Brandes v Community Association DP 270482

1. The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 29 July 2025, which is within the time provided by r 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (NCAT Rules).
2. Attached to the Notice of Appeal (being pp 1-7) are 83 pages of attachments being:

(1) at pp 8-10, the Primary Decision;

(2) at pp 11-14, the respondent's submissions before the Tribunal;

(3) at pp 15-91, is evidence relied on by the appellant at the Tribunal hearing, together with much commentary explaining why the appellant considered the Tribunal erred in reaching the conclusions it did in the Primary Decision.

1. In the Notice of Appeal, the appellant seeks leave to appeal on the basis that the Primary Decision was not fair and equitable, against the weight of the evidence and that there is now new evidence available that was not reasonably available at the time of the Tribunal hearing.
2. The substance of the appellant's grounds of appeal appears at pp 18-21 of the bundle. In summary, the appellant submits:

Orders Challenged on Appeal:

Due to the allowance for the hearing to be held as a virtual hearing which Senior Member Charles commented at the start of proceedings his expectations for it to be in person, there was no opportunity to fairly prove that the Respondent Managing Agent Stephen Pettit was committing Perjury supported by the present Chairperson of DP270482 Ratnam Chandrasegaran. The same was achieved in a hearing in 2024 heard by Senior Member Ross.

I am appealing the ability for Senior Member Charles to make the orders I was seeking considering the inability for me to use the evidence on the USB card which I provided to both the responded and the senior member to cross examine the statements made by Stephen Pettit under oath. I appreciate the senior member acknowledging that he received the USB with hundreds of Photos and many many hours of video footage and a court transcript and voice recorded conversations. I set no unrealistic expectations or accept any possibilities that either party looked at it and matter of fact Stephen Pettit sent an email stating that it was not looked at by the managing agent.

I am challenging the entire document from Senior Member Charles as not fulfilling the applications hearing in a fair manner and accusing the managing agent and Chairperson of Perjury.

1. After reproducing the Primary Decision, the appellant then states his grounds of appeal as follows:

On the 13th June 2025 in Stephen Pettit's "Submission from Respondent" I read what was full of false statements which I saw could mislead the Senior Member to not be able to conduct a fair hearing considering the fact that it is standard at a NCAT hearing for the Senior Member to expect both parties to be honest at the NCAT hearing.

As a result of receiving the false statement with no validity to reality I was left feeling that it was not possible for a fair hearing to take place on the 29th July 2025 so I submitted further evidence to both Senior Member Charles and the Respondent Stephen Pettit.

Due to NCAT approving for the hearing to be held as a "Virtual Hearing" the ability to cross examine and use a screen with ready to view snippets of video footage was removed and therefore the hearing relied upon that Stephen Pettit was factual and honest (not committing Perjury) and supported by the Chairperson Ratnam which was present at the hearing and even asked to speak. At the time of the chairperson speaking he made comments regarding the PID supply which he was well aware of it being false and not the truth so was also committing Perjury.

Since the hearing there was a mention for an APVO with the caretaker Steve Hutchesson and a letter of undertaking was signed by both Steve Hutchesson and myself on the 6th August 2025.

Within 48 hours on the 8th August 2025 this was broken by the current caretaker and the managing agent was notified and nothing as has been done about it and no response. Everything the managing agent and association committee has done in the last 5 years has continued and promoted acts of violence, intimidation and vandalism towards myself and any lot owner they see fit and without NCAT conducting a thorough and fair internal Appeal review, I am left with no way of resolving serious issues between myself and the association and the current caretaker Steve Hutchesson. The committee and managing agent keep finding ways of misleading lot owners. We just conducted a Email EGM regarding the caretaker getting a 1-year contract that was completed 1 day before the APVO mention at cessnock local court [sic] and then the managing agent emailed me that I was the only lot owner that opposed the caretaker contract and that I must let the magistrate know the outcome.

When the association keeps telling me that it's between me and Steve and the association has nothing to do with it. This mistreatment is potent in the fencing reimbursement matter, corrupt PID vandalism and manipulation matter and everything else brought to your attention. The current caretakers "Facilities Managers Duties" actually contradict the APVO interim orders made by the magistrate which was used for the complete content of the Underwriting agreed at the APVO mention.

