BJT20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 402

1. Before this Court is an application filed on 30 March 2020 seeking judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 11 March 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (delegate) dated 30 December 2016, to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (protection visa).
2. This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
3. I must determine whether there was jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The key issues for consideration are whether the Tribunal misconstrued provisions relating to fear of significant harm, whether the Tribunal complied with the adverse information provisions and whether the Tribunal applied the legislative provisions correctly.
4. The application is dismissed for the reasons that follow.

1. The applicant is a citizen of India (Court Book (CB) 209). He arrived in Australia on 6 September 2015 as the holder of a Visitor (Tourist Stream) (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visa (CB 251).
2. On 30 October 2015, the applicant applied to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) for a protection visa (CB 174-219).
3. The applicant claimed to fear that he would be killed in India by the Baharatiya Janata Party (BJP) because he had worked for the Congress Party and canvassed vigorously against the BJP in India (CB 216-219).
4. On 30 December 2016, the Department refused to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 248-259).
5. On 27 January 2017, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Department's decision (CB 260-266).
6. On 30 January 2017, the Tribunal acknowledged the application and invited the applicant to provide material and written arguments for the Tribunal to consider (CB 274-276).
7. On 31 January 2017, the Department issued a certificate pursuant to s 438(1)(a) of the Act (the Non-Disclosure Certificate) (CB 267-273).
8. On 11 July 2019, the Tribunal advised the applicant that the matter was being prepared for hearing. The Tribunal further invited the applicant to provide any material or written arguments for the Tribunal to consider as soon as possible (CB 283-284).
9. The applicant responded with a letter dated 7 August 2019 which contained further information and evidence about his claims (CB 285-286). He also provided articles on statistics of political murders in his village (CB 287-290).
10. On 21 January 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing in person on 4 March 2020. In the hearing application letter, the applicant was invited to provide any additional documents or information that he intended to rely upon by 19 February 2020 (CB 299-301).
11. A Tribunal hearing was held on 4 March 2020. The applicant attended the hearing to give evidence and present arguments assisted by an interpreter of the Malayalam language (CB 307-309).
12. On 11 March 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the Department's decision not to grant the applicant a visa (CB 320) and notified the applicant the following day (CB 319).

TRIBUNAL DECISION DATED 11 MARCH 2020 (TD) (CB 321-335)

1. The Tribunal identified the visa under review and summarised the procedural history of the matter (TD [1-2]).
2. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's evidence and claims (TD [3-12]).
3. The Tribunal recorded that at the hearing it explained the process under s 424AA of the Act to the applicant (TD [13]).
4. The Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on information it had obtained from the Department's file. The Tribunal recorded the existence of the Non-Disclosure Certificate and that it had put to the applicant 'the gist' of the information. The applicant did not object to this course (TD [14]).
5. The Tribunal considered the applicant's response to the information and further evidence he provided at the hearing (TD [15-37]).
6. The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence and response to adverse information put to him at hearing (TD [27-37]).
7. The Tribunal summarised the relevant law and set out the relevant legal and policy framework (TD [38-43]).
8. The Tribunal summarised the country information (TD [44-47]).

1. The Tribunal recorded that the basis of the applicant's claim was that he was a member and supporter of the Congress Party and that members of the BJP had threatened and attempt to kill him (TD [49]).
2. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's claims (TD [50]).
3. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not a credible witness and recorded that his evidence at the hearing was 'evasive and vague' and contained 'numerous inconsistencies' (TD [51]).
4. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would simply be seeking a few more years in Australia before returning to India, if his claims about fearing harm in India were genuine (TD [51]).
5. The Tribunal found that the applicant's evidence about his involvement in the Congress Party in India as well as his lack of knowledge about politics was not a profile of a person who would be targeted for any reasons for his political opinion (TD [54]).
6. The Tribunal found that the inconsistency in the claims made by the applicant as to the actions of BJP members against him undermined all of his claims (TD [58]).
7. The Tribunal found that the evidence that the applicant had provided about the alleged attack on his parent's house and assaults, indicated that it was inherently unlikely that these events had occurred (TD [63]).
8. The Tribunal also found that the significant inconsistencies in the claims made by the applicant as to what he and his wife did after the alleged attack made it likely that the attack 'never took place' (TD [67]).
9. The Tribunal did not accept that if the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution or if there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in his hometown that he would have only spent two weeks at his parents-in-law's house after the alleged attack (TD [68]).
10. The Tribunal found that the fact that the applicant claimed to have travelled to Chennai by train during the time that he was living at his parents-in-law's house indicated that he was not in hiding from anyone and made further claims being made by him further unlikely (TD [70]).
11. The Tribunal found that it was inherently unlikely that the applicant would be able to continue working at his father's temple if he were of any interest to the BJP if the administrators of that temple were affiliated with the BJP (TD [71]).
12. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's claims about why he travelled to Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in February 2015 (TD [72]).
13. The Tribunal found that if the applicant did have any well-founded fear of persecution or if there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in India while he held a valid visa to enter Malaysia that he would have exercised that right to travel to Malaysia and spend time there. The Tribunal found that the fact he only spent one week there undermined the credibility of all of his claims (TD [72]).
14. The Tribunal did not accept that there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm or that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in India because he was not the subject of any further threat or assault over the 12 months before he entered Australia (TD [73]).
15. The Tribunal found that the fact that the applicant had applied to return to India and then remained in India from 18 August 2018 to 22 September 2018 undermined the claim that he had any fear of persecution or that there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in India (TD [77]).
16. The Tribunal did not accept that if the applicant were to return to India that he would have a well-founded fear of persecution due to his political opinion or for any reason or that there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in India (TD [78]).
17. The Tribunal considered whether accepting the applicant's claims at their highest, it would be reasonable for him to relocate to another region in India where there would be no appreciable risk of the claimed persecution or a real risk that he would suffer significant harm (TD [80]).
18. The Tribunal found that the applicant would be able to relocate to areas in the south of Kerala as well as other areas in southern India, including Bangalore (TD [82]).
19. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant satisfied the requirements for protection under s 36(2) of the Act and affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (TD [83-85]).

1. The applicant applied to this Court for judicial review in an application filed on 30 March 2020. The applicant's grounds for judicial review are set out in the application. The applicant seeks orders that the Tribunal Decision be quashed and that the decision be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
2. The applicant also filed an affidavit deposed on 20 March 2020 attaching a copy of the Tribunal Decision and containing a number of statements.
3. The matter was docketed to me on 6 August 2025. By orders of the Court on 8 September 2025, the applicant was ordered to file and serve an amended application, any affidavit evidence and submissions by 27 October 2025. No further documents were filed.
4. On 25 November 2025 the applicant appeared before this Court as a litigant in person. Mr T Pattinson of Mills Oakley appeared for the first respondent. An interpreter assisted the Court. The applicant confirmed that he could understand the interpreter.
5. The following documents were before the Court - the initiating application for judicial review, the supporting affidavit of the applicant filed on 30 March 2020, a Court Book (numbering 341 pages and marked as Exhibit 1R) filed 14 July 2020, written submissions of the Minister filed on 8 October 2020, further written submissions of the Minister filed 10 November 2025 and an accompanying affidavit of service filed 10 November 2025. The affidavits were read in court. The applicant's affidavit included a number of statements, which have been treated as submissions by this Court, with no objection from the Minister.

1. Section 476 of the Act provides that this Court has the same original jurisdiction as the High Court. The High Court, under s 75(v) of the Constitution, has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.
2. A privative clause as defined in s 474 of the Act is final and not amenable to judicial review. The Court can grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
3. The role of judicial review was explained in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic) per Allsop CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17] as follows:

...an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the Executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision, nor does it remake the decision.

1. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321, the plurality of the High Court commented on some of the forms of jurisdictional error. The Court stated that jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of authority [2-3] (footnotes omitted):

Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed.. Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

1. In Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 (Hamod), Beazley JA (Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing) referred to the duty of courts to litigants in person, observing that the touchstone remains that of fairness at [313]. The court found that a trial judge should take steps to ensure that an unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court to ensure a fair trial (Hamod [311] - [313]).
2. While Hamod was a criminal case, similar principles apply in civil matters: BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [22]; MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 (MZAIB) at [100].
3. At the hearing I confirmed that the applicant had a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's submissions, and that the applicant could understand the interpreter. I outlined the role and processes of the Court and explained that jurisdictional error must be demonstrated if the applicant were to succeed in his application. I explained that jurisdictional error is a kind of serious legal error and outlined some common categories, noting that these categories were not exhaustive. I also noted the well-established principle expressed by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (Wu Shan Liang) at [272] - that a court cannot engage in reviewing the merits of the decision. The applicant indicated that he understood the role of the Court.

CONSIDERATION - WAS THERE JURISDICTIONAL ERROR IN THE TRIBUNAL DECISION?

1. The applicant has advanced three grounds of jurisdictional error in his application.
2. After considering each of the grounds, and an additional ground raised by the Minister, I have not identified any jurisdictional error, for the reasons set out below.

Ground 1 - did the Tribunal misconstrue the meaning of significant harm?

1. The applicant contended in his application that the first ground of jurisdictional error was that (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm as set out in s36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958.

The Tribunal construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to me upon my return to India;

It ignored relevant material and facts;

It asked and focused on the wrong questions;

1. The applicant was invited to provide particulars of this claim at the Tribunal hearing. He said that he is afraid to return to India (Tp 7.26-28). Asked why he believes the Tribunal made a mistake, he said he could not say (Tp 7.30-33). Asked to particularise the relevant material and facts which were ignored, or the 'wrong questions' asked by the Tribunal he said that he could not remember, but he had some 'issues in India' (Tp 7.35-8.7). Asked if there was anything else he wished to say about Ground One, he said that he had nothing further to submit (Tp 8.9-12).
2. Without further particulars I am unable to ascertain what material and facts the applicant claims were ignored or what wrong questions he claims were asked. I have considered these issues broadly as the applicant is a litigant in person.
3. As in this ground the applicant has claimed that the Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm, I have considered whether there was jurisdictional error in the way the Tribunal considered the complementary protection provisions.
4. Significant harm is defined in s 36(2A) of the Act as:

(2A) A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

1. I note that it is clear from the Tribunal Decision that the Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence at [3-6] and [9-37]. Without particulars, I cannot identify any evidence (as found in the Court Book) which was not considered by the Tribunal.
2. The Tribunal identified the relevant law (TD [38-43]). The Tribunal referred to the complementary protection provisions including the real risk of significant harm at [42] of the Tribunal Decision. The relevant legislative provisions were annexed to the Tribunal Decision.
3. After identifying the evidence and law, the Tribunal went on to consider whether the applicant met the refugee or complementary protection criteria (TD [48-84]).
4. The Tribunal recorded that the basis of the applicant's claim was that he was a member and supporter of the Congress Party and that members of the BJP had threatened and attempted to kill him (TD [48]). The Tribunal did not accept these claims (TD [49]).
5. At [76] and [77] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not have an adequate explanation as to why if there was a real risk of significant harm he would remain in Bangalore for three weeks, if his wife had returned to Koyilandy. At [51], the Tribunal referred to the applicant's statement that he just wished to have a few more years in Australia. The Tribunal found this statement to be inconsistent with a genuine fear of significant harm in India.
6. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's claims that he was a member or supporter of the Congress Party and that members of BJP had threatened and attempted to kill him (TD [49-50] and [78]). The Tribunal did not accept that he had been assaulted, threatened or that his parents' home was attacked. For these reasons the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm (TD [78]).
7. The characterisation of a decision as legally unreasonable is not easily made out: Djokovic at [33]. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) at [76], the High Court observed 'unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification'.
8. It is a reasonable conclusion to reach that there would be no real risk of significant harm, in circumstances where the Tribunal had not accepted the basis of the applicant's claims - that members of BJP had threatened and attempted to kill him in the past. It cannot be said that the decision lacked an evident and intelligible justification.
9. Although the Tribunal found at [78] that the applicant was not a member of the Congress Party at [79] the Tribunal found that:

Accepting the applicant's claims at its highest, the applicant was simply a Member of the Congress Party who participated in some limited activities in his home village.

1. The Tribunal went on to find that he was not a leader and was not attacked by any party. Presumably, although not clearly expressed, the Tribunal here is presenting an alternative, that if the Tribunal was wrong that he was not involved at all in the Congress Party, then at most, he was an ordinary member not involved in any attacks (TD [79]). In this scenario, the Tribunal goes on to say that it would be reasonable for him to relocate to another region in India where there would be no risk of harm (TD [80]).
2. I am satisfied that the Tribunal considered whether there was a real risk of significant harm and was satisfied that no such risk existed (TD [48- 84]).
3. At [78] the Tribunal found:

The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has been threatened by any individual or organisation for any reason. The Tribunal does not accept that if the applicant were returned to India that he would have a well-founded fear of persecution due to his political opinion or that there is a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in India.

The Tribunal finds that the applicant would be able to reasonably relocate to areas in the south of Kerala as well as other areas in southern India, including Bangalore, and that in doing so he would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and there would not be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm for any reason.

1. It would have been clearer for the Tribunal to make a finding in the terms of the legislation that it was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the removal of the applicant from Australia to India there was a real risk of significant harm. Although the Tribunal did not make this finding in these terms, I am satisfied that this was what was meant by the Tribunal in the findings in [78], given the context and words selected. I accept that in the alternative scenario, as found in [79] and [82] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the applicant could reasonably relocate such that there would not be a real risk of significant harm. This finding was open to the Tribunal on the evidence: Li at [76]. There does not appear to be any misconstruction of the relevant legislative provisions.
2. I am satisfied that the Tribunal asked the right questions and applied the provisions correctly. No jurisdictional error arises in Ground One.

Ground 2 - failure to comply with adverse information provisions

1. The applicant contended that the second ground of jurisdictional error was that (reproduced without alteration):
   1. My point is that despite having attended in the hearing, it became imperative that, before the Tribunal made up its mind to dismiss my application, such information was required to be sent to me written to make comments, in order to fully compliance of s 424A.
2. The applicant was invited to provide particulars of this claim at the Tribunal hearing. He said that he gave media articles to the Tribunal which were not taken into consideration (Tp 8.26-35). He also said that he could not understand the Tribunal (Tp 9.13-28). This response appears to raise different claims, that evidence was not taken into consideration and that he could not understand the Tribunal. No further particulars were provided of these claims. These claims are considered later in the decision.
3. I have considered first whether the Tribunal erred in failing to put information to the applicant under s 424A of the Act, which provides that:

424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal

(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(2A) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.

(3) This section does not apply to information:

(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or

(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or

(c) that is non‑disclosable information.

1. The Minister has correctly submitted that the Tribunal was not obliged to put adverse information to the applicant in writing pursuant to s 424A of the Act as it was also open to the Tribunal to put information to the applicant orally at hearing pursuant to s 424AA of the Act, which was in fact the procedure followed.
2. The Tribunal recorded that it had 'explained the process under s 424AA of the Act' to the applicant (TD [13]). The Tribunal recorded:

The Tribunal explained to the applicant it would be putting to him information which would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. It would explain what that information was, why it was relevant and then invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information. If he required more time to comment on or respond to the information he could request an adjournment.

