1. The sole issue to be determined by the Tribunal is whether, at the time of the Tribunal's decision[4], the Applicant is of good character such that he meets the requirements of s 21(2)(h) of the Act.

1. The Applicant was born in Iraq in 1970 and is a citizen of New Zealand. He is aged 56.[5]
2. According to the material before it the Applicant:
   • departed Iraq on 13 December 1987.[6]
   • resided in Jordan between 14 December 1987 and November 1989.[7]
   • resided in Türkiye between November 1989 and June 1992.[8]
   • resided in Greece between June 1992 and September 1993.[9]
   • arrived in New Zealand on 27 September 1993.[10]
   • obtained New Zealand citizenship on 9 February 1998.[11]
   • first arrived in Australia on 1 June 2003 on a Subclass 444 Special Category (Class TY) visa.[12]
   • He last arrived in Australia on a Subclass 444 Special Category (Class TY) visa 26 June 2016.[13] He currently holds this visa which was granted on that date.

1. The Applicant was convicted in New Zealand Wellington District Court on 18 August 2008 for Drive with Excess Blood Alcohol Content.[14]
2. The Applicant falsely declared on 17 December 2008[15], 11 May 2009[16], 23 August 2010[17], 19 January 2013[18], 26 December 2013[19], 4 January 2015[20], 11 March 2015[21], 20 May 2015[22], 19 July 2015[23], 7 October 2015[24], 7 February 2016[25] and 22 June 2016[26] on Incoming Passenger Cards that he did not have any criminal convictions.
3. On 6 December 2020, the Applicant applied for a Skilled Independent (Subclass 189) New Zealand Stream) visa.[27] The Applicant was asked if he had ever been convicted of an offence in any country (including any conviction which is now removed from official records). The Applicant responded 'no'.[28]
4. In his Application submitted on 19 November 2023, the Applicant was asked if he had ever been convicted, or found guilty of, any offences overseas or in Australia (include all traffic offences which went to court, including offences declared in your permeant residence application, and any spent convictions in any country including any conviction which is not removed from official records. The Applicant responded 'no'.[29]
5. On 24 June 2025, the Applicant submitted a Personal particulars for assessment including character assessment (Form 80). In question 36, he was asked if he had ever been convicted of an offence in any country (including any conviction which is now removed from official records). The Applicant responded 'no'.[30]

1. On 26 April 2024, the Minister's department wrote to the Applicant requesting further information to assess his Application, namely; police clearances from countries other than New Zealand and Australia where the Applicant had resided for more than 90 days since turning 18 years old.[31] Based on the material before the Tribunal, this meant the Applicant was required to provide police clearances from Türkiye, Jordan and Greece.
2. A further request for police clearances was sent to the Applicant on 14 June 2024.[32]
3. It appears that the Applicant misunderstood the request because he also made enquiries about obtaining a police clearance from Iraq notwithstanding that he ceased living there when he was 17 years old and has not returned since that time. He wrote to the Department on 26 June 2024 informing them he was having difficulties obtaining a police clearance from Iraq through the Embassy and sought guidance as to how to proceed.[33]
4. On 6 August 2024, the Department sent the Applicant a further request for information. This requested that he complete a character statutory declaration and provide an Iraqi Non-conviction certificate. Details about how to do this were also included.[34]
5. On 14 August 2024, the Applicant signed a statutory declaration where he declared that he had never been convicted of any offence in any country.[35] On the same day, he forwarded the completed statutory declaration along with an email he had sent to the Iraqi Embassy regarding obtaining a police clearance.[36] The Department advised the Applicant on 9 October 2024 that it could not open the attachments and requested that the documents be uploaded again.[37] The Applicant did this on 10 October 2024.[38]
6. As noted above, the Application was refused on 14 November 2024.
7. Since the Application was refused and the Review Application was lodged, there have been communications between the Minister's lawyers and the Applicant regarding his ability to obtain penal clearances in Iraq[39], Türkiye, Jordan and Greece.[40]
8. In its Statement of Position dated 28 April 2025, the Minister contended that it was 'prepared to liaise with the [Iraqi] overseas post to determine whether a waiver (for the requirement to obtain an overseas penal clearance certificate from Iraq) is appropriate in ... circumstances [where the Applicant has never held any Iraqi identification (except his birth certificate), has not resided in Iraq since he was 17 years old, and has no family remaining in Iraq].'[41]
9. In relation to overseas penal clearances for Jordan, Türkiye and Greece.[42], the Minister contended in a Statement of Position dated 28 April 2025 that the Tribunal cannot be positively satisfied that the Applicant is of good character in the absence of these penal clearances.[43] This position was confirmed by the Minister in its Further Statement of Position dated 13 August 2025.[44]