NCAT is the right place to resolve this. Not the Police or local courts any anywhere else. For NCAT to do nothing about it is not in accordance of what any owner in a community association deserves when they are treated inappropriately. I can't rely on submitting motions at a general meeting. The only place I can go to to get [sic] assistance is here at NCAT. Perjury should not be tolerated.

1. The appellant then sets out the orders he says that the Appeal Panel should make, namely (paragraph numbers added):

[1] I am asking the NCAT appeal panel to find the evidence provided to be fair and sufficient to grant "leave" and approve for a hearing to be in person and to allow video / voice recording / photos to be used at the hearing to assist in litigation and finding a fair outcome at the hearing.

[2] All the orders I originally included in my application to be heard again.

[3] I am asking for a voice recorded copy of this NCAT hearing and the hearing in 2024 heard by Senior Member Ross be made available to both the Managing Agent and myself so it can be cross examined and show the perjury by Stephen Pettit when under oath and how they carried heavy weight and influence at the outcomes of the Hearings 2024/00305595 and 2025/00122624.

[4] I am also requesting for NCAT to make interim orders which gives myself LOT 34 the ability to submit a statement to all lot owners my current concerns and evidence in a format much shorter and easier to read that that submitted to NCAT and for the committee and managing agent to be required to respond respectfully to any lot owner including myself issues brought to their attention via emails within 14 days.

[5] Orders I will be seeking now will be clearer and more direct from the inability for the community association to be honest or mediate at NCAT and outside of NCAT.

1. The appellant filed further bundles of materials on 9 October 2025 (13 pages), 20 November 2025 (unnumbered, but approximately 50 pages) and 19 January 2026 titled "Internal Appeal Very New Evidence" (12 pages).
2. In the submissions of 9 October 2025, the appellant repeats some of the evidence contained in the materials attached to his Notice of Appeal, and provides further commentary on the Primary Decision. By way of example, in the Primary Decision the Tribunal stated at [6]:

MATTER 1 EVIDENCE Senior Member Charles wrote:

6. In respect of the first matter (i.e., the front fences, abutting community property) the applicant argued that he should be "remunerated" for his professional work lie., in respect of labour and materials) for installing front fences at his own expense However. such work was done without the approval of the Community Association. The Community Association disputes that the applicant's unauthorised) work on the front fences was done with due care and skill and at a reasonable cost and the applicant led no independent evidence to establish prober workmanship and reasonable cost. For those reasons, I decline to make any order under the CLMA.

Matter 1 (A) I have previously provided a lot of evidence defending "Approval / Request from the community association." As a committee member at the time Fiona Favro instructed me to do it and she falsely used parts of the Dividing Fences Act to defend her demands without taking into account other vital parts of the Dividing Fences Act which the Association committee had ignored. My understanding is that NCAT is well aware of the Act so I see no need to reproduce parts about notifying a neighbour before removing any of the fences etc. It was proven at NCAT by lot 70 owner Rick that the committee can't override the Dividing Fences Act.

(1A) Question: Could DP270482 respond to this in detail and defend the lies Stephen Pettit made at the NCAT hearing about my fence being unprofessional? I don't think Stephen Pettit has even driven along Horizon Lane Pokolbin since i installed the fence over 5 years ago.

Please give factual signed statements and not just hairy fairy allegations etc. If I need to spend more time on this, I will be seeking more reimbursement for my time.

Matter 1 (B) I have previously provided a lot of evidence defending "The Community Association disputes that the applicant's (unauthorised) work on the front fences was done with due care and skill and at a reasonable cost, and the applicant led no independent evidence to establish proper workmanship and reasonable cost."

...

I suggest that "For those reasons, I decline to make any order under the CLMA." should be revoked and I either should receive full reimbursement for my front fence or this matter should be heard again and only the truth should be considered in making the right order.

(1B) Question: Could DP270482 respond to this in detail and defend the lies Stephen Pettit made at the NCAT hearing about my fence being unprofessional? This could be included in response to 1A. I don't think Stephen Pettit has even driven along Horizon Lane Pokolbin since I installed the fence over 5 years ago. Please give factual signed statements and not just hairy fairy allegations etc. Please also refer to my pricing requests. If I need to spend more time on this, I will be seeking more reimbursement for my time.

