BEP20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 345

1. The applicants have sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 25 February 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection (delegate) to refuse the applicants Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visas (protection visas).
2. This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
3. The issues for determination by this Court relate primarily to the country information used by the applicant - whether it was 'wrong' or whether other country sources should have been utilised. The applicant has also challenged the decision generally and the relocation findings.
4. The application is dismissed for the reasons that follow.

1. The applicants are a husband and wife (Court Book (CB) 14) who are citizens of India (CB 64-71). They entered Australia on July 2015 on Visitor (Tourist stream) (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visas (Tribunal Decision (TD) [3]).
2. On 25 August 2015, the applicants applied for the protection visas (CB 130). The first applicant claimed to fear persecution if he returned to India (CB 61-63), and the second applicant applied as a member of the same family unit (CB 36).
3. The applicants set out their claims for protection in a statement which they attached to their application (CB 61-63). In the statement the first applicant identified that he had experienced 'unrest and misunderstanding[s]' with Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members in India and that he had been attacked by them due to his father's support for the Congress Party and his own interest in Congress Party ideology. He said:

One of the local BJP members used to like my wife and proposed for the marriage, but my wife's family refused his family proposal. His father is a local RSS leader. Before my marriage I received phone call from another BJP though. asked me to stope any kind relationship with my wife if I want to be alive. I did not listen to them and got married on time. This guy started to harass my wife on the phone. forced her to change her phone number few times. He begins to stalk her. On 21 September 2013, four people attacked to kill me. I survived the attack but they reported the matter to the police that I organised the attack on them. FIR was filed on the local police station against me. We realised the situation very quickly and made the decision to move to another state. In the same night police came to my home to arrest me. I was on the way to Mumbai with my wife. Because BJP is in power in the state and central. Their leaders and members are using the local law enforcement authorities for - their own benefits. We were in constant move in Mumbai to avoid him. It was very difficult situation. I have never lived without my family and my wife's family was very worried about our safety. We struggled almost two years and decided to leave the country with the advice of my parents. We wanted to have children but could not do it on that situation. My father always helped me financially and organised our visa to Australia. He threatened to kidnap my wife and kill me. We are seeking protection in Australia because we would be killed if we return to India.

1. The applicants provided the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) with a copy of the First Incident Report (FIR) which they claimed had been filed in 2013 (CB 135).
2. On 21 October 2016, the delegate refused to grant the applicants the visas. The delegate was not satisfied that they would be persecuted or face a real risk of any significant harm if they returned to India (CB 141-143).
3. On 15 November 2016, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the Department's decision (CB 144-150).
4. On 13 February 2020, a hearing was held before the Tribunal. The first applicant attended the hearing to give evidence and present arguments assisted by a Gujarati interpreter (CB 166-168).
5. On 25 February 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicants visas (CB 171) and notified the applicants the following day (CB 170).

