'likely to be successful' in its claim.[26] The judge said that, at the highest, [RC] held an opinion, fluctuating from time to time, about Ambridge's likely prospects of success, and that an opinion about a likelihood of the outcome of litigation is not knowledge of a fact.

Issue 4 (right to equitable compensation): the judge held that there was no obstacle to awarding equitable compensation to Break Fast for loss caused by a fiduciary acting in a conflict of duty and duty.[27] The judge held that, if [RC] did breach its fiduciary duty, its breach did not cause Break Fast to suffer the loss for which it claimed equitable compensation.[28] The judge held that, on the assumption that Break Fast had no interest of its own in actively defending the Ambridge Proceeding, an independent solicitor would probably have advised Break Fast to adopt a passive role and not spend potential trust funds in defence of the Ambridge Proceeding.[29] However, the judge was affirmatively satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Voukidis and Baker (then in control of Break Fast) would not have accepted such advice[30] and therefore Break Fast had failed to establish that but for [RC's] (hypothesised) breach of fiduciary duty, Break Fast would not have suffered loss.[31] The judge further held that, if recipient liability was imposed for knowing receipt, he would have found that [RC] caused Break Fast to suffer loss and that Break Fast would be entitled to equitable compensation for such loss.[32]

Issue 5 (quantum of equitable compensation): the judge held that if Break Fast was entitled to equitable compensation for a breach of fiduciary duty, he would award $1,637,439.36 less the discovery costs (to be taxed), plus the adverse costs liability in respect of the Ambridge Proceeding (also to be taxed), plus interest on those amounts.[33] The judge also noted that a possible adjustment, in relation to a sum received by Ambridge from TressCox as part of a settlement, would need to be considered in any assessment of the adverse costs liability on taxation.[34] The judge held in respect of the knowing receipt claim that he would have awarded equitable compensation in the amount of $1,637,439.36 less the discovery costs (to be taxed), plus interest on that amount;[35]

Issue [6] (unclean hands): the judge held that even if Break Fast had established an entitlement to equitable compensation, it had unclean hands by reason of its misapplication of trust monies.[36] The judge held that Break Fast's breach of trust duties had an immediate and necessary connection with the equity it sought and that, by the proceeding, it had made no real effort to clean its hands of the inequity.[37] The judge declined to exercise discretion against upholding the defence of unclean hands.[38]

Issue [7] (laches or statutory limitations periods by analogy): the judge held that the defence of laches should not be upheld.[39]

Issue [8] (contributory negligence): the judge held that the defence of contributory negligence was not applicable to either of Break Fast's claims.[40]

Issue [9] (advocate's immunity): the judge held that the defence of advocate's immunity was not applicable.[41]

Issue [10] (estoppel and counterclaim): the judge rejected the defence of estoppel and [RC's] counterclaim for fees.[42]

[70]

For an unincorporated joint venture

The following were the key indicia that Break Fast was a trustee of an unincorporated joint venture:

(a) Joint venture agreement: in March 2000, Ambridge gave instructions to Tress Cocks Maddox to draft a joint venture agreement. In 2002, the joint venture agreement was partially signed by Stanley on behalf of Break Fast and Ambridge. By October 2005 at the latest, [RC] was aware of the draft agreements;

(b) Financial statements: many of Break Fast's financial statements (including balance sheets, profit and loss statements, tax returns) referred to Break Fast as 'manager' of the Property joint venture, the 'Partners' Equity', used the term 'joint venture' and named Voukidis, Baker and later also McGrouther (and/or their respective corporate nominees) along with Ambridge (rather than Stanley);

(c) Correspondence referring to 'joint venture': there were numerous communications between Voukidis, Baker, Jacobs and others which contained references to accounts being prepared on the basis of an unincorporated joint venture with Break Fast as its manager and there was no credible correspondence correcting any of those communications;

