BJM23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 464

1. Before this Court is an application filed on 24 May 2023 seeking an extension of time in which to lodge an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 8 November 2016. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (delegate), dated 31 March 2015, to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (protection visa).
2. The application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal was filed on 24 May 2023. This was 2353 days after the expiry of the requisite 35-day filing period. The key issue for determination by this Court is whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for application to this Court, in circumstances where the delay in lodging the application is over 6 years.
3. A hearing of this matter took place at the Sydney Registry of the Court on 3 December 2025.
4. The application is dismissed for the reasons that follow.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Fiji (Court Book (CB) 29). She arrived in Australia in 2014 as the holder of a Visitor (Tourist Stream) (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visa (CB 53).
2. On 24 November 2014, the applicant applied to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) for the protection visa (CB 1-28).
3. The applicant claimed to fear mental, financial and physical harm in Fiji on account of her political opinion and involvement with anti-government lobby groups following the 2006 military coup (CB 9-10).
4. On 27 January 2015, the Department invited the applicant to attend an interview on 17 February 2015 to discuss the application (CB 40-43). The applicant attended the interview before the Department (CB 56).
5. On 31 March 2015, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the protection visa (CB 47-49) finding that she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution or that there was a real risk of significant harm should she return to Fiji (CB 61 and 64).
6. On 28 April 2015, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Department's decision (CB 67-73).
7. The Tribunal acknowledged the application on the same day and invited the applicant to provide material and written arguments for the Tribunal to consider (CB 78-79).
8. The applicant responded on 8 May 2015 and notified the Tribunal that she intended to send further documents in support of her application (CB 80).
9. On 15 May 2015, the applicant provided the Tribunal with a letter of support from the Executive Officer of Fiji National Council for Disabled Persons (FNCDP) confirming that the applicant was associated with the FNCDP through its affiliated organisation, 'Counterstroke - Fiji' (CB 82).
10. On 9 August 2016, the applicant was invited to a hearing of the Tribunal on 8 September 2016 (CB 84-85). In the hearing application letter, the applicant was invited to complete a 'Response to hearing invitation - MR Division' form with any additional information that she wanted the Tribunal to consider (CB 84-85).
11. The applicant returned the form and notified the Tribunal that she intended to call a witness at the hearing to support her claims in relation to her political ideology (CB 89). On 7 September 2016, the applicant provided various documents to the Tribunal in support of her claims concerning her involvement with the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA party) (CB 91-92).
12. A Tribunal hearing was held on 8 September 2016. The applicant attended the hearing to give evidence and present arguments assisted by an interpreter in the Fijian language (CB 96-99).
13. On 8 November 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the Department's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 103) and notified the applicant the following day (CB 102).

TRIBUNAL DECISION 8 NOVEMBER 2016 [TD] (CB 103-114)

1. The Tribunal identified the visa under review and summarised the procedural history of the matter (TD [1-2] and [11-12]).
2. The Tribunal summarised the relevant law and set out the relevant legal and policy framework (TD [3-7]).
3. The Tribunal summarised the evidence (TD [9-15]) and the applicant's claims (TD [10]). The Tribunal considered a further statement that the applicant had provided commenting on elements of the delegate's decision (TD [13]).
4. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant could explain why she had not applied for protection in 2012 when she first travelled to Australia given that the events in Fiji that were the basis of her claims started occurring in 2006 (TD [17-18]).
5. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant voted for and supported the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) and subsequently the SODELPA party in Fiji from 2001 until 2013 (TD [21]).
6. The Tribunal was also satisfied that since arriving in Australia, the applicant had supported and attended meetings of SODELPA, NSW (TD [21]).
7. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had not suffered harm in any way through political involvement in Fiji (TD [24]).
8. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant faced challenges in her role at 'Counterstroke Fiji' following the military coup, however, was not satisfied that this constituted serious or significant harm in accordance with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (TD [27]).
9. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's response to adverse information put to her at the hearing as follows:
   • When the Tribunal put to her country information indicating that there was a much freer political environment following the 2014 election in Fiji, she stated that there was information indicating that individuals voicing their opposition to the government in Fiji were still being targeted (TD [28]).
   • When the Tribunal put to her that country information indicating that unless she was a high-profile figure in Fiji she was unlikely to attract the adverse attention of the Fijian authorities, she stated that this is what she perceives could happen (TD [29]).
10. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had posted supportive comments about the views of SODELPA on social media (TD [31]).
11. The Tribunal noted that it would not put weight on the supporting letter from the Opposition Whip, SODELPA, Fiji submitted by the applicant as it was unsupported and unsubstantiated (TD [32]).
12. The Tribunal considered the evidence provided by a SODELPA member as a witness at the hearing (TD [33-35]).
13. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's response to adverse information put to her at the hearing as follows:
    • When the Tribunal put to her that based on her evidence and the evidence of her witness she was not a public figure and had not drawn the attention of authorities in Fiji and therefore that it could not see that she would be at a real risk of harm, she stated that up until the 2014 election it was a regular occurrence that if anyone said anything they would be taken away and that this happened to ordinary members as well as high profile members (TD [36]).
    • When the Tribunal put to her that it must consider what risk she faced of future harm in Fiji, she stated that she was worried about her political involvement in Australia and that there was information going around that she could be identified (TD [36]).
14. The Tribunal found that there was no credible evidence that Fijians were being harmed upon returning to Fiji (TD [36]).
15. The Tribunal considered country information from Fiji provided in a report from the Department of Foreign Affairs in April 2015 and updated information provided by the Country of Origin Information Section of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in October 2015 (TD [39]).
16. The Tribunal was satisfied, based on the evidence provided by the applicant and the available information, that the applicant's level of political engagement had not drawn her to the attention of the Fijian authorities and would not see her at real risk of harm (TD [40]).
17. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy any of the relevant criterion for the grant of a protection visa as set out in s 36(2) of the Act (TD [44-45]).
18. On 8 November 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the protection visa (TD [46]).

1. The applicant applied to this Court for judicial review in an application filed on 24 May 2023.
2. The applicant also filed an affidavit deposed on 24 May 2023 attaching a copy of the Tribunal Decision and containing a number of statements.
3. No further documents were filed by the applicant.
4. The applicant's grounds for judicial review are set out in the application filed on 24 May 2023. The applicant seeks an extension of time to lodge her application for review, and orders that the Tribunal Decision be quashed and that the decision be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration. In her application, the applicant specified four reasons why she believed it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time for review.
5. On 3 December 2025 the applicant appeared before this Court as a litigant in person. Mr Wang of Clayton Utz appeared for the respondent. A Fijian interpreter assisted the Court. The applicant confirmed that she could understand the interpreter.
6. The following documents were before the Court - the initiating application for judicial review, the supporting affidavit of the applicant filed on 24 May 2023, a Court Book (numbering 114 pages and marked as Exhibit 1R) filed 24 November 2023, and written submissions of the Minister filed on 1 December 2025. The affidavit included statements, which have been treated as submissions by this Court, with no objection from the Minister. The affidavit was read in Court.

1. In Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 (Hamod), Beazley JA (Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing) referred to the duty of courts to litigants in person, observing that the touchstone remains that of fairness [313]. The court found that a trial judge should take steps to ensure that an unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court to ensure a fair trial (Hamod at [311] - [313]).
2. While Hamod was a criminal case, similar principles apply in civil matters_: BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs_ [2023] FCA 384 at [22]; MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 (MZAIB) at [100].
3. At the hearing before me, I confirmed that the applicant had a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's submissions and that the applicant could understand the interpreter. I outlined the role and processes of the Court and explained that jurisdictional error must be demonstrated if the applicant were to succeed in her application. I explained that jurisdictional error is a kind of serious legal error and outlined some common categories, noting that these categories were not exhaustive. I also noted the well-established principle expressed by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 - that a court cannot engage in reviewing the merits of the decision. I also explained the principles of extension of time applications. The applicant indicated that she understood.

CONSIDERATION OF THE EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATION

1. Section 477 of the Act provides the time limit which applies to the applications for judicial review of tribunal decisions in respect of which this Court has jurisdiction and the basis upon which it may be extended. At the time of the Tribunal Decision, the provision relevantly provided:

477 Time limits on applications to the Federal Circuit Court

(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.

(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:

(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

(b) the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

1. The legislation does not prescribe what factors a court should consider, to determine whether extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. The Court usually takes into consideration principles such as the length of the delay, whether there is an adequate explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the Minister and the merits of the proposed substantive application: see, for example: SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442 at [46]- [48].
2. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 (Katoa) the majority of the High Court held at [12] that:

(a) the focus in considering whether to grant the extension of time is not on the interests of the applicant, but on the broader interests of the administration of justice; and

(b) the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.

Lodgement of application for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision

1. As the Tribunal Decision was made on 8 November 2016, the time to apply for judicial review expired on 13 December 2016 (35 days from the Tribunal Decision: s 477(1) of the Act).
2. The application for review of the Tribunal Decision was not lodged by the applicant until 24 May 2023 which was 2353 days after the prescribed time as set out in s 477(1) of the Act.
3. The applicant has applied for the extension pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act. The Court must consider the two limbs of s 477(2) of the Act.

1. The first limb in s 477(2)(a) of the Act is whether an application has been made to the Court in writing specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order extending time.
2. The applicant made an application in writing on 24 May 2023 seeking judicial review. In the application, the applicant contended the following grounds in support of her application for an extension of time on the review:
   1. I came to Australia seeking protection because the situation in Fiji was not good since the military coup led by Bainimarama in 2006. Since then, the Military has significant influence in Fiji. Though, there were elections, however, the Military still has the power. I developed political opinion against the military regime and against continuing human rights abuses. As a result of that I left Fiji and came to Australia on 28 August 2014 and then sought protection on 24 November 2014. The Department of Home Affairs refused my application on 31 March 2015 and I then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). On 08 November 2016, the AAT affirmed the decision of the DOHA. After that I became unlawful. I was scared and did not know what to do and became a very introvert person. I isolated myself due to the fear that I would be sent back to Fiji.
   2. Due to that I did not seek legal advice. I later in 2022 applied to the Minister under s417 for his intervention which was recently refused.
   3. I believe that there are possible legal errors in my AAT decision and if allowed I believe that the Honourable Court will remit my matter to the AAT.
   4. Due to my mental health issues, I could not seek legal advice.
3. I am satisfied that s 477(2)(a) of the Act is met, as an application has been made to the Court in writing specifying why the applicant considers it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order extending time.

Necessary in the interests of the administration of justice

1. The second limb of s 477(2)(b) allows the Court to grant an extension of time for the filing of an application if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.
2. The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time.
3. The High Court observed in Katoa at [11], that the text of equivalent provisions (relevant to the Federal Court), reveals a legislative intention to restrict exercise of the jurisdiction by placing a 35 day limit on applications and ameliorating injustice that might result by allowing that time to be extended only where a judge has reached a state of satisfaction that it is in the interests of administration of justice to extend (in Katoa per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [11]).

The extent of the delay and explanation for it

1. The applicant lodged the application for review on 24 May 2023, a period of 2353 days or over 6 years after the prescribed time. By any consideration, this is an extraordinary delay.
2. The applicant has claimed in her written submissions that after the decision of the Tribunal she 'became unlawful' and 'was scared and did not know what to do and became a very introvert person. I isolated myself due to the fear that I would be sent back to Fiji'.
3. She said that she did not seek legal advice because of her mental health issues and later in 2022 sought ministerial intervention which was refused.
4. At the hearing before me she expanded on these submissions, claiming that she was 'idle' and she 'went around asking for help' and 'had fear within her' (Tp 5.12-33). She said that she could not find help. She said it was 'not that I was not trying to do anything about my status' (Tp 5.13) She said that she tried to get advice. She also mentioned that 'during that time, 'COVID came in' (Tp 5.27-33) She said that she did not have her documents with her.
5. The Minister submitted that these reasons were deficient and failed to explain the lengthy delay. The Minister contended that while these reasons might explain a delay of a few weeks, they do not explain a delay of six years.
6. I accept these submissions. My reasons are set out below.
7. I have summarised the applicant's explanations for the delay into five main themes.
8. The first explanation contended by the applicant was isolation, introversion and fear. I have some sympathy for the applicant in this regard. There is no doubt that the process of applying for a protection visa and the process of review can be intimidating and frightening, particularly for a litigant in person. She has said that she was unlawful and did not know what to do. It is understandable that a person finding themselves in such a situation might be paralysed into inaction. However, while this explanation may have led to some leeway by the Court if there had been a small delay, it is difficult to accept that this is a compelling reason for delaying for a period of six years. The applicant did not explain if she was unaware of the time limit or made any efforts to find out: see SZLIH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 108 (SZLIH) at [33] and Duwai v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1141 at [7].
9. In SZLIH Cowdroy J said:

It is not acceptable that the applicants failed to make proper inquiries to determine when their appeal was required to be lodged.

1. In the case before me, it would have been expected that the applicant would have equipped herself with knowledge about the review process including applicable time limits for review.
2. The second reason provided by the applicant was the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tribunal Decision was in 2016, and the COVID pandemic began in around 2020. The restrictions imposed by the pandemic therefore cannot explain the delay over the four years prior to its commencement.
3. The third reason provided was the applicant's mental health issues. The applicant has not provided medical evidence. While her mental issues may provide some explanation for a delay, without medical evidence, mental health issues cannot provide justification for a delay of over six years.
4. The fourth reason provided by the applicant was that she had sought ministerial intervention in 2022. Whether ministerial intervention is a reasonable ground for delay, has been considered by the courts. In Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 59 at [29] (Jessup J) and Daniel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 21; 205 ALR 198 at [14] (Goldberg J) the courts found that the pursuit of ministerial intervention did not constitute a sufficient special circumstance to warrant excusing the delay and allowing the extension of time. In this case, the explanation of the pursuit of ministerial intervention is not a satisfactory explanation when considering that the applicant sought ministerial intervention five years after the Tribunal Decision.
5. The fifth theme in the applicant's explanation was that she sought advice but could not find any, only finding advice to seek ministerial intervention. Again, this explanation does not match a delay of six years, particularly when it is taken into consideration that the applicant did get assistance to apply for ministerial intervention. I return here to the issue of the responsibility of an applicant to ensure that they follow court procedures and legislative time limits.
6. It is established authority that ignorance of time limits, without further justification, is not generally regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay: see SZJRV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 298 and the authorities cited in CUS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 293 (CUS) at [19] per Judge Lucev. In Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491 McHugh J found that an applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending time for seeking relief at [17]. In my view, while an active seeking of legal advice may explain a short delay, CUS at [22], it does not explain a delay of six years.
7. A delay of over six years is an extreme delay. There have been many cases where courts have found a delay of over a year to be significant: see for example Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42, where the delay was 16 months. In Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470 the delay was 17 months. McHugh J observed at [16]:

Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay.

1. In Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 (Tran) at [38], Wigney J referred to a delay of almost 18 months, calling the delay 'extreme' and observing that, without some other very persuasive factor, the length weighed in favour of the application for extension of time being refused.
2. The longer the delay the more persuasive the explanation for that delay needs to be, Jess v Scott [1986] FCA 365; (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195. The explanations provided by the applicant in the matter before me have not been sufficiently persuasive even considering them cumulatively.
3. I turn then to consideration of the other factors, noting that as there is significant delay, the matter would need to be extraordinary or exceptional for the extension of time to be granted: Katoa at [18].

Any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted and public interest

1. The Minister submitted that it is usual for the respondent in extension of time cases to concede that there would be no prejudice to them if the extension were granted. The Minister submitted that in contrast in the case before me, due to the length of the delay, the Minister would suffer prejudice.
2. I accept that where there are lengthy delays in applying for review, this can detract from the efficient administration of justice, in that litigation becomes prolonged. Where matters are old they become more complex, and in some cases the Minister may need to divert resources to prepare for these matters and locate materials.
3. In WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 Derrington J considered an application for a very lengthy extension of time (being two years and two months) and observed (at [43]-[44]):

In the case of decisions made under the Act in respect of which the time for seeking review has long passed, the granting an extension of time would have the consequence that the right to seek review may be resurrected at any later time thereby necessitating a diversion of resources in circumstances where those administrative officers who were familiar with the matter may have moved on. It can be assumed that the limitation of time in which to make an application for review of the Tribunal's decision has been set by the legislature with the intent that it generally balances the interests of applicants in seeking review with the interests of the Minister and his Department in finalising the decision-making obligations under the Act. Although s 477A(2) enables the Court to extend time, the general temporal limitation cannot be entirely ignored or treated as merely provisional. The prejudice which the Minister would suffer in this case in relation to the orderly and proper administration of the Act is a further factor which weighs heavily in favour of rejecting the application for extension of time.

1. The issue of prejudice to the Minister in this regard is inter-related with considerations of public interest.
2. Clearly there is a public interest in the 'prompt disposition of allegations that officers of the Commonwealth have acted in excess of or have failed to exercise their jurisdiction under statute': MZABO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 980 at [5] per Jessup J.
3. As observed by Gyles J in Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 192 ALR 71 at [62] it can be easily overlooked that there is a significant public interest in the timely and effective disposal of litigation. He continued:

This aspect has particular force in this area of public law, where delays in dealing with applications for protection visas are obviously to be avoided if possible.

1. I am satisfied that given the extreme delay in this case, there is some prejudice to the Minister and that the public interest is better served by not extending time unless the merits of the case are exceptional.

1. If the extension were refused, this would significantly impact the applicant as there would be no opportunity for the Tribunal to revisit its decision and grant the applicant a visa. This may mean that the applicant would need to leave the country. At the hearing before me, she said that she had been in Australia for 11 years, which she said was a long time and she had a 'new life, a new way of living here in Australia'. She said that she would find it very difficult to have to return to Fiji and start again 'from the ground to the top' (Tp 11.45-12.02).
2. These compassionate considerations weigh in favour of the extension being granted.

1. In considering whether a proposed appeal has merit, a court will usually do so at a 'reasonably impressionistic level' by way of assessing whether the proposed grounds are 'arguable', 'reasonably arguable' or 'sufficiently arguable' to warrant the grant of extension of time: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [21], and approved by the Full Court in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110.
2. However, as considered in preceding paragraphs, where there is extreme delay as in this case, the matter would need to be extraordinary or exceptional for the extension of time to be granted: Katoa at [18] and Tran at [38].
3. The applicant has advanced three grounds of jurisdictional error in her application. I have considered the grounds identified by the applicant and remained alert to the possibility of error that may warrant an extension being granted: MZAIB.
4. After considering each of the grounds, I am not satisfied that there are any prospects of success, for the reasons set out below.

1. The applicant contended in her application that the first ground of jurisdictional error was that (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. Tribunal failed to comply with s 424 (A) of under s 424 (AA) of the Act in respect of information that it considered would be their reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
2. She provided particulars of this ground as follows:
   1. The Tribunal failed to provide clear particulars and failed to mention the relevance of it.
   2. The Tribunal failed to provide information related to me as an applicant previously travelled to Fiji under s424 A or s424 (AA) of the Migration Act.
   3. I am a self-represented applicant and the Tribunal had considered DFAT Country Information Report 20115 and failed to provide the report to me as the applicant to comment on or response.
   4. I am a self-represented applicant and the Tribunal has considered Country of Origin of Information Section of the Department of Immigration which is not on public domain. The Tribunal failed to provide the report to me as the applicant to comment on or response.
3. The first claim of the applicant in this ground is that her travel history should have been put to her under the adverse information provisions in the legislation.
4. The applicant's travel history between Fiji and Australia was information given to the Tribunal by the applicant for the purpose of the application for review: s 424A(3)(b) of the Act. Provided to the Tribunal was a letter dated 26 April 2015 in which she provided information about this (CB 4, 74-75). The Tribunal was not required to put this information to the applicant. However, notably at TD [17] the Tribunal did ask the applicant why she had not applied for protection in 2012 when she had travelled to Australia.
5. The applicant also claimed that the DFAT Report And other Department country sources should have been put to her under the adverse information provisions. Country information of this type is not required to be put to the applicant. Under s 424A(3)(a) of the Act, this is information 'that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or another person is a member'. The Tribunal did discuss the country information with the applicant (TD [36]) and provided her with an opportunity to comment on it.
6. At the hearing before me, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal did not investigate what was 'really happening in Fiji' (Tp 7.35-40). I note that the Tribunal considered a number of different country reports (TD [37- 39]).
7. As submitted by the Minister at the hearing before me, there is nothing in the Court Book to indicate that the applicant provided other country information which was not considered by the Tribunal.
8. In any event it is well established that the choice of country information, and the weight to be afforded to it, is exclusively a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11] to [13] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ.
9. There is no jurisdictional error established in Ground One.