1. In the submissions of 20 November 2025, the appellant includes material post-dating the Tribunal, including but not limited to correspondence between the appellant and the respondent or its agent, minutes of the annual general meeting of the respondent held on 15 November 2025 and otherwise reproduces material already included in the previous bundles of materials.
2. In the submissions of 19 January 2026, the appellant includes material post-dating the Tribunal, including but not limited to correspondence between the appellant and the respondent or its agents.
3. With respect to the new evidence, the test whether the evidence was reasonably available at the time of the hearing is not applicable because all of the evidence postdates the hearing. At the appeal hearing, the appellant made oral submissions to the effect that this material would demonstrate how the respondent managed the community property and how it was making "idiotic decisions", and how the respondent was not trustworthy. The appellant also said that this new evidence demonstrated the importance of his appeal.
4. However, none of these arguments are pertinent to grounds for the decision. Our role is to determine whether the Tribunal erred in its conclusions and the orders that it made. The new evidence postdating the Primary Decision is of no assistance in that task. Accordingly, we have paid no regard to evidence sought to be relied on by the appellant at this appeal which was not before the Tribunal.

1. The respondent filed a Reply to Appeal on 24 September 2025.
2. In summary, the respondent submits that the appellant has failed to satisfy the criteria necessary to justify leave to appeal.

1. The respondent filed submissions on 11 November 2025 (5 pages) to which were attached 31 pages of documents (being the respondent's evidence at the Tribunal hearing). In summary, the respondent submits that:

(1) in part, the appellant's argument appears to revolve around the fact that the appeal was not heard in person;

(2) it is unclear precisely what the appellant seeks. For instance, the appellant appears to seek reimbursement of up to $287,000, without setting out any legal justification for that figure;

(3) the Tribunal was correct in dismissing the appellant's application as, amongst other matters:

(a) the Tribunal was unable to make some of the orders sought;

(b) orders were sought not in a form capable of being made by the Tribunal;

(c) there was insufficient connection between the orders sought and the evidence;

(4) the appellant seeks to relitigate issues already dismissed;

(5) the appellant is attempting to raise mattes which were not even the subject of the original proceedings;

(6) the appellant has not demonstrated any reason why leave to appeal should be granted;

(7) the appeal contains references to matters which cannot be the subject of the appeal including mattes which occurred after the Tribunal hearing.

1. In addition, the respondent submits that in the appeal the appellant seeks "disparate orders" including orders:
   • in relation to committee members;
   • invalidating the appointment of a caretaker;
   • orders seeking broad but unspecified changes to the respondent's property;
   • orders in relation to interest;
   • orders seeking to vary the management statement,

in addition to the original orders sought in relation to fencing.

(1) The Tribunal was unable to make some of the orders sought;

(2) orders sought were not in a form capable of being made by the Tribunal (for example broad orders were sought in relation to certain aspects of the Association property which did not have sufficient detail to support them based on the principles in Glenquarry Park Investments v Hegyesi [2019] NSWSC 1120); and that there was

(3) insufficient connection between the orders sought and the evidence relied on.

1. In summary, the respondent submits that the appellant seeks to relitigate issues already dismissed, that the appellant is unhappy with the manner in which the hearing took place, and apart from making broad (and scandalous) accusations about those who gave evidence on behalf of the respondent at the Tribunal hearing, the appellant has failed to set out why the Primary Decision should be overturned.

1. Section 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) sets out the basis upon which appeals from decisions of the Tribunal may be brought. That section states that an appeal may be made as of right on any question of law or with leave of the Appeal Panel on any other grounds (s 80(2)(b)).
2. A failure to afford procedural fairness and a failure to take into account relevant, mandatory considerations raise questions of law.
3. Given the limited scope of the real points raised on appeal, as outlined below, it is unnecessary for us to examine in any detail the circumstances in which leave to appeal will be granted other than to say that Clause 12 of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act is applicable, along with the following matters set out in Collins v Urban [2014] NSAWCATAP 17at [84](2)]:

Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed.