1. The Tribunal identified the visa under review and summarised the procedural history of the matter (TD [1-2]). The Tribunal summarised the relevant law and set out the provisions of the Act that applied to the grant of a protection visa (TD [33-38]).
2. The Tribunal recorded the applicants' claims as set out in the statement attached to the protection visa application (TD [4]), and identified the documents provided (TD [5]).
3. The Tribunal identified the claims that the first applicant had made in his interview with the delegate on 19 August 2016 (TD [6]). These included that:
   • He worked with his father before he came to Australia.
   • His wife's family did not know they were married.
   • He feared being harassed by the same people who used to harass his wife prior to September 2013 by throwing stones when he left his house. They also discredited him, pulled his hair, would not let him sit on a bus and threw water on him.
   • The police would not write down his complaints when he tried to report the harassment and instead a report had been made against him that he tried to stab them.
   • The people who harassed him were called Chaudhary and they were a family in the village of Mehsana where he studied and worked.
   • Initially it was only three or four people who harassed him but after 10 or 15 days a crowd gathered and they would loudly harass him.
   • The people harassing him tried to kill him three to five times, but he could only remember one date where some people tried to stab him in the stomach and back. A newspaper incorrectly reported that it was he who attempted to stab people.
   • On one occasion 350 people attempted to beat him, but he ran away.
   • The police in India are looking for him and have his photograph.
   • He could not return to India because the case against him was reopened in the courts in 2015.
4. The Tribunal recorded that the delegate had identified inconsistencies between the documents provided by the applicants, and the claims that the first applicant had made regarding the report that had been made against him. In particular, the delegate noted that the applicant left India 22 months after the claimed incident and that if he 'was of any interest to the Indian authorities they would have been able to ensure the applicant could not depart India without being stopped' (TD [7]).
5. The Tribunal noted that the delegate had not been satisfied that the claimed incident had occurred or that the applicants would face harassment if they returned to India (TD [8]).
6. The Tribunal recorded the first applicant's evidence at the hearing on 21 January 2020 (TD [10-32]). The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant claimed that he no longer had any contact with his father 'due to incidents that took place in India'. He further claimed that in 2017 his mother had said that 'the applicant had spoiled their image and that if he returned to India they would kill him' (TD [13]). The first applicant confirmed that he was claiming protection on the basis that if he returned to India his parents would kill him because by marrying his wife, his parents believed they had spoiled their reputation (TD [14]).
7. The Tribunal recorded that when asked whether his parents had done anything to carry out their threats, the first applicant claimed that they had not, because he had run away from home (TD [15]).
8. The Tribunal recorded that it had put to the first applicant that his evidence about running away from home in 2013 was inconsistent with his previous claims that he had worked for his father for three or four years after finishing college in 2011. In response, the first applicant submitted that he had worked for his father for three or four years prior to leaving college (TD [16]).
9. The Tribunal recorded the first applicant's evidence that the applicants had not received any threats from the first applicant's parents since 2013 (TD [17]).
10. The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant claimed that his wife had been harassed by a person in a shopping centre in 2011 (TD [18]). He said that he told the police, but they did nothing. The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant claimed that in 2013 or 2014 a person got hold of his wife's hand in a shopping centre in India and took out a knife. The first applicant claimed that he had held the individual by the throat and grabbed the knife from him. He said that three other people attacked him but that he had hit them which caused them to run away (TD [19]). The first applicant had said that 'these people were treating lots of women like this' (TD [20]). He claimed that the police would not record their complaints.
11. The Tribunal recorded that it had put to the first applicant that his wife had given evidence that they had lived with his parents from February 2013 which was inconsistent with his evidence about when he moved out and that his parents were not aware that him and his wife were married. The Tribunal noted that the first applicant had encouraged the Tribunal to contact his parents for confirmation of these claims (TD [22]).
12. The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant had claimed that his father was a member of the Congress Party in India. The first applicant said that if his father asked him to do something for the Congress Party, such as distributing leaflets he would do it. The first applicant confirmed that he was not active in any political organisation (TD [24]).
13. The Tribunal put to the first applicant that his evidence about the knife attack was inconsistent with the claims he had made in his interview with the Department and that this information could lead the Tribunal to make an adverse finding against his credibility (TD [25]). The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant claimed that he lacked memory of the assault due to the passing of time and that if the Tribunal had asked him what had happened after the assault he would have said that he had been chased by 350 people (TD [26]).
14. The Tribunal recorded that it put to the first applicant inconsistencies in his evidence about the assault that he claimed had occurred and that these inconsistencies undermined his credibility (TD [28]).
15. The Tribunal recorded that it had put to the first applicant that in his visa application he had stated that 'my father always help me financially and organised our visit to Australia' which was inconsistent with his claims before the Tribunal (TD [29]).
16. The Tribunal recorded that it asked the applicant why he would not be able to live in Mumbai considering he had lived there for a number of years. The first applicant said that nothing happened to him there because he was in hiding (TD [30]).
17. The Tribunal recorded that it had put to the first applicant that Nepal and India had a treaty which allowed Indian citizens to live and reside in Nepal. The first applicant claimed that if he were given a house and a job then he would be able to do that but that 'it was different in Australia' (TD [31]).
18. The Tribunal summarised the country information before it contained within the 'DFAT Country Information Report - India dated 17 October 2018' (DFAT Report) (TD [39-41]). It recorded that this report assessed that 'leaders and members of opposition political parties do not face official or societal discrimination and that although the risk of political violence between rival supporters increases during parliamentary and state elections in general elections in India are peacefully conducted' (TD [39]).
19. The Tribunal did not find the first applicant to be credible and described his claims as 'inconsistent' and his responses as 'vague and dismissive' (TD [43]).
20. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence before it which indicated that the first applicant had been suffering any medical condition which would affect his memory. The Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant would not be able to provide clear details of events that had occurred due to the passage of time (TD [44]).
21. The Tribunal summarised the first applicant's claims at the hearing and to the Department (TD [45-46]). The Tribunal found that the first applicant's claims were 'significantly different' (TD [46]). The Tribunal found that the first applicant's evidence as to his father and the alleged threats his father had made against him that he provided to the Tribunal were in 'complete contradiction' to the claims he had made as to the support his father gave him and his wife in his original application (TD [47]). The Tribunal found that these inconsistencies undermined the credibility of all the first applicant's evidence (TD [47]).
22. The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant had made no claims about fearing harm from members of the BJP to the Tribunal despite this being the basis of his protection claims in his visa application (TD [48-50]).
23. The Tribunal referred to the country information and recorded that it did not accept that even if the first applicant liked the ideology of the Congress Party or had been involved in handing out leaflets for them that he would be at risk of harm from members of the BJP or any other political organisation (TD [51]).
24. The Tribunal gave little weight to the documents that the first applicant had provided as evidence of the alleged assault in September 2013 (TD [53-54]). The Tribunal noted that such documents were not those which would be difficult to generate fraudulently (TD [54]).
25. The Tribunal recorded that the fact that the first applicant was able to depart India through Ahmedabad in Gujarat indicated that his claim that there was an outstanding criminal charge against him and that the police in Gujarat were interested in him was not credible (TD [56]).
26. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant could not remember the details of the alleged assault that occurred in India in 2013 or 2014 or that 'it would be similar to the Tribunal member remembering what he had for dinner on a day in 2015' as the first applicant had suggested. The Tribunal recorded that the 'significant inconsistencies and general nature of the description provided by the first applicant as to the alleged assault leads the Tribunal to conclude that this assault never occurred' (TD [59]).
27. The Tribunal found that the threats alleged by the first applicant to have occurred in India appeared to be for personal reasons and not due to any political opinion or any other cause. The Tribunal recorded that they appeared to be localised to the first applicant's hometown and, at most, his home state of Gujarat (TD [61]).
28. The Tribunal found that the applicants could relocate to New Delhi or Mumbai and there would not be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm or a well-founded fear of persecution (TD [62-63]).
29. Ultimately, the Tribunal did not accept any of the claims made by the first applicant and found that even if he held concerns about living in Gujarat that he would be able to relocate to Mumbai where there would be no fear of persecution (TD [64]).
30. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the protection visas (TD [66]).