(d) Pre-purchase and pre-settlement work: Ambridge identified the Property as a potential investment, conducted pre-purchase work such as engaging AXIA and Meerkin & Apel, continued to engage AXIA and purchased café furniture paid for by Ambridge. There was correspondence that showed that Ambridge would receive a $500,000 management fee that would be considered as its capital contribution to the joint venture;

(e) Voukidis' Family Trust: the records of Voukidis' Family Trust listed C&O Voukidis' interest as [an] interest in the Property rather than in a share, which Vickery J considered to have been an admission by Voukidis;

(f) McGrouther's financial reports for IMF from 2000 to 2003: IMF's reports showed Break Fast as a property investment in a way indicating an investment structure such as an unincorporated joint venture as opposed to displaying it as an investment in shares of an unlisted company;

(g) [Careerpath's] tax return: in [financial year] 2000, Baker's company [Careerpath] claimed a loss in a joint venture that was likely the loss sustained in the Property joint venture. Such a claim would not have been possible if the interest in the Property was held by way of shareholding in Break Fast; and

(h) Decreasing credibility of Baker and Voukidis: in February 2006, [senior counsel for the Break Fast Defendants] raised concerns with [RC] that some documents indicating a joint venture could not be satisfactorily explained by Voukidis. As of late 2007, [RC] became aware that there was a dispute about Voukidis' and Baker's compliance with [Williams J's order of] 3 May 2007 ... with [RC] pointing out the effects of such non-compliance on Voukidis' and Baker's credibility as witnesses. Further, in or around November 2008, [RC] became aware that Ambridge alleged that some documents supportive of the Break Fast Defendants' case had been falsified.

Against an unincorporated joint venture

The following were the key indicia against Break Fast being a trustee of an unincorporated joint venture:

(a) Instructions: from beginning to end throughout the Ambridge Proceeding, Voukidis and Baker provided instructions denying that Break Fast was a trustee and that documents that indicated the contrary only reflected a proposed structure that had been abandoned;

(b) Joint venture agreement: there was no fully executed joint venture agreement;

(c) Notices of beneficial ownership: notices of beneficial ownership in Break Fast existed for Voukidis and Baker (albeit held by Vickery J to have been backdated) and no such notice existed for Stanley;

(d) Deed of acknowledgment: the 2004 deed of acknowledgment between Break Fast, Voukidis, Baker and Stanley purported to evidence an agreement that Break Fast was the legal and beneficial owner of the Property;

(e) Emails/facsimiles: there was an email chain between Baker, Stanley and Voukidis in December 2002 in which Baker purportedly instructed Stanley to delete reference to Break Fast as manager of the joint venture, and a letter fax of September 2001 from Jacobs to Ashe Morgan Winthrop that referred to 'company' instead of 'joint venture', 'shareholders' instead of 'partners' and 'Stanley' instead of 'Ambridge'. By November 2008, [RC] became aware that Ambridge contended the September 2001 letter fax and other documents to have been falsified;

(f) Stanley's mortgage over his Break Fast share: Stanley mortgaged his share in 2002, implying that the share in Break Fast was held by him beneficially (and not for Ambridge) and was of real commercial value - [RC] knew this in 2005;

(g) Stanley misappropriating funds: Stanley had misappropriated funds, which was known to [RC] from 2005, supporting an inference that a contest between the word of Voukidis and Baker on the one hand, and that of Stanley on the other, would likely favour the Break Fast Defendants;

(h) Stanley's and Jacobs' lack of credibility: Stanley and Jacobs had both been convicted of dishonesty offences and therefore [RC] considered them to lack credibility as witnesses for Ambridge, supporting the same inference set out in the previous subparagraph;

(i) Unsuccessful application to restrain Break Fast from paying legal fees: in 2005, Ambridge had unsuccessfully applied to restrain Break Fast from paying legal fees from the Property assets to [RC], supporting an inference that the proposition that Break Fast was a trustee was genuinely contestable;

(j) Appearance of Voukidis as reliable witnesses: initially, [RC] perceived Voukidis as impressive, well-presented and articulate, supporting the inference set out in subparagraph (g);