1. Before considering the grounds of appeal, it is appropriate to briefly summarise the Primary Decision.
2. At [2] of the Primary Decision, the Tribunal notes that both parties had provided written materials in accordance with the Tribunal's directions of 22 April 2025, that the appellant had given sworn evidence at the hearing, which evidence was supplemented by "videos on a USB" and oral submissions. The Tribunal noted that the respondent's managing agent, Mr Pettit, also gave affirmed oral evidence and supplemented the respondent's written materials with oral submissions.
3. At [3], the Tribunal set out the relief sought by the appellant being orders for:

(1) remuneration for front fences and interest (CLMA, s 193);

(2) reimbursement for "back fence to easement from no secure fence to water catchment within 50 metres of lot and from caretaker repeatedly entering Lot 34 and assaulting" the appellant (CLMA, s 193);

(3) reimbursement for costs for private irrigation district (PID) plumbing trespassing on the appellant's land and "getting burst twice" whilst carrying out approved lot improvements (CLMA, s 193);

(4) reimbursement for PID issues caused from caretaker intentional disruption to essential service to the appellant's lot with awareness of committee members (CLMA, s 193);

(5) reimbursement for caretaker involvement of the removal and mistreatment of cattle owned the appellant (CLMA, s 193);

(6) reimbursement for the misconduct of the caretaker and committee which resulted in undue stress and workload to the appellant (CLMA, s 193), and an order

(7) requiring a person to make or pursue an insurance claim regarding tampering and vandalism of PID water services to lots (CLMA, s 161).

1. At [4], the Tribunal notes that, in respect of the third matter, the parties had resolved their differences with the respondent agreeing to pay to the appellant an amount of $250, within 7 days. At the appeal hearing, the appellant confirmed that the appellant confirmed that he had received the $250.
2. As to the other matters, the Tribunal was not persuaded that there was sufficient evidence to make any further orders under the CLMA (Primary Decision, at [5]).
3. In respect of the first matter (that is the front fences, abutting community property) the Tribunal noted that the appellant had argued that he should be "remunerated" for his work for installing front fences at his own expense. However, as the work was done without the approval of the respondent, and the respondent disputed that the appellant's unauthorised work done with due care and skill and at a reasonable cost, and the appellant led no independent evidence to establish proper workmanship and reasonable cost, the Tribunal declined to make any order under the CLMA (Primary Decision, at [6]).
4. As for the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth matters, being the reimbursement matters, the Tribunal found that in each instance, there was either no evidence at all, or there was insufficient evidence to establish that the alleged expenses were incurred by the appellant and as to the proper amount(s) of reimbursement which was claimed (Primary Decision, at [7]).
5. In addition:

(1) in relation to the second matter, while the Tribunal accepted that the appellant may have built the back fences because of safety concerns, rejected his claim for reimbursement because the appellant built the rear fence to his lot, which abutted the community property, without first seeking the approval of the respondent (Primary Decision, at [8]);

(2) in relation to the fourth matter, the Tribunal stated (Primary Decision, at [9]):

I find that the [respondent] has no liability to the [appellant]. There is no disruption to essential services in Lot 34. Water is supplied on request to the dam by the Hunter Wine Country Private Irrigation District (PID). The [respondent] has an allocation of 50 megalitres per year, which amounts to 178 litres per day per lot. It is an auxiliary source of water, not fit for human consumption, and is intended for 'drip feed' irrigation. It is not for fire prevention. The local council requires a 10,000-litre fire-fighting water storage tank as a development condition. The design intention is for the pump to operate for 10 hours during a 24-hour cycle, so that the pump in fact, operates at night (i.e., to utilise off peak power). Each Lot owner, therefore, is required to store and repump their own water as personally required without exceeding the nominated maximum daily draw off. The system was not broken. If the applicant outside operating times, this is not a circumstance which should be visited upon the [respondent] with a finding of liability. The PID blueprint (with operating times) is available to all Lot owners, including the [appellant].

(3) in relation to the fifth matter, the Tribunal found that in breach of by-Law 40.1 of the respondent's by-laws, the appellant kept cattle on his lot without the prior approval of the respondent. While it appeared that the cattle may have escaped the appellant's property, the Tribunal found that the respondent had no liability to the appellant (Primary Decision, at [10]);

(4) in relation to the sixth matter involving alleged misconduct of the caretaker, which was said to have caused undue stress and workload to the applicant, the Tribunal found that these concerns were not to be visited upon the respondent in a claim (as to an unspecified amount) for reimbursement. The Tribunal noted that the alleged misconduct of the caretaker was for investigation and prosecution via a complaint to the Police and is being pursued in the Local Court (Primary Decision, at [11]).

1. As to the seventh matter, the Tribunal found that the evidence did not give rise to a claim against the respondent. The Tribunal noted that the relevant insurance policy was not provided, and thus it was not known (for instance), whether the amount the subject of any claim to the respondent's insurer exceeds the insurance excess under the policy. The Tribunal stated that, in any case, a decision as to whether to pursue an insurance claim must be made in the interests of all Lot owners, and not by reference only to the matters put by the appellant in this proceeding. The Tribunal further stated that, in the exercise of its discretion under s 161 of the CLMA to make an order, noting that it was always open to the applicant to put a formal motion about any insurance claim to a general meeting of the respondent (Primary Decision, at [12]).

1. We spent some time during the appeal hearing discussing with the appellant what in substance were his grounds of appeal. We explained that the legal authorities permitted the Appeal Panel, where an appellant was not legally represented, to approach the issue by looking at the grounds of appeal generally, and to determine for itself whether a question of law had in fact been raised: Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 [28].
2. We understood the appellant's grounds of appeal to be as follows.
3. First, the appellant was denied procedural fairness at the Tribunal hearing as the hearing was conducted as a virtual hearing and not as an "in person" hearing.
4. Secondly, the appellant was denied procedural fairness as the fact the hearing was conducted as a virtual hearing prevented him from displaying the contents of his USB (which contained evidence on which he proposed to rely) at the Tribunal hearing. The appellant further contended in relation to the USB that he had been prevented from showing the Tribunal the materials contained on the USB with the result that the Tribunal did not consider those materials in the Primary Decision.
5. Thirdly, the appellant was denied procedural fairness as the fact the hearing was conducted as a virtual hearing prevented him establishing that witnesses relied on by the respondent had perjured themselves.
6. These three grounds raise questions of law (namely a denial of procedural fairness), for which leave to appeal is not required.
7. When asked at the hearing of the appeal whether there were any other reasons why the appeal should be allowed, the appellant spoke in strong terms about a variety of criticisms he had about the management of the scheme and that he was before the Tribunal to obtain justice and to have his fence paid for. In this context he made reference to the lack of toilet facilities, wheelchair access and the alleged unhealthy state of the swimming pool. However, none of these statements raised any recognisable ground of appeal.

1. In submissions that address all these grounds of appeal, the appellant submits that:

Due to the allowance for the hearing to be held as a virtual hearing which Senior Member Charles commented at the start of proceedings his expectations for it to be in person, there was no opportunity to fairly prove that the Respondent Managing Agent Stephen Pettit was committing Perjury supported by the present Chairperson of DP270482 Ratnam Chandrasegaran. The same was achieved in a hearing in 2024 heard by Senior Member Ross. I am appealing the ability for Senior Member Charles to make the orders I was seeking considering the inability for me to use the evidence on the USB card which I provided to both the responded and the senior member to cross examine the statements made by Stephen Pettit under oath. I appreciate the senior member acknowledging that he received the USB with hundreds of Photos and many many hours of video footage and a court transcript and voice recorded conversations. I set no unrealistic expectations or accept any possibilities that either party looked at it and matter of fact Stephen Pettit sent an email stating that it was not looked at by the managing agent. I am challenging the entire document from Senior Member Charles as not fulfilling the applications hearing in a fair manner and accusing the managing agent and Chairperson of Perjury.

