1. Hughes Holdings and Investments No.600 Pty Ltd (the 'Respondent') holds pastoral leases over two properties, Inverway Station and Riveren Staton, in the Northern Territory. Wiso Oil Pty Ltd is the holder of Petroleum Exploration Permit 200 (the 'Petroleum Interest') over Inverway Station and Riveren Station. Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd is authorised by Wiso Oil Pty Ltd to be the operator of the Petroleum Interest. In this decision, Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd and Wiso Oil Pty Ltd shall be collectively referred to as the 'Applicants'.
2. Land Access Agreements ('LAA') over both Inverway Station and Riveren Station have been negotiated and, by order of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Wiso Oil Pty Ltd & Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd v Hughes Investments [2025] NTSC 2, have been executed and lodged with the relevant Minister. The Respondent seeks its reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred by the Respondent in connection with participating in the LAA negotiations pursuant to regulation 17(1)(b) of the Petroleum Regulations 2020 (the 'Pet Regs'), and its reasonable costs of participating in an Alternate Dispute Resolution ('ADR') process under Part 4, Division 4 of the Pet Regs.[1]
3. The quantum of costs sought to be recovered by the Respondent is $49,500 in relation to Inverway Station and $16,500 in relation to Riveren Station. The Applicants refused to pay the costs and seek a determination from the Tribunal as to the costs owing under either regulation 17 or 28 of the Pet Regs.

1. The Respondents purchased Inverway Station and Riveren Station from Lavington Pty Ltd and HPPL Services Pty Ltd in April 2022. Prior to the purchase, Lavington Pty Ltd had been in negotiations with the Applicants for a LAA.
2. That the negotiations between the Applicants and the Lavington Pty Ltd over the LAA were well advanced at the time of the sale of Inverway Station and Riveren Station to the Respondent is evidenced by an email from Stephen Skinner on behalf of Lavington Pty Ltd to a representative of the Respondent dated 4 April 2022. The email states, inter alia:

Over several months, Lavington Pty Ltd has been in negotiations with Blue Energy Limited as to the contents of a land access and compensation deed relating to Inverway Pastoral Station. Attached is the final form of the draft agreed between Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd, Wiso Oil Pty Ltd and Lavington Pty Ltd relating to Inverway Pastoral Station. This document could also be used for Riveren Pastoral Station.

Given that a sale and purchase of the pastoral stations was imminent, Lavington did not enter into the agreement but finalised it with a view to offering it to the purchaser of the pastoral stations. However, Lavington has no objection to your client entering into the agreement with Blue Energy with appropriate modifications.

1. The Applicants, pursuant to regulation 15(1) of the Pet Regs, issued negotiation notices in relation to the LAA. The negotiation notice relating to Inverway Station was issued on 2 May 2023, and that relating to Riveren Station was issued on 1 December 2023.
2. Correspondence between the parties indicates that, by 10 October 2023, negotiations as to the terms of the Inverway Station LAA had concluded. In an email from the Respondent's lawyers to the Applicants' lawyers dated 10 October 2023, it was noted:

We confirm LAA for Inverway Station has been provided to Hughes and we are awaiting provision of Hughes' executed counterpart of same.

Subsequent to receipt of the executed LAA counterpart from Hughes, we will revert to Blue Energy to arrange for full execution.

We are continuing to await instructions from Hughes in relation to secondary LAA proposed for Hughes' Riveren Station. We will revert to Blue Energy once we are in receipt of Hughes' instructions in respect of same.

1. By an email dated 14 November 2023, lawyers for the Applicants forwarded to the Respondent's legal representatives a draft LAA for Riveren Station. In the email, it was noted that the LAA terms were identical to those in the Inverway Station LAA.
2. On 15 January 2024, the Respondent's lawyers sent two emails to the Applicants' lawyers, one of which related to Inverway Station and the other to Riveren Station. In relation to what is set out below, the two emails are identical.

We confirm that our Office is in receipt of Hughes' executed LAA counterpart for this Matter.

Notwithstanding, Hughes requires Blue Energy's commitment to attend to reimbursement of Hughes' reasonable and necessarily incurred legal costs in this Matter prior to Hughes exchanging their executed LAA counterpart with Blue Energy.

As Blue Energy would be aware, clause 5.5 of the LAA states Blue Energy agrees to pay Hughes' costs and expenses of the kind referred to in regulation 17 and 28 of the Petroleum Regulations 2020 (NT).

Regulation 17 provides the interest holder (Blue Energy) must pay the reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred by the designated person (Hughes) in connection with participating in the negotiation of the LAA.

1. Attached to the emails were Emanate Legal Tax Invoice No 14285 relating to Inverway Station in the sum of $49,500 inclusive of GST and Emanate Legal Tax Invoice No 14286 relating to Riveren Station in the sum of $16,500 inclusive of GST. The Respondent stipulated that executed LAAs would be provided to the Applicants only when the Applicants paid, or committed to pay, the above-noted invoices.
2. At [43] of Wiso Oil Pty Ltd & Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd v Hughes Investments [2025] NTSC 2 Blokland J, in reference to Invoice No 14285, found that:

The invoice is vague, refers to 'steps' and 'professional fees' and likely did not comply with the requirements under the Regulations to provide evidence of reasonable costs necessarily incurred.

1. Regulation 17(3) of the Pet Regs provides that a request for the payment of reasonable legal or accounting costs necessarily incurred by the Respondent in connection with participating in negotiations with the Applicants for a LAA must be in writing (regulation 17(3)(a)) and "provide reasonable details and evidence of the costs that are being claimed" (regulation 17(3)(b)). Neither Invoice No 14285 nor Invoice No 14286 satisfied the requirements of regulation 17(3)(b).
2. Blokland J concluded that the actions of the Respondent in refusing to provide the executed LAAs for Inverway Station and Riveren Station until such time as its costs were paid appeared obstructive and were not made in good faith.

The [Respondent's] conduct undermines the operation of the Act and Regulations to the extent that the only conclusion to be drawn is that it is not taking the steps required in good faith. The conduct appears obstructive. The Act requires all parties to act in good faith. The issue of costs is extraneous to the consensus arrived over the access agreements and costs are treated as such in the regulations.[2]

1. On 24 June 2024, the Respondents provided to the Applicants an itemisation of the costs claimed in relation to both Inverway Station and Riveren Station.[3] With respect to Inverway Station, the time period for which costs were claimed was 4 April 2022 to 22 March 2024 and the amount claimed was $38,650 (excluding GST). In relation to Riveren Station, the time period for which costs were claimed was 12 September 2023 to 22 March 2024, and the amount claimed was $24,031 (excluding GST). It is not clear why these amounts differed from the amounts initially claimed by the Respondent in its earlier invoices.

1. A question arose at the hearing regarding which party bears the onus of proof when costs under regulation 17 or 28 of the Pet Regs are in issue. Reference to the relevant authorities provides an answer.
2. Generally, "if a person thinks that he has a claim against another person ... the duty is on him to establish that claim".[4] In other words, "the legal burden of proving all facts essential to their claim normally rests upon the plaintiff in a civil suit and the prosecutor in civil proceedings".[5] It follows, therefore, that the legal burden of proving that the costs proffered by the Respondent did not satisfy the criteria in regulation 17(1)(a) or 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs was on the Applicant.
3. While the legal burden is on the Applicants to prove its case that the legal costs, or a portion of such costs, incurred by the Respondent did not meet the criteria in regulations 17(1)(a) or 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs, the Respondent has an evidential burden to satisfy the requirements of regulations 17(3) and 28(3). The requirement on the Applicants to pay the reasonable costs of the Respondent in the circumstances stipulated in regulations 17 and 28 do not arise until such time as the Respondent satisfies the evidential onus stipulated in regulations 17(3) and 28(3).
4. In Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1 at [665], Bell J noted:

An evidential burden is not an "onus of disproof". An evidential burden does no more than oblige a party to show that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence (or non-existence) of a fact.

1. In the context of these proceedings, the existence of a fact is the statutory requirement on the Applicants to pay the Respondent's reasonable legal costs incurred in the circumstances stipulated in regulations 17(1)(a) or 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs. Until such time as the Respondent provided to the Applicants "reasonable details and evidence of the costs that are being claimed",[6] the Applicants were under no obligation, pursuant to regulations 17(2) or 28(2), to pay any of the Respondent's legal costs. Such details were not provided to the Applicants until 24 June 2024. Once such details were provided, the evidential burden shifted to the Applicants to prove that such costs did not fall within the criteria in regulations 17(1)(a) or 28(1)(a).

1. Regulation 40(1)(d) of the Pet Regs provides that the Tribunal may deal with an application by the Applicants as to whether any costs claimed by the Respondent under the Access Agreement provisions in Part 4 are "reasonable or were necessarily incurred".[7] The term 'reasonable legal ... costs necessarily incurred' used in both regulations 17(1)(a) and 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs is not defined in the Petroleum Act 1984 or the Pet Regs. Reference, therefore, must be made to relevant case law.
2. In Bropho v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR 105, French J (as his Honour then was) considered the concept of reasonableness in the context of section 18D of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). After considering the definitions of 'reasonable' in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, his Honour noted at [79]:

A thing is done "reasonably" in one of the protected activities in paras (a), (b) and (c) of s 18D if it bears a rational relationship to that activity and is not disproportionate to what is necessary to carry it out. It imports an objective judgment. In this context that means a judgment independent of that which the actor thinks is reasonable. It does allow the possibility that there may be more than one way of doing things "reasonably". The judgment required in applying the section, is whether the thing done was done "reasonably" not whether it could have been done more reasonably or in a different way more acceptable to the Court.

1. While the observations of French J arose in a different statutory context, his Honour's approach to a determination of the question of reasonableness assists the Tribunal in determining whether legal costs under regulations 17 or 28 of the Pet Regs were "reasonable legal ... costs necessarily incurred".
2. In Clayton Utz v Ceccon Transport Pty Ltd (2023) 380 FLR 249, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory considered an appeal from a determination of a costs assessment application under the Legal Professions Act 2006. Brownhill J, at [13], enumerated the considerations of a cost assessor when assessing legal costs.

In conducting an assessment of legal costs, the cost assessor must consider: (a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the legal costs relate; (b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable way; (c) the fairness and reasonableness of the amount of legal costs in relation to the work except to the extent that ss 339 or 340 apply to any disputed costs.

1. The Tribunal's approach to a determination of the reasonableness of legal costs incurred in the circumstances addressed in regulations 17 and 28 of the Pet Regs differs from that of a cost assessor in that the Tribunal does not have before it the entirety of the Respondent's file. It does have, however, experience with the relevant legislation and the drafting of LAAs,[8] the parties' evidence and submissions, and the Respondent's "reasonable details and evidence of the costs that are being claimed" in compliance with regulations 17(3)(b) and 28(3)(b) of the Pet Regs. With this caveat, the considerations enumerated by Brownhill J informs the Tribunal's approach to its task under regulation 40(1)(d) of the Pet Regs.
2. In addition to what has been noted in Clayton Utz, also relevant to a determination of reasonableness under regulations 17 and 28 of the Pet Regs is the fact that the matters in dispute were relatively complex and the statutory regime for negotiating a LAA was relatively new. The fact that both pastoralists and their legal representatives were faced with a compulsory statutory requirement to enter into a LAA under what, for them, may be a novel legislative regime is a relevant consideration.

1. A consideration of regulation 28 arises only in connection with Inverway Station. Regulation 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs provides that the Applicants must pay the reasonable legal costs incurred by the Respondent in connection with participating in an ADR process under Part 4, Division 4 of the Pet Regs. While a mediation was scheduled between the parties in relation to the Inverway Station LAA, it was adjourned.
2. In the details of legal costs incurred in relation to Inverway Station provided to the Applicants by the Respondent on 24 June 2024, the following entries relate to the proposed mediation.

Perusal of email correspondence from Applicants' solicitor

Undertaking preparation for mediation (including review of LAA, drafting mediation statement of positions/discussion with clients)

1. A contest at the hearing was whether regulations 17 and 28 of the Pet Regs allowed for indemnity costs to be awarded or, alternatively, costs on the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory scale. The simple answer is that the regulations require that the legal costs must be reasonable and necessarily incurred in connection with participating in the negotiation of a LAA (regulation 17) or an ADR process relating to a LAA (regulation 28). In determining what is reasonable and necessarily incurred in these circumstances reference will be made to the case law, as discussed above. Additionally, reference may be made to the relevant Supreme Court scale as an indicator of what the Supreme Court considers appropriate costs.
2. Dealing first with the hourly rate of the Respondent's lawyer, Mr Taylor, the Tribunal was advised that, as at the date of the hearing, Mr Taylor had been admitted to practice law for 12 years. At the time the costs related to the ADR process occurred, Mr Taylor would have had at least 10 years post-admission experience.
3. Reference to the relevant practice direction issued by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory at the time the work was performed indicates that the rate per unit appendix to Order 63 of the Supreme Court Rules for a solicitor of at least 10 years' experience was $39.00 per unit,[9] which equates to $390 per hour. The Tribunal takes notice of the fact that costs on the Supreme Court scale are generally lower than the legal costs actually incurred by a client.
4. It is the Tribunal's view that, while at the upper end of what may be considered a reasonable hourly rate for a solicitor of at least 10 years post-admission experience engaged in the negotiation of a LAA, the $700 per hour charged by Mr Taylor was reasonable for the legal work he was required to carry out. The same can be said of the rates charged by Mr Taylor's associates who worked on the matter. Further, the Tribunal finds no fault with the steps taken by Mr Taylor, or the time spent, in preparing for the mediation. The sum of $3,990 claimed by the Respondent is a reasonable cost necessarily incurred in connection with participating in an ADR process under Part 4, Division 4 of the Pet Regs.

1. The Applicants submit that the legal costs provided by the Respondent relating to the negotiation of the LAA for Inverway Station were "grossly excessive and were not necessarily incurred"[10] for a number of reasons, including:
   • 32.1. the itemised costs include amounts for numerous emails that were perused or sent by the Respondent's solicitors for reasons which were unexplained;
   • 32.2. charges are made for the period in which the Supreme Court held that the Respondent was not acting in good faith;
   • 32.3. the time charged by Mr Taylor for perusing, advising or drafting the LAA was excessive given that the LAA ultimately signed by the Respondent was first drafted by the Applicants.
2. The purpose of regulation 17(1) of the Pet Regs is to compensate the Respondent for the reasonable costs of participating in the compulsory negotiation with the Applicants for a LAA. Such costs may consist of legal or accounting costs (regulation 17(1)(a)) or the cost of engaging a suitably qualified person to provide advice or reports on a relevant matter (regulation 17(1)(b)). It is only the recovery of reasonable legal costs that are in issue in this proceeding.
3. The correspondence between the parties indicates, as has been noted above at [7], that negotiations relating to the substance of the Inverway Station LAA concluded on 10 October 2023. After this date, the Respondent submits that it should be reimbursed for legal fees in the sum of $2,875 for: perusing email correspondence from the Applicants, a mediator, and their client; drafting email correspondence to the Applicants, a mediator and their client; and for a telephone conversation with their client.
4. In light of the court's findings in Wiso Oil Pty Ltd & Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd v Hughes Investments [2025] NTSC 2 discussed above, and the fact that the correspondence indicates that the terms of the LAA had been negotiated by 10 October 2023, the legal costs claimed by the Respondent after 10 October 2023 are not reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred in connection with the negotiation of a LAA. Consequently, such costs are not recoverable under regulation 17(1) of the Pet Regs.
5. Also at issue in the proceeding was the date in which the negotiations relating to the Inverway Station LAA commenced. The first item in the Respondent's cost details is from 4 April 2022, being a perusal of email correspondence from Stephen Skinner, the representative of Lavington Pty Ltd. On the same date, time is charged for the perusal of the draft LAA received from Mr Skinner which has been discussed above.
6. The Applicants submit that negotiations for a LAA commenced when the Applicants served on the Respondent a notice of the Applicants' intention to obtain an access agreement pursuant to regulation 15 of the Pet Regs. In relation to Inverway Station, such notice was given on 2 May 2023.[11]
7. Between 4 April 2022 and 2 May 2023, extensive correspondence passed between the Applicants and the Respondent. In addition, it is evident from the Respondent's cost details that, during this period, the Respondent's lawyers were perusing drafts of a LAA and were engaged in drafting a LAA (discussed in detail below). Finally, the Applicants acknowledged that the negotiated draft of the Inverway Station LAA was based largely on the draft the Applicants negotiated with Lavington Pty Ltd.
8. It is clear in the circumstances of the Inverway Station proceeding that negotiations between the parties in connection with participating in the negotiation of the Inverway Station LAA commenced on 4 April 2022. The Respondent is entitled to its reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred in connection with its participation in such negotiation.
9. With respect to such negotiation, issue was taken by the Applicants with the amount of time spent by the Respondent's lawyers in reading correspondence from the Applicants, and in drafting correspondence to the Applicants and to their client. This issue is without merit.
10. The fact is that negotiations for a LAA generates a significant amount of correspondence between the lawyers for the parties, and between the lawyers and their clients. When correspondence is received from the Applicants in relation to the LAA, the Respondent is entitled to the legal costs incurred in reviewing such correspondence, provided the time spent on the activity is reasonable. Further, if such correspondence raises a matter which requires advice to the client, the Respondent is entitled to the legal costs incurred in generating such advice, again subject to the caveat that the time spent on the activity is reasonable.
11. A review of the Respondent's costs details indicates that the time spent on reviewing correspondence was usually 0.10 unit. This is the minimum unit of time that could be charged. When correspondence to either the Applicants or the client was drafted, more time was charged but, again, there is nothing in the Respondent's cost details to indicate that such time spent was unreasonable.
12. Finally, the Applicants submitted that the Inverway Station LAA ultimately negotiated between the parties was substantially the same as the LAA negotiated between the Applicants and Lavington Pty Ltd. Consequently, the Applicants submitted, the time spent by the Respondent's lawyers in drafting a LAA were not reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred within the meaning of regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs. The costs in issue are as follows:

1. The evidence of the Respondent at the hearing was that, notwithstanding that it had been provided with a draft LAA by Lavington Pty Ltd when it purchased Inverway Station, it drafted its own LAA. The reasons why the Respondent deemed it necessary to undertake such work was not given in evidence to the Tribunal. Ultimately, the Respondent agreed to a LAA based on the draft LAA provided to it by Lavington Pty Ltd with amendments negotiated by the parties.
2. The drafting of a LAA by the Respondent, in the circumstances of this proceeding, was disproportionate to what was necessary to carry out the finalisation of an Inverway Station LAA.[12] The drafting of a LAA was not a legal cost necessarily incurred by the Respondent in connection with participating in the negotiation. Such costs do not fall within regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs and are not recoverable from the Applicants.

1. From the $38,650 claimed from the Applicants by the Respondent for reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred in connection with participating in the negotiation of the Inverway Station LAA, the amount of $11,275 should be deducted, namely:
   • $2,875, being the costs incurred after the terms of the Inverway Station LAA were finalised; and
   • $8,400, being the costs incurred by the Respondent in drafting a LAA.
2. It follows, therefore, that the Applicant, pursuant to regulations 17(1)(a) and 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs, must pay to the Respondent the sum of $27,375 (excluding GST). With GST added, the amount owing is $30,112.50. Of this amount, $4,389 is payable pursuant to regulation 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs, and $25,723.50 is payable pursuant to regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs.

1. Having concluded the negotiations relating to the content of the Inverway Station LAA, the Applicants forwarded to the Respondent on 14 November 2023 a draft of the Riveren Station LAA. Subject to some minor amendments, the content of the Riveren Station LAA mirrored that of the Inverway Station LAA.
2. On 15 January 2024, as has been noted above, the Respondent advised the Applicants that the Riveren Station LAA had been executed. This notwithstanding, the Respondent claims legal costs in the sum of $1,824 for the perusal and drafting of correspondence after this date. Based on the reasoning noted at [35] above, this sum is not recoverable pursuant to regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs.
3. It is also noted that the hourly rate charged for the Respondent's lawyers working on the Riveren Station LAA matter were greater than the rates charged in relation to the negotiation of the Inverway Station LAA. For example, the rate Mr Taylor charged for perusing correspondence from the Applicant's solicitors on 29 September 2023 was $700 per hour. On the same day in relation to the Riveren Station negotiation, Mr Taylor's hourly rate was $912 per hour. At the hearing, Mr Taylor advised that the discrepancy in the hourly rates charged was because a new legal cost agreement, with increased hourly rates, was entered into between the Respondent and the Respondent's solicitors in relation to the negotiation of the Riveren Station LAA.
4. While it is open for a lawyer and client to agree to higher hourly rates for services provided on the same day but relating to different matters, it is not reasonable to expect that a third party which has a statutory obligation to pay the Respondent's reasonable legal costs should have to pay the higher fees charged. At [31] above it was noted that the rate of $700 per hour for a lawyer of Mr Taylor's experience was at the upper end of what might be considered reasonable in the Northern Territory. The rate of $912 per hour is not reasonable. Consequently, the fees recoverable should be calculated based on the fees charged in the Inverway Station negotiation. This applies equally to the rates charged by the associates of Mr Taylor working on the matter.
5. The Applicants also take issue with the fact that Mr Taylor charged the following amounts for perusal of the draft Riveren LAA, advising his client and undertaking amendments to the LAA.

1. The Applicants submit that the substance of the Riveren LAA negotiated between the parties was essentially identical to that negotiated for access to Inverway Station. Consequently, they submit, it cannot be said that the legal fees charged by Mr Taylor were reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred by the Respondent in connection with participating in the negotiation within the meaning of regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs.
2. It was reasonable for Mr Taylor to review the draft Riveren LAA provided by the Applicants and provide advice to his client on 14 November 2023. Likewise, it was reasonable for Mr Taylor to undertake the finalisation of the Riveren LAA for execution on 22 November 2023. Based on an hourly rate of $700, the Respondent is entitled to be reimbursed the sum of $3,500 for the work done on 14 November 2023 and $700 for the work done on 22 November 2023.
3. Different considerations apply to the work done on 16 and 20 November 2023. The final Riveren LAA negotiated between the parties was substantially the same as that negotiated for Inverway Station. The amount Mr Taylor charged for perusing, and undertaking amendments to, the LAA were disproportionate to what was necessary to carry out the finalisation of the Riveren Station LAA.[13] The legal costs arising from this work were not costs necessarily incurred by the Respondent in connection with participating in the negotiation.
4. The same applies to Mr Taylor's charge for perusing the draft of the Riveren LAA and advising his client on 4 December 2023. Mr Taylor, as has been noted above, finalised the Riveren LAA for execution on 22 November 2023 therefore it is difficult to see how a three-hour charge for work done on 4 December 2023 can be considered reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred. Consequently, such costs are not recoverable pursuant to regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs.
5. In conclusion, the following legal costs incurred by the Respondent do not fall within regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs.

1. When the sum noted in [57] is deducted, and the remaining legal work is calculated on the basis of the hourly rates charged in the negotiation of the Inverway Station LAA, the Respondent's reasonable legal costs necessarily incurred in connection with the negotiation of the Riveren Station LAA are $7,215. When GST is included the amount is $7,936.50.

1. The Respondent instructed a lawyer and costs assessor, Mr Glenn Walter, to review the Respondent's legal costs and provide his opinion on the reasonableness of such costs. Mr Walter concluded that the reasonable legal costs of the Respondent were $62,681.20.
2. While the Tribunal accepts that Mr Walter is an experienced cost assessor in Queensland, it is noted that Mr Walter was not provided with the Respondent's complete file. In fact, the documents to which Mr Walter had access in formulating his opinion were not as extensive as those before the Tribunal. Finally, there was no evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Walter had any experience in the negotiation and drafting of LAAs pursuant to the Petroleum Act 1984 or the Pet Regs.
3. Consequently, no weight was placed by the Tribunal on Mr Walter's opinion. Regulations 17 and 28 of the Pet Regs require the Tribunal to assess whether the legal costs sought to be recovered from the interest holder were reasonable and necessarily incurred by the designated person in connection with participating in a negotiation or an ADR process. This task, as the above analysis indicates, involves more than assessing whether the legal costs incurred comply with the relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld).

1. In relation to the negotiation of the Inverway Station LAA, the Applicants, pursuant to regulations 17(1)(a) and 28(1)(a) of the Pet Regs, must pay to the Respondent the sum of $30,112.50 (including GST). In relation to the negotiation of the Riveren Station LAA, the Applicants, pursuant to regulation 17(1)(a) of the Pet Regs, must pay to the Respondent the sum of $7,936.50 (including GST). In total, the sum owing by the Applicants to the Respondent is $38,049.00 (including GST).
2. Both parties asked to be heard on the question of costs of these proceedings. No order for costs is made at this time as there may be matters relevant to the question of costs of which the Tribunal is not aware. Should either party still wish to be heard on the question of costs, they shall have 28 days from the date of the orders arising from this decision to bring an Ordinary Application for costs.

1. In Tribunal file number 2024-00765-CT, Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd and Wiso Oil Pty Ltd collectively must pay, pursuant to regulation 17(1)(a) of the Petroleum Regulations 2020, the sum of $25,723.50 to Hughes Holdings and Investments No.600 Pty Ltd by no later than 30 days from the date of this order.

1. In Tribunal file number 2024-00765-CT, Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd and Wiso Oil Pty Ltd collectively must pay, pursuant to regulation 28(1)(a) of the Petroleum Regulations 2020, the sum of $4,389.00 to Hughes Holdings and Investments No.600 Pty Ltd by no later than 30 days from the date of this order.

1. In Tribunal file number 2024-00766-CT, Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd and Wiso Oil Pty Ltd collectively must pay, pursuant to regulation 17(1)(a) of the Petroleum Regulations 2020, the sum of $7,936.50 to Hughes Holdings and Investments No.600 Pty Ltd by no later than 30 days from the date of this order.

1. Within 28 days from the date of this order either party has leave to bring an Ordinary Application for the costs of these proceedings.

[1] Petroleum Regulations 2020, reg 28(1)(a).

[2] Wiso Oil Pty Ltd & Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd v Hughes Investments [2025] NTSC 2, [48].

[3] Unattested Declaration of Bradly Steven Torgan dated 30 June 2025, [19].

[4] Dickson v Minister of Pensions [1953] 1 QB 228 at 232.

[5] JD Heydon, Cross on Evidence (12th Australian ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2020), [7060].

[6] Petroleum Regulations 2020, reg 17(3)(b) and reg 28(3)(b).

[7] Petroleum Regulations 2020, reg 40(1)(d).

[8] Sweetpea Petroleum Pty Ltd v Rallen Australia Pty Ltd [2022] NTCAT 1.

[9] Supreme Court of the Northern Territory Practice Direction No 4 of 2022.

[10] Applicant's Submissions in Reply dated 17 September 2025, [6].

[11] Wiso Oil Pty Ltd & Blue Energy (Wiso) Pty Ltd v Hughes Investments [2025] NTSC 2, [35].

[12] Bropho v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR 105, [79].

[13] Bropho v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16; (2004) 135 FCR 105, [79].