(k) Amendments of the statement of claim: commencing in 2006, Ambridge amended the statement of claim six times, with changes of substance, supporting an inference that Ambridge's claim that the parties had agreed on an unincorporated joint venture lacked cogency; and

(l) Opinion of counsel: counsel's memoranda of advice pointed out the uncertainty of litigation and the significance of the Court's findings on the credibility of the witnesses to the determination of the case.[43]

[81]

(a) The Ambridge Proceeding in substance involved a contest between Ambridge, which alleged that it was one of the joint venture partners who had a beneficial interest in the Property, and the Voukidis Defendants, who alleged that Break Fast held the Property absolutely and for their benefit to the extent of their shareholdings in the company. The determination of the question whether Break Fast held the Property on trust for the joint venture partners or absolutely for the benefit of its shareholders would not adversely affect Break Fast itself as a separate legal entity and therefore it did not have any real interest in the outcome of the Ambridge Proceeding, and thus in actively defending that proceeding. On the contrary, Break Fast had an interest in taking a passive role in that proceeding, by agreeing to abide by the outcome, and not using assets which were alleged to be trust assets in paying for the defence of that proceeding.

(b) Break Fast was in a similar position to a company caught up in litigation between shareholders, such as an oppression action. The authorities dealing with those situations indicate that, ordinarily, the company should not adopt an active role in the litigation.

(c) The determination of the question of the capacity in which Break Fast held the Property would resolve whether the Voukidis Defendants had a beneficial interest in the Property or only an indirect financial interest to the extent of any shareholding in Break Fast, and therefore the Voukidis Defendants had an interest in defending the Ambridge Proceeding. The Voukidis Defendants also had an interest in Break Fast taking an active role in the defence of the Ambridge Proceeding and paying the defence costs of all of the Break Fast Defendants.

(d) By actively defending the Ambridge Proceeding and paying the defence costs of all of the Break Fast Defendants, Break Fast risked breaching its trust duties whereas the Voukidis Defendants did not face such a risk. The payment of legal costs was of no benefit to Break Fast, or the trust of which it was alleged to be trustee, but only advantaged the interests of the Voukidis Defendants.

(e) As the interests of Break Fast and the Voukidis Defendants in relation to the defence of the Ambridge Proceeding were adverse to one another, RC was placed in a situation where its duty to Break Fast was in conflict with its duty to the Voukidis Defendants, or at least there was a real and sensible possibility of such a conflict.

[87]

Break Fast was not only an alleged active participant in the factual events which were said to have taken place, but it had real, consequential stakes as an individual legal person in the findings to be made on the contested events.

... Break Fast was itself alleged [by Ambridge in its pleadings] to have been a party to the joint venture agreement. It denied having entered that agreement. ... If it was proven, against Break Fast's denial, that it did in fact enter the joint venture agreement, the consequences for Break Fast were significant and onerous. Rather than being the beneficial owner of the Property, as it contended, Break Fast would only hold a legal interest in the land. Put another way, instead of having a valuable asset on its balance sheet, Break Fast would have none (save a right of indemnity against the Property for liabilities properly incurred). Further, if, against its denial, Break Fast held the Property on trust, it would be subject to the onerous duties of a trustee rather than being free of such duties. And if it were found to be a party to the alleged joint venture agreement, Break Fast would be subject to other enforceable contractual obligations to which it would not be subject if it were not party to such an agreement.

In my view, it is simplistic and incorrect to equate the Ambridge Proceeding with a shareholders dispute or an oppression action as Break Fast contended in the current proceeding. ...

In the Ambridge Proceeding, Break Fast faced allegations which, once determined, would determine the capacity in which it held property, what were or were not its own assets and what legal or equitable duties it was or was not subject to. Break Fast was no mere spectator in a dispute between rival shareholders. The dispute went to the very question whether the protagonist, Ambridge, was in fact a shareholder or otherwise a participant in a venture in which Break Fast was said to be both manager and trustee. In my view, if, on the instructions of its directors, Break Fast had arguable grounds to dispute the factual allegations being made, it had a real and substantial interest in defending the claims made against it based upon those facts. Given what was at stake for Break Fast, it was necessary and expedient in the interests of the company as a whole to defend the proceeding.