1. The applicant contended that the second ground of jurisdictional error was that:
   1. The Tribunal failed to consider relevant consideration.
2. The particulars were:

I have advised that and confirming expressing my views on social media (Facebook) and the Tribunal failed to consider whether I will face serious harm due to my Facebook activities.

1. At the hearing before me she referred to the Tribunal failing to consider SODELPA's posts on social media (Tp 7.35-40).
2. It is clear from a reading of the Tribunal Decision that the Tribunal considered the social media posts in TD [30] - [31]:

The applicant has from time to time posted supportive comments about the views of SODELPA.

The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant is at risk of serious or significant harm for her use of social media and/or SODELPA fan page or signed petitions in Fiji.

1. To the extent that the applicant is inviting this Court to reach a different conclusion on the social media evidence, that would amount to merits review, which is impermissible in this Court: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at [17].
2. There is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision as advanced in Ground Two.

1. The applicant contended that the third ground of jurisdictional error was that:
   1. The Tribunal failed to consider my activities as the applicant under the Complementary protection ground.
2. She provided particulars of this ground as follows:

The Tribunal failed to consider applicant's Facebook activities under the Complementary Protection ground.

1. The applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to consider the social media posts in respect of complementary protection. She said that they did not consider the social media as her face was exposed.
2. Again, a fair reading of the decision indicates that the Tribunal considered the social media posts (TD [30]-[31], [43]).
3. The Tribunal referred to the complementary protection provisions at TD [6].
4. The Tribunal set out the applicant's evidence at TD [14] - [15], [17]- [28].
5. Under a heading 'Is there a real risk of serious or significant harm occurring to the applicant?' (TD [28] - [32]), the Tribunal considered the applicant's claims and discussed them with her, including her claims that she put comments on the SODELPA fan page and posts on her own Facebook page (TD [30]). The Tribunal accepted that she had from time to time posted supportive comments about SODELPA (TD [31]).
6. After considering the evidence and country information the Tribunal was not satisfied that she had drawn adverse attention from the Fijian authorities or that she would be at risk of serious or significant harm (TD [41]).
7. At [43] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal said:

The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant is at risk of serious or significant harm for her use of social media and/or SODELPA fan page or signed petitions in Fiji.

1. The use of the words 'significant harm' denotes that the Tribunal was, in (TD [43]) considering the complementary protection provision in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act which provides that there must be substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm.
2. It is clear that the Tribunal considered the social media evidence and made findings on it, based on the applicant's level of engagement and country sources. To the extent that the applicant is claiming that the findings were unreasonable, the findings had an evident and intelligible justification: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76]. It was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning which it did engage in on the evidence before it: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 per Crennan and Bell JJ at [133].
3. No jurisdictional error arises from Ground Three.

1. As the application for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision was made outside the statutory timeframe, the Court may only grant an extension of time if it is satisfied such extension is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice: s 477(2) of the Act.
2. I have considered the various factors above, based on the decision in Katoa. Although there may be significant impact on the applicant if no extension is granted, I have taken guidance from the High Court in Katoa at [12], that the Court's power to extend time is not focused on the interests of the applicant but rather on the broader interests of the administration of justice.
3. This is a case where the prejudice to the Minister and the public interest weighs in favour of refusal of an extension of time. The claim of jurisdictional error does not appear to have any prospects of success and the delay of six years is extreme and without satisfactory explanation, which supports a conclusion that this Court should exercise its discretion to refuse the extension of time, even where there is significant impact on the applicant: AZAFJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 291 at [57].
4. Given there are no arguable prospects of success, I am not satisfied that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice that an extension of time for lodgement of the application for judicial review be granted.
5. The application for extension of time is dismissed.
6. The Court will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-two (122) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Marquard.