1. As to the appellant's overarching submission that he was denied procedural fairness at the Tribunal hearing as the hearing was conducted as a virtual hearing and not as an "in person" hearing, we see nothing of substance in this ground of appeal. Not infrequently, the Tribunal conducts hearings by virtual means. Matters are able to proceed as they would have in an in- person hearing, with parties presenting their evidence, witnesses being cross-examined and the parties making oral submissions.
2. There is no issue that the Tribunal has the power to order that there be an AVL (or virtual) hearing rather than an "in person" hearing. This issue was discussed at some length by the Appeal Panel in Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 239 at [42]- [45].
3. The background to this issue is that on 10 June 2025, the parties were notified by the Tribunal that the matter had been listed for an in person hearing at Gosford on 29 July 2025.
4. On 22 and 23 July 2025, the Tribunal received a request that the respondent's Chair Mr Chandrasegaran and Mr Pettit attend the hearing by AVL. This was because Mr Chandrasegaran would be in Singapore at the time of the hearing, and because Mr Pettitt was based in Sydney.
5. On 23 July 2025, the Tribunal (being Senior Member Charles), granted that application, and the appellant was notified that day by email.
6. It appears that the appellant was not informed of the application for an AVL hearing, nor were his views sought. Nonetheless, he was informed of the Tribunal's decision and, as far as we can tell, made no complaint about this at the Tribunal hearing on 29 July 2025.
7. We pause to note that we know very little about the Tribunal hearing, as neither party filed a sound recording of the hearing or any transcript of the hearing, despite directions to do so if they wished to rely on what had occurred at the hearing.
8. Thus, we do not know what attempts the appellant made to engage with the Tribunal about the contents of the USB which he apparently sought to rely on at the hearing, nor do we know if the appellant raised the issue of alleged perjury by the respondent's witnesses. The respondent relied on one witness statement only, that being the witness statement of Mr Pettit, dated 6 September 2024. We do not know if the appellant required Mr Pettit for cross-examination or whether the appellant sought to cross-examine him at the hearing. From our discussions with the appellant at the hearing, it appears that the appellant did neither.
9. As to the Tribunal's alleged failure to review the materials on the USB, we have noted above that the Tribunal specifically referred to the USB at [2] of the Primary Decision. We are not satisfied simply on the appellant's "say-so", and particularly in the absence of the sound recording of the hearing and transcript, that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the USB's contents. We, therefore, reject the appellant's claims in this respect.
10. In our view, the holding of a hearing by AVL in and of itself is not a denial of procedural fairness. Nor do we see any substance in the submission that the appellant was prevented from displaying the contents of his USB at the Tribunal hearing or prevented from establishing that Mr Pettit had perjured himself. Furthermore, the appellant did not point to any specific material with reference to specific evidence from Mr Pettit as establishing that perjury had occurred. We should also add that so far as Mr Chandrasegaran was concerned the Tribunal referred only to sworn evidence by Mr Pettit and the appellant was unable to show that Mr Chandrasegaran had, in fact, given any sworn or unsworn evidence at the hearing.
11. To the extent that these matters raise questions of law, we see no error and we would not allow the appeal on any ground.

1. We should add that the appellant did not set out to try and demonstrate by reference to any specific evidentiary material before the Tribunal in the primary proceedings that the Tribunal had made any specific, material error of fact or that the decision was more than arguably wrong.
2. We consider that to a considerable extent the appellant has misunderstood the role of the Appeal Panel, which is to identify error by the Tribunal and, if satisfied that there is in fact an error, either correct that error by redetermining the matter itself or remitting the matter to the Tribunal for a further hearing.
3. Thus, oral submissions, in very general terms, to the effect of:
   • "I couldn't be heard the way I wanted to be heard";
   • "my evidence was treated as insignificant";
   • the respondent offered the appellant "no empathy or compassion";
   • "I'm here for justice and to get my fence paid for"; and
   • "I want the truth to be heard", and
   • the Tribunal's role "is to make the country a safer place",

1. As the Appeal Panel noted in Tanwar Institute of Professional Studies Pty Ltd v Ruggeri [2025] NSWCATAP 326, and in words that we adopt in this appeal, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the appellant is simply seeking to reagitate factual findings that were available to it. As the Appeal Panel has stated on many occasions, an appeal does not simply provide a losing party in the Tribunal with the opportunity to run their case again
2. As the Tribunal Guideline, Internal Appeals (November 2023) states at [4], generally, an appeal is not an opportunity to have a "second go" at a hearing.

1. We find that the appellant has raised questions of law in his appeal. However, we see no error by the Tribunal in respect of those questions of law.
2. During the appeal hearing, the respondent indicated that it would seek costs were the appellant unsuccessful.
3. We have included in our orders a timetable for the filing of submissions on the costs of the appeal.
4. We propose to deal with costs on the papers and without a hearing: see Westerweller v The Owners Strata Plan No 18482 [2023] NSWCATAP 113 at [85]. Any party opposing that approach must address that issue in their submissions.
5. Submissions are to be limited to five pages, and must identify the relevant costs rule.

(1) The appeal is dismissed.

(2) If the respondent seeks its costs of the appeal, it is to file and serve any submissions (and if necessary, evidence) as to costs on or before 27 February 2026.

(3) The appellant may respond on or before 13 March 2026.

(4) The respondent may reply on or before 20 March 2026.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.