(a) a fair minded lay observer having viewed the hearing of the proceeding prior to the appellants having given evidence might reasonably have apprehended that his Honour had prejudged the credibility of the appellants, including Baker, on the basis of conduct engaged in by Voukidis during the pre-trial stages of the proceeding: Tr1039, 25 - Tr1040, 14;
(b) having correctly identified the Briginshaw standard as the standard or proof for such a finding his Honour erred in applying that standard in that:
(i) there was no direct evidence before the Court that the documents in question had been fabricated either by the appellants or at all;
(ii) there was insufficient indirect evidence before the Court to support such a finding having regard to the seriousness and the gravity and consequences that his Honour found (J365-366) would flow from such a finding;
(iii) in reaching the conclusion his Honour relied on a finding, made in error, that the email in question was the first reference in writing to the structure in the terms which were contended for by the Appellants (J443) and in doing so failed to take into account other evidence to the same effect including:
(a) a letter of advice from Herbert Geer & Rundle Lawyers dated May 2002 received and paid for by Stanley: Exhibit D8
(b) the financial accounts of Break Fast (prepared by Jacobs and Stanley) which were consistent with Break Fast being an operating company and not a trustee:
(c) correspondence and documents provided to financiers (by Jacobs and Break Fast) on the basis of which Break Fast borrowed money which were consistent with Break Fast being an operating company and not a trustee:
(d) each of the tax returns of Break Fast, save one, which were all consistent with Break Fast being an operating company and not the trustee of an unincorporated joint venture.
(iv) In finding that the email was the first piece of correspondence in writing that referred to the structure contended for by the Appellants his Honour also failed to take into account that, on the appellant's case, the incorporated joint venture was oral and was settled on or before 24 November 1999 (D&C[7.1) as a reasonable alternative explanation for the absence of correspondence;
(v) his Honour gave too much weight to the fact (J444) that despite having produced hard copies of the email the applicants were unable to produce electronic copies of the email nearly seven years after the event, despite reasonable explanations from the appellants as to why;
(vi) erred in finding that Baker, Voukidis and Stanley signed a resolution which described Break Fast as manager of the joint venture (J463) without taking into account the evidence of Voukidis that he had personally applied Baker's electronic signature to the resolution prior to receiving Baker's email, in circumstances where there was no direct evidence to the contrary;
(vii) his Honour erred in finding that after 10 December 2002 the accounts of Break Fast continued to be prepared on the basis of an unincorporated joint venture as alleged by Ambridge (J453) in that:
(A) he placed too much weight on the fact that some of the accounts were headed 'As manager for the Wellington Parade Joint Venture': (J453) when others were not;
(B) he failed to take into account that all of the financial accounts of Break Fast, in substance, indicated that Break Fast was not a trustee of an unincorporated joint venture as alleged by Ambridge but was an operating company as alleged by the Appellants with assets and liabilities income and expenditure;
(C) failed to take into account the evidence of Jacobs that: