BLQ23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 350

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. The applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, originally travelled to Australia on a business visa in 2018. Shortly thereafter, he applied for a Protection visa, which was denied in 2019 by a delegate of the first respondent. In May 2023, the then Administrative Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed that refusal decision. The judicial review application, having been the subject of a callover before me about five weeks earlier, was listed for hearing on 24 February 2026.
2. Following the callover, the lawyer for the applicant gave notice of his ceasing to act, and when the matter came on for hearing before me, the applicant sought an adjournment of the hearing for three months, which I refused. The matter proceeded on 24 February 2026, but in circumstances where the applicant's former lawyer had fairly recently ceased to act, I gave the applicant two weeks after the hearing in which to file further written submissions in response to the Minister. None have been received.

1. The applicant was described by the Tribunal as a "Muslim Punjabi man" from Pakistan, whose protection claims particularly focused on a rival in his region who I will call Mr AB, and his brother, Mr BB. The applicant contended that Mr AB became his enemy, made life for him and his family difficult, wanted him dead, filed false claims against him with the police, and murdered two advocates who were close friends of the applicant. It was also alleged that the police tortured the applicant's brother in Mr AB's presence. According to the applicant, Mr AB was then charged and convicted of these murders in 2016. It was further alleged that, in 2018, Mr AB and his brothers murdered a friend of the applicant, for which Mr AB was allegedly convicted and given a long sentence of imprisonment, but Mr AB only served a short sentence, having been released in July 2019.
2. As a result of this enmity with Mr AB and his family, the applicant claimed he could not safely return to Pakistan.
3. The Tribunal had listened to a recording of the applicant's interview with the Ministerial delegate and put the applicant on notice at the Tribunal hearing that the answers to the delegate's questions by the applicant appeared to be evasive, and that if he was similarly evasive before the Tribunal, it could form the view that his evidence was untruthful. In the result, at various places in the decision (eg, Tribunal reasons paragraphs 56, 75 and 95-97), the Tribunal came to adverse conclusions about the truthfulness of the applicant's evidence. In the end, the Tribunal concluded (at paragraph 98) that the claims about persecution by Mr AB and Mr BB were not credible and therefore decided any fear he held not to be well-founded.
4. There were three grounds of review, to which I now turn.

1. Ground 1 provided:
   1. The Second Respondent (Tribunal) made a jurisdictional error of legal unreasonableness or lack of proper consideration.

PARTICULARS

1. The Tribunal made the error at Paragraphs [91]-[93] of its decision, which is unreasonable by not properly considering Police First Information Report. At the very least this FIR contains the date of incident claimed and level of threat the applicant faced.
2. It was unreasonable to consider that how the reporter had access to the FIR for reporting in the newspaper.

1. Paragraphs 91 to 93 of the Tribunal's decision state:
   1. These FIRS relate to incidents in Sialkot reported which the applicant claims demonstrates that the ... brothers are above the law and continue to threaten opponents and his family even in his absence.
   2. The Tribunal maintains its concerns about the access the applicant and his family have to police reports which are unrelated to them. Even if the FIR's are genuine documents, they relate to allegations and do not constitute evidence that an event actually happened or that the accused are actually guilty. There is no evidence that any charges were laid against the persons named nor do they prove that the accused are related to the ... brothers or were acting on their behalf.
   3. Be that as it may, the Tribunal has no evidence before it to corroborate the applicant's account of his dealings with Mr [AB] or his brother. The Tribunal does not accept that the FIR's constitute evidence to corroborate any of his claims even if they are genuine documents, which the Tribunal is not satisfied they are.
2. Significantly, paragraph 32 of the decision states:

The Tribunal has also had regard to the Department's file and has listened to the interview between the applicant and the delegate. The Tribunal also received information and submissions from the applicant through his adviser prior to the Tribunal hearing, including the following:

1. A detailed submission from the applicant through his adviser dated 10 April 2023.
2. Some photographs of the applicant with others allegedly at a political rally, undated
3. A photograph of a woman allegedly murdered by Mr [AB], undated, not captioned and not identified as having been murdered by Mr [AB].
4. A screen shot of a news report allegedly on the murder of ... undated - in Urdu and no translation provided.
5. A Poster of someone allegedly the relative of Mr [AB], undated - in Urdu and no translation provided
6. Dossier on violations of human rights by PDM government post regime change.
7. Amnesty International Human Rights Report 2022-2023

...

[and various First Information Reports (FIRs), which the Tribunal then summarised]

1. The Minister submits that the decision-maker (here, the Tribunal) was not required to accept all of the applicant's claims and evidence, and there was no jurisdictional error. As six Justices of the High Court said in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 574-575:

The course of the future is not predictable, but the degree of probability that an event will occur is often, perhaps usually, assessable. Past events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability - high or low - of their recurrence. The extent to which past events are a guide to the future depends on the degree of probability that they have occurred, the regularity with which and the conditions under which they have or probably have occurred and the likelihood that the introduction of new or other events may distort the cycle of regularity. In many cases, when the past has been evaluated, the probability that an event will occur may border on certainty. In other cases, the probability that an event will occur may be so low that, for practical purposes, it can be safely disregarded. In between these extremes, there are varying degrees of probability as to whether an event will or will not occur. But unless a person or tribunal attempts to determine what is likely to occur in the future in relation to a relevant field of inquiry, that person or tribunal has no rational basis for determining the chance of an event in that field occurring in the future.

Determining whether there is a real chance that something will occur requires an estimation of the likelihood that one or more events will give rise to the occurrence of that thing. In many, if not most cases, determining what is likely to occur in the future will require findings as to what has occurred in the past because what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future. It is therefore ordinarily an integral part of the process of making a determination concerning the chance of something occurring in the future that conclusions are formed concerning past events. In the present case, for example, the Tribunal correctly relied on what it found had happened to Mr Guo and others to make a finding that he was not "differentially at risk for a Convention reason." Without making findings about the policies of the Chinese authorities and the past relationship of Mr Guo with those authorities, the Tribunal would have had no rational basis from which it could assess whether there was a real chance that he might be persecuted for a Convention reason if he were returned to the PRC.

1. I reject the first particular of Ground 1. The Tribunal's conclusions in paragraphs 91 to 93, taking into account also the earlier paragraph 32, were conclusions well open to the Tribunal and indicated no jurisdictional error on the basis that:

(a) there was no evidence any charges had been laid;

(b) there was no evidence to corroborate the applicant's accounts of his dealings with Mr AB or his brother;

(c) the First Information Reports (FIRs), even if genuine, concern allegations as reported, rather than evidence that events actually occurred; and

(d) what was missing was any evidence that charges were laid, or that the accused or convicted persons (if such be the case) were, or were related to, the brothers, or acting for them.

1. The second particular of this ground concerns the scepticism the Tribunal had about how reporters could have had access to the FIRs for reporting in the newspaper in the following paragraphs:
   1. The applicant also provided copies of two FIRs ... in relation to the allegations that Mr AB murdered the ... brothers. Both were lodged by the uncle of the ... brothers. They include a significant amount of detail, including what gun was fired by whom and what part of the body was struck by each particular bullet and in what order. It seems unlikely that such level of detail could be included in a police report a short time after the event which happened in the middle of the night. The following is an extract of the English translation of the FIR copy provided to the Tribunal:

...

1. The newspaper reports include significant details of the FIR. Its difficult to imagine how a reporter could have access to the details of a report (its number, for example) made to the police at 1.55am and be able to publish an article about it later that morning.

...

1. It would not be farfetched to suggest that the applicant obtained or produced a bogus FIRs, based on the news report well after the fact, in order to support a claim for protection. In any case, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the FIRs are genuine documents and do not support the applicant's claims that AB and BB were involved in, accused or, or convicted of the incident relating to the alleged murder of the ... brothers.

1. Here, again, the essential challenge is to the weight to be given to evidence, or the merits of the matter, both of which are matters for the Tribunal. As a Full Court of the Federal Court said in NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 in terms fatal to this ground:

[11] The appellants' submissions contained a number of complaints about reliance by the Tribunal on information from sources other than the first appellant, referred to as 'country information'. The Tribunal summarised in its reasons for decision a significant quantity of material it saw as relevant to the task it had to perform. This included material from the United States of America State Department, DFAT and various international news services and publications. To some extent, this material could have been considered to be helpful to the appellants' case, but it is certainly true that the Tribunal relied on some of it in making findings adverse to the appellants. By s 420(2)(a) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. By s 424(1), in conducting a review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. There can be no objection in principle to the Tribunal relying on 'country information'. The weight that it gives to such information is a matter for the Tribunal itself, as part of its fact-finding function. Such information as the Tribunal obtains for itself is not restricted to 'guidance', as the appellants submitted. It may be used to assess the credibility of a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. It is not, as the first appellant submitted, an error of law, or a jurisdictional error, for the Tribunal to base a decision on 'country information' that is not true. The question of the accuracy of the 'country information' is one for the Tribunal, not for the Court. If the Court were to make its own assessment of the truth of 'country information', it would be engaging in merits review. The Court does not have power to do that.

1. There was, on the face of paragraphs 76, 81 and 87, also no illogicality or lack of cogent reasoning, the leading case on that issue being the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 per Crennan and Bell JJ:

[134] The process of reasoning followed by the Tribunal, which needs to be considered in the light of all of the evidence set out above, was as follows: the Tribunal appeared to accept that homosexuals as a social group in Pakistan were the subject of persecution. It also appeared to assume that a person with a genuine fear of persecution as a homosexual in Pakistan would not go back to Pakistan and that a person with such a fear would seek asylum at the first available opportunity. The Tribunal then examined the first respondent's conduct in the United Kingdom in 2006 and in returning to Pakistan for three weeks in 2007. The Tribunal asked whether that conduct was consistent with a fear of persecution based on the practice of homosexuality said to have occurred in the UAE. The Tribunal then concluded that the conduct was not consistent with the claims of homosexual conduct said to form the basis for the fear of persecution. The Tribunal essentially found that it was improbable that the first respondent feared persecution because of homosexuality as claimed. It is that conclusion which the Federal Court found illogical and irrational; it would have come to a different conclusion which appears to be largely based on the view that no one in Pakistan would necessarily discover that the first respondent had, as claimed, engaged in the practice of homosexuality. The Federal Court differed from the Tribunal in finding that the first respondent's fear of persecution as a result of homosexuality was plausible whereas the Tribunal had found it improbable.

[135] On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. None of these applied here. It could not be said that the reasons under consideration were unintelligible or that there was an absence of logical connection between the evidence as a whole and the reasons for the decision. Nor could it be said that there was no probative material which contradicted the first respondent's claims. There was. The Tribunal did not believe the first respondent's claim that he had engaged in the "practice of homosexuality" in the UAE and accordingly it was not satisfied that he feared persecution if he returned to Pakistan.

1. Thus, there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal coming to the conclusions it did. This ground fails.

1. This ground states in the terms drafted in the application:
   1. The Tribunal failed to properly investigate and therefore reach to the subject adverse decision and the lack of proper investigation of the claim and fell in error.

PARTICUELRS

THE applicant provided photos with political figures to show level of his involvement in the Politics. The Tribunal failed to ask questions to gain inside knowledge about the applicant involvement to determine whether there was a threat to him or very least no finding in the subject decision about the truthfulness of these photos.

1. This appeared to be a reference back to what the Tribunal found at paragraphs 67 to 68, where it stated:
   1. The applicant has provided photographs of himself with others claiming that this is proof of his political activity. However, he has not identified the people in the photos, the dates that the photos were taken or the context in which they were taken.
   2. On the basis of the evidence before it, even if the applicant was involved in the election campaigns of opposition party candidates, the Tribunal is not satisfied that such assistance as he claimed to have provided would lead the brother of the winning candidate in different union council, Mr [AB], to form a negative view of him such that he would be motivated to kill him, or cause him or his family and colleagues significant harm, or to even take an interest in him.
2. Generally speaking, including here, it is for applicants, or those acting for them, to make out a case: as a Full Court of the Federal Court said in Applicant S214/2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2006] FCAFC 166 at [26]:

Proceedings before the Tribunal are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. A Tribunal member conducting an enquiry is obliged to be fair. However, the Tribunal is not in the position of a contradictor of a case being advanced by an applicant. In a case such as that brought by the appellant under his application for review to the Tribunal, it was for him to advance whatever evidence or argument he wished to advance and for the Tribunal to decide whether his claim that he was a refugee ... had been made out. The Tribunal was not obliged to prompt and stimulate an elaboration which the appellant may have chosen not to embark upon. The rule of fairness expressed in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 has no application to proceedings in the Tribunal (per Gummow and Heydon JJ in Re Ruddock (in his capacity as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs); Ex parte applicant S154/2002 ('Re Ruddock') (2003) 201 ALR 437 at [57]-[58]).

1. The applicant, or his representative, had provided a wide range of information, but what was missing were key dates, context, probative evidence or even the identities of people photographed. It was for the applicant to provide this information and to identify relevant people. The Tribunal was not conducting an inquiry, and any suggestion of duty to inquire generally is put to rest by Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 (SZIAI), where it was said by French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel (as her Honour then was) and Bell JJ at [25]:

Although decisions in the Federal Court concerned with a failure to make obvious inquiries have led to references to a "duty to inquire", that term is apt to direct consideration away from the question whether the decision which is under review is vitiated by jurisdictional error. The duty imposed upon the Tribunal by the Migration Act is a duty to review. It may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error. It is not necessary to explore these questions of principle in this case.

(Citations omitted)

This ground does not identify any such "obvious inquiry about a critical fact" in the sense discussed in SZIAI.

1. This ground states:
   1. The Tribunal failed to give benefit of doubt to the applicant when he was responding to the sequence of the events took place and therefore made an error when determining credibility of the applicant.

PARTICULARS

Paragraph 95 and 96 of the subject decision

(As per the original)

1. The Tribunal's findings about credibility were very significant in this matter. True it is that the well-known statement by Middleton J in SZLVZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1816 (SZLVZ) at [25] is important. His Honour there said:

It is also the case that in assessing credibility, the Tribunal must be sensitive to the difficulties often faced by applicants and should give the benefit of the doubt to those who are generally credible, but are unable to substantiate all of their claims: see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437. However, the Tribunal is not required to uncritically accept any or all of the allegations made by an applicant.

1. Nevertheless, the Tribunal can, and not infrequently does, come to a reasoned conclusion rejecting the credibility of an applicant, without engaging in jurisdictional error, and this is such a case.
2. The Tribunal records the scepticism expressed and warnings given to the applicant at paragraph 33, and then carefully reasoned at paragraphs 56, 75, 95 and 96, leading to the conclusions in 97 and 98:
   1. The Tribunal reminded the applicant that it was not able to rely on the findings of the delegate and would be examining all his claims afresh including his protection claims. The Tribunal also asked the applicant to be direct and truthful and answer all its questions with as much detail as possible. The Tribunal informed the applicant that it had listened to his interview with the delegate and noted that there appeared to be a lot of misunderstandings between himself and the delegate and that his answers to the delegate's questions appeared to be evasive. The Tribunal told the applicant that if he did not understand its questions then he should let it know and it would rephrase the question. The Tribunal told the applicant that it would otherwise assume that he understood the question and that he considered his response relevant to the question asked. The Tribunal put to him that if it found his answers to be evasive, it may form a view that his evidence may be untruthful. The applicant indicated that he understood.

...

1. The Tribunal found the applicant's oral and documentary evidence unpersuasive, contradictory, unreliable, and frequently irrelevant. The Tribunal has formed a view that the applicant fabricated the material claims in his application solely for the purpose of obtaining a protection visa. For the following reasons is not satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations.

...

1. The inconsistencies in the applicant's claims along with his overall lack of credibility have led the Tribunal to form a view that the incident did not occur and that the FIR is a bogus document fabricated solely for the purpose of supporting a protection claim.

...

1. The Tribunal accepts that inconsistencies in evidence can occur, particularly in circumstances of high stress and when applicants are being asked to recount potentially traumatic events which may have occurred several years prior. The Tribunal is also mindful that the benefit of the doubt should be given to asylum seekers who are generally credible, but unable to substantiate all of their claims.
2. The Tribunal was very clear with the applicant about the aspects of his evidence it considered lacked credibility or were implausible and the applicant was given the opportunity to respond at the hearing. The applicant was unable to allay the Tribunal's concerns to its satisfaction. The lack of credible and consistent corroborating evidence, his evasive and contradictory responses to concerns with oral and documentary evidence reveals, in the Tribunal's mind, a contrived account of events rather than a recollection of memories from actual lived experiences.
3. The discrepancies identified by the Tribunal were about significant and central aspects of his claims. Considered collectively and along with the manner in which he testified, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has not been truthful.

Conclusion

1. The Tribunal thus finds that the applicant's claims about his persecution by his political opponents, [AB and BB], are not credible. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant's claimed involvement with the PTI, even if true, would be such that it would attract the adverse attention of anyone such that they would seek to persecute him or harm him.

1. This was both careful assessment by the Tribunal of the applicant's claims and proper reasons for rejecting them, which it was open to it to do: see SZLVZ at [26] where Middleton J said:

The case before me is not a situation where the appellant was considered to be generally credible but was unable to substantiate all of his claims as discussed by Beaumont J in Randhawa [1994] FCA 1253; 52 FCR 437. Rather, the Tribunal carefully assessed each of the appellant's claims and made findings based on the material before it, giving detailed reasons for either accepting or rejecting those claims. The Tribunal was entitled to make findings adverse to the appellant and was not required to accept everything alleged by the appellant.

1. I am also conscious of the caution which this Court should exhibit to ensure that an attack on a credibility finding does not turn the review into a merits review case: thus as a Full Court of the Federal Court said in AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133:

[23] A decision-maker is entitled to rely upon inconsistencies in assessing a visa applicant's credibility but it is important that the process be conducted fairly and reasonably, taking into account that the assessment of the reliability, and credibility, of accounts given by asylum seekers is well recognised as involving a number of particular features and considerations, and calls for a careful and thoughtful approach.

...

(f) Considerable caution must be exercised before concluding that errors in an adverse credibility assessment result in the decision being affected by jurisdictional error, in order to avoid judicial review transgressing into the impermissible area of merits review.

1. The Tribunal has carefully and permissibly rejected the credibility of the applicant. It was open to it to do so. There is no evident jurisdictional error.

1. Each ground having failed, the application must be dismissed with costs. The Minister seeks $5,600 in costs, which is well below the scale amount. In view of the complexity of the matter, that is a quite reasonable amount.
2. The orders of the Court are that:
   1. The application be dismissed.
   2. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $5,600.

I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Renwick.