1. The Applicant gave evidence at the hearing and was cross-examined by the Minister's representative. The Tribunal also heard evidence from Mr Y, personal friend and business partner of the Applicant.
2. The Minister relied on its Statement of Position dated 28 April 2025[45], Further Statement of Position dated 13 August 2025,[46] and Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 28 October 2025 (SOFIC).[47] In its SOFIC, the Minister contends that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that the Applicant is a person of good character and should affirm the decision under review.

The Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship represents full and formal membership of the community of the Commonwealth of Australia, and Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting all Australians, while respecting their diversity. > > The Parliament recognises that persons conferred Australian Citizenship enjoy these rights and undertake to accept these obligations:

(a) by pledging loyalty to Australia and its people; and

(b) by sharing their democratic beliefs; and

(c) by respecting their rights and liberties; and

(d) by upholding and obeying the laws of Australia.

1. Subsection 21(1) of the Act provides that a person may make an application to the Minister to become an Australian citizen.
2. Section 24(1A) of the Act provides the Minister must not approve a person becoming an Australian citizen unless that person is eligible under one of ss 21(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) or (8). There is no suggestion in this reviewable decision that any subsection other than

s 21(2)(h) is in issue. 3. The term 'good character' is not defined in the Act. The Australian Citizenship Policy Statement and the Citizenship Procedural Instructions provide guidance for decision makers. The policy relevant to this application is found in Citizenship Procedural Instruction No.15 ('CPI 15') - Assessing Good Character under the Act. 4. The Instructions reflect government policy and are not binding on the Tribunal. However, in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration, and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (Drake No 2), Brennan J stated that the Tribunal should adopt a practice of applying lawful government policy unless there are cogent reasons not to do so.[48] 5. More recently, in GJDB and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (GJDB)[49] the President confirmed that these Instructions (in that case, CPI 16) do not bind the Tribunal as a matter of law.[50] The President referred to three types of policies. Two of the three are relevant for present purposes:

'[20] The first type of policy seeks to provide guidance to public officers about how they should exercise a discretion conferred by a statutory instrument. For example, a statute may confer a discretion on public officers to make grants of up to $50,000 to flood victims without specifying any criteria for determining the amount of the grant in any particular case or class of cases. ...[51]

[21] This is the type of policy in respect of which Brennan J stated in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] 2 ALD 634 (Drake (No 2)] that 'there are substantial reasons which favour only cautious and sparing departures' and that 'in general, it would be manifestly imprudent for the Tribunal to override a ministerial policy and to adopt a general administrative policy of its own.'[[52]] Brennan J went on to state that the Tribunal should adopt a practice of applying lawful ministerial policy, unless there were cogent reasons to the contrary.[[53]] His Honour observed that adoption of guiding policies by the government promoted consistency in decision-making and that, whilst the government is well equipped to formulate broad policies, the Tribunal is not.[[54]] [55]

[25] The third type of policy seeks to provide guidance to public officers by setting out a process of reasoning they must follow in deciding whether they are satisfied that a particular statutory requirement is met. Such a policy cannot bind the Tribunal, as the Tribunal is obliged to form its own view about the correct or preferable process of reasoning it should follow. In performing its task, the Tribunal must give an active intellectual consideration of the material before it in a fulsome way, and not only in accordance with a structure imposed on the decision-maker by an executive policy.[56] The Tribunal may consider the logic underpinning the process of reasoning set out in the policy and may adopt it if it is persuaded by it and concludes that it is preferable to all alternative processes of reasoning that are argued before it. In such a case, the Tribunal reaches its own view about the correct or preferable process of reasoning to determine whether it reaches a state of satisfaction after taking into account not only the policy but all other submissions and matters before it that are relevant to whether it should reach the state of satisfaction.[57]

[26] In my opinion, CPI 16 falls into the third ...[because] it sets out a state of satisfaction that a decision-maker either reaches or does not reach. It follows that CPI 16 cannot be characterised as a policy which seeks to provide guidance on the exercise of a statutory discretion. Rather, it is a policy which sets out a process of reasoning to be followed in deciding whether the state of satisfaction to which s 24(3) refers is reached. In the case of a policy such as CPI 16, the desirable consistency in administrative decision-making to which Drake (No 2) referred can be achieved by applying the same legal principles to attain similar outcomes in factually similar cases.[58]