1. The applicants applied to this Court for judicial review in an application filed on 18 March 2020. The matter was docketed to me on 6 August 2025.
2. The applicants filed an affidavit deposed on 13 March 2020 attaching a copy of the Tribunal Decision, which was read in Court. The affidavit included a statement that the first applicant applied for the protection visa as he feared for his life. He also said that he believed that the Tribunal made legal and factual errors. These statements were treated as submissions, with no objection by the Minister.
3. The applicants' grounds for judicial review are set out in the application filed on 18 March 2020. The applicants seek orders that the Tribunal Decision be quashed and that the decision be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
4. On 3 November 2025, the first applicant appeared before this Court as a litigant in person. Ms Warren from Sparke Helmore Solicitors appeared for the Minister. A Gujarati interpreter assisted the Court. The first applicant confirmed that he could understand the interpreter.
5. The following documents were before the Court - the initiating application for judicial review, the supporting affidavit of the first applicant filed on 18 March 2020, a Court Book (numbering 188 pages and marked as Exhibit 1R) 7 July 2020, written submissions of the Minister filed on 2 October 2020 and an affidavit of Carly Warren affirmed on 17 October 2025, which was read in Court.

1. A court has an intrinsic duty to assist unrepresented litigants: Dietrich v R [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292; Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 per Beazley JA (Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing). At [309] to [316] in Hamod, Beazley JA outlined the relevant principles in ensuring there is the right balance between impartiality and assisting litigants in person (citations omitted):
   • The duty reposes in the individual judicial officer hearing a case.
   • The touchstone is that of fairness.
   • The duty requires that a person does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising the recognised right of a litigant to be self-represented.
   • Trial judges should ensure that litigants do not remain ignorant of fundamental procedures which if invoked may prove advantageous.
   • The court has an obligation to ensure a fair trial for all parties such that the impartial function of the judge should be preserved, and no advice should be given as to how rights should be exercised.
   • The unrepresented litigant should have sufficient information about the practices and procedure of the court so far as reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial.
2. These principles apply in civil cases: Mortimer J in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 (MZAIB) at [70] - [75]. Mortimer J referred to various authorities and observed that what a judge must do to assist a litigant in person depends on the litigant, the nature of the case, and the litigant's intelligence and understanding of the case. She endorsed the approach of Smith J in Panagopoulos v Southern Healthcare Network (unreported, Sup Ct, Vic, 15 September 1997) at [9] who observed that while judges should maintain neutrality, the boundaries of legitimate intervention are flexible.
3. In the case before me, I confirmed that the applicant had a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's submissions. At the hearing I outlined the role and processes of the Court and explained that jurisdictional error must be demonstrated if the applicants were to succeed in their application. I explained that jurisdictional error is a kind of serious legal error and outlined some common categories, noting that these categories were not exhaustive. I explained that the Court cannot undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (Wu Shan Liang) at [272].

1. The applicants have claimed that the Tribunal Decision fell into jurisdictional error. The function of this Court is to review the Tribunal Decision and determine whether the Tribunal has fallen into error.
2. Section 476 of the Act provides that this Court has the same original jurisdiction as the High Court. The High Court, under s 75(v) of the Constitution, has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.
3. A privative clause as defined at s 474 of the Act is final and not amenable to judicial review. The Court can grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
4. The role of judicial review was explained in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic) per Allsop J, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17] as follows:

...an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the Executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision, nor does it remake the decision.

1. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321, the plurality of the High Court commented on some of the forms of jurisdictional error. The High Court observed that jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of authority [2-3] (footnotes omitted):

Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed.. Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

1. The Tribunal was required to consider whether the applicant met the legislative criteria for a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa.
2. Section 29(1) of the Act gives the Minister or its delegate power to grant a non-citizen a visa to travel to and enter or remain in Australia. The Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) prescribe the criteria for classes of visas: s 31(1) and (3) of the Act. A non-citizen must apply for a visa of a particular class: s 45 of the Act.
3. The Minister considers whether an application is valid and then grants a visa if satisfied that criteria identified in s 65(1)(a) of the Act are met. This includes criteria prescribed by the Act or Regulations: s 65(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.
4. Subsections 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act provide that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to the receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm.

...

1. Section 5J of the Act sets out the meaning of 'well-founded fear of persecution':

(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

...

(4) If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5) Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a) a threat to the person's life or liberty;

(b) significant physical harassment of the person;

(c) significant physical ill treatment of the person;

(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person's capacity to subsist;

(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist;

(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist.

...

CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF JURISDICTIONAL ERROR ADVANCED BY THE APPLICANT

1. The applicants have advanced four grounds of jurisdictional error in their application. I have considered these grounds broadly in accordance with the principles in MZAIB at [100].
2. Although invited to do so on various occasions, the applicants did not wish to make submissions at the hearing. The first applicant made one statement that everything he had said was true.
3. After considering each of the grounds, I have not identified any jurisdictional error, for the reasons set out below.

1. The applicants contended that the first ground of jurisdictional error was (reproduced below without alteration):
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred in its decision in applying protection visa criteria prescribed under the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
2. At the hearing before this Court, the first applicant was asked if he wished to provide further particulars or submissions on this ground. The first applicant responded that he did not wish to say anything.
3. It is difficult to distil the claim being made as the claim in Ground 1 as it is unparticularised. I note that the ground is liable for dismissal due to want of particularisation, however as the applicants are litigants in person, I have attempted to identify the claim being made.
4. To the extent that the applicants are claiming that the Tribunal incorrectly applied the law, I note that the Tribunal correctly set out the law (TD [33-38]), referred to the criteria and the evidence (TD [45-46]). The Tribunal then evaluated the evidence to ascertain if the applicants met the criteria (TD [50-59].
5. A fair reading of the Tribunal Decision indicates that the Tribunal understood the criteria and considered the evidence before it and the question as to whether the applicants met the criteria.
6. I am unable to identify any jurisdictional error in the way the Tribunal approached the task before it.
7. To the extent that this is a claim that the Tribunal should have reached a different conclusion, this is a request for this Court to engage in review of the facts, which is impermissible: Djokovic at [17]; Wu Shan Liang at [272].
8. No jurisdictional error is established in Ground 1.