1. At [51], the Tribunal refers to putting numerous inconsistencies to the applicant. The Tribunal also refers to putting adverse information to the applicant as follows:
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that the claims he had made in respect of the attack on his house were inconsistent with previous information he had provided about this incident (TD [27]). At [27], the Tribunal notes that 'the applicant did not give any response'.
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that the attack on demolition of Babri Masjid by Hindu nationalists occurred in 1992 when the applicant was seven years old which made it unlikely that this event caused the applicant to become politically active, and thus this information undermined his claims (TD [28]). At [28], the Tribunal records that 'the applicant did not respond to this'.
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that his claim about remaining in his parents' home in his hometown after the attack was inconsistent with his previous claims that he and his wife had fled to her parents' home for two weeks. The applicant provided an explanation that the Tribunal considered to again be inconsistent. When the Tribunal put this to the applicant, he said that he had nothing to say about this (TD [30]).
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant information that indicated that BJP were not in force in the applicant's hometown and therefore that the applicant would not face any threat of harm or persecution from the BJP. The applicant said that the BJP had a very cruel nature and that they were very violent. The applicant claimed that there was always violence, often between the BJP and communist parties (TD [31-32]).
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that country information did not highlight any conflicts between the BJP and the Congress Party but referred to conflicts between the BJP and Communist parties in Kerala. In response, the applicant said that he had nothing further to say (TD [32]).
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that country information did not support his claim that the BJP were the dominant party everywhere and he would face persecution. The applicant said that he wanted to be given a couple of more years to be able to stay in Australia (TD [34]).
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that the Treaty of Friendship between India and Nepal would allow the applicant and his family to live and reside in Nepal where he would not face any persecution from the BJP. The applicant said that he could not say anything about this (TD [35]).
   • The Tribunal put to the applicant that the information and documents he had provided in support of his visitor visa application were all bogus which indicated that the applicant was willing to provide bogus documents and information. The applicant said that his father had arranged for an agent to prepare the application and that he did not know anything about this (TD [37]).
2. I accept on the basis of the preceding paragraphs that adverse information was put to the applicant in accordance with s 424AA of the Act and that s 424(2A) relieved the Tribunal of providing information in writing pursuant to s 424A of the Act.
3. In respect of the applicant's claim at hearing that he did not understand what was explained to him, it is not clear if he is referring to the explanation provided by the Tribunal in respect of s 424AA of the Act.
4. The Tribunal at [13] recorded:

The Tribunal explained the process under s 424AA of the Act. The Tribunal explained to the applicant it would be putting to him information which would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. It would explain what that information was, why it was relevant and then invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information. If he required more time to comment on or respond to the information he could request an adjournment.

1. While it may have been difficult for a layperson to understand the process of s 424AA, I am satisfied that the Tribunal satisfactorily explained it to the applicant using the mandatory language of the provision.
2. I note in terms of his level of understanding generally that in the Tribunal Decision, reference is made to an interpreter being present at the Tribunal Decision and the applicant's ability to converse in English (TD [11]). The Tribunal does not refer to an inability to understand. Even if there were some issues at the hearing, multiple opportunities were provided for the applicant to provide evidence (30 January 2017 (CB 274-276), 11 July 2019 (CB 283-284) and 21 January 2020 (CB 98-301)).
3. The applicant at hearing also referred to the failure of the Tribunal to consider media articles. This claim was not particularised. At [10] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal referred to a table of political murders which had been provided by the applicant (CB 287-290). By referring to this table, I am satisfied that the Tribunal considered it. There is no information in the Court Book to suggest that other articles were provided by the applicant to the Tribunal which were not considered by the Tribunal. If the applicant wanted to provide other information, the Tribunal did provide opportunities for the applicant to provide written material on 30 January 2017, 11 July 2019 and 21 January 2020 (CB 274-276, 283-284 and 298-301).
4. No jurisdictional error is disclosed in Ground Two.

Ground 3 - Tribunal did not comply with legislative provisions

1. The applicant contended that the third ground of jurisdictional error was that (reproduced without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act.
2. The applicant was invited to provide particulars of this ground, at the hearing before me. He said that he had 'some issues in India' and this is why he sought a protection visa. When asked to explain why he contended that the Tribunal was in error, he said that they asked for more evidence and he did not have it to give them.
3. I am satisfied that the Tribunal applied the law appropriately. At [38-42], the Tribunal referred to the relevant legal principles. Extracts of the legislation were attached to the decision.
4. The Tribunal referred in detail to the applicant's evidence (TD [4-37]). At [4], the Tribunal set out the applicant's statement in support of his application.
5. The Tribunal then considered the applicant's evidence (TD [48-84]). The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not meet the refugee or complementary protection criteria. There is nothing on the face of the decision to indicate that the Tribunal did not apply the law correctly.
6. To the extent that in this ground the applicant invites the Court to reach a different decision to that of the Tribunal, as I explained to the applicant at the hearing, this Court cannot engage in merits review: Wu Shan Liang at [272]; AHV19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 6 at [21] per Markovic, Thomas and Banks-Smith JJ.
7. The applicant claimed at the hearing before me that the Tribunal asked for evidence which he did not have. I note that at TD [22] the Tribunal said:

The applicant claimed that he was a member of the Congress Party. He claimed that when he joined the Congress Party you are given a one rupee voucher. He said that he no longer had this and had no evidence that he had ever been a member of the Congress Party. He said that he was only an ordinary member and was not a leader or anything else. He said that he campaigned for the party. He was not able to provide details as to what that campaigning entailed.

1. This request does not lead to any form of jurisdictional error. It is well-established that it is for an applicant to adduce evidence in support of his or her claims for protection: VCAK of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 459 per Crennan J at [27]. The Tribunal is under no obligation to 'afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case or improve upon the evidence': Li at [82].
2. This ground does not establish jurisdictional error.

Ground 4 - was there lack of procedural fairness in relation to the Non-Disclosure Certificate?

1. The Minister as a model litigant addressed a further issue not raised by the applicant in the grounds (Minister's written submissions filed 10 November 2025). This was the disclosure by the Tribunal of the existence of the Non-Disclosure Certificate dated 31 January 2017 issued under s 438 of the Act (TD [14]) which was referred to earlier in this judgment. The Non-Disclosure Certificate was issued in respect of folios 48-53 of the Department file which comprised internal Department case notes that recorded 'post-decision checks' on the applicant in relation to his claimed employer, Harvest International Consortiums India Ltd (CB 267-273).
2. Where there is a non-disclosure certificate issued by the Department, a question arises as to whether procedural fairness was afforded to the relevant applicant in relation to the material the subject of that certificate.
3. I asked the applicant at the hearing before me if he had any concerns about the way in which the Non-Disclosure Certificate was discussed by the Tribunal. He said that he had explained to the Tribunal that 'one agent' prepared the application to the Department for him. He did not indicate that he had any concerns about the process adopted by the Tribunal.
4. In MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 1; [2016] FCA 1081 at [37] (MZAFZ) per Beach J, the court found that the certificate in question was invalid, as the basis for public interest immunity was identified as 'internal working documents'. It was held that even if valid, procedural fairness required that the Tribunal ought to have disclosed the existence of the certificate to the applicant per MZAFZ at [50].
5. It was submitted by the Minister that it was likely that the Non-Disclosure Certificate in the matter before me was invalid as, similar to the certificate in MZAFZ at [37], it failed to identify a reason that could form the basis for a claim of public interest immunity given it only covered 'internal working documents'. Although invalid, I accept that there was no breach of procedural fairness in relation to the way the Non-Disclosure Certificate was put to the applicant, for the following reasons.
6. In NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 135 FCR 567 (NAVK) the court considered whether s 438 of the Act, on its proper construction, contained a prohibition against disclosure to an applicant of information that would otherwise be subject to disclosure pursuant to the requirements of procedural fairness. Within NAVK at [86] Beaumont, Conti and Crennan JJ found that disclosure of the substance, but not the detail, of the material will often effect a satisfactory compromise between the demands of disclosure and confidentiality. Their Honours said that the need to preserve confidentiality does not exclude procedural fairness, but it reduces its content NAVK at [87].
7. In the matter before me, the Tribunal disclosed the existence of the Non-Disclosure Certificate to the applicant at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal noted that it had told the applicant that it would not provide the Non-Disclosure Certificate but would put the gist of the information in the certificate to the applicant (TD [14]). The Tribunal recorded that the applicant did not object to the Non-Disclosure Certificate being addressed in this manner (TD [14]).
8. The Tribunal also put the information the subject of the Non-Disclosure Certificate to the applicant pursuant to s 424AA of the Act (TD [36]). The Tribunal referred to the applicant's visitor visa application and the documents in support and the fact that these documents were bogus. The applicant was invited to comment or respond on whether the provision of bogus documents indicated that the applicant was willing to provide false information.
9. I am satisfied that procedural fairness was afforded and there was no jurisdictional error in relation to the Non-Disclosure Certificate.

1. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were attended by jurisdictional error.
2. I will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and ten (110) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Marquard.