[27] In my opinion, in the case of a statutory provision such as s 24(3) of the Act, to require the Tribunal to follow a process of reasoning that is not set out in the section itself in order to achieve consistency would unduly constrain the Tribunal and potentially compromise its ability to decide the outcome by a different process of reasoning which it considers is more appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case. There is no support for adopting such a formulaic approach to merits review reasoning in Drake (No 2) or any other authority.'[59]

1. In SBFH and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,[60] Senior Member Manetta formed the view that GJDB also applies to the question of 'good character' and decided the case without reference to CPI 15. In doing so, Senior Member Manetta stated that 'if the Instructions are applied by the Tribunal in any given case, it is not because the Tribunal is bound to do so as a matter of law: it is because the Tribunal has formed the view that they are a useful and appropriate way to approach the question before the Tribunal in a particular matter.'[61]
2. In the present case, 'Good character' was considered by the predecessor to this Tribunal, as presently constituted, in Dawlatshahi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[62] as follows:

4. Pursuant to s. 24(1A) of the Act, the Minister (and hence now the Tribunal) must not approve an application for Australian citizenship unless the applicant satisfies the relevant eligibility requirement under s. 21 of the Act; ... s. 21(2)(h). The Tribunal must be satisfied that the Applicant is of 'good character' at the time of this decision by forming an "opinion requiring an evaluative judgement" and by reaching "an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character" BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574 at [54]- [55].

5. In determining 'good character' the Tribunal is to look holistically at an applicant's behaviour over time to be satisfied of 'enduring moral qualities' within the prospective Australian citizen. Such phrase, as guided by the Citizenship Policy Instruction 15 - Assessing Good Character under the Citizenship Act (CPI), encompasses the following:

(a) Characteristics which have been demonstrated over a long period of time;

(c) Behaving in an ethical manner, conforming to the rules and values of Australian society.

6. CPI 15 further sets out examples of characteristics of a person of good character and they do not include those who practice deception or fraud in their dealings with the Australian Government or other organisations. For example, intentionally providing false personal information (such as fraudulent work experience or qualification documents); or other material deception during visa and citizenship applications.

7. Section 50 of the Act provides that it is an offence to deliberately make, or cause to make, a false or misleading statement, or conceal circumstances in relation to an application for Australian citizenship.

8. The Tribunal is to consider a range of events and conduct connected with the Applicant: Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 44; (2015) 231 FCR 128 at [60].

9. Justice O'Bryan in BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574, engaged in a substantial analysis of the meaning of 'good character' in this context. Since not defined, the Parliament intended the term to be used in a broad way:

(a) One looks to the enduring moral qualities of a person and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community, although the latter may provide evidence of the former;

(b) It does not have a fixed and precise content;

(c) It imports a discretionary value judgement to be made by reference to undefined factual matters confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory provisions; and

(d) It requires judgement as to whether any proven deficiencies in the moral qualities of a person are sufficient to deny the person citizenship.

10. Justice O'Bryan accepted that "[t]he subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act is informed by its Preamble which states:

The Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship represents full and formal membership of the community of the Commonwealth of Australia, and Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting all Australians, while respecting their diversity.

The Parliament recognises that persons conferred Australian citizenship enjoy these rights and undertake to accept these obligations:

(a) By pledging loyalty to Australia and its people;

(c) By respecting their rights and liberties; and

(d) By upholding and obeying the laws of Australia.

These ideals of diversity, democracy and liberty are to be assessed "by moral qualities that are regarded as a necessary concomitant of Australian citizenship".

11. As to the 'satisfied' requirement in s. 21(2)(h) of the Act, the word:

"is not amenable to the application of an evidentiary burden of proof, such as the balance of probabilities... the decision is an administrative decision to which the rules of evidence are inapplicable, and the evidentiary burden of proof inapposite... the applicant's good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgement. A standard of proof, such as balance of probabilities, is incapable of application to such an opinion".

"The absence of an evidentiary burden of proof does not mean there is an absence of a legal standard of satisfaction. In the context... satisfaction requires that the decision-maker reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character. It is not sufficient for the decision-maker to believe that there is a chance that the applicant is a person of good character; equally, it is not necessary for the decision-maker to have a high degree of confidence that the applicant is a person of good character".