1. I have considered grounds two and three together as they are inter-related.
2. The applicants contended the second ground of jurisdictional error was:
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not consider into the circumstances leading to the in India as BJP emerging as party who discriminate people and made legal mistakes.
3. The third ground of jurisdictional error was:
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal at Paragraph - 39 leaders and members of opposition parties do not face official or societal discrimination is wrong and made legal error at Paragraphs - 39 "The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade describes India as having a diverse political landscape. It assesses that leaders and members of opposition political parties do not face official or societal discrimination and that although the risk of political violence between rival supporters increases during parliamentary and state elections in general elections in India are peacefully conducted".
4. The first applicant was asked at the hearing if he wished to further particularise these grounds or make submissions. He said that he did not wish to provide particulars or make submissions (TP 6.9-42).
5. The applicants in this ground may be claiming that the Tribunal did not consider evidence or country sources which indicate that BJP was a party which discriminated against people including leaders and members of BJP. There also appears to be a suggestion that the country source used by the Tribunal, the DFAT Report, was wrong in respect of lack of discrimination of leaders and members.
6. The Minister in written submissions noted that the Tribunal observed at (TD [61]) that the first applicant had never advanced any claims on the basis of political recrimination from the BJP (CB 182). This appears to be correct. The first applicant's claims of serious or significant harm related primarily to his own family and a person who had been harassing women (CB 175-176, TD [14] and [19]), rather than discrimination or other harm from BJP due to his political profile. The first applicant confirmed at the Tribunal hearing that he was claiming protection on the basis that if he returned to India his parents would kill him because by marrying his wife, his parents believed they had spoiled their reputation (TD [14]).
7. Although there was not a specific claim based on political recrimination from the BJP, the Tribunal did consider the evidence about BJP. The Tribunal referred to the applicants' evidence generally and specifically to the first applicant's evidence about BJP and political views, in the statement accompanying his application and at hearings with the delegate and Tribunal as follows:
   • He was born into an influential political family, and his father supported the Congress Party (TD [4]).
   • He liked the ideology of the Congress Party (TD [4]).
   • The BJP did not like his family's activities and he was attacked by BJP members (TD [4]).
   • A local BJP member liked his wife and proposed marriage to her which she refused (TD [4]).
   • The applicant was threatened by a local RSS leader who said he would die if he married his wife (TD [4]).
   • The BJP member harassed his wife and stalked her (TD [4]).
   • On 21 September 2013 four people attacked him and then they claimed he attacked them. There was a first incident report and police went to arrest him (TD [4]).
   • As the BJP is in power their leaders use local law enforcement authorities for their own benefit (TD [4]).
   • He provided a copy of a newspaper report about a knife attack and a copy of a First Information Report: (TD [5]).
   • He and his wife were harassed and beaten: (TD [6] and (TD [18-19]).
   • His father was a member of Congress Party, but he was never a member of any political organisation, although if his father told him to do something like distribute pamphlets for the Congress Party, he would: (TD [24]).
8. The Tribunal also considered the first applicant's evidence in his visa application that he had been threatened by local BJP and particularly by one BJP member who liked his wife (TD [48]). The Tribunal noted that he claimed threats and harassment had occurred due to his family's support of the Congress Party.
9. The Tribunal recorded that his only involvement was handing out pamphlets (TD [51]), and that there was no corroboration of his claim that his family had involvement with the Congress Party (TD [49]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would get involved with the Congress Party if he returned (TD [50]).
10. The Tribunal referred to the DFAT Report (TD [39]). The Tribunal noted that the Report assessed that leaders and members of opposition parties do not face official or societal discrimination and that although the risk of political violence between rival supporters increases during elections, in general elections are peaceful.
11. The Tribunal did not accept, based on the country information cited, that even if the applicant liked the ideology of the Congress Party and handed out pamphlets, he would face serious or significant harm from supporters of BJP or other political organisations. The Tribunal noted his evidence that he was not involved in any political organisation (TD [51]). The Tribunal found that there was nothing to indicate that the BJP as an organisation would have any interest in him at all (TD [61]). The Tribunal noted that the threats against him (which the Tribunal did not accept) were for personal reasons. The Tribunal found that there was nothing to indicate that BJP would have any interest in the applicant (TD [61]).
12. It is important to note, when considering the use made by the Tribunal of the DFAT Report, that the Tribunal had considered the first applicant's evidence and did not find the applicant's claims to be credible (TD [43]). The Tribunal noted a number of inconsistencies (TD [16], [22], [25], [28], [43], [45] - [47]).
13. It is clear from the information set out in preceding paragraphs that the Tribunal did consider the applicant's evidence about BJP and considered whether BJP would harm the applicant. The findings of the Tribunal were based on the DFAT Report and the applicant's evidence of his low level of involvement with the Congress Party. The Court Book and Tribunal Decision do not reveal that the applicant provided any other country information or references to any country sources.
14. It is well-established that the selection and weight to be afforded to the country sources is a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ at [11] to [13]:

By s 424(1), in conducting a review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. There can be no objection in principle to the Tribunal relying on 'country information'. The weight that it gives to such information is a matter for the Tribunal itself, as part of its fact-finding function. Such information as the Tribunal obtains for itself is not restricted to 'guidance', as the appellants submitted. It may be used to assess the credibility of a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. It is not, as the first appellant submitted, an error of law, or a jurisdictional error, for the Tribunal to base a decision on 'country information' that is not true. The question of the accuracy of the 'country information' is one for the Tribunal, not for the Court. If the Court were to make its own assessment of the truth of 'country information', it would be engaging in merits review. The Court does not have power to do that.

1. I accept that the Tribunal considered whether the applicants would face harm from BJP, even though this was not the central claim made by the applicants. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants would face harm for political reasons, based on the applicant's evidence and information in the DFAT Report. The choice of country information, and the weight given to it, was a matter for the Tribunal particularly as no other country sources were offered by the applicants. There is no evidence before me that the information in the DFAT Report was wrong in relation to the issue of discrimination by BHP.
2. No jurisdictional error is disclosed by Grounds Two or Three.

1. The applicants contended that the fourth ground of jurisdictional error was:
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal at Paragraph - 63 come to conclusion that applicant can relocate in other parts of country is not true. Para - 63 "The Tribunal finds that if the applicant did have any concerns about returning to Gujarat, the applicant would be able to relocate to Mumbai, New Delhi or many other cities or regions of India. The Tribunal finds that if the applicant were residing in Mumbai, he would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and there would be no real risk that he would suffer significant harm there".
2. The first applicant was invited to provide further particulars or submissions. I explained to him that this may assist his case. He again said that he did not wish to say anything.
3. In this ground the applicant is questioning the Tribunal finding at (TD [63]) that he could safely relocate if he returned to India.
4. The Tribunal was not required to consider relocation as the Tribunal had found that the applicants did not meet the refugee or complementary protection criteria. Even if I were to find that the finding on relocation finding was unreasonable, which I do not, it would make no difference to the outcome as the Tribunal found that it did not accept the applicants' claims for protection, for various reasons articulated in the decision (TD [64]).
5. The relocation finding was a finding for the Tribunal to make, based on the country information before it (TD [40]). The Tribunal also took into consideration the ability of the applicant to live peacefully in Mumbai for two years on a prior occasion (TD [62]). This Court cannot engage in merits review of the Tribunal decision (which would include a consideration of whether the applicant could relocate): AHV19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 6 at [21] per Markovic, Thomas and Banks-Smith JJ.
6. Without any particulars from the applicant, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal findings in respect of relocation demonstrate any unreasonableness. They appear to be findings which were open to the Tribunal based on the country sources and the evidence of the applicants' residence in Mumbai.
7. Ground four does not demonstrate any jurisdictional error.

1. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were attended by jurisdictional error.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
3. I will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding ninety-seven (97) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Marquard.