DINCER -v- GIANCRISTOFARO [2015] WADC 49 (7 May 2015)

Chin v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 110

De Alwis v The State Of Western Australia [No 2] [2015] WASCA 42

Drexel London (a firm) v Gove (Blackman ) [2009] WASCA 181

Echo Tasmania Pty Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries PLC [2008] FCAFC 58

Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30

Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) [1938] HCA 35; (1938) 60 CLR 438

Instant Transportable Offices Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd [2012] WADC 99

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550

Marsh v Baxter [2015] WASC 187; (2014) 46 WAR 377

Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2004] WASCA 149; (2004) 29 WAR 273

O'Conner v SP Bray Ltd [1937] HCA 18; (1937) 56 CLR 464

Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 148

Re Burton, Ex parte Lowe [2003] WASCA 306

Re Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64; (1979) 2 ALD 33; (1979) 36 FLR 482

Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2002] FCA 30

Simonsen v Legge [2010] WASCA 238

Sims v Suda Ltd [2015] WASCA 65

Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director Of The Department of Conservation and Land Management [2012] WASCA 79

Sullivan v Department of Transport [1978] FCA 48; (1978) 20 ALR 323

Waters v Williams [2013] WADC 169

It appears the appellant's claim is of actual and apprehended bias. In the case of apprehended bias, the test is whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: The Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v De Alwis [2006] WASCA 198 [64].

The apprehension of bias principle involves two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge or juror to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. Second, there must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 [8].

...

In judging whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, it should be assumed that the lay observer would base his or her opinion on a fair assessment of the judge's conduct in the context of the trial as a whole: Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263. Kirby A-CJ said in Galea:

It will often be necessary with a self-represented litigant for a trial judge to intervene in order to stop irrelevant matters being raised and to prevent unnecessary delays or disruptions: Michael v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 100 [65]; De Alwis v De Alwis (Unreported, WASC, Library No 930439, 12 August 1993).

(1993) 47 FCR 264

(1997) 18 WAR 450

(1938) 60 CLR 438

(1985) 159 CLR 550

(2014) 46 WAR 377

(2011) 244 CLR 427

(2001) 205 CLR 507

(2004) 29 WAR 273

(1937) 56 CLR 464

(1979) 36 FLR 482

(1978) 20 ALR 323

(2000) 205 CLR 337

(1990) 19 NSWLR 263