12. The decision-making power is therefore to be exercised reasonably.

13. Part of the task is to assess the relative weight to be given to conduct that reflects positively or negatively on the Applicant's character.

• Part 4 of CPI 15 sets out the characteristics that are generally expected of a person considered to be of good character, providing that:

As a general proposition, a person who is of good character would:

• respect and abide by the law in Australia and other countries;

• not be violent, involved in illegal drugs or unlawful sexual activity, and not cause harm to others through their conduct (for example multiple and/or repeated instances of recklessness exhibited by negligent or drink driving, excessive speeding or driving without a licence).

1. Part 11 of CPI 15 provides that decision-makers should consider all of an applicant's interactions with the Department, including visa and citizenship applications, in making this assessment.[63] Decision-makers can also consider whether the applicant has disclosed past criminal offences and can look to visa applications and passenger card declarations to make this assessment,[64] and if an applicant has knowingly presented incorrect information, this may reflect on the person's character.[65]
2. Ultimately, CPI 15 provides for decision-makers to weigh up all relevant factors to decide whether the applicant is of good character. The decision-maker must look holistically at the applicant's behaviour over time and reach a conclusion about the person's enduring

moral quality. In that regard, the decision-maker is generally to weigh the offending behaviour against any mitigating circumstances which may indicate the person is of good character despite adverse information. This includes the length of time since the offence was committed, whether they have accepted responsibility and shown remorse for their conduct and whether there were extenuating circumstances relating to the offence.[66]

1. The Tribunal has considered the documentary material lodged by the parties, the testimony of the Applicant, who was cross-examined and questioned by the Minister, as well as the oral testimony given by Mr Y, who was also cross-examined and questioned by the Minister.
2. The Applicant provided character references to support his claim that he is a person of good character. For the Minister it is submitted that the character references provided by the Applicant should not be given weight because they do not demonstrate the Applicant's behaviour in a domestic setting. The Tribunal agrees that they should be regarded with caution because of the tendency for friends and work associates to focus only on what might be helpful. The Tribunal also accepts that limited weight should be afforded to the references of Mr P and Mr W as these references do not demonstrate they are aware of the Applicant's prior convictions. Nevertheless, it counts in the Applicant's favour that Mr M and Mr S have each stated that they are aware of his offences and attest to his good character. Overall, the Tribunal has placed limited weight on this evidence in assessing whether the Applicant has demonstrated the 'enduring moral qualities' associated with 'good character'.

1. The Applicant gave evidence that on the night of the offence he was attending a celebration after his football team won. He was unwell at that time and taking strong antibiotics. He was told by his medical practitioner not to drink alcohol. His friends encouraged to have one drink. He eventually agreed and had one 30 ml shot of vodka. He did not realise one 30 ml shot would affect him and did not believe he was over the limit when he drove. He was picked up by the police five hundred metres away from when he had been celebrating. He said he was an 'idiot' for having that one drink when he had been told not to and he made a 'mistake' 'big time' by driving. He had a solicitor represent him at Court and received a fine and licence disqualification for 6 months. He then applied to the Court for a limited licence to drive during this time between 9am and 12pm each day so he could continue to operate his business. This was granted: his licence was disqualified for 28 days and he was granted a limited licence for 6 months (the initial disqualification period).
2. The Minister contended that there were no victims, that he was picked up by police 500 metres from where he had been celebrating and the offence does not appear to have been premeditated. It was also contended that there are mitigating factors including that the offence took place 18 years ago and although it was serious, he had not committed any offences since then. It does not accept it is a case of extenuating circumstances in the way envisaged by CPI 15 but conceded the Applicant is law abiding, a productive member of society, has a stable family life and involvement in the community although this appears to be linked to his business commitments.
3. Aside from the Ministry for Justice Convictions History Report, there is no documentary material before the Court detailing the charges, the blood alcohol content reading, the amount of the fine, if there was a minimum disqualification period for the charges, how long the Applicant's licence was disqualified for, or for the application made to the Court by the Applicant for a limited licence during the disqualification period. There is also no evidence regarding the medication he had been prescribed or how this may interact with alcohol. These issues were not contested by the Minister and the Tribunal found the Applicant's evidence to be frank and credible and accepts his evidence that he only had the one celebratory drink, that he was on heavy antibiotics at the time, that his licence was disqualified for 28 days and the Court granted him a limited licence to drive for 3 hours per day during the disqualification period.
4. There is no 'rule of thumb' for establishing how much time must pass for a person to demonstrate that they are now of good character.[67] The Tribunal notes that paragraph 14.1 of CPI 15 provides that in determining the period of the enduring/lasting moral qualities of an applicant, the nature of the offence is more relevant to whether or not the person is of good character than the period of time since the crime was committed. In Assafiri and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[68] Senior Member Toohey stated that:

Time of itself is not enough. The "enduring moral qualities" of which good character speaks must be demonstrated objectively over a sufficient period. How long that will be will depend on all the circumstances of the case_.[69]_

1. The Tribunal has had regard to the fact that the offence was committed 18 years ago and there have been no further charges, court appearances or convictions in New Zealand or Australia since 2008.
2. Notwithstanding that drink driving is a serious offence, there is nothing in the Convictions History Report that indicates that the Applicant has driven in a way that put the New Zealand public at risk. He has not been convicted of the offence of dangerous or culpable driving for example. The Tribunal has also taken into account that he was fined[70] and successful in overturning his disqualification period and granted a limited licence, and that it is the Applicant's only drink driving offence.
3. In its SOFIC, the Minister contended that the single offence he committed in New Zealand weighs against a finding that he is of good character.[71] The Minister does also contend that the Applicant's lack of further offending in New Zealand, a country he had resided for approximately 23 years weighs in his favour, as does the fact that the Department's internal Iraqi checks did not disclose any adverse findings.[72] The Tribunal agrees with this contention.
4. The relevant statutory question is simply whether the Applicant at the present time is of good character and in the Tribunal's view, that is reliably assessed by reference to the objective criterion of an absence of offending over many consecutive years. Coupled with the oral testimony of Mr Y, attesting to the Applicant's good character, these matters weigh in the Applicant's favour.

1. Paragraph 4 of CPI 15 recognises that a person of good character would not practise deception or fraud in their dealings with the Australian Government, for example they would not intentionally provide false personal information or other material deception during visa and citizenship applications or conceal criminal convictions. As noted above, the Applicant provided false information in his Application, Subclass 189 application, his Form 80 and Incoming Passenger Cards by failing to disclose that he has been convicted of 'drive with excess blood alcohol content' in 2008.
2. In Re Harry Taradel and Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[73], Senior Member McCabe observed:

"... dishonesty in dealings with the department is a very serious matter. The integrity of the immigration system depends on individuals telling the truth about their personal circumstances and history. The department is not in a position to know what applicants know, after all. When dishonesty comes to light, it must be dealt with firmly to deter others who might intend acting dishonestly...". [74]

1. The Applicant gave evidence that he had no idea he was convicted. He thought convictions were connected to serious criminal offences like murder. His lawyer never said he was convicted and because he was able to get his licence back after his lawyers' submissions to the Court, he never had any reason to believe he had been convicted. He said if he knew that his record would include a conviction he would have challenged it in court; he honestly had 'no idea'. He said when he answered 'no' on the various applications, he believed he was answering honestly and was telling truth based on his knowledge. He ticked 'no' inadvertently' every time. He understood he lost his licence because he plead guilty to driving after having a drink but 'until today', he did was not aware this resulted in a criminal conviction.
2. When asked about the Clean Slate Scheme in New Zealand, the Applicant said he was not aware of it. He said he applied for the police clearance from New Zealand, and it did not include any convictions. When it was put to him by the Minister's representative that he was reckless not to disclose it, he said that he did not know it was a conviction so how could he have disclosed it or been reckless not to disclose it. He said he had applied for a police clearance in the past in 2020 and again in 2024, and both indicated that he had no convictions.
3. The Minister contends that the Tribunal should find that the Incoming Passenger Cards and failure to disclose criminal convictions in the various departmental forms amount to dishonest dealings with the department such that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that the Applicant is of good character:
4. The Tribunal has also considered the Applicant's claim that his non-disclosures were inadvertent and caused by him not knowing he had been convicted. In his closing, the Minister's representative repeated the Applicant's evidence that he did not understand he had been convicted of drink driving. He also stated that there is no evidence to suggest that there was 'intentional deception' or at least evidence does not appear to 'reach that level'. He also stated that there is no evidence to impugn the Applicant's evidence that he had received police clearances in the past indicating that he had no criminal conviction[75].
5. Considering all of the evidence before the Tribunal, it is satisfied that the Applicant did not intend to deceive the department. It appears that he was convicted by operation of law (not by discretion of the Court) and given that he had not applied for a police clearance for many years, his offending would not have been apparent because of the operation of the Clean Slate Scheme. Given that the conviction occurred more than 18 years ago, the Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant was reckless in not making further enquiries to ascertain if he did have a criminal conviction. Whilst his evidence is misguided that he had never been stopped by Customs or immigration in the past despite his repeated false disclosures on his incoming passenger cards, there is nothing in the evidence before the Tribunal that indicates he was aware of this criminal conviction prior to the refusal of the Application, or that he was trying to conceal them. In the circumstances, despite this error, the Tribunal does not weigh these non-disclosures in the balance against him.