...

Had Break Fast been the only defendant in the proceeding, and its directors were neither shareholders nor stakeholders in the joint venture itself, in my view, there would be nothing amiss if solicitors acted on the directors' instructions to dispute the claims made against the company if, on those instructions, there was a viable defence to the allegations made. Break Fast, as a separate legal person, would have had all the interests I have identified above in denying the existence of the trust and its role as trustee if, on those instructions, there was an arguable case that it did not enter the joint venture agreement or relinquish its beneficial ownership of the Property.

The question is whether anything changes in that analysis because the directors were also either shareholders or stakeholders in the joint venture and, thus, had personal interests as co-defendants as well. In my view, the various attempts to posit conflicting personal interests by reason of their status as shareholders, stakeholders or co-defendants failed ...[48]

[92]

The second limb ... may appear true at a superficial level. On close analysis, however, it is of no significance in this particular case, for a number of reasons.

First, there was no evidence that the Voukidis Defendants could not fund their own defences. In fact, the opposite appeared to be true. As counsel for Break Fast in this proceeding pointed out, and was accepted by Nemeth, Baker himself was extremely wealthy. Voukidis himself was an accountant with apparent financial resources of his own. Later in the Ambridge Proceeding, in October 2009, the Voukidis Defendants funded the costs of the trial from their own resources. In other words, although it might have been expedient to have Break Fast pay their legal costs, it was not essential that Break Fast would do so for the Voukidis [Defendants] to have their interests protected.

Furthermore, it was not the case that the Voukidis Defendants had no personal stake in the fund under the control of Break Fast from which the legal costs were being paid. Either that fund was the asset of the company of which they were the three shareholders, or it was the property of the trust in which, collectively, they held the largest interest subject only to adjustment between themselves and Ambridge.

There was potential for there to be some future adjustment between the joint venture participants because of expenses that had been paid to or on behalf of those participants from Break Fast's funds. Such potential future adjustment was something which was readily contemplated by all the parties to the Ambridge Proceeding. Such an adjustment had been contemplated as the practical solution to the problem that would arise if it later transpired that Break Fast had been spending trust money, against the interest of one of the beneficiaries (namely, Ambridge), in defending the Ambridge Proceeding.

The possibility that there might be the need to adjust the beneficiaries' interests if Ambridge succeeded in the action was discussed on numerous occasions between [RC] and the Voukidis Defendants. It was also the subject of Break Fast's counsel's submissions to the Court in response to the restraint application brought by Ambridge in November 2005. Justice Whelan himself alluded to it as a likely solution in his remarks during that application. [Senior and junior counsel for the Break Fast Defendants] advised on 17 February 2006 that for the purpose of any distribution among joint venturers, should it be found Break Fast was a trustee of a joint venture, Break Fast would first need to reimburse to the trust all legal costs paid to defend the proceeding because Break Fast would not have been entitled to indemnify itself out of trust funds to deny it held the Property on trust. Such a reimbursement would, logically, have had to come from the pockets of the Voukidis Defendants, or an equivalent sum would have had to be deducted from their interests in the trust assets. ...

It follows that it is simply wrong to say that the Voukidis Defendants faced no risk, but only benefit, by having Break Fast pay the legal costs of the Ambridge Proceeding.

Finally, and significantly, even if (contrary to what I have found) there was a conflict between the interests of the Voukidis Defendants in having their defence costs paid by Break Fast, on the one hand, and of Break Fast in avoiding the risk of being in breach of trust by paying fees out of trust assets, on the other, this scenario did not produce any conflict between the duties owed to them by [RC]. Saying that the Voukidis Defendants had an interest in having their defence costs paid is not the same thing as saying that [RC] had a duty to pursue that outcome for them.

