10 In order to understand the arguments on appeal, it is necessary to consider the facts in some detail. Before doing so, it is convenient to record a submission made on behalf of the bank and the insurer, to the effect that this Court should not interfere with any of the factual findings made by the trial judge, because those findings were based on the judge's view of the credibility of the witnesses. I do not accept that submission. As appears below, the trial judge did not reach his conclusion adverse to the appellants on credibility grounds. To the contrary, the only significant comments made by the judge as to credibility were directed at criticising the evidence of the bank's principal witness, Mrs Davis, on the ground that she was not giving evidence of actual recollection but more likely of reconstruction based on her usual practice and contemporaneous records. Having read the whole of her evidence, I agree with the trial judge's view. It is obvious that Mrs Davis had no actual recollection of what was said in conversations with Mr and Mrs Sahin and that she was reconstructing from usual practice and documents. Further, it is clear that her reconstruction was wrong and inconsistent with the bank's documents in at least one key respect, and that her brief contemporaneous notes are incomplete, ambiguous or mistaken in material respects. In my view, this Court is in as good a position as the trial judge to assess the probabilities on the evidence as a whole, and must do so in order to comply with its duty to afford Mr and Mrs Sahin a true right of appeal in the nature of a rehearing.[1]