1. The Tribunal notes that the Minister does not press police clearances for Türkiye, Jordan or Iraq, because it appears the department have been able to ascertain the required information through internal checks.
2. However, according to its SOFIC, it maintains that 'unless and until' the Applicant is able to demonstrate further meaningful steps that he has taken in order to obtain his Greek penal clearance (via the steps indicated in the Minister's Further Statement of Position), it is appropriate for the Tribunal to apply the policy in CPOI 15 and conclude that there is before it insufficient evidence to be satisfied that the Applicant is of good character.[76]
3. The Minister refers to an earlier decision of the Tribunal in Terzis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship).[77] In that case, Mr Terzis was 54 years old and resided in South Africa until the age of 28 years. He had not been able to obtain a police clearance from South Africa but had made significant efforts to try and do so. Applying the policy and relying on Re Drake (No 2), the Presiding Member did not consider that there was any reason to depart from the policy guidance requiring a penal clearance. The Minister submitted that the Applicant has not made significant efforts to obtain a police clearance from Greece.
4. The question that arises for the Tribunal is whether to apply CP15 in so far as it requires the Applicant to provide a penal clearance from Greece or take further steps to obtain one.
5. Respectfully, as noted above, the well-known remarks in Re Drake (No 2) have been held to be directed towards guidelines issued by the Minister to govern the exercise of a wide discretionary power.[78] The Tribunal in Tetris decided did not consider there was any reason to depart from the policy guidance that overseas penal clearances are required, particularly in circumstances where the period outside Australia accounted for approximately eight years of the Applicant's adult life, and formed the view, that without the overseas clearance, the Tribunal is unable to be satisfied that the Applicant is of good character.[79] In other words, in that case, the Tribunal formed the view CPI 15 were a useful and appropriate way to approach the question before the Tribunal in that particular matter.'[80]

6. In the present case, whilst the Tribunal accepts the logic underpinning the policy guidelines with respect to penal clearances, in circumstances where:

• The Applicant resided in Greece for just over 1 year 34 years ago
  • The Applicant has resided in 6 countries in his 56 years, including almost 20 years in Australia without a blemish on his record
  • The Applicant resided in New Zealand for 13 years and had only had one transgression with the law 18 years ago which was an error of judgment explained by him having one alcoholic beverage whilst taking prescribed medication,
  • The Applicant has provided evidence of two attempts to obtain police clearances from Greece, by sending emails to email addresses previously appearing on a link provided by the department,
  • The Applicant has a strong employment and business history in New Zealand and Australia
  • The Applicant has a stable family life being married with children
  • There is no information before the Tribunal to indicate that he has been or has ever been involved in antisocial behaviour or conduct
  • The Tribunal heard evidence from an Australian citizen who has known the Applicant for more than 30 years that he is an honest, trustworthy, and decent family man, and a man of good character and standing in the community.

7. In view of the above, and the material before the Tribunal regarding the Applicant's life, and his character, it is the Tribunal's view that a period of 14 months does not represent a significant period in the Applicant's life. It is also the Tribunal's view that even if his attempts at obtaining the Greek police clearance were perfunctory, or insufficient from the department's viewpoint, he did make attempts to obtain the clearance. It is the Tribunal's view that it can appropriately decide this case without reference to that aspect of the Instructions (i.e., including without further evidence of attempts to obtain a police clearance or provision of the Greek penal clearance).