[RC] had no duty to obtain a free litigation service for the Voukidis Defendants or to have Break Fast pay their defence costs. Ensuring that Break Fast pay the Voukidis Defendants' defence costs was not part of the terms of [RC's] retainer or otherwise a general law duty owed by [RC] to the Voukidis Defendants. [RC] did not advise its clients how the fees were to be paid. The clients decided that for themselves and it was not suggested otherwise. [RC] was not 'disabled' from performing its duty to give proper legal advice to Break Fast owing to any conflicting duty to the Voukidis Defendants to secure for them payment of their defence costs out of the funds at Break Fast's disposal ─ because there was no such conflicting duty. Put another way, the Voukidis Defendants would have had no cause of action against [RC] for failing to advise Break Fast that it must or should pay the Voukidis Defendants' defence costs. On this particular matter, there was no prospect of [RC] being swayed by its duty to one against performing its duty toward the other.

If, contrary to my view, [RC] breached a duty owed to Break Fast for failing to advise it to take a passive role only in the Ambridge Proceeding and not to spend money from the Property assets on the defence of the proceeding, such a breach was not a manifestation of any conflict of duties owed to several clients. It was not submitted that [RC] declined to give such advice to Break Fast because it was disabled or swayed from doing so by a conflicting duty owed to the Voukidis Defendants. At the highest, it would have been the breach of a unilateral duty owed to Break Fast alone which would sound in either negligence or breach of retainer. It would not have been a breach of a fiduciary duty [of] loyalty.[52]

[124]

(a) a claim for equitable compensation requires proof of a causal link between the breach and the loss, a principle expressed memorably by Mummery LJ in Swindle v Harrison, quoted by the High Court in Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher ('Youyang'), that '[t]here is no equitable by-pass of the need to establish causation' and that '[i]n questions of causation it is important to focus on the relevant equitable duty';

(b) the basic equitable principle applicable to breach of trust (and breach of fiduciary duty) is that the beneficiary is entitled to be compensated for any loss he would not have suffered but for the breach;

(c) in approaching the issue of causation for breach of trust or fiduciary duty, once the 'but for' link is established equity does not enquire as to whether the loss was also caused by other acts or omissions, including those of a third party;

(d) whilst the onus is upon the plaintiff to establish a causal link and there is no equitable by-pass to causation, it was explained in GM & AM Pearce & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Tallow Producers & Ors ('GM Pearce') -

Nevertheless, one must have regard to the principle that the court is entitled not to speculate against the interest of the plaintiff or to make assumptions against the defendant on the issue of causation. This allows the plaintiff to lead only a minimum of evidence to discharge the evidentiary burden of causation. Indeed, in this regard it has been said that -

[e]quity must strive to repair the breach of fiduciary duty lest the fiduciary in default could be exonerated too easily ... [and] the courts being seen to wink at wrong-doing.

(e) once a causal link to the loss claimed is established, the onus shifts to the defendant to establish that it is inequitable to order the defendant to account for the whole of the identified benefit or gain (or compensate for the whole of the claimed loss).

...

[T]he entitlement to not speculate against the plaintiff does not justify making assumptions of fact that are otherwise necessary to establish the sufficient 'but for' connection between the breach and loss. Further, it is for the trial judge to determine what inferences may reasonably be drawn from the known facts. Where findings of fact enable a judge to be satisfied that, but for the breach of fiduciary duty loss would not have occurred, yet there remains a question as to the extent of the loss, the Court is entitled to make assumptions in favour of the plaintiff in determining the character and dimension of the loss. Seen this way, the principle in subparagraph [(d)] above is reinforced or re-stated by the principle in subparagraph [(e)], and both are harmonious with the principle in sub-paragraph [(a)].

Not speculating against the plaintiff in this sense does not entail supplementing the existing evidence with favourable assumptions in order to establish the sufficient causal connection to some loss.[60]

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (282 paragraphs)

Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v Rigby Cooke Lawyers [2022] VSCA 118 (23 June 2022)

Parties

Legislation Cited (2)

Cases Cited (8)

Cited By (1)