1. The grant of Australian citizenship is a privilege not bestowed lightly.[81] In determining whether the Applicant is of good character for the purposes of s 21(2)(h) of the Act, the Tribunal is required to reach an 'affirmative belief' that the Applicant is a person of good character.[82]
2. In answering the question of whether the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant is of good character, the Tribunal should weigh the totality of the evidence.
3. There is sufficient evidence before the Tribunal for it to reach an affirmative belief that the Applicant is of good character.
4. First, the Applicant's first and only offence occurred 18 years ago. This weights in his favour.
5. Second, Mr Y gave strong compelling evidence attesting to the Applicant's character. This evidence weighs in his favour.
6. Third, although the Applicant has provided incorrect answers in earlier forms (including incoming passenger cards) and applications to the department including in his Application, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant did not intend to deceive the department. Or distract attention away from his conviction. His answers were truthful and his belief that he was not convicted was truthfully held albeit wrong. His errors were inadvertent. The Tribunal does not weigh this in the balance against him.
7. The concept of 'satisfaction' is an important one. The drafting of the section makes it clear that if the Tribunal is not satisfied that an applicant is of good character, then it must find the eligibility criterion is unmet. The concept of 'satisfaction' connotes in the Tribunal's view an actual persuasion of the good character of the applicant before the Tribunal.[83] In terms of his criminal conviction, enough time has passed since the charged offending to establish a pattern of good behaviour. In terms of his failure to disclose his criminal convictions, as noted above, the Tribunal has found this was not deliberate and does not represent any dishonest or criminal offending.
8. All in all, having weighed matters carefully, there is little doubt that despite a single error of judgment 18 years ago, the Applicant has lived a law-abiding focus in the community. He is a successful businessman with strong family values. He has the support and confidence of a peer from Iraq who is himself well-settled in the Australian community and has given positive evidence about him.

1. In all the circumstances, the Tribunal has decided that it is satisfied that the Applicant is of good character as at the time of its decision. Having reached this conclusion, the Tribunal's decision will be to set aside the decision under review and to substitute a decision to this effect.

[1] Hearing Book, Exhibit HB1 (HB), HB 237.

[4] See VFWQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 230.

[11] HB 151, see also, HB 185 (New Zealand passport).

[39] Email dated 21 February 2025 from Minister's lawyers to the Applicant regarding Iraq: HB 243, the Applicant's email response dated 26 February 2025 including completed Form 1563, and emails sent between the Applicant and Iraqi Consulate: HB 242-265.

[40] Case conference on 7 February 2025, Statement of Position dated 28 April 2025 (HB 269-274) and Minister's Further Statement of Position dated 13 August 2025 (HB 275-277).

[42] On 4 July 2025, the Applicant provided four emails to the Minister's lawyers regarding his attempts to obtain police clearances from Jordan, Türkiye and Greece: HB 266-268.

[43] HB 274, [27], see also HB 273, [18] where the Minister cites _Re Chen and Minister for Immigration and Citizenshi_p [2007] AATA 1815, at [18].

[45] HB 274, [27], see also HB 273, [18] where the Minister cites _Re Chen and Minister for Immigration and Citizenshi_p [2007] AATA 1815, at [18].

[48] (1979) 2 ALD 634, 645 per Brennan J, which was cited with approval in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray [1994] FCA 1052; (1994) 33 ALD 13, 30 per French and Drummond JJ. See also; Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another [2019] FCAFC 79. See also Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173, 193-6 [52]-[60].

[49] [2023] AATA 3245.

[53] Ibid, at [645]. See also Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173, 193-6 [52]-[60].

[54] Drake No 2, at [640], [643], [644].

[56] G v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1229; (2018) 266 FCR 511, 564 [266]; BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [11]. See also National Disability Insurance Agency v Foster [2023] FCAFC 11; (2023) 295 FCR 521, 536-7 [60]-[67].

[60] SBFH and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Citizenship) [2025] ARTA 2645 (12 December 2025).

[61] Ibid at [7] referring to GJDB at [23].

[62] [2021] AATA 2437 at [4] to [13].

[68] [2014] AATA 35.

[70] CPI 15 provides that the length of a sentence imposed on a person should be considered when assessing the relative seriousness of an offence.

[73] [2005] AATA 1255.

[77] [2025] ARTA 230.

[78] See [2023] AATA 3245 at [21] and [26] - [27].

[79] [2025] ARTA 230 at [57].

[80] Ibid at [7] referring to GJDB at [23].

[81] Fenn v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931 at [8].

[82] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 at [55].

[83] See in this connection the discussion in SBFH and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (ART decision, Senior Member N Manetta, delivered 12 December 2025).